History, Definition and Levels of Incident Command System - Coursework Example

History of Incident command system 2 Definition of incident command system 3 Levels of command in incident command system 3 Bronze level of command 3 Silver level of command 3 Gold level of command 4 Incident command system sectorisation 4 Sectorisation in a fire incident 4 Fire sector 4 Search sector 5 Lobby sector 5 Responsibilities of incident commander 5 Responsibilities of operations commander 5 Responsibilities of sector commander 6 Functional officer 6 Functional structure 6 Functional officers in the ICS and their tasks 6 Span of control 7 Cordons in ICS 7 Inner cordon 7 Outer cordon 7 Tactical modes in ICS 7 Offensive tactical mode 8 Defensive tactical mode 8 Transitional tactical mode 8 Importance of using ICS at emergency incident 8 Incident command for a high rise building 9 The harrow court fire incident 10 Steps leading into fire incident at harrow court building 10 Mistakes made at Harrow court building 10 Management of fire incident at harrow court building 11 What ought to have happened 11 What ought to have been done 12 Dynamic risk assessment 12 Dynamic risk assessment at the Harrow Court fire incident 12 Fire and rescue service operational philosophy 13 Importance of carrying out dynamic risk assessment 13 Position of dynamic risk assessment at harrow court building 14 Role of inter-agency 14 The police 14 The ambulance 14 Local authority 14 The human resources agency 14 Conclusion 15 Recommendations 15 Bibliography 15 History of Incident command system Incident command system (Ronald W, 2003) was formed by Ian Gilchrist in 1970 with primary aim of facilitating and promoting inter-agency co-operation in incident management. Definition of incident command system Incident command system (Ronald W, 2003) is an on-site system management process that is used for command of the incident, control of the incident, and co-ordination of the incident of emergency response. Incident command system (Flin, Incident Command: Decision Making and Team work, 1995a) provides an enabling environment for different agencies to partner together by allowing use of common terminologies and fostering use of similar operating procedure in order to control personnel, facilities used, equipments and efficient communication in an incident. Levels of command in incident command system The following are some of command levels that make incident command system (Fire Service Inspectorate, 2002). The levels are designated depending on their functions and function of incident commander at each level. Bronze level of command Bronze level personnel are mainly involved with forward control point (Fire Service Inspectorate, 2002). The responsibility of incident commander at bronze level is to deploy resources related with the incident. Silver level of command Silver level command staff implement tactical mode to be used. The silver incident commander (national fire protection association, 2000) determines tactic mode to employ for the incident and announces it to the team. Silver level incident commander helps to develop on-site safety plan, reviews incident action plan (IAP) for safety purposes and provides accurate assessment of the hazards. Gold level of command Gold level command staff is responsible for implementing command functions (national fire protection association, 2000). The responsibiliities of gold level incident commander include analyzing strategies for combating the incident, proposing priority plan especially on safety of the responders, incident victims and the public and formulates sectorisation necessary for the incident (Fire Service Inspectorate, 2002). Incident command system sectorisation Sectorisation involves dividing command staff, team leaders and general staff into three major tasks in an incident (Flin, Incident command: Decision Making and Team Work, 1995a). It’s a strategy aimed at ensuring that the incident is timely controlled and that there is no loss of lives, no property is not lost, nobody goes missing and checking spread of fire (Diguiseppi, et al., 2002). Sectorisation in a fire incident Fire sector Command staff in fire sector is responsible for extinguishing fire and controlling its spread by minimizing ventilation (Diguiseppi, et al., 2002). Search sector Command staff in search sector is involved with evacuation and looking for persons trapped or injured in the incident and are helped by lobby sector personnel (Diguiseppi, et al., 2002). Lobby sector These provide support tasks in the incident. They are positioned next to fire sector command staff and search sector (Diguiseppi, et al., 2002). Responsibilities of incident commander Announces command (Ronald W, 2003) Ensures practices of incident safety (Ronald