The Ramifications of the Soviet Union Invasion of Afghanistan - Essay Example

The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979 was one of the events that happened during the cold war era in an ongoing standoff between the two super powers as they tried to flex their economic, military and political power. History has proven, however, that this invasion which lasted for ten years was a political mistake made by the Soviet leaders. The consequences whether positive or negative have been far reaching and have undoubtedly allowed the Soviet Union to learn valuable lessons from the unforgettable occurrence. The rivalry between the two super powers was exhibited, to a large extent, in making alliances with less powerful countries. The United States establishment of military ties with Pakistan in 1954 was one event that drove the Soviet Union to seek a matching military connection. “The Soviets in return used the strategic location of Afghanistan, at the juncture of Asia and the Middle East, to counter the U.S. alliance with Pakistan and the surrounding Persian Gulf states” (Shaban 2006). This strategy did not appear to be such a difficult task for neither the Afghans nor the Soviets. Arnold (1985) pointed out that after the end of World War II Afghanistan made numerous appeals to the United States to aid in modernizing their armed forces. Their requests were constantly being denied as the Americans felt that politically and geographically Pakistan was better suited to their interests. The rise to power of Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud in 1953 renewed the request of Afghanistan in seeking aid from the United States. His request was denied as well. This led Daoud to turn his attention to the Soviet Union in asking for military assistance. At first the assistance came in the form of arms. The Soviet’s interest in Afghanistan expanded with the advanced credit of $3.5 million in the construction of some industrial buildings as well a $1.2 million in 1954 in the construction of a gasoline pipe line and related storage tanks. This assistance was happening at the same time that the United States was helping Pakistan in certain critical areas. The 1956 agreement with the Soviet Union in helping to equip the Afghan army provided the Soviets with the opportunity of forming a closer military bond with Afghanistan. Both Afghan and Soviet military personnel were afforded exchange training programs. This gave the Soviets an opportunity for assessing and recruiting individual officers to serve Soviet political aims (p.38). The Soviets invaded Afghanistan when there was much internal conflicts and turmoil within the ruling party. Although they came during the rule of Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin, a Communist sympathiser, though not a true follower of the Kremlin as they would like him to be, there was no evidence of him advocating for the presence of the Soviets. The leaders were led to believe that there was an impending attack from the West. “Neither Amin nor the Revolutionary Council had either orally or in writing asked the Soviet Union to send its troops into Afghanistan, although Soviet officials had made extensive efforts to frighten them about an imaginary danger directed at Afghanistan” (Kakar 1995:46). The invasion and occupation of Afghanistan was one that culminated in many challenges and failures for the Soviets and it also helped to highlight the shortcomings within the political structure of the communist super power. The general objectives largely rested on their intentions of transforming Afghanistan. They did not comprehend the complex nature and the intricacies within the Afghan society. They were not prepared mentally for the resistance. Years later the Soviets can look back and realize that the task of transforming the country may be virtually impossible. “We did not succeed and you will not either”, commented General Victor Yermakov (Matthews and Nemtsova 2009:2). Their aims were to bring stability to the political crisis, established a Moscow–led government and to suppress Islamic military factions. The short term ramifications for the Soviet Union were many and varied. The lack of cooperation among government officials led to mismanagement and seemingly lack of control among the men in the forefront of the invasion. There was a competition in terms of decision making among groups such as the military, the Committee for State Security (KGB), officials of Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as political advisers. Kalinovsky (1986) believed that this competition and lack of cooperation led to a partial and often inaccurate understanding in Moscow of what was happening in Afghanistan as well as confused and often contradictory policy implementation. There were three members of the Kremlin who decided that an invasion was necessary to avert an alliance between Afghanistan and the United States. The three members were Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, chief of the KGB Yuri Andropov and Dmitri Ustinov, Minister of Defence. These three members assured President Brezhnev that the military operation would be over in three or four weeks (McGeary 2003). The Soviet’s aim of entering Afghanistan to help the revolutionary government in creating a unified party with the hope of creating stability for the country could not be realized according to how situations unfolded. The military’s efforts were frustrated by the mujahedeen continued resistance to the Soviet intervention. This did not boost the image of the soviet military machinery. Undoubtedly, withdrawing from Afghanistan without having some measure of success ‘must be counted as a major political and military defeat for the USSR’ (Saikal and Maley 1989:67). The Cold War era also allowed for support of the Muslim fighters by countries such as the United States, Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia. This support came in the form of advanced weaponry largely in part from the United States which contracted the services of Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence Agency (ISI). They transported the arms and ammunition to the numerous Islamic groups within Afghanistan. The use of the Stinger anti-aircraft missiles was also successful, to a large extent, in counteracting Soviet military efforts. The Soviets death toll totalled 14,500. The defeat for the Soviets was humiliating. In a special report the Economist observed that the humiliation of that defeat, following on from the crippling cost of the campaign, helped to undermine the Soviet system itself (Economist, 2001). At the time of the invasion the Soviet Union received international condemnation and was isolated from the rest of the world. In 1980 the United Nations Security had a meeting to deal with a resolution aimed at condemning the Soviet invasion but the draft resolution was blocked by the negative vote of the Soviet Union. The United States was one of their greatest critics, blaming the Soviets for the devastation of Afghanistan. They also terminated the export of grains to the Soviet Union, discontinued Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT II) and boycotted the Olympic Games