Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) - Term Paper Example

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Introduction There is no doubt terrorism is one of the greatest threats to national, regional, and international peace and security. Terrorist groups from various parts of the world have been at the centre of this major threat issue for decades (Cook 2009). These groups are involved in planning and coordinating terrorist activities, as well as executing terrorist attacks against their targets. Besides, these groups have been propagating extremist ideas regarding various issues of world order and, as a result, inspire certain individuals and groups to sympathize with them and embrace terrorism as a means of achieving certain ends (Larkin and Michael 2012). Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) is one of such organizations. This paper will discuss PIJ within the context of its organization, origins, ideology, goals, and objectives. In addition, it will discuss its leadership, funding, and capabilities such as physical bases or support/operating location(s), communications methods, training programs, and personnel strengths. The paper will finally provide a description of suspected and known lethal agents/weapons and delivery methods, as well as surveillance methods, propaganda, procedures in prior attacks, and significant dates/events that may be used in planning attacks. The PIJ was founded in the late 1970s by three radical Palestinian students, Bashir Moussa, Fathi Shikaki, and Abdul Aziz Odeh, who were studying in Egypt (Alexander 2002). This group was an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist and Sunni religious movement which origin lies in Egypt. It aims at seeking broad moral, political, and social reforms based upon the Islamic principles (Hatina 2001). The founders of this group believed that the Muslim Brotherhood had abandoned the Palestinian cause and that they had become very moderate. The formation of PIJ was inspired by the Shi’a Islamic revolution that had taken place in Iran. He PIJ blended Sunni Islamic fundamentalism, Shi’a revolutionary thought, and Palestinian nationalism into its ideological agenda. The United States has designated this group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (Rashid 2003). This group believed that the liberation of Palestinians and annihilation of Israel are prerequisites for the creation of a pan-Islamic empire. The group further stressed that the conflict between Israel and Arabs is over a fundamentally religious conflict and not so much over territory (Cook 2009). It is against this background that the group rejected any diplomatic activity or political arrangements aimed towards resolving the conflict. The group believes that jihadist violence will eventually inspire Palestinians to action and ultimately lead to the destruction of Israel (Litvak 2010). The main goal of the group remains violent destruction of Israel. To achieve this, the group does not show interest in joining the political process of resolving any dispute between Israel and Arabs. In addition, PIJ continually attempts to injure Israel military personnel and civilians through terrorism acts (Hatina 2001). It is worth noting that PIJ was initially operating out of Egypt but its leadership was exiled to Gaza Strip after the assassination of the Egyptian President in 1981 - Anwar Sadat. It carried out a series of attacks on Israel soldiers in Gaza in the early 1980s. The first Palestinian Intifada that started in 1987 saw the PIJ leadership being exiled to Lebanon (Larkin and Michael 2012). As a result, many of its leaders established direct contact with Iranian officials through the Islamic Republic’s embassies in Damascus and Beirut. Its operatives soon started training in Lebanon at Hezbollah camps under the supervision of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran (Alexander 2002). These operatives became stationed in Lebanon and carried out some operations against Israeli forces during 1990s in south Lebanon in collaboration with Hezbollah. PIJ’s headquarters is in Damascus and was established in 1989. The group opposed the 1993 Oslo Accords strongly and severally attempted to derail the process of peace by committing several terrorist attacks against Israel (Kepel 2002). This prompted action from the Israeli forces who dealt the group a severe blow in 1995 when they assassinated its leader, Shaqaqi, in Malta. Nonetheless, PIJ sprang back to life in 2000 with the start of the al-Aqsa Intifada. Since then, it has claimed responsibility for a number of terrorist attacks in Israel. This has reflected the greater coordination of the group with other militant groups such as the Palestinian security services and Hamas (Litvak 2010). While PIJ remains a relatively small militant and terrorist organization with limited support base, it receives funding from different sources, has structured leadership and capabilities, such as communications methods, physical bases or operating/support location(s), training programs, and personnel strengths (Rashid 2003). It is widely believed that PIJ receives funding from Iran. Actually, it is believed that its revival can be greatly attributed to the increase of funding from Iran. The PIJ office in Damascus directs funding and coordination to terrorist activities in Gaza and West Bank. Syria is accused of allowing Iranian weaponry to pass through its territory en route militant groups in Palestine such as PIJ (Cook 2009). Since its inception, PIJ has had active leadership that has been involved in planning, coordination, and execution of its activities. Its founding leaders were Sheikh Abd al-Aziz Awda, Fathi Shaqaqi, and