Rethinking Pierre Bourdieu - Essay Example

Rethinking Pierre Bourdieu: Social Theory as ‘Combat Sport’ Introduction Argument thinkers have historically been interested with the account of actual everyday social theory. The study of argument disciplines, since the Uses of Argument of Stephen Toulmin, has developed into a subject matter in argumentation theories that explore social arguments (Prosise et al. 1996). Toulmin, in response to analytic theorists, stated that formal logic was an insufficient tool for describing social agents’ argumentative practices (Prosise et al. 1996). Because arguments for general rationality was unavoidably unsuccessful to clarify arguments in their actual world setting, Toulmin disputed that a variety of rational forms of propositions symbolise various human spheres, metaphorically called ‘fields’ (Verdes-Leroux 2001). From this point of view argument thinkers could differentiate among fields by exploring the structures of argumentative form effectively applied in social theory. Therefore, the research on argument fields facilitated the methodical study and inclusion of argument without having to create general claims (Swarts 2003). This perspective provided a concrete step toward the understanding of the mechanics of social authority in actual social settings (Swarts 2003). This essay is an attempt to discuss how and why Pierre Bourdieu describes social theory as a ‘combat sport’. This essay argues that the theory of power and practice of Bourdieu offers a solution to the chronic dilemmas facing theorists engaged in a ‘combative’ social theory of argument. WHY: Social Theory as Combat Sport As a matter of fact, the theory of Bourdieu offers a practical way to reunite the contemporary challenges confronting field theory. The claim of Bourdieu that social theory is a ‘combat sport’ is founded on discursive struggles and the symbolic representations of social authority at the base of the prearranged social authority forms (Jenkins 2002). He tries to understand and elaborate how the discursive practices of an individual are an outcome of, and function to preserve, social authority. His assumption attempts to reconcile the conflicts in social science, to include “the seemingly irresolvable antagonism between subjectivist and objectivist modes of knowledge, the separation of the analysis of the symbolic from that of materiality, and the continued divorce of theory from research” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, 3). Bourdieu, from the beginning of his career, has been deeply doubtful of the social scientific dichotomies orienting theory and practice (Jenkins 2002). Bourdieu’s assumption, functions to go beyond numerous traditional dichotomies of social science. It includes the interconnections among the social agents’ habitus, the social fields where in capital and power are wielded, and the representations of symbolic authority (Prosise et al. 1996). At one point, authority is attributed by agents and at another point, arranged by social fields (Collins 1984). Take into account each major concept. The term habitus by Bourdieu is identified as a “system of generative dispositions based on the particular social experiences of agents” (Calhoun, Gerteis, Moody, Pfaff & Virk 2002, 278). A habitus of an agent permits him/her to perceive or make up their through the diversity of specific social circumstances. The outlooks of agents are enduring, in the sense that they shape the foundation for the view of social experiences (Calhoun et al. 2002). People are capable of acting with autonomy and yet they are limited theoretically by the social formation of argument. Moreover, their social techniques are not entirely deliberate; instead practices are perceptive social disputes or actions, rooted in the attained set of outlooks (Adams & Sydie 2002). Bourdieu argues, “The conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence produce habitus, systems of durable, transporable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organise practices and representations” (Prosise, Miller & Mills 1996, 111). Hence, the habitus functions as a socially acquired structure of theoretical limitations. Obtained judgments are subjective but not only at the point of the agent (Adams & Sydie 2002). Clusters of judgments are established by the commonalities of material conditions and actual experience, such as the addition in specific social sense-making clusters (Swarts 2003). The commonalities of judgements are rooted in their resemblances with environmental and social conditioning (Garner & Hancock 2009). The “habitus... is the site of mediation between social norms on one hand and individual practices on the other, (Prosise et al. 1996, 111)” stated by Kevin Olson. The outcome of the types of socialisation is the creation of a collective sense of what is given, natural or normal. This is called ‘doxa’, which is fundamentally an unaware sense of actual constraints on behaviour and thought (Prosise et al. 1996, 111). The classifications through which agents view the social field “incline agents to accept the social world as it is, to take it for granted, rather than to rebel against