Analysis of the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan - Coursework Example

ANALYSIS OF THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN College The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was one of the defining moments of the 1980s. It is also an event that has many valuable lessons for contemporary commanders. War is an unpredictable affair, but the uncertainty can always be moderated by adopting a retrospective approach to conflicts. In truth, although every conflict has its own element of uniqueness, it also shares some attributes with others that have preceded it. In the case of the Soviets, several factors went against them, but they also made several mistakes that cost them a moral and military victory. The Soviets ended up leaving Afghanistan worse than they had found it, and making a mockery of their political and military powers. In this paper, I will analyze, at the operational level, the planning and prosecution of the campaigns waged by the principle participants in the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. This will be followed by an identification and discussion of any relevant lessons for contemporary commanders. Introduction When Soviet forces crossed into Afghanistan in 1979, many observers thought that they would execute their mission swiftly and leave without any fuss. After all, the odds favored them in just about every matchup against Afghan opposition. A decade later, the last remaining Soviet forces crossed the Friendship Bridge while withdrawing from Afghanistan with the notion of defeat dominating talk at the time. The same observers who had installed the USSR as a clear favorite in its fight against ill-equipped and poorly trained Afghan guerillas now wondered what has gone wrong. In truth, many mistakes were made even before the first battalions of troops were deployed. However, this would be exposed later in various inquests into the surprising turn of events. The intervention demonstrated the protracted nature of war, but also emphasized the importance of superior strategies at all levels: operational, tactical, and decision-making. It appears that USSR did not take any cues from the French and the Americans’ cagey and disastrous campaigns in Vietnam. Vietnam pitted conventional warfare against unconventional warfare and showed that employing one where the other is required is futile. Currently, the United States and NATO have operations in Afghanistan but, unlike the Soviets, it seems that they have learned something from history. In addition to using conventional tactics, they have employed counterinsurgent measures to secure rural and urban areas and pin back guerilla units. Planning, Operation, and Execution The decision to deploy troops was arrived at after extensive discussions and frequent appeals by the chairman of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Recent reports on the planning of the intervention reveal that Soviet leaders did not want to deploy troops in Afghanistan. Prior to the actual deployment, Soviet leaders had insisted on sending materiel instead of troops, which shows that that the actual deployment was not preceded by proper planning1. In fact, most of 1979 was spent sending materiel instead of troops. Things took a dramatic turn, however, when Nur Mohammad Taraki was deposed in a coup by Hafizulla Amin upon the former’s return from a trip to Moscow in September. Soviet leadership became increasingly paranoid about the possibility of Amin morphing into another Anwar Sadat and courting the United States after having cooperated with them2. The final decision to deploy troops was actually arrived at secretly by a small band of Politburo members and in contradiction to the military’s advice. As such, it is easy to see that the Soviets had already started on the road to failure even before launching the campaign. A very critical decision like this warranted a comprehensive debate and consensus between the military and political powerbrokers. However, it was left to a minority driven by self-interests to decide what would become a significant event in Soviet history. Other members of the Politburo only approved the decision after it had been ratified by their renegade counterparts3. Both the heads of the Soviet army and general staff expressed fierce opposition to sending troops, arguing that the number of soldiers suggested for deployment could not support the goals of the intervention. The decision to deploy was informed by scanty information. In later years, veterans of the campaign would state that KGB information was prioritized over military information of the GRU. Such a misinformed move is partially indicative of the increasing power of Yuri Andropov, who was the chairman of the KGB at the time. Andropov managed the information accessible to Leonid Brezhnev, the general secretary who was sick and debilitated for most of 1979. KGB intelligence from Afghanistan manipulated the situation on the ground, exaggerating the urgency and desperation of the predicaments facing the ruling party. KGB reports also overstressed the likelihood of Amin’s relations with the CIA and American espionage operations in the region4. It is now clear that the KGB used a 1979 decision by President Carter to approve a covert mission supporting Afghani opponents of the government of the day. Afghanistan was incongruent with the mental pictures and ideological thinking of the USSR leaders5. Their