Social Citizenship and Social Exclusion in Relation to Homelessness - Essay Example

August 11, 2006 TOPIC: SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION IN RELATION TO HOMELESSNESS THAT THEY MAY NOT FALL WITHIN THE CRACKS: AN EXPLORATION AND EXAMINATION OF BRITAIN'S SOCIAL POLICY IN RELATION TO THE HOMELESS AND THE MARGINALISED It may appear that the problem of homelessness is strictly a third-world malaise. Indeed, surrounded by gleaming accoutrements of economic stability and first-world fortunes, it is all too easy to turn a blind eye to the marginalised members of our society who, for a variety of reasons, have not been able to partake of the material benefits enjoyed by their richer fellow citizens. Perhaps it can be attributed to simply a pattern of personal misfortunes, perhaps it may be a question of health, perhaps too, one wrong choice after the other. Or perhaps there are bigger issues that must be grappled with, difficult questions of race and class dynamics. (Fitzpatrick, 2001.) Whatever the reason is, the stark and painful truth is that the homeless live among us, drifting and teetering precariously, and it is the duty of law and policy to ensure that the mechanisms are in place so that they may not be left behind - fall within the cracks, as it were. In order to understand the intricacies of Britain's Social Policy (Alcock, 2003) - its strengths as well as its weaknesses, for indeed there are many from both-- it is imperative to begin by examining its ideological moorings. Scott (1985) provokes the thoughtful reader and states: But it is not sufficient merely to understand the obviously self-interested basis of these social relations of production. What is critical for my purpose - that is, the analysis of ideological conflict - is to grasp the nature of the normative filter through which these self-interested actions must pass and how and why they are socially transformed by this passage. Why, in other words, is economic power "euphemized" in this fashion and what are the consequences of its euphemization From one perspective, what the wealthy did was to transmute a portion of their disproportionate economic means into forms of status, prestige and social control by means of acts they passed off as voluntary acts of generosity or charity. This social control was, of course, again convertible into labor services - and hence, again into material wealth. James Scott uses a very defined space to illustrate his thesis on charity as a mechanism to reinforce existing hierarchical relations. He gives the example of a tenant who, understanding that his employer is in a position to provide him with work and benefits, couches his requests for assistance in words that he knows the employer is comfortable with. The tenant uses words like "help" and "assistance", words that convey the idea of generosity and liberality. The worker gets what he wants through this strategy, and at the same time, the class dynamic is reinforced in a manner advantageous to the employer. There is a one-to-one correspondence in Scott's example: laborer to employer, tenant to landlord. However, upon reflection, one concludes that the same thesis may be arrived at in situations wherein the class relations are as pronounced but the players are interacting with each other in less direct ways. What we see here, therefore - and precisely what Social Policy seeks to address -- this twisted dance of double symbolic manipulation wherein both the ruling class and proletariat subscribe to the euphemization of economic power to achieve their own ends, results in the ruling class' long term interests being satisfied and the proletariat's short term interests being satisfied temporarily. And at the end of the day, the tangible costs of this inequality - lack of accountability in governance, corruption, disenfranchisement, stark and painful poverty -- are borne solely by the marginalized. It used to be that the idea of social policy was often focused exclusively in the domain of the economic. After all, the debate concerning it may be traced back to the Poor Law, which was from 1598 to 1948. (Anderson, 1993) Much derided because it was founded on principles perceived to be undemocratic, it was replaced subsequently by the "Welfare State" model, which focused on social security, health, housing, education and the welfare of children. (Barr, 2004) Gradually, however, the realization grew that poverty is not merely economic poverty. It can also mean a sense of disenfranchisement, lack of access to institutions and state infrastructure, lack of redress mechanism, lack of participation in policy-making. In short, these are the rights afforded to a citizen, hence the idea of social citizenship. Said Jenson (2001), Social citizenship was -- and is -- of interest to social democrats because it shines the spot light on a key value, that is equality of participation. This is the "for what" answer. Citizenship by definition implies equality for all members of the polity. It has meant this since the Greeks first invented it (and restricted equality to male residents of the city-state). Therefore, being a full citizen means being able to participate, to exercise one's responsibilities as well as one's rights. We are most familiar with the notion of