W, 2003) Determines incident aims and strategies (Ronald W, 2003) Prioritizes immediate incident priorities (Ronald W, 2003) Approves use of volunteers (Thomas, 2004) Approves requests for additional resources (Ronald W, 2003) Analyses intelligence information (Diguiseppi, et al., 2002) Authorizes release of information through public information officer (Ronald W, 2003) Responsibilities of operations commander Manages tactical mode operation to use (Paton, 1996) Responsible for inter-agency collaboration (Paton, 1996) Makes changes to incident action plan (Ronald W, 2003) Supervises execution of incident action plan (Ronald W, 2003) Ensures operation schedules run according to span of control (Brunacini, 1991) Requests additional resources to support tactical operations (Ronald W, 2003) Responsibilities of sector commander Evaluates incident priorities (Flin, Incident command: Decision Making and Team Work, 1995a) Prioritizes resource use (Robinson, 1998) (Ronald W, 2003) Responsible for health and safety Functional officer Functional officer is responsible for command. A command is a function and not a position at ICS (Ronald W, 2003). Functional structure Functional officers in the ICS and their tasks Command functional officer is responsible for on-site management (Ronald W, 2003) Operations functional officer ensures incident tactical operations (Ronald W, 2003) Planning functional officer is responsible for Incident Action Plan and maintaining resource status (Ronald W, 2003) Logistics functional officer ensures support services are provided (Ronald W, 2003) Finance and Administration functional officer formulates incident costs (Flin, Incident Command: Decision Making and Team work, 1995a) Intelligence functional officer assists in analysis of information during the incident (Ronald W, 2003) Span of control Span of control (Schmitt, 1994) refers to the number of task force or strike team under a given team leader. Span of control is expressed as a ratio. For example, eight strike command staff against one team leader. Cordons in ICS Inner cordon They maintain a circumference in the scene of incident and ensure safety standards are maintained. They allow restricted access to the site of incident (Salas, bowers, & Edens). Outer cordon Outer cordon surround the inner cordon and are support personnel sourced from different agencies (Schmitt, 1994). Tactical modes in ICS These are methods of attacking an incident. Offensive tactical mode It is used if advantages of the rescue mission are more than risks involved. It is implemented by getting into the building or lobby area (Schmitt, 1994). Defensive tactical mode It is used if risk involved is more than the benefit of rescue mission. The incident is attacked using of external or aerial jets (Schmitt, 1994). Transitional tactical mode It applies when offensive and defensive tactics are being employed and is implemented via sectorisation (Schmitt, 1994). Importance of using ICS at emergency incident ICS brings communities together with a sole aim of creating an environment for a consistent response by utilizing organizational structures that can be expanded or contracted depending on needs or scale of the incident. ICS structure divides responder’s responsibilities and this ensures there is no confrontation among responders. ICS Promotes inter-agency cooperation without restrictions based on jurisdiction or discipline. This attitude fosters unity and ensures there is no redundancy of responsibilities. ICS is backed up by efficient two-way communication between response units. Without ICS, there would be conflict of interest among agencies and reporting system would be compromised. Without ICS, there would be a higher loss of lives and property following outbreak of an incident. Many lives that would have been saved would be lost because of lack of co-operation between agencies. Deaths of fire fighters would be common due to lack of dynamic risk assessment that was introduced by ICS. Incident command for a high rise building High rise buildings have many storey and this make it difficulties to control fires that attack them (Paton, 1996). High rise buildings have higher ventilation and this increases the risk of fire spread due to higher speeds of winds. High rise buildings have a higher level of heat retention. The heat warms air in the building and makes it difficult to breath both for the users of the building as well as the fire fighters. Many incidences of death in high rise building are due to asphyxiation (Robinson, 1998). Spread of fires in high rise buildings is fast. This phenomenon makes it difficult for fire fighters to deliver water in higher floors since they risk meeting a fierce fire that can cost their lives (Paton, 1996). Fire control in high