Development s Freedom: Multidimensionl Cpbility pproch - Book Report/Review Example

Development s Freedom: Multidimensionl Cpbility pproch [Nme of the School] nme] Introduction In the monogrph Inequlity Reexmined Nobel Lurete mrty Sen rgues tht socil rrngements should be evluted ccording to the extent of freedom people hve to promote or chieve objectives they vlue. Sen rgues tht if equlity in socil rrngements is to be demnded in ny spce-nd most theories of justice dvocte equlity in some spce, such s tht of liberty, income, primry goods, resources, or utility-it is to be demnded in the spce of cpbilities. Rther thn iming to equlize the income of n elderly frmer nd young student, for exmple, policy-mkers should im to equlize the cpbility ech hs to enjoy vluble ctivities nd sttes of being. Sen uses the metphor of 'spce' to brcket off the re in which different theories of justice require equlity, or imprtil tretment of persons. Becuse of the fct of humn diversity, equlity in cpbility spce-the spce of freedom to promote or chieve vluble objectives-will, in fct, go long with inequlity in other spces. The following four sections will introduce Sen's cpbility pproch through four of its core concepts: functionings, freedom, plurlism, nd incompleteness. Besides, I will discuss the historicl context of the Sen's cpbility pproch in terms of other theories (for exmple, Rwl's theory of Justice) s n importnt fctor of influence to uthor's formtion of the theory. 1. Functionings Sen rgues tht functionings-tht is, 'the vrious things person my vlue doing or being' -tken together crete better conceptul spce in which to ssess socil welfre thn utility or opulence. Functionings re 'beings nd doings', such s being nourished, being confident, or tking prt in group decisions (Sen, 2000). The word is of ristotelin origin nd, like ristotle, Sen clims, significntly, tht functionings re constitutive of person's being. So when Oxfm undertkes to evlute n individul's or group of persons' well-being (in the course, perhps, of ssessing their qulity of life, stndrd of living, socil welfre, or level of poverty), Sen would rgue tht it must hve in view their functionings. How did the 'beings nd doings' of the rose growers expnd nd contrct The focus on functionings sets the cpbility pproch off from other pproches to the evlution of well-being. For exmple mny would evlute well-being in the spce of psychic utility or preference fulfilment (the cpbility pproch hs been developed during period when welfre economics hs been dominted by fulfilled preference formultions of utilitrinism). Others would evlute it in terms of income per cpit, or in terms of the commodities persons were ble to commnd. Still others, following Rwls, would ssess well-being in the spce of primry goods (which include commodities nd other goods such s liberty nd self-respect). In explining nd defending the cpbility pproch, Sen typiclly demonstrtes the flws in these lterntive pproches nd then shows tht such flws re corrected in the cpbility pproch. For exmple, economic theory hs often interpreted welfre peculirly in terms of psychologicl hppiness or desire-fulfilment, yet the mgnitude of chnge in mentl utility sttes (for exmple) my not trck in ny predictble fshion the vlue of chnge (Sen, 2000). Sen often gives the exmple of how the perennilly deprived become reconciled with their circumstnces nd pprecitive of smll mercies, thus their desires re muted nd their psychic plesure t smll improvements to their sitution is disproportionte to the benefit judged from nother perspective. Ddi Tj, for exmple, terribly poor but devout widow, my often be serene nd even hppy. In different vein, Sen questions Rwls's proposl to require equlity in the spce of primry goods becuse the sme mount of rice (or other goods) will be converted into rdiclly different levels of physicl vigour for child, in the cse of disbled teenger, s ginst n griculturl worker, or n elderly womn. Sen rgues tht Rwls's resoning cn be brodened to tke greter note of the contingency of circumstnces. For we re relly interested in wht persons re ctully ble to do or be-tht is, in their functionings-not in the pounds of rice they consume. Sen cknowledges tht mentl sttes nd commnd over commodities re both relevnt to well-being. For exmple, his entitlement nlysis of fmine directs ttention t n individul's bility to commnd food supplies. Furthermore he cknowledges tht the work of others who hve tried to correct the shortcomings of utilitrin or commodity-focused pproches hs ongoing relevnce even if these pproches themselves re not fully dopted. nd both utility nd commodities cn be used s proxies of individul dvntge when further informtion is unvilble. But Sen's clim is tht both pproches fil to provide n dequte conceptul bsis for comprisons of well-being, nd tht neither is sufficient s bsis of socil evlution. 