participation when we think of political rights and responsibilities -- the right and responsibility to vote, to right to stand for office, to be heard and respected in political debate. But we can also think about the equality of participation in social rights. One then is bound to ask: What exactly is equality of participation in social rights and how should this concept animate our discourse Jenson (2001) posits that it means two things, and this true today as it was in the past. We may understand it to be guaranteeing equal access to market incomes, through state sponsored policies that impact on regulations, education, training and employment. However, and this is where the paradox lies, it can also be taken to mean removing market income as a yardstick or as a basis for providing benefits, or allowing the exercise of rights. Said Jenson: "The first implies that all citizens will have the capacity to exercise a key social citizenship responsibility, that is to pay their taxes. The second implies that all citizens will be able to enjoy the entitlements that come with citizenship." What is manifest in this discussion is two things: first of all, the State and the legal system as it currently stands are of the persuasion that citizens are entitled to enjoy the same services and benefits on similar levels, and therefore, corollary to that, it is the responsibility of the state to at least provide minimum protections to vulnerable classes such as marginalized communities so that they may have a nurturing environment where they may be flourish and develop as human beings. (Drake, 2001.) Secondly, and no less importance, it underscores the idea that it really is not just a "free lunch". The citizen - as part precisely of his or her role as citizen - has an obligation to the community he or she belongs to contribute to its continued existence. The most obvious example for this is the paying of taxes, the lifeblood of any polity. In a sense, the ideological firmament of social citizenship, including as it does the idea of "responsibility" is ultimately more human than the concept of welfare merely as charity. (Mishra, 1999). Charity can be legitimately withheld; justice cannot. It is entirely dependent on the magnanimity of the giver. With charity comes the discretion to decide who deserves it the most and to what extent. This offends the idea that every person has a demandable right to food and shelter and protection. Justice distributes power; charity empowers only the giver. They are the kind-hearted benefactors, smiling indulgently as they watch the hungry hoi polloi enjoy their crumbs. The obscenity of their wealth in the face of so much want has become sanitized by strategically-timed acts of grace and generosity. It is a two-way thing. The poor reinforce this hierarchical construct with their servile mien and their blubbering gratitude, knowing that this will have a greater chance of getting them what they want than taking any real steps to cure the malaise. Social exclusion is yet another problem that is imperative to discuss when discussing the homeless. These statistics are chilling (Internet, 2006): Two-fifths of people from ethnic minorities live in low income households, twice the rate for White people. More than half of people in Pakistani and Bangladeshi households are in low income households. People of African, Bangladeshi, Caribbean and Pakistani descent are all twice as likely as White people to be out of work but wanting work. Black Caribbean pupils are three times as likely to be excluded from school as White pupils. Black young adults are three times as likely as white young adults to be in prison. Black adults are twice as likely not to have a bank or building society account as the population as a whole. What this can only mean is that there clearly is a nexus between racial discrimination and economic marginalization. We see not only economic exclusion but social exclusion as well. Those coming from racial minorities are marginalized in many different ways at so many different levels. While it may seem as though the apartheid has ended and we are ushering a new age of tolerance, pluralism and diversity, it is still difficult to correct people's impulses and preconceived notions made and arrived at under very antiquated paradigms. Even though the European community may be considered a pluralistic and openminded society, compared to other communities, and there is a greater tolerance for divergent viewpoints, one must not be complacent and believe that the problem is solved. The number of homeless people still is staggering, and that the exist in a society of plenty is cause for alarm and for a reexamination of policies. Many people believe that self-reliance and industry are values that must not be undermined by a welfare system. The welfare system is seen to "coddle" the lazy and the weak. But the statistics militate against this argument. The poor and homeless are not the lazy and the weak, they come from traditionally-oppressed sectors like migrants and those from minority racial communities. It is folly to think that they are homeless because of their own doing, when in fact, what we see is a systemic pattern of keeping them at the fringes of society. It is a moral imperative to make their voices