rise building involves sectorisation namely, fire sector, lobby sector and search sector. This involves analysis of equipments to be used, safety measures in place, utilization of wt or dry standpipes and staircases. Lifts in regions that have not been affected can be used as means of escape but they should be a last resort and only when electrical system serving the lift has not been affected (Ronald W, 2003). Due to the height involved, defensive tactic mode is a preference though in most high rise incident cases, a transitional tactic mode is put into use (Schmitt, 1994). This is because high rise building has a limited staging area (Brunacini, 1991). The harrow court fire incident Steps leading into fire incident at harrow court building Mr. and Mrs. Natalie were drunk prior to outbreak of fire. They left a candle that lay on a television lit. The candle was the cause of the fire (Hertfordshire Fire Rescue Services, 2005). Mr. Brown who lived in flat No. 95, 16th floor work up to the smell of smoke issuing from a lower floor and called 999 to report the fire incident that he believed was in Flat No. 89 on 15th Floor. On his way out via the rear stair, he met MS Cuffe and Ms. Holt leaving flat no. 91, 15th floor. Mr. Brown later determined it was flat No. 85 that was on fire and descended to meet the fire rescue team to correct his claim (Hertfordshire Fire Rescue Services, 2005). Mistakes made at Harrow court building Harrow court fire incident, in its initial step, was characterized by lack of dynamic risk assessment and failure to follow fire incident safety rules and regulations. The reporting of the incident was wrong as Mr. Brown gave the wrong address to the flat and had to stop outside to correct the anomaly. The first responders did not check if there were supporting fire control measures in place. This was lapse of fire safety measures. The fire fighters entered into the building without water to fight any fire or protective fire gears. The fire fighters did not close the door to the flat upon rescuing Mr. Natalie. This increased ventilation led into rapid spread of fire that burned down the plastic trunking that held the cables. It is the cables that entangled fire fighter Wornham and caused his death. The increased fire trapped fire fighter Miller in the flat (Hertfordshire Fire Rescue Services, 2005). Management of fire incident at harrow court building Generally, protocols were followed. Dynamic risk assessment was carried out when firefighter Wornham was entangled by molten plastic and miller had died in flat 85, 14th floor. Sectorisation was carried out well and this helped to bring the fierce fire under control. Procedures on first aid were followed following freeing of fire fighter Wornham who was rushed to hospital immediately. The other casualties of the fire incident Mr. Miller and Mrs. Natalie were to undergo forensic examinations. This agrees with specifications of fire service procedures (Hertfordshire Fire Rescue Services, 2005). What ought to have happened Mr. and Mrs. Natalie should not have left a burning candle on a television. Mr. Brown ought to have confirmed the exact location of the fire before reporting the incident. The fire fighters ought to have carried out dynamic fire risk assessment and sectorisation (Hertfordshire Fire Rescue Services, 2005). The fire fighters should have armed themselves with water to fight any fire. They should have had protective clothing to protect themselves from risks of fire. The fire fighter should have closed the door that increased ventilation and led into increase and spread of fire (Hertfordshire Fire Rescue Services, 2005). What ought to have been done The door should not have been left open as this would have reduced ventilation. Windows should have been closed. Mr. Brown, Ms. Cuffe and Ms. Holt should have broken the door to the flat and help to put off the fire as they waited for the fire rescue (Hertfordshire Fire Rescue Services, 2005). The candles should have had handling procedures in place (Hertfordshire Fire Rescue Services, 2005) The building should have had fire resistant partitions (Hertfordshire Fire Rescue Services, 2005) Dynamic risk assessment Dynamic risk assessment ensures every command staff knows exactly his or her role and responsibilities. Dynamic risk assessment ensures safety plan and incident action plan is followed. Immediately after arriving at the incident site, the incident commander, is supposed to access the magnitude of fire and immediately provide advice on the tactical mode to be used to bring the fire under control, rescue measures to be taken and what equipment s are going to be used (Hertfordshire Fire Rescue Services, 2005). Dynamic risk assessment at the Harrow Court fire incident The harrow court