This commentary is by principle groundwork and unfinished, founded on early accounts from correspondents and researchers and on the experiences of the victims.
In August 26, Friday morning, Hurricane Katrina was approaching the northern part of the Gulf of Mexico, with a forecasted strike on the Florida Panhandle. During the day, the predicted path of the storm changed to the west, hence that by the evening of Friday the mark location was heading towards New Orleans. This was beyond from the earliest time that New Orleans had been placed in the target zone, yet earlier hurricanes had swerved away from the area at the last minute or later on discovered to be merely a nuisance. However, this time was unusual (Brinkley 2006).
Provided the classification 5 ranking of the hurricane, which implies that winds of higher than 155 miles per hour and a hurricane gush normally of at least 18 feet could be predicted, and the pushing currents directing it, an increasing sense of alarm befell on New Orleans that this hurricane Katrina could be the 'Big One' (Brinkley 2006, 17).
New Orleans has all the reasons to dread the Big One. ...
ned on the natural flood banks adjacent to the Mississippi River, on aged river distributaries, and on the coast of Lake Pontchartrain, a great deal of which is man-made land. In majority of these areas 'high ground' is described as anything situated above sea level. The rest of the city was constructed by sapping wetlands, burning forests and clearing land for further development, which result into massive soil erosion. Thunderstorms are a regular threat; "rainwater is removed from below-sea-level areas using 180 miles of canals, 22 pumping stations, and a water-removal capability of 30 billion gallons a day" (Travis 2005, 1657). It has traditionally been dreaded that the Big One would not merely go beyond pumping capacities but as well immobilize the pumps in general (Travis 2005).
Indeed, the hurricane Katrina was the Big One. In the morning of August 29, hurricane gushes drove the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet up with such power and force that the mud flood banks of New Orleans overflowed and the solid walls adjacent to the Industrial Canal were infringed. Water surged into the Lower Ninth Ward of New Orleans, the sections of the eastern New Orleans, flooding numerous nearby vicinities with at least 10 feet of water. Later on of the same day, a storm surge coming from Lake Pontchartrain flip sided into drainage canals, discharging water that curved below-sea-level nearby vicinities into massive lakes. Any pumps that remained functional were devastated by the sheer size of the disaster. Roughly 80 percent of the urban area of New Orleans was inundated (Brinkley 2006, 20).
In New Orleans the predicament of those individuals who have not evacuated turned out to be severe. Numerous of their houses were partly immersed. In a number of instances water went