The Ambiguity of National Self-Determination: Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia - Essay Example

The Ambiguity of National Self-Determination: Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia It is ironic that countries which once relied upon principles of national self-determination in order to create and sustain unitary nation-states following the First World War later relied upon the same precepts in fragmenting these unitary nation-states into separate states. In Yugoslavia, for instance, Serbian centralism was able to moderate Croatian separatist urges and to incorporate a variety of different ethnic and racial groups into an overarching and multiethnic nation-state. In much the same way, despite the fact that national minorities accounted for more than 33% of its total population, Czechoslovakia was also able to create a viable unitary state based upon the slogan of "one nation for two tribes" (Bakke, 2002: 90). That these unitary states would be destroyed following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the Soviet Union was perhaps not as important as the manner by which these nation-states disintegrated. The process in Yugoslavia was extraordinarily violent, and notions of national self-determination and territorial sovereignty led to substantial conflict and bloodshed; on the other hand, the process of state disintegration in Czechoslovakia was much more moderate and civil, leading one commentator to characterize this period of Czech history as the period of the "Velvet Revolution to the Velvet Divorce" (Bakke, 2002: 92). This essay will argue that these differences were the result of different approaches to minority rights, different demographic realities which made a more peaceful secession much more difficult in Yugoslavia, and certain ingrained philosophies regarding the legitimacy of national self-determination. 1.1 National Self-Determination: Theory and Conflicting Interpretations As a preliminary matter, before examining how Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia viewed secession, it is necessary to examine the common understanding of the terms used. The fundamental problem, as noted by Bakke, is that "The principle of national self-determination is as ambiguous as the nation concept itself. In old Rome, the word natio was used about foreigners from the same geographical region, who were below the Romans in status. In modern time, nation has come to mean a sovereign people and a unique people" (2002: 93). This ambiguity is particularly illustrative in the instant case; it is illustrative because some people view national self-determination as a civic nation encompassing a variety of ethnic and cultural groups whereas other people have interpreted national self-determination as the right of groups with distinct cultural and ethnic characteristics to have their own autonomous state. As history has demonstrated, the Czech people generally subscribed to the civic notion before relenting and recognizing the cultural and ethnic aspects of national self-determination; Yugoslavia, on the other hand, was torn by a stubborn Serbian adherence to the Roman natio interpretation. The Serbians held steadfast to the civic notion, demanding the preservation of the multiethnic unitary state, whereas Croatia and other regions relied on the cultural ethnic interpretation of national self-determination. A reconciliation of these ambiguous interpretations was resolved peacefully in Czechoslovakia, but unreconciled in Yugoslavia. One simply cannot engage in a comparative analysis of these two formerly unitary nation-states without understanding the role which ethnicity played. Following the First World War and decolonization, national self-determination tended to represent freedom and political and economic independence; later, however, as these newly formed unitary states evolved, people with their own unique cultural and ethnic characteristics often sought to incorporate notions of cultural sovereignty and territorial integrity into their articulation of national self-determination. Indeed, as stated by Hannum, Ethnic wars of secession highlight the inherent tension between "self-determination" and "sovereignty" or "territorial integrity." One problem in developing coherent responses to such conflicts has been the vagueness of these terms. In the context of decolonization, self-determination meant immediate independence, but there has been continuing disagreement over its applicability to noncolonial situations. Lip service is also routinely paid to the principle of territorial integrity, but the shattering of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Ethiopia within the past decade is a precedent not lost on many "nations" that would be states" (1998: 67). These were, in many ways, evolutionary aspirations for statehood. It is true, as amongst the Croats and the Slovaks, that separatist urges were always undercurrents as these national minorities were absorbed by larger unitary nation-states. Still, it took significant changes in geopolitical realities, such as the demise of the Soviet Union, for these claims for autonomous states to be taken seriously. The manner in which these claims were made, and the consequences, will be addressed in the next sections of this essay. 