which took place in Moscow in 1980. Although the SALT agreement was signed by the presidents of the United States and the Soviet Union in 1979 President Carter requested a delay in the consideration of the treaty after the Soviets invasion and occupation. In addition, President Ronald Reagan designated March 21, 1982 as Afghanistan Day. The proclamation highlighted the condemnation of the United States and its allies. ‘The international community, with the United States joining governments around the world, has condemned the invasion of Afghanistan as a violation of every standard of decency and international law and has called for a withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan’ (Ronald Reagan – proclamation 4908). The Soviet invasion helped to worsen the weakening Soviet economy. The invasion cost in the region of $12 billion coupled with the destruction of 546 aircraft, 304 tanks, 436 armoured personnel carriers, and 2758 other vehicles (Arnold p. 100). Perhaps the greatest ramification of the Afghan invasion for the Soviet Union was the collapse of the Soviet Union itself heralding a new era and the end of the Cold War. According to Higham and Kagan (2002), the Soviet empire reached its global peak in the period from 1945 to 1979, and the end of the USSR began with the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. The invasion tarnished the political image of the Soviet Union. The strong and powerful communist icon that was portrayed to the rest of the world thus enabling it to be labelled as the second super power dissipated with the defeat of the conflict in Afghanistan. The ramifications of the invasion were also felt in the domestic political arena in the Soviet Union. The lack of strong leadership helped to weaken the Communist Party. There was corruption within the party and the demoralization of the soldiers fighting in Afghanistan helped to worsen the situation alienating many members as well as the members of the general public from the main ideologies of the communist state. Weaknesses in the centre had enabled the local ethnic and regional mafias within the party-state apparatus to increase their power. Moreover, the USSR was internationally isolated, bogged down in a draining war in Afghanistan, and facing an aggressively, hostile American President (Suny 1993:127). As the nationalistic and ethnic tendencies began to develop conditions they helped to herald the delegitimization of Communist Party rule. There was a growing reluctance and inability of Moscow to use force to impose its will (p.128). The time was ripe for Perestroika and the reforms of President Mikhail Gorbachev to take place. The savagery of the invasion placed the Soviet Union at a distance with the Muslim in many countries as well as in states within its borders. Mikhail Agursky (1989:6) comments described the beliefs of many at that time. The Afghan invasion was a fatal mistake on the part of the Soviet leadership. It transformed the peaceful and dormant state, an exemplary friend of the Soviet Union, into an enemy; it awoke the monster of fundamentalist Islam in the medieval country. It brought the USSR humiliating defeat and a deep national trauma. It will also have a devastating effect on Soviet Moslems throughout the USSR and especially in Central Asia, who will be encouraged by successful Afghan resistance to start their own guerrilla war of terrorism within the USSR. All this can be expected in the foreseeable future. His prediction was realized in the two Chechen wars with Russia in the 1990’s. One should not downplay the Islam factor in these wars with the overtly Muslim population agitating for secession from Russia. The atrocities against civilians in Afghanistan were so alarming that in 1985 a special commission of the United Nations on human rights accused the Soviets of almost completely ignoring the Geneva conventions on treatment of peaceful residents and prisoners-of-war (Khovansky 1986). The ramifications for the Soviet Union from the invasion of Afghanistan have in many cases been unfortunate and negative. The damages done by the defeat have catapulted the once stalwart Soviet empire into smaller individual political states that exist today. While Afghanistan still remains a force to be reckoned with in the on going conflict, the supposedly demise of the Soviets should serve as pointers and guides. Draft The essay will begin with an introduction of the topic. This will also include the thesis statement. The invasion of Afghanistan happened during the cold war era. The era was one of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. The conflict was established in the military, political, and economic power between the two super powers. The second paragraph will continue with a background to the invasion. The rivalry between the two super powers continued into Asia. In 1954 the United States established military ties with Pakistan. The Soviet Union strategically formed alliance with Afghanistan in response to the link with Pakistan. The unstable political situation in Afghanistan paved the way for the Soviet invasion. The invasion occurred when the country was in the middle of a civil war. The body of the essay will look at the ramifications of the invasion for the Soviet Union. This includes examining the objectives that the Soviets had hoped to achieve in the invasion and to what extent the objectives were met. This includes the effect of the invasion on the military sources as well as the effect on the soviet’s domestic problems. It will also look at the foreign relations between the Soviet Union and the International community during the period. The effect on the Soviet economy will also be a factor. The conclusion will include a summary of all that was mentioned in the body of the essay. Agursky, M., 1989. The Tragedy of Afghanistan. Jerusalem Post. Feb. 17, 6. Arnold, A., 1985. Afghanistan, the Soviet invasion in perspective. New Delhi: Hoover Press Publication. Higham, R.D.S. and Kagan, F.W., 2002. The military history of the Soviet Union. New York: Palgrave. Kakar, M.H., 1995. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response. Los Angeles: University of California Press. Kalinovosky, A., 2009. Decision-Making and the Soviet War in Afghanistan: From Intervention to Withdrawal. Cold War Studies, 11 (4), 46-73. Khovansky, S., 1986. A dissidents view: time to end the war in Afghanistan. The Washington Post. April 2, 89. McGeary, J., 2003. Soviet Folly in Afghanistan. Time, 161 (13), 61. Matthews, O, and Nemtsova, A., 2009. Learning from the Soviets. Newsweek, 154 (25), 2. Saikal, A, and Maley, W., 1989. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shaban, S., 2006. The Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth_coverage/asia/afghanistan/soviet.html. Retrieved March 14, 2010. Suny, R, G., 1993. The revenge of the past: nationalism, revolution, and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Stanford: Stanford University Press. The Economist., 2001. Special Report: A bitter harvest; Afghanistan. 360 (8239), 19. Reagan, R., 1982. Proclamation 4908 - Afghanistan Day http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=42249 Retrieved March 15, 2010. Read More