fire incident was characterized by a late implementation of dynamic assessment. This is because, initially, there was an error in reporting of the fire incident by Mr. Brown. Sectorisation was done after fire fighter Miller and Wornham had suffered gravely (Hertfordshire Fire Rescue Services, 2005). Mr. Miller and Mr. Wornham as the first responders should have strategized on modalities to be employed. They should have considered safety measures before embarking on the rescue mission (Hertfordshire Fire Rescue Services, 2005). Fire and rescue service operational philosophy The philosophy of fire rescue service is to save life, carry out evacuation and save property by following safety guidelines as determined by risks of fire (Brunacini, 1991). Importance of carrying out dynamic risk assessment To determine the tactic mode to be used To determine sectorisation To determine span of control To determine if there is need of requesting additional resources To determine immediate priorities To determine incident action plan To determine safety measures to be implemented Position of dynamic risk assessment at harrow court building Dynamic risk assessment was carried out after the fire had already burnt two fire fighters namely Miller and Wornham. There was inefficient planning due to incorrect reporting. Role of inter-agency The police Police provide security and help to keep public from the incident site. They also help in collecting information concerning the fire outbreak (Schmitt, 1994). The ambulance They offer first aid to the victims of fire outbreak. This helps to safe lives (Ronald W, 2003). Local authority The structural engineering should have checked if Harrow Court met building regulation act and if there have been any fire risk assessment report in place to foster safety among the users of the high rise building. The local authority structural engineering department would have evaluated if the building mechanical and electrical installation contravened safety (Fire Service Inspectorate, 2002). The human resources agency Human resources agency would have provided additional personnel and volunteers to help in search and rescue operations (Flin, Incident command: Decision Making and Team Work, 1995a). Conclusion There should be training of incident command staff and introduction of refresher courses to evaluate preparedness of the firefighters for their tasks. High rise building should be installed with automatic sprinkler system, smoke detectors and standpipes whether wet or dry. Safety measures should be followed by all users of high rise building to minimize cases of fire incidents. The high rise building should satisfy specification of the building types as outlined by building regulation act. Users of high rise building should be drilled to conform to fire safety order 2005. Recommendations All candles should have user handling guidelines Fire fighters should undergo a refresher course to keep them in a position to know control measures to follow in the event of fire rescue Reporting of fire incidents should be correctly done Doors of high rise building should be made such that they can close themselves automatically Bibliography Brunacini, A. (1991). Command Safety: A Wake up Call. National Fire Protection Association Journal , pp. 74-76. Diguiseppi, C., roberts, i., Wade, A., Sculpherm, M., Edwards, P., Goward, C., et al. (2002, November 2). Incidences of Fires Related Injuries After giving out Smoke Alarms: Cluster Randomized Trials. 325 (7372), pp. 995-995. Fire Service Inspectorate. (2002). fire Service operation Incident command. The Stationary Office , Vol. 2. Flin, R. (1995a). Incident command: Decision Making and Team Work. Journal of the Fire Service College , 1, 7-15. Flin, R. (1995a). Incident Command: Decision Making and Team work. Journal of the Fire Rescue college , (1), 7-15. Hertfordshire Fire Rescue Services. (2005, February 2nd). Investigating Into Deaths of Fire figher Jeffrey Wornham , Fire Fighter Michael Miller and MS. Natalie Close. National fire protection association. (2000). Standards on emergency services incident. Quincy . Paton, D. (1996). Training disaster Workers: Promoting Well-Being and operational effectiveness. 5 (4), 10-16. Robinson, J. (1998). Fire-A Technical challenge and a Market Opportunity. Journal of Comstructional Steel Research , 46 (no.1), 307-307 (1). Ronald W, P. (2003). incident management systems in disaster management. disaster prevention and management , 12 ((5)), 405-412. Salas, B., bowers, C., & Edens, B. (n.d.). (in press) (Eds) Applying Resource Management in Organisations. LEA . Schmitt, J. (1994). Mastering Tactics: Tactical Decisions give Framework. US Marine Coprs Association . Thomas, R. P. (2004). Information Security fundamentals. Read More