Bashir Moussa. The two founding leaders are still alive but Fathi Shaqaqi was killed in Malta in 1995 (Hatina 2001). A British-educated Palestinian, Ramadan Abdallah Shallah replaced him. The leadership of the militant group is still maintained in its Damascus office and is actively involved in planning, coordination, and execution of the group’s activities (Kepel 2002). The main focus of the organization’s activities is in Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, and West Bank. Primarily, the focus of the group is on Israeli’s interests, civilians, and armed forces. Lebanon, Syria, and Iran are the group’s support locations, with Syria being its physical and operating location (Larkin and Michael 2012). Although the group is still a relatively small organization and its support base limited, it possess some considerable personnel strength capable of causing harm through terrorist acts when opportunity arises for them to do so (Hatina 2005). The group receives significant support from Iran and essential support from Lebanon and Syria. As a result, its personnel strength is enhanced. Besides, Iran facilitates enhancing personnel strengths and training programs to the organization. As has been noted, PIJ operatives were trained in Hezbollah camps in Lebanon; this training was under supervision of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards of Iran (Alexander 2002). It is widely believed that Iran still facilitates training to PIJ operatives. The known methods of the PIJ are paramilitary operations against military and civilian targets, and suicide bombings against the targets. Often, the organization carries out suicide bombings that target military personnel and civilians (Rashid 2003). It is worth noting that the frequency of such attacks inside the Israeli territory has considerably decreased since Israel constructed security barriers around Gaza. Some of the most notable attacks that reflect the methods used by PIJ include: shooting in December 1993 that killed Israeli reservist; a suicide bombing in January 1993 that killed one civilian and 18 soldiers near Netanya; and a suicide attack in June 2002 that killed 18 people and injured 50 at the Megiddo Junction. There was also a suicide attack in January 2007 at an Eliat Bakery that led to three deaths (Cook 2009). In all these attacks, PIJ has claimed responsibility. The organization’s communication is done mostly from its Damascus office as well as through its small offices in Tehran, Khartoum, and Beirut. Like many other terrorist organizations, JIP uses propaganda as one of its ways of planning and executing its activities, as well as attracting support. The organization banner is derived from a Quran verse that states that those who do jihad for the sake of Islam will be guided and that God is with those who engage in jihad (Larkin and Michael 2012). The main weapons used by this organization are suicide bomb and guns in cases where they employ paramilitary techniques in executing its activities. While it is believed that the organization uses certain procedures in prior attacks, the information regarding the procedures is scanty (Litvak 2010). What is known, however, is that the organization identifies the location of executing attacks and mandate one or more individuals to undertake the terrorist acts. Moreover, some of its members commit terrorism acts on their own discretion when an opportune moment arises (Hatina 2005). Conclusion From this discussion, it is evidently clear that PIJ is a well-organized terrorist organization. The organization has a relatively long history, formidable ideology, goals, and objectives. In addition, it has leadership, funding, and capabilities such as physical bases or support/operating location(s), communications methods, training programs, and personnel strength. All these are key ingredients that ensure that a terrorist organization achieves its goals. However, as has been noted, the organization remains a relatively small organization and its support base is limited. The limited support has been attributed to its unwillingness to provide impoverished Palestinians with social services network and due to their exclusive focus on terrorist attacks. Since it is clear that PIJ is a formidable terrorist group that has the potential of causing considerable harm and damages through its activities, there is need for enhanced efforts by states, intelligence agencies, and the international community to effectively deal with it and all other terrorist groups. Bibliography Alexander, Yonah. Palestinian Religious Terrorism: Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Ardsley, N.Y.: Transnational Publishers, 2002. Cook, David. "Islamism and Jihadism: The Transformation of Classical Notions of Jihad into an Ideology of Terrorism." Totalitarian Movements & Political Religions 10, no. 2 (June 2009): 177-187. Hatina, Meir. Islam and Salvation in Palestine: The Islamic Jihad Movement. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2001. Hatina, Meir. "Theology and power in the Middle East: Palestinian martyrdom in a comparative perspective." Journal of Political Ideologies 10, no. 3 (October 2005): 241-267. Kepel, Gilles. Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002. Larkin, Craig, and Michael Dumper. "In Defense of Al-Aqsa: The Islamic Movement inside Israel and the Battle for Jerusalem." Middle East Journal 66, no. 1 (Winter2012 2012): 31-52. Litvak, Meir. "“Martyrdom is Life”: Jihad and Martyrdom in the Ideology of Hamas." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33, no. 8 (August 2010): 716-734. Rashid, Ahmed. Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia. New York: Penguin Books, 2003. Read More