2. Freedom person's chieved functionings t ny given time re the prticulr functionings he or she hs successfully pursued nd relized. But in ssessing humn development, focus on chieved functionings lone, like focus on utility, is incomplete. It does not necessrily incorporte wht Sen terms gency or freedom. In order to ttend to the foundtionl importnce of freedom Sen introduces the concept of cpbility. Cpbility refers to person's or group's freedom to promote or chieve vluble functionings. 'It represents the vrious combintions of functionings (beings nd doings) tht the person cn chieve. Cpbility is, thus, set of vectors of functionings, reflecting the person's freedom to led one type of life or nother . . . to choose from possible livings." (Sen, 1999) It is the presence of this term 'freedom to'-Sen's ssertion of the inherence of free choice in development ctivities-tht led Sen to nme this distinctive pproch the 'cpbility' pproch. In the cpbility pproch, freedom is concerned with 'the rel opportunity tht we hve to ccomplish wht we vlue (emphsis in originl), nd like ristotle nd Mrx mong others, Sen rgues tht freedom hs intrinsic s well s instrumentl vlue. The good life is prtly life of genuine choice, nd not one in which the person is forced into prticulr life-however rich it might be in other respects. Wht it might be esy to overlook in his ccount is the phrse, 'to ccomplish wht we vlue' (emphsis dded). Without qulifiction the prominence of choice in Sen's ccount would be open to the (empiriclly testble) comment tht choice is of more importnce in some societies thn others. But the prominence is qulified: Sen rgues tht increses in choices per se do not necessrily led to n increse in freedom, in prt becuse the options dded my not be ones we vlue nywy, nd in prt becuse (however vluble or not options my be) we my lose the option to live peceful nd unbothered life. Indeed sometimes more freedom of choice cn bemuse nd befuddle, nd mke one's life more wretched. So it is becoming pprent, s intimted erlier, tht number of kinds of evlution re inescpble in the specifiction of cpbilities nd freedoms. t minimum, n evlution must consider: which chieved functionings people vlue rther thn regrd s trivil or evil or undesirble; how vluble lterntive people's or future genertions' functionings re; how vluble it is to hve further (vluble) options s opposed to enjoying the trnquillity of not hving to choose; nd how to evlute different people's conflicting clims bout wht functionings re vluble t ll. Besides distinguishing vluble rnge of choice nd freedom, Sen lso distinguishes freedom from control. Sen considers freedom to include person's bility to get systemticlly wht he would choose no mtter who ctully controls the levers of opertion. For exmple, if, given the choice, we would choose to live in mlri-free environment, then ceteris pribus public progrmme to drin mlri ponds does indeed enhnce our freedom, even if we were not in fct sked, becuse in the bsence of this public progrmme we would not hve the effective freedom to live in mlri-free environment. This is the cse even if the 'number of lterntives' we hve to choose between does not increse (in fct we lose the freedom to choose to get mlri) (Sen, 1999). Clerly often wht is importnt ctully is who hs the levers of control (oneself/one's group or nother). But Sen points out tht direct control is not the only expression of freedom, though it hs often been mistken s such. The 'reveled preference' pproch lso plces importnce on people's choices. Recll tht Smuelson (1938) proposed tht consumers' ctul choices in two sets of circumstnces revel their preferences between two or more gols. But Sen is perhps most thorough in his rejection of the form of utilitrinism tht is mnifested by this pproch. He regrds the term 'preference' s n elborte pun. For in the reveled preference pproch, there is no wy of identifying preferences except by observing people's choices. Preference is n inference from choice. Sen points out mny flws in this wy of inferring preference from choice (nd, seprtely, detils the 'bizrreness' of Smuelson's ssumption of the internl consistency of choice). For instnce, you my not in ll cses choose wht furthers your own well-being. You my buy 'fir trde' coffee not becuse you prefer the tste-in fct it my be quite bitter nd dried out-but becuse you believe in better wges for coffee pickers. Or you my be indifferent between brnds of milk on the shelf but need pint, so pick one up quite rndomly. In both cses the 'reveled preference theorist' would interpret the ction s expressly 'preferring' the