it” offering “a tacit acceptance of one’s place” (Prosise et al. 1996, 111). On the other hand, social fields are identified as areas inhabited by agents. Fields are differentiated by the organised authority forms highly recognised in the social arena and by the risks available to involved individuals, over whom symbolic fights for authority occur, hence ‘combat sport’ (Jenkins 2002). As elaborated by Richard Jenkin, “A field, in Bourdieu’s sense, is a social arena within which straggles or manoeuvres take place over specific resources or stakes and access to them” (Calhoun et al. 2002, 93). The social dimension is composed of overlying fields inhabited by agents. There is concurrently a field of science and an arena of aesthetics, each with its unique representations of recognised symbolic authority (Garner & Hancock 2009). Furthermore, a field of power functions within these two arenas. Power is an inherent feature of the fields of science and aesthetic and its own social field (Webb, Schirato & Danaher 2002). Each social field can be viewed “as a set of objective power relations that impose themselves on all who enter the field” (Garner & Hancock 2009, 176). Communicative relationships accomplish more than merely send and receive messages. A challenging statement is at the same time a linguistic interaction and an indication of authority and power (Garner & Hancock 2009). Agents are limited and facilitated by the objective circumstances for effective intervention in the social field. The argumentative techniques are hence rooted in the connection between the objective circumstances of organised symbolic authority forms in fields, and the specific symbolic capital form upheld by an agent (Bauman & May 2001). Invented arguments originate from an agent’s personal view of achievement with regard to the material features of the field. Nevertheless, capital agents wield authority and power in the social field through the application of symbolic codes and signals (Bauman & May 2001). The capital forms discovered to be accessible to empirical research are, primarily, purchasing power and material or economic resources (Elliott 1998); second, varieties of social knowledge or cultural capital and perceptions of social affairs (Elliott 1998); third, political resource or acknowledged investigations or documentations in institutional settings and (Garner & Hancock 2009); lastly, symbolic resource or varieties of the other three capital forms, when viewed by agents as codes or manifestation of authority and power (Garner & Hancock 2009). The significance of symbolic capital cannot be overlooked, as it is the foundation for all types of social status. To the point that this authority is viewed as legitimate by the social space members, the arrangement of the social field is replicated. The formation of the appropriate or justifiable types of social authority is the major risk in social arenas (Adams & Sydie 2002). This symbolic authority functions as the core of seeing all other types of social authority. It must be acknowledged evidently that even the highly recognised symbolic capital form are fundamentally random, the outcome of a previously successful symbolic fight over what must form valid types of authority (Adams & Sydie 2002). Due to the fact that social space is vibrant, authority forms are consistently arbitrated by its inhabitants. The prevailing types of social authority form the classifications of perspective (Calhoun et al. 2002). This social pattern for legitimate perspective is fundamental to the creation of social reality and is founded on the effective discursive ‘combat’ of field agents. Hence symbolic power rests in the capability of identifying the methods of perception that organise consequent theory and practice in the social arena. These three core models (habitus, social field, and capital) open themselves to explanation. Bourdieu directs his strategy to the empirical study of the social field and agents (Swarts 2003). The notion of a field is not entirely hypothetical. Instead, fields can be “determined through empirical research and through ethnographic investigation” (American Forensic Association 1995, 121). Social spaces become apparent through the examination of the symbolic authority forms and through the uniformities of practices and experiences that are discernible to scholars (Verdes-Leroux 2001). Social groups “can be constructed empirically by discovering the main factors of differentiation which account for the differences observed... by discovering the powers or forms of capital’ possessed and employed by agents” (American Forensic Association 1995, 121). The uniformities of the habitus are practically discernable through categorisation and can hence be discriminated. Due to the fact that social fields are inhabited in some measure by agents with alike social experiences, they have alike practices and attitudes. Therefore, the broad orientation toward behaviour and thought is traditional. The concrete social structures in fields can be included by recognising the symbolic authority forms that are disseminated among the agents taking part in social spaces. Commonalities among perceptions help