Course of Action Statement and Sketch - Coursework Example

 of Action ment I. Mission ment As the staff officer for 25 SBCT, I have been tasked to provide a of Action ment for the order of battle against Ahurastan. As intelligence assessments predict that the enemy’s forces will not attack prior to 3 June 2017, which should give the unit approximately eighty-five days to prepare and be in position. The SBCT has been attached to the 4ID for operational support of its Area of Operations (AO). Although EUCOM CFLCC OPLAN 59991-17 is still a work in progress and 4ID does not have their battle plans cemented, it is expected that the SBCT will have lead in the battle, as it is the only unit fully deployed in the AO. II. Intent The 4ID CG has announced his intent to disallow Ahurastan movement below PL White and to neutralize SATA in the AO, all the while protecting civilian assets in the AO. As SATA can only sustain itself for a maximum two weeks, the second objective is fairly simple. The 11th Commando Brigade will no doubt present the largest problem in terms of enemy capability. Heavy units such as ours can only offer defensive operations against Special Forces type attacks and they will probably attack soft targets such as civilians, bridges, and roads The terrain and vegetation are not challenging while the June weather (averaging in the eighties) does not appear to present a problem either. III. Decisive operation In accordance with Field Manual (FM) 3-21-31 (2003), “Decisive operations at any echelon (accomplished by a designated main effort) directly achieve the purpose of the mission of the higher headquarters. At the SBCT level, there is only one decisive operation”. By that definition, once the attack by Ahurastan forces occurs, EUCOM will automatically switch to Phase 2, which is Seize the Initiative. With 4ID aviation assets disrupting enemy forces, it is hoped that the SBCT will be able to accomplish its main decisive operation as established by the 4ID CG, to designate two routes through AO for passage and to close said routes on/order. These routes have been designated on the map as the primary and alternate route. AA1 has been preliminary chosen as the primary route because of the dam adjacent to AA2. If the Commandos choose to sabotage the dam, road traffic would be cut off, especially considering there is no improved bridge on AA2. IV. Shaping operations Because the 4ID battle plans are not finalized as of this date, it is impossible to determine whether the division CG will require simultaneous shaping and decisive operations. Therefore this COS will assume they will be separate entities. In order to maintain the Decisive Operations as described above, SBCT fires teams will be established at integral areas along both designated routes, as well attempting to neutralize all enemy assets in the AO. As it slow to move them, Engineer assets should be mobilized closer to AA2 with a fires team in order to keep that route operational in case AA1 is overrun. If the area is not as heavily attacked as is predicted, the engineers can work on preparing a possible bridge over the ARAKS, even temporary will work in the event of an emergency. V. Sustaining operations By the FM, sustainment operations are conducted throughout the area of operations, so it would probably be best to break the sustainment down into the levels as discussed in Chapter 1 of the FM. The Op Order states the SBCT should be prepared to accomplish this mission for “several weeks”, until the Task Force is fully deployed and operational, a large order considering support is “austere”. V.1 Movement Military Police will provide movement control along the designated routes, especially once enemy forces have been neutralized. This will be one shortfall for the SBCT, as the MP’s will be stretched extremely thin along some 120 kilometers of roadway. If there are any MP assets available, perhaps the 4ID CG can attach them to the Combat Team, to augment our own forces. V.2 Security (Including rear area) This factor includes lines of communication, which should be accomplished readily with the SBCT’s own commo assets. For this reason, satellite and microwave communications equipment should be made secure in the rear area. For rear security, since the 4ID and SBCT CP’s will be co-located, one platoon of the rifle companies should be rotated to there on a continual basis, augmented with the forces of the CP command staff. V.3 CSS This will definitely be a shortfall, as the SBCT is expected to deploy to the forward area with its basic load (maybe fifteen days) and support will be far away. The Team will have to learn to conserve fuel, food, and ammunition until the team is either relieved or augmented. The support battalions will also no doubt face repair part shortages, especially as vehicles and equipment become incapacitated due to battle damage. Due to destruction and/or non-repairable damage, it can probably be estimated that twenty per cent of the team’s equipment will be unusable by D+10, when it is hoped mop-up and sustainment operations occur. The 4ID is providing a medical support team as well, so with their vehicles as well as ours, ambulance and casualty support should go well. Also, if intelligence is indeed correct and chemical/biological weaponry is not to be utilized in this conflict, the chemical people’s vehicle assets could also be utilized. The only malfunction seen is the possible lack of MEDEVAC support, for it is not mentioned anywhere in the support. Even with our highly skilled medical staff, it can be expected that casualties will occur and some will require evacuation to rear hospitals. Also, what about the swift removal of KIA? Would the failure to do so not be against US Policy? WORKS CITED Field Manual (FM) 3-21-31, The Stryker Brigade Combat Team, USGPO: Washington, 2003, Print. Read More