Aberfan Disaster - Case Study Example

Aberfan (21/10/66 a mass disaster fatality. Give a brief overview of the incident. Discuss what, in your opinion was executed and what could have been done better. How would you safeguard against these less than optimal situations occurring again and how, with the benefit of hind sight, would you have tackled the problems faced by the original investigative team The Aberfan disaster was one of the most tragic accidents in English history, both in terms of the sheer numbers of people killed and also the demographics of those victims: mainly young children at a primary school. Those killed at Aberfan have become a symbol for both the apparent randomness of accidents and also the need to carefully administer/regulate industries and also to manage disasters after they have occurred in as rational and logical a manner as possible. What occurred in the Aberfan disaster On Friday 21st October 1966, at exactly 9.15 AM, colliery waste tip #7 (consisting of unwanted material from a local mine) became unstable and slid down the Merthyr Mountain. As it descended the mountain, it destroyed 20 houses, a farm and eventually decimated the Pantglas Junior School. The school children had just left assembly and so were exposed in the open as they were returning to their classrooms. They were hit directly by the slide. The casualty figures are still shocking 41 years later. There were a total of 144 people killed, including 116 children from the school, most of whom were 7-10 years old. Five teachers were also killed in the slide, and only a few children were actually pulled from the rubble alive. The beginning of the trouble surrounding the aftermath of the Aberfan disaster was embodied by the fact that Lord Robens of Woldingham, who was the Chairman of the NCB at the time, decided to go through with the ceremony of his investiture as the Chancellor of the University of Surrey rather than going to the scene. His casual reaction to the immediate news of what had occurred at Aberfan continued with an apparently deliberate attempt at misrepresentation of what had caused the slide - including the false claim that nothing could have been done to prevent. The idea that virtually all "accidents" involving manmade materials or structures (as opposed to purely natural phenomena such as floods) could actually be avoided with the right planning and management had yet to appear. This analysis will consider what might have been done differently both before the disaster to avoid what occurred, and then after it to alleviate the suffering and effect of it upon survivors. Hindsight always gives us 20-20 vision, but it is clear that a number of mistakes were made which could have been regarded as rising to the level of negligent homicide if the inquiry had been orientated that way. Soon after the disaster a "Tribunal of Inquiry" was set up into the Aberfan disaster, and the National Coal Board was found completely responsible for what occurred due to its "ignorance, ineptitude and a failure of communication" (National, 1967). The basis of this ineptitude was the fact that the tip had been located in 1958 on the site of a known stream. The NCB had been warned on repeated occasions regarding the possible dangers of such a location, but chose to either ignore them or underestimate their importance. Several small slides had already occurred. Both mine managers and colliery workers knew of the problems but no-one did anything about them. More of this in the analysis of the long-term reaction to the disaster, but it is clear that twenty-first century planning permission procedures and regulatory authorities would have prevented the tip from being located where it was, and in the event that it had been located there it would soon have been removed. Specifically, the Mines and Quarries Tips Act of 1969 was passed that made the planning of mine tips close to villages a far more public and carefully considered project. No longer would it be left to the managers of mines to locate where and how they would be located. Police involvement within the disaster occurred after a rather simple emergency call that the Merthyr Tydfil police received at 9.25 AM on 21st October, 1966: "I have been asked to inform that there has been a landslide at Pantglas. The tip has come down on the school." (southwales, 2007) When they arrived at the scene, the police faced a situation that was unparalleled even within the often tragic annals of Welsh mining accidents. As the police site suggests, "the police had to overcome their own feelings of shock and grief to deal with the practicalities arising from the tragedy" (southwales, 2007). Today grief counselors and professional psychologists would have immediately been made available both to the police and to the families of the victims, but few such ideas were in existence in the 1960's. People were left to cope with their feelings as best they could. It would be twenty six years before the South West Wales Constabulary would create an emergency-planning department that would have contingency plans available for a disaster such as this. So in 1966, the local authorities were left to essentially improvise their reaction to the destruction of the houses and school. As will be revealed, much of what they did appears to have been the best possible reaction under the circumstances, although the fact that their tactics worked was often more a product of pre-existing features of the village such as the close-knit nature of the community rather than deliberate planning. The rapid identification of the bodies because is an example of such luck. In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, the police forces provided much-needed manpower in the attempt to rescue any children who might have survived the slippage. As search and rescue inevitably turned into a body recovery operation within a few hours, two police forces provided an essential logistical framework within which