Meno and Phaedo - Essay Example

? Pythagoras was a philosopher who was very influential on Plato. In the Phaedo, the notion of 'harmony' owes much to Pythagoras. Pythagoras discovered the octave and the roots of musical harmony by creating a lyre that had two strings at a size of 2:1, and the sound generated by this relationship of 1:2 represents an octave [Joost-Gaugier 172], both in Ancient musical systems but also in modern ones. Musically, harmony is the very opposite of “discord” [94a] and moreover, it is “invisible and incorporeal, and very beautiful” [85e]. However much Plato's background is receptive to Pythagoras, when it comes to the soul, the proposal that the soul is a type of harmony is one that is rejected by Plato. The following will present three succinct (and related) arguments which defend the position concerning the immortality of the soul. The arguments in question, are as follows (1) ‘argument from opposites’ [69e-72e], (2) argument from recollection [73-78b], and finally, (3) ‘the argument from affinity’ [84c-88b]. The focus of this analysis will be on the above three sections, however, both a consideration of some of the objections will follow, and finally, the final or summary refutation provided by Plato’s mouthpiece (Socrates). The first position in question, is the argument from opposites. This is an argument which is based on an inference which is an extension of observation. What we perceive around us, is a process in nature where opposites turn into each other. In this section in question, Plato observes the following opposites which typify this process of “becoming” [72B], namely, the opposites of ‘small/larger’ [70E]‘faster/slower’, ‘waking/sleeping’[71D], and ‘hot/cold’[71B]. As mentioned, these are processes whereby opposites turn into one another. There are, however, some problems with this argument. First, the very notion of ‘opposite’ is problematic. Plato is arguing that these are opposite in the sense that they are a difference in ‘kind’ or contradictories in some sense. However, it could be argued that these ‘contrary’, but not contradictory, and moreover, they are distinct as a difference of degree rather than as a difference in kind. For example, there is unquestionably a difference in ‘degree’ (literally e.g. in Celsius) between ‘hot’ and ‘cold’, but they are not opposites in the contradictory sense of ‘life’ and ‘death’. In other words, ‘life’ and ‘death’ are binary opposites in the sense that a person is either ‘alive’, or they are ‘dead’. A difference in the sense presented by Plato with respect to ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ or conversely, ‘fast’ and ‘slow’ are not binary opposites – the admit of a middle ground, and moreover, they are united or related in some sense. They are related in the sense of being relative to another. While a tortoise is relatively slow when compared with a hare, a hare is slow when compared to the speed of light. Thus, is the ‘hare’ fast or slow? In normal logic, one cannot predicate real opposites of the same thing, this is the law of non-contradiction [Wagner 28] and this is actually that which brings into question some of what Plato is claiming concerning these opposites. This said, Plato is claiming that “all things come to be in this way, opposites from opposites” [71A]. Further, he infers that among “all” of these “things”, must also be the soul and the body. Thus, if everything turns into its opposite, then, the soul must turn into the body, and the body must turn into the soul. Phrased in terms of a syllogism, (1.) if it can be said “that to be dead is the opposite of being alive” [71D], and (2) “all things come to be in this way, opposites from opposites” [71A], then, (3) it can be inferred that the body and soul turn into each other. As has been noted, the form of this argument is an inference, and there are some problems, and second, his very notion of opposites includes ‘contraries’ and not just ‘contradictories’ – that is, where we might consider opposites in terms of a difference in ‘kind’, Plato’s notion of opposites includes differences of ‘degree’ (e.g. sleeping/waking, hot/cold, fast/slow, etc.). Some of the problems which were raised in the previous section (re. opposites), are resolved in his argument concerning ‘recollection’, which will be presented in the following. What is important in regard to the argument from ‘recollection’, is that Plato establishes a position which defends the existence of “prior knowledge” [74E]. Moreover, this notion of prior knowledge is further inferred to have come from a time before this life. In other words, it is an argument which goes further than merely defending a tradition philosophical position concerning the nature of ‘rationalism’, but that there is a further inference that this prior knowledge must have come to us at a time before the present existence – hence, immortality. Socrates later reminds Simmias that he had at one point, namely this juncture, that preferred the idea that knowledge is recollection or that the soul is a harmony [92c] The following will break down his argument concerning ‘prior knowledge’ or ‘recollection’. To state or argue that we have a priori knowledge, is to necessarily posit this as succinct from the senses. In other words, this is a form of knowledge which can be understood as ‘interacting’ with the senses or perception, but it is also a form of knowledge which is distinct as well. Toward establishing this important distinction, Plato raises the problem with respect to the notion of “equals” and unequal's. However, he arrives at these abstractions through an argument which claims that “learning is recollection” [73B]. Specifically, it is a recollection of the notions of similarity and difference – sameness and difference. When we distinguish one thing from the next, we do so on the basis of ideas concerning similarity and difference. In other words, some object looks ‘familiar’ to some object which has already been experienced, and distinct from other objects and so forth: “in all these cases the recollection is occasioned by things that are similar, but it can also be occasioned by things that are dissimilar” [73D]. However, this process of learning necessarily involves ‘recollection’, and second, we are capable of making abstractions concerning this process of learning. For example, from the notion of similarity and difference, we can arrive at more abstract notions such as ‘equal’ and ‘unequal’. Further, we can abstract these notions from the sensible or perceivable objects which there are often predicated of: “what of the equals themselves” [74C]. good argument could be made for both the idea that Plato was an epiphenomenalist [Taylor, 1992: 25], or an interactionist [Taylor, 1992: 18ff.]. On the one hand, it has been demonstrated, without question that Plato makes a convincing distinction between knowledge and perception, and the body and the soul, and in this respect, he is unquestionably a ‘dualist’. This is his main point of criticism of Simmias. While the body is subject to change, the mind communes with that which is continuous through time – hence, the inference(s) concerning immortality. Although ‘distinct’, it is difficult to establish the whether there is any interaction at all. On the one hand, it seems impossible that there would not be any interaction, given that movement and so forth (e.g. moving my arm) would be impossible without some connection between the mind and body (see: Taylor). On the other hand, there is a sense that there is a very rigid distinction between the realm of the forms and the realm of the senses. For example, we can approximate a geometrical figure in the sensible realm, but it is never perfect. Similarly, we can ‘calculate’ mathematical concepts such as ‘infinity’, but these two can never be perfectly manifest in the realm of the senses. In this sense, it could be argued that the nature of Plato’s dualism is rigid enough to suggest that he is an epiphenomenalist, and this is echoed by R.M. Dancy who likens or finds an analogy with the form of equality with Leibniz' Law: “We are going to advert to Leibniz’s Law: we need some defeating predicate true of any ordinary equal thing that is not true of the equal itself.” [Dancy 269]. If we have only our senses to rely on regarding equality, it follows that no two things are alike and at the very least, they have the predicate of location as different. Even if two things are alike down to the molecule, they are different by virtue of being in two separate places, argues Plato and Leibniz. If there is harmony in the soul, then there is unity between the senses and the mind. It has been demonstrated in this analysis that the 'mind' and 'body' distinction articulated in Plato's notion of the soul, is the main refutation of the notion of the soul as harmony. Works Cited: Dancy, R.M. 2004. Plato's Introduction of Forms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Joost-Gaugier, Christine. 2006. Measuring Heaven: Pythagoras and his influence on Thought and Art in Antiquity and the Middle Ages. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Plato, “Phaedo”. 1995. Translated by G.M.A. Grube. Reprinted in Classics of Western Philosophy. Fourth Edition. Edited by Steven M. Cahn. Indianapolis: Hackett. Taylor, Richard. 1992. Metaphysics. Fourth Edition. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. Wagner, Ellen. (Ed.) 2001. Essays on Plato's Psychology. Lanham: Lexington Books. Essay Question: At Phaedo 86a-d Simmias puts forward the view that the soul is a sort of harmony. Socrates provides at least two arguments against this view of the soul in the text that follows. Describe his arguments and explain why you think they are convincing or not. Read More