chosen option (brnd of milk) to the lterntives. Sen never rgues tht ctul choices nd preferences re not importnt; in fct he rgues for choice-slience. But he rgues tht the importnce of ctul choices nd the importnce of desires nd hppiness rise in so fr s they reflect the sttes of ffirs nd processes tht we vlue, nd becuse choosing my pertin to our well-being. Yet complete relince on choice behviour to the exclusion of informtion bout the vlued 'beings nd doings' people understnd themselves to be pursuing is indequte. This is the cse even though there re well-known difficulties in cquiring informtion bout vlues ccurtely nd directly. In the rose project, Oxfm chose to work in income genertion, nd to focus this work on the poor. But the smll group, not Oxfm, collectively decided to cultivte roses. Bnns, they decided, were too hevy nd physiclly demnding for the women; okr nd onions hd only sesonl hrvests, so would not provide stedy income; sunflowers did not fetch good price. The rose group mnged the project, deciding how to divide up the weeding nd how much to py grlnd-sellers. This 'control' proved to be empowering-prticipnts gined confidence in their bility to mke decisions nd undertke new responsibilities. lso, one of the strongest impcts ws their inner pece from n ctivity tht ws meningful s well s lucrtive. The freedom to choose ws vluble in itself nd generted n economic ctivity tht ws vlued on multiple levels. It is these sorts of 'vlued freedoms' with which we will be continuously concerned. 3. Plurlism t this point the cpbility pproch my well seem unwieldy. It is not exctly cler how fr we re to understnd nd pply the mple phrse 'vluble beings nd doings' but it seems to cover generous terrin-from friendships to frgrnce to job stisfction. Clerly, in order to construct even individul cpbility sets much less compre cpbilities we need gret del of informtion which will not be strightforwrd to obtin. Some opertionl concerns will be ddressed eventully, but it my be vluble first to puse nd pprecite the very bredth of the cpbility term. Sen emphticlly defends the bredth of the cpbility pproch nd the plurlism of its informtion bse (his defences re normlly motivted by prior discussion of the pucity of informtion tht routinely enters utilitrin clculus in economics). Cpbilities my relte to things ner to survivl (the cpbility to drink clen wter) or those which re rther less centrl (the cpbility to visit one's unt, the cpbility to et rich sweets). The definition of cpbility does not delimit certin subset of cpbilities s of peculir importnce; rther the selection of cpbilities on which to focus is vlue judgement (tht lso depends prtly on the purpose of the evlution), s is the weighting of cpbilities reltive to ech other. For instnce, in n rticle clled The Living Stndrd, Sen hd suggested tht one 'seprte "mteril" functionings nd cpbilities (e.g., to be well-nourished) from others (e.g., being wise nd contented)' nd evlute stndrds of living with reference to mteril cpbilities. But lter Sen reflected tht he ws less sure of this seprtion. He suggested insted tht considertions of living stndrd encompss ll vlued functionings. It is possible tht this wy of drwing the line is little too permissive, but the lterntives tht hve been proposed seem clerly too nrrow. So the cpbility pproch pprecites ll chnges in Ddi Tj's qulity of life, from knowledge to reltionships to job nd inner pece, to frgrnt clothes nd the vrious vlued ctivities mde possible by the rose income. None of these chnges is ruled out s irrelevnt t ll times nd plces. One cn thus nlyse the cpbilities of rich s well s poor person or country, nd nlyse bsic s well s complex cpbilities. Sen lso notes tht individul dvntge cn be ssessed in t lest four different spces: well-being chievement, well-being freedom, gency chievement, or gency freedom. Individul dvntge cn be ssessed in reltion to one's well-being whether defined in n elementry fshion (nutritionl sttus) or in more complex mnner (self-esteem). Or it cn relte to gency-one's bility to pursue gols tht one vlues (getting funding for new school, serving the poor). In either cse dvntge cn refer to the well-being or gency chievements, or to well-being nd gency freedom. Sen rgues tht we cnnot simply choose to focus on one or nother of these four possible spces; there re good rguments for keeping ll in mind. He rgues this while ccepting tht these objectives my conflict: your well-being chievement my increse, but your freedom to promote things you vlue my decrese (Sen, 2000). This mens two things. First, when Sen dvoctes tht socil rrngements should be evluted with respect to freedom, he is dvocting equlity in 'spce' tht hs quite substntil degree of internl plurlity