Crisis in the Middle East - Report Example

The changing nature of warfare is highlighted by the rise in insurgency and global terrorism. As such, contemporary warfare is becoming increasingly significant, changing armed forces around the world and the ways wars are fought. Indeed, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Armed Forces Report “Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Government: Private Military and Security Companies”(The Geneva Report) (2007) opines that “as new forms of armed conflict multiply and spread, they cause the lines between public and private, government and society, military and civilian to become blurred” (The Geneva Report, 3). In particular, the changing nature of contemporary warfare has redefined military strategy and simultaneously highlighted the interrelationship of complex cultural factors that fuel instability requiring international military intervention. This in turn has propagated international debate as to the legality of such military intervention, which is further compounded by the use of private contractors and private military companies. The focus of this paper is to undertake a critical analysis of the interrelationship between cultural issues and military intervention. To this end, this paper will provide a contextual focus on the rise of insurgency in Iraq, which has brought to the fore the debate regarding counter insurgency operations as part of military strategy and the legality of private contractors, particularly in aiding US defence efforts in Iraq. Moreover, it is submitted as a central proposition in this paper that military intervention in Iraq whilst being justified on anti-terrorism and nuclear proliferation grounds, failed to take account of the complex cultural backdrop of Iraq. As a result, this has perpetuated instability in the region with the rise of insurgency and a refugee crisis in neighbouring areas, which in turn has placed burdens on conventional military strategy. The aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom has fuelled Iraqi insurgency against the combined forces and as a result, Iraq has been the subject of numerous Crisis Group reports addressing continued violence, ethnic tension and insurgency in the aftermath of the recent US invasion (www.crisisgroup.org). This in turn has fuelled the need for continued military intervention and heightened the need for private military contractors. Indeed, the Crisis Group’s report on insurgency in Iraq highlighted the “need for a comprehensive political strategy in order to ensure that the new state is built on institutions that are accepted as legitimate and include groups disenfranchised by the current political configuration, ensuring stability and the rule of law, and preventing a collapse into violence following a U.S. withdrawal” (www.crisisgroup.org). As highlighted above, it is submitted that central problem regarding the need for continued military intervention to counter insurgency is the cultural backdrop of Iraq. This proposition is further supported by Rubin’s argument that “the first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make” wrote the great military analyst Carl von Clausewitz, “is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something alien to it’s nature”. The very much the case regarding the war in Iraq” (Rubin 255). Rubin further argues that the Iraq war was justified by the Bush administration as a necessary process in the war on terror campaign. However, Rubin highlights how the US military operations have only been able to limit units in region and whilst the US military defeated Iraqi armed forces and removed Saddam Hussein from power within three weeks; the post Iraq war situation has failed and “the enemy we’re fighting is a bit different from the one we war-gamed against” (Rubin 256). It is submitted that a central reason for the American failure in Iraq is the failure to account for the cultural, historical and social political backdrop. Indeed, asserts that “the study of culture seeks to discover the relative importance of individual and group norms and values in a given society and the resulting interactions of institutions and organisations are based on those norms and values” (Rubin 256). For example, if we consider the historical and cultural dynamics of Iraq’s demographic, the traditional Sunni and Shi’a divide was not exploited by Operation Iraqi Freedom and confounded the Bush administration’s naive assumptions of the Iraqi response to US “democracy” (Cassidy 144). Moreover, “the thousands of military aged youths arrested in cordon and search operations, civilians shot near Coalition checkpoints, military or private security contractor convoys and the deaths of those Iraqis caught in the cross fire triggered a cycle of revenge in Iraq’s very tribal society” (Rubin 256). Therefore, whilst tribal and religious divides in Iraq have historically fuelled ethnic tension, these factions united against the US military, highlighting the complexity of contemporary warfare. Indeed, the Britain’s Defence Committee’s discussion of post conflict operations in Iraq suggested that “military intervention might be, as it is in Iraq, a confused situation” (House of Commons Defence Committee 38). Moreover it is precisely “this confused situation” that has been ignored by post conflict military strategy. To this end, Rubin argues that the US has ignored the cultural reasons behind increased insurgency and as a result has employed private contractors and changed military warfare with counter insurgency operations (Rubin 257). A prime example is the reference to comments of Ambassador Paul Bremer, who was the highest ranking civilian in the Coalition Provisional Authority “I was a businessman until more or less 10 days before I got here” (in Rubin 357). This cultural ignorance was mirrored by many of the coalition forces and reluctance to adapt to Iraq and as such, “failure to implement coalition provisional authority initiatives more in line with Iraq’s societal expectations and cultural frame of reference explains why many of the organisations good-faith efforts were unsuccessful” (Rubin 257). For example, in Iraq inherently complex as variety of cultural groups that previously clashed were fighting the coalition, including Ba’th party affiliates, nationalists, tribal fighters, criminals and Islamic extremists. Additionally, in considering the Iraqi cultural backdrop and causality for insurgency, Forest refers to historical context, which suggests a consistent lack of democracy in the area. To this end, Forest further argues that: “Another set of explanations centres on the traits of Arab culture and its political manifestations. The authoritarian nature of Arab culture with its emphasis on the tribal leader distributing both social and economic benefits leads to political ramifications that support authoritarianism. Thus the leader of the state utilises state resources to reward those who belong to its tribe or clan rather than setting up a system based on equal citizenship. Rival tribes and clans are therefore in constant conflict over the possession