The Contribution of Air Power in the Allied Victory in the Second Battle of El Alamein - Essay Example

The Contribution of Air Power in the Allied Victory in the Second Battle of El Alamein Introduction It was World War II and the year was 1942. The whole human race was at war. It was thirsty for the blood of its own brethren, and nowhere else was this thirst more acute than in the arid wastelands of El Alamein in the desert of Egypt. The two warring camps were "Germany's Panzer Army Africa, comprising of the German Afrika Korps and Italian and German infantry and mechanized units under the command of General Erwin Rommel" ("The Second Battle of El Alamein"), and the Allied forces made up of mainly British Commonwealth forces, commanded by General Montgomery. At stake in this battle was the whole African war theatre, which the Panzer Army was desperately trying to salvage, and the Allies were determinedly trying to seize. Determination was pitted against desperation in this fight, and in the end, the former proved to be superior. The historical context of the onset of this battle is the pre-emptive attempt by Rommel to strike the Allied forces in Africa before they received massive reinforcements, thereby not letting their might swell to threatening proportions. This effort not only failed but backfired and the Panzers were caught in a catch-22 situation created by their misendeavour. The Allies, who managed to capitalise on this situation, kept the Afrika Korps in check for six weeks and then, when they were fully replenished, they launched an all-out offensive, engaging the enemy in a battle that was to change the course of WW2 west of the Suez. This gigantic war effort was implemented on a vast scale. The sheer numbers and the scale of logistics was mind boggling. When the Allies first retaliated against the Afrika Korps in August 1942, its strength was 200,000 men and 10,000 tanks, while that of the Afrika Korps was exactly its half. But logistics apart, Rommel was fighting a losing battle at El Alamein right from the beginning and had inherited several other strategic disadvantages which circumstances only aggravated. Notable amongst the major shortcomings of Germany were a pathetic short supply of resources and no reinforcements, lack of responsive support from the high command, war fatigue, virtually no air support, inability to adjust to desert warfare tactics and erroneous planning at crucial junctures which cost a heavy body count and massive loss of armour and artillery machinery. The mention of these factors is aimed at providing credence to historian Niall Barr's main contention in his important book on the subject, Pendulum of War: Three Battles of El Alamein that the Allied victory in this battle was as much due to the enemy's shortcomings as it was due to its own strengths. "Rather than attribute British victory to any unique stratagem resulting from Montgomery's august appointment, Barr finds that it was the combination of circumstances and positional realities, along with the Allied ability to modify its tactics-an ability the Germans apparently did not share-that led to decisive victory on November 4" (Pendulum of War: Three Battles at El Alamein). Notably, Barr is also sparing in his praise for Montgomery and instead, gives more credence to the ground forces for the victory. The Battle, which began on August 30, 1942, and ended on November 4 the same year, was conceived by Montgomery in various phases, "Consisting of the break-in - October 23-24, the crumbling - October 24-25, the counter - October 26-28, Operation Supercharge - November 1-2 and the breakout - November 3-7" ("The Second Battle of El Alamein"). At various stages during the battle, the Allied aerial attack was requisitioned to play its role in the battle, either to provide air cover or to attack the ground forces of Afrika Korps. These air attacks are chronicled below. In an attempt to thwart the advance of the Allied army towards its stronghold, the Afrika Korps had planted one of the largest quantities of landmines in WW2, numbering around 500,000. This plantation had earned a dubious name of Devil's Gardens. These gardens were spread out on the Axis Area devised by Rommel, in shelter of which the Afrika Korps was dug in. Due to clever deception tactics of Montgomery, the enemy was confused as to when, where and how the Allied assault will gather steam. As a result, the Axis had to be scattered sparingly across a vast battle area. This compulsion further mellowed down the Axis' already thinning resources and strike power. The landmine park initially succeeded in thwarting the assault of Operation Lightfoot, the codename given to the Allied battle plan which symbolised the ineffectiveness of the mainly anti-tank mines on which the weight of the foot soldiers was too light. Subsequently, the Allies used the divisionary tactic. Its XIII corps attacked the 21st Panzer Division and the Italian armoury in the south, while the XXX Corps was assigned to secure a safe passage through the Devil's Gardens to enable the XXX corps to move in. On the night of 23 October, the XXX Corps went to work and by pre-dawn it facilitated a passage for 500 tanks to move ahead in the Devil's Garden. But this progress was woefully inadequate for the Allies attack to be effective, because the length, breadth and depth of the Devil's Gardens was dimensionally beyond the Allis' initial