Though well researched, P. Kimble’s argument presents prejudice. How did they fail to acknowledge contrary views despite supporting their stand? For instance they argue that once tissues are removed from the body we lose interest in them- which is quite true. The next level of the debate takes shape immediately; is there an express manner in which you are rightfully dispossessed of your extracted tissues? Could a legal provision authorizing joint ownership of the extracts be justified? To this it is impossible that anyone could argue in the contrary, unless they got a sinister motive, perhaps realizing or discovering hidden potential benefits in the particular organs.
Whereas every claim in this front has been lost, we could however look at it this way: an economically viable mine deposit has just been discovered on a piece of land legally owned by a Mr. Edward and his family. Under US law, Edward and his family will be beneficiaries from the mining sales proceeds if their deed to the land presents both surface and mineral rights (McLinden 2008). Contrasting this in the face of the judgments passed on the tissue ownership and patenting cases, you realize a very unfortunate inconsistency.
Whereas in the case of land the law allows for different levels of ownership, the same is not extended to the more similar issue of tissue patenting. Yet the matter of Mrs. Lacks has been given a peripheral ethical look, all the time disregarding the potential legal potential it has. A glance at this provision would influence Kimble’s view