assessments of Afghanistan’s internal social dynamics were based on the theoretical view of Marxist-Leninist ideology. This impeded the Soviet leadership’s critical perspectives and impeded a realistic view of traditional Afghan society, which was very ethnic. Convinced that there was no one country in the world which was not ready for communism, some Politburo members thought Afghanistan was Mongolia 2.0. Such notions led to the misinformed moves to impose foreign social and economic programs on Afghan society (e.g., mandatory land reform). The Soviet leadership did not consider the powerful influence of Islam in Afghanistan. The Soviet government and academic facilities had very few authorities on Islam, so they could not give them sound advice on how to deal with Islam’s influence in the country6. In the end, they deployed troops without even considering this dimension, and it ended up costing them dearly. The highest Soviet leadership was largely uninformed or misinformed about the power of religious practices among Afghans. Military and political luminaries were later shocked to find that instead of being seen as an aggressive anti-imperialist entity, Afghanis viewed the Soviets as infidels and foreign occupiers. Later during the war, reports from Afghanistan revealed Soviet military and political leaders’ growing comprehension of the Islamic dimension. By this time, however, it was too late; the war could not be won on the ground or in the hearts and minds of Afghans. The Soviet Army was not only ill-equipped in terms of unconventional warfare, but also suffered from inadequacies in planning and clarity of the overall mission. The initial objective, which was to protect cities and vital structures, was soon extended to operational duties and kept expanding over time7. As a result of casualties suffered and damages to equipment, the Soviet leadership was forced to deploy reservists to combat the growing threat of Afghan guerillas. The regular Afghan army, which should have been trained and armed by the Soviets prior to the deployment of troops, proved to be unreliable due to indiscipline and desertions. Ultimately, the USSR was left with the option of using its own personnel and equipment in a region its troops were unfamiliar with and where the enemy used tactics they had never encountered before. This led to demoralization among the troops and the commanders and, ultimately, set the stage for the failure of the intervention and the embarrassing withdrawal. While the official mission was to secure the public from anti-government units, Soviet troops often ended up fighting against the people they were supposed to protect8. Anti-government and anti-Soviet forces looked and acted like civilians until they struck. This created a heightened sense of paranoia among Soviet troops and led to indiscriminate attacks on innocent civilians. This, in turn, turned the public against them, meaning they were now fighting two enemies, the public, and the guerillas. Operations to identify and capture guerilla installations were usually futile and had to be repeated severally in the same locations because the guerillas advanced from and retreated to the mountains and villages as soon as the troops went back to their posts. Due to lack of clarity on the goals, there was enough confusion to cause accidents and demoralization, which led to numerous failures of critical missions and objectives. Although their original orders were to protect Amin’s regime, they were ordered to depose him and his administration as soon as they reached Kabul. The mission morphed again severally, but the Soviet leadership did not want to concede that their soldiers were basically helping the PDPA by fighting the country’s civil war9. The idea of global policing that the Soviet Limited Contingent was implementing in Afghanistan was fundamentally ideological and driven by the notion that the troops were safeguarding the communist revolution in the country. As a matter of fact, it was betrayed by the events on the ground, which portrayed the campaign negatively and undermined such logic. Contrary to popular opinion, it dawned on the Soviet leadership the situation in Afghanistan could not be remedied militarily within the first year of the intervention. In fact, the idea of withdrawal and the quest for a political remedy were proposed as early as August 1980. However, probably due to the fear of admitting defeat and looking weak, the Soviet leadership did not pursue these options10. Instead, it left troops to continue fighting with no understanding of their mission and objectives. These mistakes led to the drawn-out nature of the campaign and demonstrated poor judgment and actions on the part of the Soviets. Early reports showed that Soviet troops would struggle to operate in Afghan topography, for which the army was not familiar with at all. Later records even show that Soviet political and military leaders drew parallels with the US’s campaign in Vietnam and found that the situations were eerily similar. However, once again, no action was taken to limit the damage already done, and the intervention accelerated towards its doom11. In its overall makeup, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan suits the flexible conceptual framework of compound conflict, although it also displayed its own numerous unique attributes. In any event, the analytical framework of compound conflicts enables a better comprehension of