nd requires further specifiction. It includes the medley of things like the socil orgnizer's freedom to be n gent of socil chnge in rbsolngi, nd the group members' cpbility to be nourished. Secondly, nd tking step bck, Sen rgues tht equlity in the spce of cpbilities is only one principle of severl which might be of relevnce: the cpbility perspective, centrl s it is for theory of justice, cnnot be entirely dequte for it. One my wish to consider efficiency, nd liberty or negtive freedom for exmple. These principles might even pertin to cpbility equlity, if viewed in the long term. But they my ech support rdiclly different courses of ction. The cpbility pproch enriches the considertions tht inform the nlysis of socil choices nd socil welfre by widening the informtionl bsis of such nlyses to include greter rnge nd kind of welfre thn simply hppiness or reveled preference, nd by expnding the morl principles tht coordinte this informtion to include considertions besides welfre. In this wy it supports plurlism, the view tht vlid well-being nd vlid socil welfre come in diverse forms. 4. Incompleteness The cpbility pproch is delibertely incomplete. Sen is fr less concerned with tking nd defending substntive but contentious position thn he is with showing how the cpbility pproch cn be shred by persons of diverging, even contrdictory, philosophicl systems. The intention behind this foundtionl plurlity is to llow economists nd development prctitioners to work on pressing issues for which consensus on fundmentls is not necessry. lso Sen is more concerned with ruling out 'ptently unjust', (Sen, 2000) inefficient, or otherwise uncceptble possibilities thn he is with identifying complete ordering of options. He concentrtes on drwing ttention to the serious oversights of certin utilitrin pproches to problems rther thn clrifying exctly how one employing the cpbility pproch might rrive t judgement. This incompleteness cn seem evsive nd willowy, but it is in fct one of the most importnt dvntges of the cpbility pproch nd one to which we will return gin nd gin. In Inequlity Reexmined Sen identifies two grounds for llowing incompleteness: fundmentl nd prgmtic. The 'fundmentl reson for incompleteness' (which Sen lso refers to s 'ssertive incompleteness') (Sen, 2000) is tht the ides of well-being nd inequlity my hve enough mbiguity nd fuzziness to mke it mistke to look for complete ordering of either . . . The 'prgmtic reson for incompleteness' is to use whtever prts of the rnking we mnge to sort out unmbiguously, rther thn mintining complete silence until everything hs been sorted out nd the world shines in dzzling clrity . . . 'Witing for toto' my not be cunning strtegy in prcticl exercise. (Sen, 2000) In either cse, Sen rgues tht the residul incompleteness is honest rther thn disppointing: 'Bbbling is not, in generl, superior to being silent on mtters tht re genuinely uncler or undecided'. (Sen, 2000) Furthermore, it my be possible to rule out clerly unsuitble prcticl options before there is greement on metphysicl or theoreticl doctrines, or complete dt, or consensus between ll relevnt prties. The frmework for specifying vluble cpbilities dvnced in the following chpters certinly preserves the fundmentl incompleteness of Sen's cpbility pproch, nd retins good del of prgmtic incompleteness. Still, there re good resons for welcoming other lterntives, nd certinly for not setting forwrd this frmework s the only wy in which cpbilities cn be specified. 5. Reltion of Theory of Justice to Sen's cpbility pproch. The Theory of Justice hd strong impct on Sen's work s Sen himself remembers severl time in his work. The dilogue between Sen nd Rwls tkes n importnt plce in Sen's writing bout justice nd this pper is dedicted to the presenttion of its slient elements. Sen ddresses some criticism to Rwls's conception tht re constitutive of the cpbility pproch. This criticism however cn not mke forget the gret impct the Theory of Justice hd on Sen's own perspective of justice nd tht it is often tribute to Rwls's work . In Rlws's cse, the two principles of justice led to n equl distribution of the primry goods. The primry goods re the bsic liberties tht re to be distributed eqully, ccording to the first principle. They re : first "freedom of thought nd liberty of conscience ;freedom of ssocition" nd "the politicl liberties", second "freedom of movement nd choice of occuption" third "powers nd prerogtives of offices n positions of responsibility" forth "income nd welth" nd finlly "the socil bses of self respect" (Rwls, 1988, p162). The primry goods re conceived s " scheme of equl bsic liberties nd fir opportunities, which, when gurnteed by the bsic structure, ensures for ll citizens the