clarify the concrete presence of social classes and the exclusion and inclusion of confrontational types within fields (Webb et al. 2002). Scholars can pinpoint concrete argument fields by examining symbolic authority forms and the discursive contests over authority forms. Such investigation is identical to the classification of fields rooted in the forms of authorisations acknowledged as legitimate in argumentative fields. HOW: Social Theory as Combat Sport Bourdieu’s sees the relationship between an individual’s discursive technique and the social space where in s/he is located as the core unit of appropriate social investigation (Prosise et al. 1996). He creates a theoretical framework that explains both the argumentative forms used by the agents and the structured social factors that organise ‘combative’ practices (Jenkins 2002). The concept of ‘good reasons’ is founded in the sphere of discursive contests for legitimacy that become instituted and replicated within social fields (Jenkins 2002). Bourdieu is engaged in the connection between the techniques used by social agents and the structuring fields that facilitate and limit discourse. His point of view provokes an examination of behavioural and linguistic practices of individuals (Collins 1984). Rational forms used by social agents can be perceived as invented social tactics rooted in the experience of the social actor and the social space where in their arguments are put forth (Webb et al. 2002). These tactics are not perceived as deliberate discourse persistently used by rhetors. Rather, an agent’s range of credible tactics is founded in a group of behavioural and linguistic tendencies that assume a form that limits, but does not entirely establish, their discursive outcome (Swarts 2003). Internalised patterns of recognised discourse function as the foundation of an individual’s discursive tactics. The perceptions of Bourdieu function as an instrument that an individual applies as s/he invents through life by responding to the external environment in manners that appear proper and normal (Garner & Hancock 2009). To the point that discourse has a sphere called ‘speech act’ that shows its social purpose, an individual’s blueprint of linguistic outcome can be identified as invented social tactics (Garner & Hancock 2009). Forms of valid argumentative authority are organised as component of the habitus. The invention of daily argument is an outcome of what feels appropriate and normal, grounded on the internalisation of the social agent of their experiences of material symbols in fields (Adams & Sydie 2002). Particular discursive techniques triumph whilst others are unsuccessful. Effective types of evidence are successful to the level that they are authorised by other social actors (Calhoun et al. 2002). Bourdieu emphasises the significance of material symbolic social systems limiting the effective types of rational foundation (Collins 1984). Jenkins (2002) portrayed Bourdieu’s concept of the field as “a structured system of social positions—occupied either by individuals or institutions—the nature of which defines the situation for their occupants” (Jenkins 2002, 85). Hence, the enthusiasm in exploring rational forms can be continued within an inclusive conceptual framework of a specific actor’s view of the socially organised features of the field within which s/he is involved. The invented tactics of the social actors and the limitations of a social field where in discourses combine are major elements of a general linguistic practice theory (Bauman & May 2001). Core argument field research in a social practice theory improves knowledge of fluid argument forms introduced by actors in certain social settings (Bauman & May 2001). Both of the major models of field definition are important elements to the examination of any argument. The social theory of Bourdieu deals with the conciliatory component between social structure and agency. Such conciliation is the dynamics of socialisation employed to clarify the replication and the reassertion of social status or authority (Jenkins 2002). The victory of an argumentative treatise in a field relies on the participants’ linguistic habitus with regard to the ‘linguistic market’ that implements what comprises rightful practices (Verdes-Leroux 2001). The symbolic contests of the concerned groups or people are fundamental to understanding how authority is exercised in argument spaces. Authorising the prevailing definition of what comprises suitable arguments in a field of continuous procedure, merely due to traditional character of social practice (Verdes-Leroux 2001). Legitimation is organised collectively, and symbolic social systems are the product of the forceful discursive struggles or competitions of the past. Bourdieu’s concept of ‘combat sport’ or symbolic struggle is important for argument thinkers. It informs us of the realities that valid argumentative authority types can be remediated. Also, the remediation of authority is completed through actual social confrontation. The victory of argumentative techniques relies on the detached positions occupied by agents in a field. The comparative position of proponents