1.2 The Czech Approach: The Velvet Divorce It would be incorrect to argue that the process or the proffered justifications, as opposed to the underlying ethnic realities, for creating a multiethnic state were different in Czechoslovakia than elsewhere. Czechoslovakia was faced with the same ambiguities that confronted other nation-states considering issues of national self-determination. In many ways, the multiethnic amalgamations previously represented by empires were simply replaced within smaller administrative units designated as sovereign nation-states. The early notion that national self-determination did not necessarily imply separate states for separate ethnic groups was implied in the preamble to the 1920 Czech constitution, which stated matter of factly that, "We, the Czechoslovak nation, declare that we will endeavor to carry out this constitution [] in the spirit of the modern principles embodied in the slogan of self-determination" (Bakke, 2002: 95). A view of Czech census statistics from 1921 demonstrates that this new unitary state was highly diverse: ethnic Czechs represented 50.8 percent of the population, ethnic Slovaks represented 14.7 percent, ethnic Germans represented 23.4 percent, ethnic Magyars represented 5.6 percent, ethnic Ruthenians represented 3.5 percent, Jews represented 1.4 percent, and ethnic Poles represented 0.6 percent. (Bakke, 2002: footnote 1). Following disintegration of the unitary state, by contrast, ethnic Czechs now represent roughly 95 percent of the population in the Czech republic, and ethnic Slovaks represent roughly 86 percent in Slovakia, with ethnic Hungarians now representing the largest minority group. In short, it can be seen that a couple of significant things were accomplished. First, despite a traditional interpretation of national self-determination which favored incorporating ethnic minorities into a larger unitary state, the majority Czechs and the minority Slovaks were able to broaden their interpretations peacefully in order to accommodate the territorial and political aspirations of a minority ethnic group (Krej and Machonin, 1996: 346). Second, in sharp contrast to Yugoslavia, the ethnic groups were peacefully relocated and, for the most part, volunteered to move to new territorial boundaries. To be sure, there were no allegations of ethnic cleansing in Czechoslovakia. Oddly enough, the disintegration in Czechoslovakia was precipitated by a constitutional crisis. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, many countries in eastern Europe exercised haste in drafting and implementing new constitutions, "but Czechoslovakia was the only country where the failure to agree on a constitution contributed to the division of the state" (Bakke, 2002: 91). This failure to agree on a new constitution was reduced to a question as to how to best accommodate and incorporate ethnic Slovaks into the new constitutional system. The ethnic Czechs, themselves long the victims of oppression from the likes of Hitler and Soviet leaders, were quite sensitive to the principle of minority rights (Stein, 1997: 58). The time was thus ripe, at least from the Slovak point of view, to begin pressing for the creation of an independent state. This would solve thorny constitutional issues regarding the scope of minority rights and protections, and it would remove ethnic politics from both of the new states. There remained, however, many Czechs and Slovaks whom wanted a cooperative federation of two nations; in the long run, Czechoslovakia was formally dissolved and the disintegration of the state was accomplished in a peaceful manner. This civility, on the did not prevail in Yugoslavia. 1.3 The Yugoslavian Approach: The Bloody Divorce That Yugoslavian disintegration did not proceed peacefully can be explained by contrasting certain philosophical and demographic features with Czechoslovakia. First, national self-determination was never envisioned as a concept which would allow ethnic minorities to secede from the larger nation-state. The Serbs, in contrast to the more flexible Czechs, have always been adamant in this respect. Second, from a demographic point of view, ethnic minorities mingled with ethnic majorities and were hesitant to relocate to new territorial boundaries (Mostov, 1988: 107). Thus, at the same time that there were claims for greater political and economic autonomy, the demographics on the ground were such that the creation of culturally and ethnically distinct states was resisted by vast segments of the population; in effect, politicians wanted increased power without being able to devise mechanisms for persuading their ethnic constituencies to relocate and claim citizenship in a new state (Thomas, 1994: 43). Finally, there were religious and geopolitical considerations in Yugoslavia which were absent in Czechoslovakia. The Czechs, for instance, did not have to negotiate with a substantial Muslim minority being supported by foreign nations such as Iran and Turkey. The Yugoslavian context, in nearly every substantive respect, was fundamentally different than that in Czechoslovakia. In addition, there was a sense of Serbian arrogance and dominance which was at times cruel and brutal. If the