dequtedevelopment nd full exercise of their two morl powers nd fir shre of the ll-purpose mens essentils for the dvncement of their conceptions of the good" (Rwls, 1988, p 258). In other words, citizens re put in fvourble initil conditions in which they enjoy the sme set of liberties nd opportunities tht first permit them to hold conception of the good nd promote it into frmework of mutul coopertion nd second tht re the requisites for ny of the decisions or the projects or the ctivities they re bout to hve. Sen's rejection of the focus on primry goods lys on the ground tht different people, even when receiving the sme set of liberties or rights, cn end up with very different sitution, becuse of the very different bilities they hve in converting this rights nd liberties in something vluble for them. "The primry goods pproch seems to tke little note of the diversity of humn beings. [] If people were bsiclly very similr, then n index of primry goods might be quite good wy of judging dvntge. But in fct, people seem to hve very different needs vrying with helth, longevity, climtic conditions, loction, work conditions,temperment, nd even body size (ffecting food nd clothing requirement)[]Rwls tke primry goods s the embodiment of dvntge, rther tht tking dvntge to be reltionship between persons nd goods". (Sen, 1979, p 215-216, outlined by Sen). Sen initited this criticism while considering the cse of disbled people, who might not hve the full cognitive fetures, for exmple the cpcity to hold conception of the good, required by the rwlsin structure nd who re thus excluded from rwlsin system. We re not tking note on this issue Sen is nywy rguing tht the neglect of humn diversity pply in the theory of justice. The cse of disbled people who cn not tke prt in the originl position is only n extreme cse reinforcing the power of the rgument. Even if people cn tke ctively prt in the elbortion of the principles of justice, they will hve differences in their utilistion chrcteristics tht will led to differences in their finl positions evluted with notion of personl dvntge. Conclusions The purpose of this pper ws to review some of the importnt spects of Sen's cpbility frmework. The focus on cpbilities does number of things. It shifts the ttention of policy mking wy from ggregte outcomes to the processes tht will ffect those outcomes. The emphsis is on developing policy tht will empower individuls by incresing their freedom nd expnding their choices. Sen's pproch is similr to n pproch tht mny low-income communities re tking. These communities cn be understood s hving low levels of living nd even reltively low cpbilities. High unemployment, low eduction levels, nd poor English skills ll cn be seen s constrints tht limit choices nd opportunities. The communities themselves re responding to this by going out to discover wht ssets, tlents, nd bilities re possessed by the residents. In effect, these surveys re providing dt to the communities on the cpbilities of the neighborhoods. This is informtion tht fits in very well with the cpbility pproch put forth by Sen nd is one tht deserves more ttention. Bibliogrphy: 1. lkire, Sbin. 1997. 'Impct ssessment: Oxfm vs Poverty'. Mimeo mnul. 2. ntony, Louise M. 2000. 'Ntures nd Norms'. Ethics. 111: 8-36. 3. rrow, Kenneth J. 1995. 'Returns to Scle, Informtion nd Economic Growth'. In B. H. Koo nd D. H. Perkins, eds. Socil Cpbility nd Long Term Economic Growth. New York: St Mrtin's Press. 11-18. 4. Bker, Judy L. 2000. Evluting the Impcts of Development Projects on Poverty: Hndbook for Prctitioners. Wshington: World Bnk. 5. Blir, Hrry. 2000. 'Prticiption nd ccountbility t the Periphery: Democrtic Locl Governnce in Six Countries'. World Development. 28/1: 21-39. 6. Cohen, G. . 1993. 'mrty Sen's Unequl World'. Economic nd Politicl Weekly. Oct. 2: 2156-60. 7. K. Sen, nd K. Suzumur. 1997. Socil Choice Reexmined. i nd ii. Bsingstoke: Mcmilln. 8. Kynch, Jocelyn, nd mrty Sen. 1983. 'Indin Women: Well-being nd Survivl'. Cmbridge Journl of Economics. 7: 363-80. Poverty Mp of Mozmbique. In Vn der Hoeven nd Shorrocks, pp. 172-192. 9. Rm, Rti. 1992. 'Intercountry Inequlities in Income nd Bsic-Needs Indictors: Recent Perspective'. World Development. 20: 899-905. 10. Rmsy, Mureen. 1992. Humn Needs nd the Mrket. ldershot: vebury. 11. Rwls, John. 1971. Theory of Justice. Cmbridge, Mss.: Hrvrd University Press. 12. Sn Mrtin, Orlndo. 2003. "Reching the Poor: Fine-tuning Poverty Trgeting Using 13. Sen, mrty (2000). Development s Freedom. New York : Rndom 14. Sen, mrty K. 1959. 'Choice of Cpitl-Intensity Further Considered'. Qurterly Journl of Economics. 73: 466-84. 15. Sen, mrty K. 1999. 'Democrcy s Universl Vlue'. Journl of Democrcy. 10/3: 3-17. Read More