the intervention. It would be an understatement to say that following the deployment of troops, the Soviets were surprised that they were even engaging Afghan guerillas in the first place. This was exacerbated by the fact that the enemy was supported by an intimidating ally with impressive military strength (the United States). Although America never participated in the conflict directly, the impact of its influence nevertheless affected the strategic outlook profoundly. Moreover, because they had lesser supporters, the Muhajideen found important havens that the Soviets were compelled to honor for broader diplomatic purposes12. Confronted with these challenges, which they could have prepared for but did not, the Soviets faced losses and frustration in abundance. Initially, the Soviets’ well-planned and executed surprise intervention appeared to meet its objectives, which were to capture Kabul, change the regime, and control the main communication lines. In reality, it was just a matter of days before the Mujahideen started launching counterattacks and providing resistance in many areas. Although it was disorganized, the guerilla movement was popular and was significantly bolstered by international moral, diplomatic, and military support13. The Mujahideen were well-schooled in Soviet military tactics since many of them had received training in the USSR. When attacked by Soviet troops, they withdrew to the mountains and the countryside to avoid massive casualties and, in the process, suffered only minor losses. These tactics were so effective that Soviet military commanders started growing disillusioned with the whole campaign. Due to the Soviet’s destructive strategies that displaced thousands of people, many Afghans became refugees in their own country, and even more hostile to the Soviets and the new puppet regime. As troops patrolled the villages, they would come under surprise attacks from refugees who used weapons supplied by the Mujahideen and international allies to inflict heavy casualties on Soviet troops and destroy their equipment14. For example, the campaign in the Kanur Valley was a massive failure that resulted in Soviet troops withdrawing from the area, a sign of what would come later. It also represented what formed a pervasive trend: strategic victories that did not lead to concrete, tactical benefits. Due to the multiethnic and fragmented structure of the Mujahideen, the Soviets found it virtually impossible to establish a real focal point for military and political interventions in the country. Soviet political and military planners could not settle on a tribe or tribes to target in order to improve their chances of success. The different tribes, led by the Pashtuns, prevented the Soviets from ever finding a true friend or foe to capitalize on. The diffuse but almost far-reaching presence of the Mujahideen across Afghanistan prevented Soviet troops from identifying a suitable target against which they could concentrate their power. The Mujahideen also managed to put aside their differences and hostilities – albeit temporarily – to fight foreign occupation. This allowed them to offer stern resistance that was ultimately unbroken by the Soviets. Excellently adapted to the mountainous geography and harsh climate of Afghanistan, the Mujahideen could launch surprise attacks anywhere and organized ambushes and then disappear into the villages and mountains15. Most importantly, they drew huge moral motivation from the protection of their homes, lifestyle, and culture. In essence, they were the perfect representation of the impact of motive force in any form of warfare. Lessons For the Soviets, the invasion of Afghanistan was an embarrassing chapter in its political and military history. To date, Russia is still haunted by the ghosts of Afghanistan, especially the blatant failures in logistics, planning, preparation, and execution. Modern commanders can learn a lot from the Soviets’ mistakes in Afghanistan, and these lessons can be used to develop better strategies for countering insurgencies across the world. As a matter of fact, United States and NATO can use the mistakes made by the USSR to manage the current situation in Afghanistan more effectively than they are doing now16. To present a clear perspective of the lessons that can be taken from the Soviet incursion, it is important to outline the mistakes made by the USSR. Without errors, there would not be any real lessons to be taken from the situation. The misjudgments that led to the whole adventure being described as a failure will be discussed as part of the lessons that modern military commanders and even politicians can draw from the USSR’s doomed operations. Use the Right Form of Warfare Soviet forces deployed in Afghanistan did not have adequate training in unconventional warfare. In fact, it could be said that the entire Soviet armed forces were not proficient in guerilla warfare. The whole world, apart from the Soviets, knew that Afghanistan’s geography and conflict situations did not support conventional warfare. From the terrain to the personnel fighting for different causes, the country was a hotbed of guerrilla warfare and insurgencies. It is hard to understand why the Soviets chose to employ conventional forces and tactics in a country dominated by unconventional forces and strategies17. So what is the lesson here? War can only be won by using the right tactics, and this demands targeting the enemy’s