The computer simulations and the mathematical analysis extend formal collective actions in treating the social networks and the organization of costs.
A common good is highly non-rival, majority of people will be served when the specific good is served (Kollock, 202). Just as the concepts of the common, using the internet undergoes the strategy of the commons. This is because the use of internet just like any other common good does not have the controlled guidelines in consuming it. Internet is one of the common goods because it can be accessed with the consumption regard. Similarly, the internet can be damaged when it is abused during consumption . Assuming the members of the public are restrained using the bandwidth. The use of the internet as a common good will benefit everyone in an efficient and effective means of exchanging and carrying on with the discussions. Unfortunately, some of the users of the internet reasons on the basis that the using bandwidth does not affect what other can access, thereby using the common resource without any restrictions. There are concrete solutions that deal with the social dilemma’s core characteristic (Kollock, 202).
Social media can be defined as one of the situations where the rationality of an individual results to collective irrationality (Kollock, 183). The best strategy for social dilemmas either is not always evident in risky exchanges as a defect or cooperates. Each of the social dilemmas has pair of options as their outcome. This can either be cooperate to cooperate, cooperate to defect, defect to cooperate, and defect to defect. The social dilemma occurs because the payoffs have dissimilar relationship, which are defined as reward, sucker’s payoff, temptation, and punishment. Therefore, if one is worried about being the topic, important interaction cease to exist. However, provided people are keen in making comments that are relevant to the threads, other