Czechs had managed to respect Slovak rights to some extant, the Serbians often treated ethnic minorities as inferior subjects; indeed, as stated by Mostov, For Serbia, the Yugoslav state became nothing more than a vehicle for Serbian domination, which, in turn, stimulated Croatian national opposition. The first Yugoslav state (1918-41) was not only unable to pacify internal conflicts and dilute rigid national ideologies, but its collapse in World War II left no mechanisms in place to prevent extreme methods of resolving the national question (1988: 111). In short, ethnic minorities were dealt with harshly, were punished and repressed rather than given a voice in national affairs, and the issue regarding their proper place in Yugoslavian society was buried beneath the soldiers' feet. To be fair, ethnic Serbs were also dominated and abused by outside powers; though Tito was often praised as constituting an independent voice within the Soviet Bloc, he too had limits. Thus, in hindsight, that Yugoslavia resorted to violence should not be too surprising. There was disagreement about the meaning of national self-determination, there were disagreements about how to allocate territorial boundaries in the event of secession, and there were outside countries supporting different ethnic groups. In effect, the problems became almost cyclical; more specifically, the more that one ethnic group conceded, the more that other ethnic groups sought more autonomy and more beneficial territorial boundaries. As stated by Thomas, "Although the Yugoslav problem began as one of the right of national self-determination among its several internal "nations," subsequently it became a conflict of contested boundaries among newly created states and of new disgruntled and/or fearful minorities within these states" (1994: 41). In Czechoslovakia, ethnic groups were peacefully relocated to new territorial boundaries; in Yugoslavia, this did not happen, and the distinction between nations and states became nearly impossible to resolve. In the end, the international community did attempt to impose a sort of national self-determination scheme for Croats, Slovenes, Muslims, and Slavic Macedonians. Whether the disintergration of Yugoslavia will evolve peacefully is still very much in doubt 1.5 Conclusions In the final analysis, a comparative analysis of the disintegration of unitary states in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia demonstrates a few lessons. First, and most important, is the ambiguity of the principle of national self-determination. This is a principle which is quite old, which is discussed in universities and political offices alike, and which is open to conflicting interpretations. How one defines national self-determination, in terms of entitlement and scope, can go a long way towards more appropriately defining acceptable expectations among ethnic minorities and ethnic majorities. That Czechs interpreted national self-determination in one way, and Serbs another way, is simply unacceptable. The international community ought to choose a definition, vote on it, and implement it as the guiding principle for national self-determination in the twenty-first century. Of course, this is often easier said than done; the notion that China, for instance, might adopt a Czech approach with millions and millions of ethnic Muslims in the north is highly dubious. Second, the extant and the quality of the ethnic diversity are exceptionally important. The Czechs and the Slovaks certainly had more in common than the Serbs and the Croats--or the Croats and the Muslims. To simply believe that the Velvet Divorce could have been superimposed onto a more diverse Yugoslavian context would have been foolishly idealistic; even today, with the presence of the international community, the prospects for a harmonious co-existence between and among the separate ethnic groups is dubious. Were the international community to withdraw, the violence very well might continue. Finally, on an optimistic note, it has been proven that the principle of national self-determination can be interpreted expansively, negotiated to suit local conditions, and implemented successfully as in the case of the former Czechoslovakia. Works Cited Bakke, Elisabeth. The principle of national self-determination in Czechoslovak constitutions 1920-1992. Central European Political Science Review vol. 3, no. 10, pp. 88-125, 2002. Hannum, Hurst. The Specter of Secession: Responding to Claims for Ethnic Self- Determination in Foreign Affairs, vol: 77 no: 2, March, April 1998. Krej, Jaroslav and Machonin, Pavel. Czechoslovakia 1918-92. A laboratory for Social change. London: Macmillan. (1996). Mostov, Julie. "Democracy and Decision-making," in Yugoslavia: A Fractured Federalism, ed. Dennison Rusinow. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1988, pp.105-119. Stein, Eric. Czecho/Slovakia. Ethnic conflict, constitutional fissure, negotiated breakup. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. (1997). Thomas, Raju. Nations, States, and Secession: Lessons from the Former Yugoslavia. Mediterranean Quarterly vol. 5 no. 4, 1994. pp. 40-65. Published by Duke University Press under the editorial direction of Mediterranean Affairs, Inc. Read More