The series of explosions and subsequent fire that caused widespread damage at the Buncefield oil storage and transfer depot, Hemel Hempstead, on 11 December 2005 conspicuously reveals the need for an incident command system (ICS) to be in place in the depot.
Also, fire that followed the explosion lasted five days and razed most of the site "emitting a large plume of smoke into the atmosphere that dispersed over South England and beyond" (Assignment Brief).
Hence, the available information provides enough evidence to prove that it was a major incident in a large area and it was sheer providence that only 43 people were injured and none of them seriously although 2000 people had to be evacuated from the location of the fire to safer places (Assignment Brief).
The need for ICS at the Buncefield depot cannot be overstated. The devastating effects of not having ICS were already felt at the depot in 2005 when a series of explosions ripped through the depot. It is therefore primarily important to have an ICS in place at the Buncefield depot. Having a relevant ICS will help limit damages arising from situation like the one that occurred in 2005. Indeed, it must be made statutorily compulsory for organizations such as the Buncefield oil storage and transfer depot to keep in place an ICS (Freeman, John; 2006).
The ICS is time tested to effectively avert and counter disasters that could otherwise lead to destruction to lives and properties on a mass scale.