weaknesses, not facing it at its strongest points. The same point can be made for the Vietnam War, where the United States and France approached the conflict with conventional tactics that favored the Vietcong18. Although Americans and the French do not like to admit it, the Vietnam War was another massive military failure necessitated by employing the wrong form of warfare. Strategic bombing and air superiority do not count in guerilla conflicts as much as they do in conventional ones. The fighting forces must be on the ground and must be sufficiently trained in unconventional tactics to stand a chance of prevailing over insurgencies and counterinsurgencies19. Soviet armored personnel carriers and tanks were extremely exposed on Afghan geography. Conventional strategies that would have been ideal for waging war in European plains were sterile in the rugged topography of Afghanistan. This notion is confirmed by a memo written by the Politburo at the conclusion of the invasion and copied to all members of the communist party20. In the memo, the Politburo acknowledged that the government did not conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the distinct topographical aspects of Afghanistan – which it called a “hard-to-enter-country” – before launching the invasion. In essence, the Soviet leadership was conceding that it was complacent and poor in its preparation for the incursion into Afghanistan. The letter continued by stating that the poor assessment manifested in the operations of Soviet forces, especially when facing small, extremely mobile guerilla units. Finally, it acknowledged that such a serious mistake killed all the chances of success its forces could have had, and made very few goals attainable, even with all the sophisticated military technology it could muster21. In the modern military environment, the mistakes made by the Soviets are still very much relevant to any form of conflict. Military commanders should conduct thorough evaluations of their intended targets before launching operations. If the area of engagement supports conventional warfare then unconventional tactics should not be used, and vice-versa22. Although the United States and NATO have incurred thousands of casualties since 2001, they have matched guerrilla units’ preferred unconventional strategies and managed to pin them back in many areas. War is never won or lost in the field; it is won or lost in the boardrooms and meetings where planning takes place. Using the wrong form of warfare is a precursor to failure. Establish Political Legitimacy As much as military strategists may want to avoid politics, it is a fundamental component of any victorious military campaign. It is easier to claim short-term success in a conflict, but any invading country that wants long-term success should use politics as an instrument for ensuring that the victories achieved in the field are supported by political goodwill. If the invading country supports a regime that is unwanted by a majority of the population, that is a recipe for failure23. The people will simply put the aggressors and the government of the day in one corner and oppose them with everything they have. This creates significant opposition and can make a campaign that was intended to be concluded quickly drawn out and extremely costly. It inspires armed, religious, and political opposition, and this extends the length and casualties of an invasion. The result is an increase in instability and religious and political propaganda. This problem can be solved in two ways. First, the invading country should identify whether or not the current regime is favored by a majority of the population24. If it is, then it should receive all the support it needs. In the event that it does not, it should be uprooted and a new leadership supported by the citizenry should be installed. This will result in the invading country and the government being viewed favorably and not as enemies that need to be fought. Political legitimacy is especially important in situations where the invading country is trying to implement its political ideologies. This can create enormous challenges, particularly if such ideologies contradict the prevailing conditions25. In 1988, Afghans refused to wait ignorantly for the current administration to show its ability and readiness to provide concrete outcomes of the socialist uprising. Despite the fact that some Soviet analysts forecasted that victory over counterrevolutionary units would require at least 5 years even in good conditions, they forgot to consider early enough the existence of a breaking point in the logic of Afghans regarding their stoicism for an alien occupation and for the introduction of benevolent leadership. In 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev informed the Politburo of his feeling that the USSR should act fast in creating measures aimed at national reconciliation, enhancing collaboration with the peasantry, and cementing the political leadership of Afghanistan’s ruling party26. People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was not trusted by a majority of Afghans, and because it was supported by the Soviets, USSR automatically became the enemy as well. Instead of an ideal breeding ground for a socialist revolution, the result was a massive demoralization of Afghans, a dilution of any gains made, and a complication of the objectives. While the Soviets were supporting the government and fighting