According to the bargaining power hypotheses, the whole process is characterized by assumptions model; and beliefs. As per the assumptions, the first premise assumed during the 1914 period in Europe was expectations. The government of the time rested its governance on a mix of tacit, customary and formal (constitutional) expectations. The expectations concerned the level of government output (balance of costs and benefits) for the rulers and those ruled. Another expectation is bargaining. The assumption under this is that the level of costs and benefits are attained through a negotiation process between the rulers and those ruled (Fromkin 39). The hypotheses greatly suggest the modification of behavioral patterns for the European population. The main reasons attributed to were the costly expansion in the political bargains. Such aspects correlated strongly to the increase in the cost of warfare.
During the period, Europe was undergoing tremendous transitions in many sectors. More so, this was the time when the governments were running their agendas to acquire more territories. The balance of power became an important task due to world war on was declared during this period (Kindsvatter 10). Applying the bargaining hypotheses to discuss the behavior of Europe population during this time brings out various outputs. Most of the countries were scrambling to exploit resources due to the industrial revolution that occurred at the time from colonies (Fromkin 173). According to the hypotheses assumption, the more a population had, the more it had to lose. This is an asset binding assumption that well applies to this discussion (Fromkin 180).
Major developers of the world war one believed that they held the balance of power upon declaration of the war. The behavior at this time may be described as that of a mixed nature. The main reason being that the