of the state” (Forest 60). This in turn implies that the societal ethnic divides within the backdrop of an authoritarian prevalent Islamic culture lends itself to an absence of a civil society, which in turn renders it inherently impossible to democratise and support democratic institutions once established. However, whilst such a proposition is arguably too dogmatic to apply to Iraqi society; it is evident that the complex socio-cultural makeup of Iraq has defied attempts of US “democratisation” and that a significant cause for this is culture. As such, contemporary warfare is becoming increasingly significant, changing armed forces around the world and the ways wars are fought with an increasing focus on counter insurgency as part of military doctrine in Iraq. This blurring of the distinctions in traditional warfare has created debate regarding the contemporary relevance of the manoeuverist doctrine, further fuelled by the British Army’s formal adoption of an official counter-insurgency doctrine, which was published in Part Ten of its Field Manual in 2001. Alderson comments that the “pamphlet is the latest in a line of Army publications that have wrestled with the challenges of applying military force to meet the threat of revolutionary war and insurgency thrown up by the Cold War” (Alderson, 2007). This has created polarised argument with regard to whether or not contemporary military strategy is growing a generation of Counter Insurgency Operations (COIN) professionals at the expense of real war fighting capabilities. Moreover, it is submitted that the very changing nature of warfare arguably renders it necessary to adapt and develop army doctrine to address the rising reality of insurgency operations. To this end, it is submitted that the British official counter-insurgency operation doctrine is merely a necessary extension of existing army doctrine as opposed to a rendering pre-existing doctrines obsolete. Indeed, it has been argued that a central failure of the Army in addressing rising insurgency in problematic territories such as Iraq has been that counter insurgency operations have not been considered core Army activities and its impact on the national cultural framework, with a focus on conventional “real war” capabilities (Nagl, 2002; Alderson, 2007). As such, it is further submitted that to suggest that COIN strategy is being developed at the expense of real war fighting capabilities ignores the important reality that addressing insurgency and non-state sector terrorism should be considered as part of “real war fighting capabilities”. Therefore COIN strategy and real war fighting capabilities should not be considered mutually exclusive. Moreover, the strain on military resources highlighted by the use of private military contractors and private military companies to address gaps in COIN strategy further supports the argument that the British Army counter insurgency directive is necessary to address gaps in Army training initiatives in context of contemporary warfare. This is further supported when considering the potential risks posed to military strategy by the use of PMCs in such conflict zones. The risks are variable, particularly in hostile states such as Iraq, where insurgents target combatants and private contractors with equal measure (Scarhill, 2008). Furthermore, General Sir Richard Dannatt highlights the point that “the Mission hasn’t changed, but the situation and circumstances around it have- and so a new plan is needed. We believe that our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere have called us to question whether our previous assumptions regarding current practice and future development have been right” (Dannatt, 2008). To this end, the inherent flexibility of British Army doctrines as extrapolated by Nagl clearly enables strategy to remain relevant to address contemporary military needs, which in turn promotes “real war fighting” capabilities as opposed to merely becoming COIN professionals. Therefore the British Army’s official adoption of a counter insurgency operation clearly moves towards the Army’s doctrine and strategy remaining relevant, which Dannatt argues is imperative for the British Army. Moreover, Primoratz argues that the cultural and political backdrop of such states often provide fertile ground for insurgency operations such as Iraq (Primoratz, 2004). To this end, Alderson argues that an Army doctrine that fails to address counter insurgency operations is outdated by “being too redolent of fifty-year old rubber plantations, the dusty jebel and the seething, violent souk” (Alderson, 2007:8). As such, the move towards acknowledging counter insurgency in the Army doctrine is necessary and essential to acknowledging change, which is argued to be the “driving force for doctrine development” (Alderson, 2007: 9). Accordingly, the official adoption of a counter insurgency doctrine does not constitute a move towards COIN professionals at the expense of real war fighting capabilities but rather a necessary requirement in ensuring the purpose of army doctrines to address contemporary needs. Alternatively, the complexities of Iraq insurgency operations were not envisaged when troops went in on a prima facie attempt at regime change liberation. As such, whilst the previous approach may served its purpose, Alderson extrapolates that “it is important to continue to acknowledge that, whilst there are lots of crossovers between Belfast and Basra, every campaign has its own unique problems, that require bespoke strategic, operational and tactical solutions” (Alderson, 2007:9). To this end, express counter insurgency moves within military strategy should not be viewed as being part of a replacement doctrine at the expense of real war fighting capabilities. Such a narrow view of military doctrine ignores the reality that insurgency operations are a reality in warfare and therefore counter insurgency operations are vital to preserve and maintain real war fighting capabilities in order to avoid the pitfalls in the harsh lessons learned in Iraq. Nevertheless, it is submitted that such counter-insurgency operations should evaluate cultural elements in causality rather than merely operating as knee jerk stabilising operations, with no long term solutions to instability. Bibliography Alderson, A. Revising the British Army Counter Insurgency Doctrine. Available at www.rusi.org Accessed October, 2009. Army Code 71749 Army Field Manual Volume 1 Combined Arms Operations Part 10 Avant, D. Privatising Military training. Foreign policy in focus. Interhemispheric Resource Center and Institute for Policy Studies, Volume 5 No. 17 June 2000. Mira Banchik. 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Conflict and Insurgency in Contemporary Middle East. Taylor and Francis, 2009 Scarhill, J. Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army. Nation Books Revised Edition, 2008 Singer, P. War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatised Military Firms and International Law. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. Volume 42, pp. 541-549, 2004 Websites www.crisisgroup.org Read More