heard and to give them avenues to participate and be considered. Which is why, even as we work towards providing them with economic assistance and helping them develop sustainable livelihoods, it is more important to be able to provide them with participatory tools and lenses with which to view the issue. Without such interventions, whatever economic assistance we will render will be stopgap at the least, unable to go to the root of the problem. Moreover, legislation to prevent social exclusion is not enough. It is very important as well, based on our understanding and analysis of history, to note the problem is not solved merely by prohibiting overtly discriminatory practices such as making race a basis for employment. Such practices are outdated and have no place in the twenty first century. The problem is the more insidious forms of discrimination. These are the forms that are difficult to legislate. How indeed, can one determine where the right of marginalized racial communities begin and where the right to free speech ends The boundaries are ever-shifting; and internally, the judge will be trying not only to apply the law, but to subject the text or speech in question to her own subjective inquiry in order to determine the intent of the message-bearer and what the material was trying to say. Social and political values inevitably come to the fore. To quote legal writer Thomas Streeter (1995), "It is in the character of language, in other words, that a judge will never be able to look at the text of the Bill of Rights and legal precedents to decide whether or not flag burning is protected by the First Amendment; he will always in one way or another be forced to make a choice about whether or not he thinks it should be protected, and will always be faced with the possibility that a reasonable person could plausibly disagree.". What distinguishes the area on free speech from other "legally-indeterminate" areas is that it is inextricably intertwined with and largely dependent on language which, as many eminent linguists have said, is arbitrary in the sense that meanings cannot be derived from anything logically-inherent in the words. These meanings are merely "assigned meanings" born of the collective experiences of people in a community and this system of interpretation is never static. This said however, one cannot underscore completely enough that the legal system plays a very fundamental part. This is where it becomes important to choose between Legal Doctrinalism and Legal Realism. Doctrinalism views the law as a pure and formal science, with case law or jurisprudence as its sole and exclusive foundation. Realism, on the other hand, views law as part of a larger social milieu. Law is not an end in itself, but rather, a means to achieve social change. I do see the need to keep the law moored in a stable scientific framework. The more scientific it is, the more empirical, the less likely will it be subjected to the vagaries of politics and the moral predispositions of our human arbiters and judges. The element of replicability will safeguard it against fluctuations of power. This notwithstanding, however, I maintain that Legal Realism is still the better paradigm in these contemporary times. Given the changing complexion of conflicts and players that has led to the creation of many new areas of dispute and controversy, given the increase of social sectors and the resultant widening of the competition of divergent interests, the law has no choice but to reposition itself. The many gaps in the law that have failed to take into account these newly-emergent and marginalized interests demand that the legal system view itself as a mechanism to address ininquity and to take on a more responsive - and responsible - social function. The most important thing, therefore, is tp strike a balance. Judicial radicalism should never be countenanced. Its role is not to taunt or provoke society; doing so would be its downfall. The law should keep itself solid and reliable, a bulwark of stability, but with slow and sure steps, advocate for felt and real changes. Yes indeed, concepts such as "social policy", "social democracy" and "social exclusion" seem very difficult to grasp. However, it is incumbent on us to grasp the concept and see how it applies to one's daily life and once immediate worldview of experiences, so that we may continue to educate ourselves and educate other people. REFERENCES Alcock, P 2003 Social Policy in Britain Esping, Anderson. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Polity Press. 1990. Barr N. The Politics of a Welfare State. Oxford University Press. 2004. Clarke & Newman. The managerial state: power, politics and ideology in the remaking of social welfare. Sage Publications. 1999. Drake, R 2001 The Principles of Social policy Jenson, Jane. Putting Citizenship into the Social. Available at http://www.misc-iecm.mcgill.ca/socdem/jenson.htm Fitzpatrick, H 2001 Welfare Theory: An introduction Mishra, R. Globalization and the welfare state. Edward Elgar Publishing. 1999. Wilenski, The welfare state and equality: structural and ideological roots of public expenditures. Polity Press. 1990. Williams, F. Social Policy: A critical introduction on issues of race, gender and class. Polity Press. 1989. Read More