insurgents, the peasantry (comprising 80% of the population) continued living in squalor and blaming the administration and, by extension, USSR27. To make matters worse, data at the time revealed that only 5 million of the 18 million Afghans could lay claim to the government. Ultimately, with majority of the population opposing them and the regime they supported, armed uprisings became the order of the day, and the USSR lost all political goodwill it could have had before the invasion if it supported a popular regime28. Understand Local Ethnic and Religious Dynamics Ethnicity and religion are a vital aspect of many countries’ affairs. These two dimensions influence everything from political appointments, distribution of wealth, and opportunities. Religious and ethnic dynamics should be clearly understood by political and military strategists of the invading country29. Efforts to reconcile people and create unified regimes that support and enhance the success of military operations can be significantly hampered by an inability to comprehend and capitalize on ethnic and religious difference. It is vital to understand the sentiments and roles of the various communities, and how these influence the overall stability of the country. These issues are especially important in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, where ethnic and religious differences influence virtually everything30. Foreign invaders might underestimate these factors and prepare the ground for failure even before launching operations. For instance, in some countries some communities are known for dominating different spheres of culture, politics, education, etc. For instance, community A might be known for political domination; community B may be known for academic excellence while community B may be known for running the economy31. In such societies, tensions are likely to flare up if the status quo is upset. However, the situation could be worse if military and political strategists do not understand the religious and ethnic dynamics that shape a country’s affairs32. This could lead to mistakes such installing a president from community C, leading to uprisings from community A, and creating volatile situations that complicate the tasks at hand. When the Soviets launched their campaign in Afghanistan, they instituted policy measures aimed at fostering national reconciliation. However, these efforts failed because they underestimated the influence of ethnic tensions in that society. Within the PDPA, the two prominent ethnicities (the Khalq and the Parcham) could not see past their preexisting conflicts. To exacerbate the situation, other Afghans opposed reconciliation initiatives because they mistrusted the PDPA since it had not roots at the village level33. The Soviets were intentionally hesitant to assign responsibilities to traditional centers of influence, and this made them a sworn enemy of many different ethnicities. From this juncture, there was no way they were going to achieve a military or political victory in Afghanistan; they had failed to observe the ethnic tensions that dominated the country34. Conclusion The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was a failure, mainly due to poor planning, preparation, execution, and decision-making. The other important factor was the stubbornness and tactics employed by the Mujahideen, and the international support they received. Diminished to its basics, Soviet tactics for triumph in Afghanistan depended on the achievement of 5 critical goals, all of which concentrated largely on destroying the Mujahideen. First, they wanted to control the main urban centers and communication lines. In this regard, they managed, albeit tenuously, to control Kabul, the largest and most populous city at the beginning of the war. With the ascendance of Babrak Karmal, who was their preferred choice for president, to power, the Soviets managed to control all important state departments and installations. Had the country been more stable as a government to start with, the superiority obtained might have been significant. In most first-world countries, for instance, control of the capital would hold huge symbolic meaning. Previous Soviet interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1956 and 1969 respectively ascertained, beyond a reasonable doubt, the effectiveness of this tactic. However, this strategy could not be replicated in Afghanistan. In contrast to Prague or Budapest, Kabul was not Afghanistan’s psychological focal point. At every juncture, state authority needed military support. As a result, the local legitimacy of the regime was limited. Bibliography Banks, William. Making Sense of Proxy Wars States, Surrogates & the Use of Force. Edited by Michael A. Innes. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2012. Borer, Douglas A. Superpowers Defeated: Vietnam and Afghanistan Compared. 5th, Paperback ed. London: Routledge, 2013. Collins, Joseph J. Understanding the War in Afghanistan: A Guide to the Land, the People, and the Conflict. London: Skyhorse Publishing, 2013. Dimitrakis, Panagiotis. The Secret War in Afghanistan the Soviet Union, China and the Role of Anglo-American Intelligence. Illustrated ed. London: I.B. Tauris, 2013. Dodds, Klaus. Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction. 2nd Revised ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Dupree, Louis. Afghanistan. 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