in a social field verifies the possibility of an argument becoming recognised. This is factual for a number of reasons (Prosise et al. 1996). First, argument recognition is more probable if it originates from an authority that is positioned in a quite powerful space in the field. Authorities in general have a vast amount of symbolic capital viewed in the field as valid (Prosise et al. 1996). Their claims will bear more social relevance. Second, the comparative triumph of particular discursive tactics can be envisaged by an actor’s actual knowledge with a field (Webb et al. 2002). Agents who are more capable of adjusting arguments to the demands of the field are seen as having more sound arguments. For instance (Prosise et al. 1996): When neo-Aristotelian rhetorical criticism was the preferred textual strategy in speech journals, scholars criticising rhetoric in this way were given a substantial amount of scholarly resources. Because such criticism fell out of favour years ago, adherents to the neo-Aristotelian school of criticism are excluded from most of the discipline’s resources today. Scholars who have obtained enough symbolic capital in the discipline, however, could theoretically bring Aristotelian criticism back into favour through discursive struggles to redefine the legitimate purpose and method of rhetorical criticism (p. 113). Fields of argument are identified and interpreted from theoretical classifications and values rooted in shared social understanding or knowledge. The communicative relationships that tie participants also function to separate and differentiate them from one another (Swarts 2003).The marginalisation of individuals within fields is an outcome of the similar discourse that ties them together. Valid discursive processes function to subordinate people whose symbolic capital does not match with the linguistic field (Adams & Sydie 2002). Jenkins (2002) claims that “speech and other forms of discourse are... practical interventions in social life, which have effects and which help to constitute and shape social life. They are both means and ends in... symbolic violence and structures of symbolic domination” (p. 58). Certainly, it is the difference between illegitimate and legitimate symbolic capital that permits authority to be wielded in everyday activities. The random enforcement of what comprises cultural capital functions as a technique of discerning those who possess valid preference from those who do not (Verdes-Leroux 2001). The actual outcome is a form of suppression. Bourdieu states that “speakers lacking the legitimate competence are de factor excluded from social domains in which competence is required, or are condemned to silence” (Verdes-Leroux 2001, 106) and “the competence necessary in order to speak the legitimate language (ibid, p. 106)” relies “on social inheritance (Verdes-Leroux 2001, 106)” and “re-translates social distinctions into the specifically symbolic logic of differential deviations, or... distinction” (p. 106-107). Another scholar, Fraser creates a statement that the political treatise about welfare is interpreted in a way that rules out feminist view (Jenkins 2002). Bourdieu would demand us to reinterpret and expand her statement. An examination of the theories of the political arena of welfare dialogue by rhetorical academics may show the repercussions of social outlooks, rooted in the commonalities of material conditions, of actors adopting effective argumentative processes with regard to race, gender, and class (Jenkins 2002). Argument academics can hypothesise on the social roots of discursive tactics, as well as to explore the argument forms effectively used by participants in the field, and can hence concentrate on the connection between the triumphant argumentative tactics and the social systems that limit the rhetoric of an agent. A more inclusive social power discourse within social theory helps such investigations. Bourdieu provides a valuable theory of contemporary power. Power is shown in the capability to establish the “terms through which the world is understood” (Prosise et al. 1996, 113). The relevance of Bourdieu’s concept of power is that the interpretation or espousal of social-symbolic systems is at the point of epistemology (Bauman & May 2001). Provided that the habitus of an agent is linguistically ordered, the political field discourse describes and interprets social problems grounded on the overlooked ideas of the experts in the field (Bauman & May 2001). The social context of experts and their involvement in the field lead to policies formulated by the experts. These experts’ habitus is far isolated from the general public to which policy formulations are intended for (Elliott 1998). What is eliminated is the diversity of opinions and experiences enclosing a specific issue. As a result, the welfare rules that are enforced are basically austerity schemes aimed mostly at women, minorities and children (Elliott 1998). The concept of discursive ‘combat’ has direct social repercussions for groups and individuals that are subordinated in social spaces (Verdes-Leroux 2001); the actual argumentative contest of the subordinated for legitimacy