more specialized professionals could work: A total of 15 Glamorgan Police officers and 17 Merthyr Borough Police Officers provided 24-hour coverage at the mortuary. They organized a water supply to the chapel, telephone installation, an administration system and made the necessary arrangements for identification and medical examination of the deceased, inquests and the issuing of burial and cremation orders. (southwales, 2007) So in many ways the police forces involved improvised an efficient emergency-management plan on the spur of the moment. They enabled the smooth process of the recovery, identification, preserving and then releasing of the victims' bodies to their next of kin in as organized a fashion as possible. While it was the closeness of the village community which enabled there to be no discrepancies on either the number of the dead nor on identifications:- which is surprising considering the comparatively sparse records kept at the school, the police did produce a successful system for hastening the process: The police supervised all identifications. As bodies were brought to the mortuary, each was labelled with a consecutive number in the presence of a police officer, recorded and placed in the chapel to await identification. After identification the name was inserted on the label and in records. The body was then dealt with by the embalmers, properly coffined, and released to undertakers in accordance with the wishes of the relatives. The label never left the body. (southwales, 2007) This was an efficient, if somewhat crude, method of identifying the bodies. By Monday 24th October all the bodies had been released to the families, just three days after the disaster had occurred (Report, 1967). It seems unlikely that such efficiency would be repeated in the event of such a disaster today, despite the greater sophistication of emergency management and the availability of computer databases. The longer term aftermath of the inquiry must be viewed in the context of other mining disasters, which were often accused of being essentially whitewashes for the National Coal Board. The Tribunal was the biggest and longest of its type up until this time. It called 136 witnesses, examined more than 300 documents/exhibits and heard more than 2,500,000 words in testimony. The evidence discovered was exhaustive and overwhelming, and as far from a whitewash as could be imagined. It became clear that the NCB's claim that they were not aware of the stream under the tip was simply false. On August 3, 1967 the Report was issued by the Inquiry. It did not mince its words: . . . the Aberfan disaster is a terrifying tale of bungling ineptitude by many men charged with tasks for which they were totally unfitted, of failure to heed clear warnings, and of total lack of direction from above. Not villains but decent men, led astray by foolishness or by ignorance of by both in combination, are responsible for what happened at Aberfan. (Report, 1967) Again, it seems unlikely in the 2007 that the final report on such a massive tragedy would take less than a year to produce. The multiple layers of bureaucracy that would become involved today would certainly slow the process up. However, on the other hand it seems clear that "the legal liability of the NCB to pay compensation" (Report, 1967) would probably be held to a much higher standard than the NCB was actually held to. Its initial offer was for 50 pounds per child, which was eventually increased to 500 pounds per child. In reality, the Charities Commission ordered that each family be means-tested to see how close they were to the child before they received any money. Also no member of the National Coal Board faced criminal charges, nor were any of them sacked, demoted or even apparently disciplined in any way because of the disaster. Such action would apparently have implied an admission of some responsibility that the Chairman of the NCB was determined to avoid at all costs, despite the mounting evidence. In many ways his ignoring of the facts mirrored the ignorant, incompetent avoidance of reality that had led the tip to be sited where it was in the first place with such disastrous consequences. To conclude, the Aberfan disaster occurred, not through some freak act of nature that could not be avoided, but because of the willful ignorance and terrible management which occurred within the National Coal Board. The immediate police response was superb, essentially embodying an emergency management organization through sheer improvisation at the site of the disaster. The families were left to fend for themselves emotionally as bereavement counseling barely existed within the psychological discipline at this time. The recovery, identification, preservation and release of the bodies to the families occurred with remarkable speed - perhaps an indicator that multiple layers of bureaucracy are not required in such situations, especially within a small, tightly-knit community. It is clear that if such a disaster had occurred at a large comprehensive school with casualties much higher, then the improvisational manner in which the victims were identified and the records checked to see that none were still missing would not work. The manner in which the families were treated after the disaster is perhaps the area in which most improvement would be seen if the disaster happened today. It is doubtful that they would be treated with the near contempt which came from senior NCB members in 1966, including the almost insulting offer of 50 pounds per child. This aspect of the disaster would (hopefully) be dealt with in a far more seemly and professional manner. _______________________________ Works Cited http://www.south-wales.police.uk/fe/textonly.aspn1=8&n2=253&n3=492 The Mines and Quarries Tips Act, 1969. Report of the National Tribunal, The Disaster at Aberfan, 1967. UK. DVI (Disaster Victim Identification)by Prof Sue Black. 2007 www.south-wales.police.uk/fe/master.asp Read More