He also claims that Susan Okin’s theory is quite similar to that of Rawls and says further that she is unaware of the wider consequences of Rawl’s view of justice in general. He goes further to object his criticism of Rawls, saying that a different principle is one that applies only to social institutions and, therefore, not one that applies to choices that people make within such institutions. Rawls goes further to claim that inequalities are just if they are crucial to make the worst-off individuals in society better off than they otherwise would be.
Cohen goes further to say that he disagrees with Rawls on which inequalities pass the test for justifying inequality and how much inequality passes the test. In his view, there is hardly any serious inequality that satisfies the requirement set by the different principle. He claims that it is often thought that the difference principle licenses an argument for inequality that centers on the device of material incentives. He highlights the idea that talented individuals would produce more than they otherwise would if their payments were higher than their ordinary wages. Additionally, some of the extra, which they would then produce can be recruited on behalf of the worst off. He claims that they are so positioned, and do not command a high salary, and can vary their productivity according to exactly how high it is. As far as the incentives argument is concerned, their happy position could be due to circumstances that are entirely accidental, relative to whatever kind of natural or social induced endowment they possess. The particular criticism of the incentives argument is whether or not well-placed people merit the contestable designation. His use of the argument’s terms shows the strength of his critique. It is appropriate to make such assumptions since the Rawlsian difference principle is lexically