can alter the values and symbols in fields (Verdes-Leroux 2001). Wacquant and Bourdieu (1992) claim that “in each field, hierarchy is continually contested, and the very principles that undergird the structure of the field can be challenged and revoked” (ibid, p. 81). This does not mean that the remediation of social power is a simple endeavour. Nevertheless, what is relevant is that such transformation is likely and that it is mainly realised through discursive ‘combat’ (Prosise et al. 1996). Such recognition is more and more vital to the acceptance of the multiplicity of points of view and frames of thinking throughout the social field (Elliott 1998). Social fields are forceful spaces, occupied by a large number of agents who embody the beliefs and experiences of various social groups (Webb et al. 2002). These groups and individuals have a common symbolic struggle for legitimacy and acceptance in the social field. From a point of view obtained from Bourdieu, social spaces cannot be claimed to develop or advance (Collins 1984). Instead, field authority scatters over time as a social tradition of exclusion and inclusion of explanations. The change from an evolutionary to an argumentative knowledge has considerable relevance to critical thinkers (Garner & Hancock 2009). The acceptance of the forceful components of fields emphasises the possibility for social change: ‘if practices are arbitrary the symbols of traditional forms of authority are always open to renegotiation’ (Prosise et al. 1996, 113). The work of C.A. Bowers, for instance, concentrating on the ecological repercussions of contemporary educational practices, provides a valuable illustration of the challenge to the base authority forms in the educational field (Verdes-Leroux 2001). Bower supports a reassertion of the theoretical blueprints of students, grounded on community metaphors and the interconnection between the natural environment and community (Verdes-Leroux 2001). For Bowers the environmental problem is anchored in the basic modernity metaphors, such as the concept of change as evolution and the legend of humanity as social units (Calhoun et al. 2002). By questioning these root overlooked ideas through a linguistic contest, Bowers opens up a new means of assessing practice and exposes the theoretical field for new social authority forms to emerge (Calhoun et al. 2002). Equipped with the ideas of Bourdieu, argumentation academics will be more capable of interpreting or understanding the actual mechanism of social power in the exclusion and recognition of arguments (Bauman & May 2001). Moreover, the mechanics of the stability and evolution of symbolic power within fields is expanded through the idea of social theory as a ‘combat sport’. Instead of having conclusive defining limitations, fields can be framed as overlying and forceful spaces, composed of social actors who mediate everyday affairs with regard to their personal views of the external social realities of certain fields. The research on symbolic conflicts that remediate the basic theories of an argument community will permit academics to interpret how symbolic power can evolve, and how social spaces affect one another. Furthermore, the exploration of how symbolic capital functions in specific fields can improve our knowledge of how individuals and types of experience and knowledge become excluded or included from social spaces generally. Conclusions Bourdieu’s social theory as a ‘combat sport’ aids argumentation academics in interpreting and understanding actual argument. His social theory stretches social field theory to the social dimension and contributes in the orientation of research into the creation and evaluation of power, authority, and struggle. The notion that argumentative authority forms differ across specific social spaces is concrete and valuable. However, the investigation of argument fields may be a lot more vibrant with a focus on social authority in argument fields. A more inclusive field theory should deal with the function of individual actors with regard to reassertion and replication of the social systems where in they take part. The notion of social theory as a ‘combat sport’ is not forced into the realm of analysis until and only after being tied with the venture of offering thorough explanation that comprises the dynamic internal intricacies of lifeworlds symbols and communicative practice. Analysis then is merited just after people are contented by the reliability of definition and justification of speaker’s competencies, interests, and needs as shown in their continuous discursive battles. Ultimately, the social theory of Bourdieu grasps a good deal of assurance to help an assumption of the argumentation processes of social actors in different social fields, supplementing the initial objective of field theory and promoting field theory to the sphere of social analysis. The research on argument processes has been abundant since the beginning of the concept of argument fields, the integration of a well-founded social theory of argumentation practice should improve further the discipline of argument field. 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