comprehension. The XXX Corps had just scrapped through the surface and much toiling needed to be done to enable the tanks to penetrate deeper. Consequently, the air support of the Allied Desert Air Force was called in. The planes reigned hell fire from the skies all day long on 24 October. This air campaign totalled a mind boggling 1,000 sorties, which were dreadfully incessant and intense. Although the 15th panzers and the Italian Littorio Division managed a feeble defence to the Allied ground attack facilitated by the air raids, the British 51st and the Australian tank Division scored an upper hand in this blitzkrieg at El Alamein. As a trophy, the Allies got the Kidney Ridge, an important forte of the Panzers. After its capture, the Kidney Ridge was guarded by the British 51st, while the Australians assaulted Point 29, a vital Axis observation and artillery fire point. It was in the vicinity of Tel al-Essa, the strategic northern battle ground that was to remain General Montgomery's thrust area for the coming days. The Australian 26th attacked Point 29 at midnight of 25 October, aided by a concentrated and focussed aerial cover. By sunrise Point 29 was captured. Back in the German camp, Rommel was not ready to concede this vital vantage point. It was his eagle's eyes, and having lost it, he felt strategically blindfolded. Rommel made a determined bid to retake the point but the Allies were unrelenting in their defence. By the time it was clear to Rommel that he could not win back Point 29, he had no fuel left for his tanks to retreat. In pathetic fallout to this situation, the 21st Panzers and the Ariete Armoured Division were left out in the open, like sitting ducks for the Allied strike planes, to pick them up at will. Almost simultaneously with the loss of Point 29, the Germans suffered another body blow that had the devastating effect of a double whammy. The liner Proserpia, which was transporting the all-important fuel for the Afrika Korps armoury, which was like the elixir of life for the tanks that were stranded and rendered immobile and useless in the desert of Tel al-Eissa, was air-torpedoed by the RAF's 42/47 Squadron at Tobruk. Along with the sinking of Proserpia, Rommel's hope of reviving the battle effort also sank. It started being grimly clear to him that he and his army were entangled in a no-win war scenario at El Alamein, and he expressed his feelings by saying, "It will be quite impossible for us to disengage from the enemy. There is no gasoline for such a manoeuvre. We have only one choice and that is to fight to the end of El Amaein" ("The Second Battle of El Alamein"). By the time the Battle of El Alamein reached its fourth phase of Operation Supercharge, the Afrika Korps was in tatters. It had no food for its men or fuel for its machines. It had no medicines for its wounded. The troop's morale had hit rock bottom. The fatigue factor was overpowering the weak and weary soldiers, who were literally falling like autumn leaves without the enemy having fired a single bullet. Meanwhile, The Allis had already advanced much further north in its conquest. The focus was now on the battle field of Tel al-Aqaqir. In particular, the 9th Australian had Thompson's Point in its crosshairs, which, when conquered, could pose as a gateway to the coast road and thence to the vast expanses of the Mediterranean Sea. Realizing the strategic importance of Thompson's Post, the 9th Australian made repeated determined bids to take it and ultimately succeeded in the dark of October 30. On the other hand, Rommel too was matching the Allied zeal to sit pretty on Thompson's Post in order to deny the Allies an access to the sea. On 31 October, the Panzers launched a counter offensive against 9th Australian. The ensuing battle was characterised by brute heroics bordering on senseless and inconsequential mass murder on both sides. It was killing for killing's sake, destroying for destroying's sake. At the end of the tussle, the desperados on both sides gained nothing and status quo prevailed. The denial of victory at Thompson's Post had a colossal implication of a comprehensive defeat for Rommel and his forces. Always a pragmatic, the German General knew it long before it was obvious, that without any hope of reinforcements, it was only a matter of time before he had to start planning his retreat. And that time had come for him when he could not win over Thompson's Post. Fuka in the west seemed to Rommel to be his best bet for a relatively safe exit from the African war theatre and he started planning for it right away. At this point, the Allis launched the decisive phase of Operation Supercharge. This operation was multi-pronged and was aimed at destroying, disorienting and disintegrating the enemy's war machinery, thus taking away the last semblance of a fighting force from it. The target was Tel al-Aqaqir, where the last of the enemy defence lay haplessly. Operation Supercharge was assigned to the New Zealanders. They did manage to throw the enemy in disarray at Tel al-Aqaqir but met fierce last-ditch resistance by the Germans who were now fighting a do-or-die battle. The 9th Australian armour later joined the effort, but by then, the New Zealanders had faced the major brunt of the Panzer's fury. Then, in a combined offensive, the 9th Australian and the New Zealanders finally managed to contain the enemy offensive and finally the XXX Corps moved in. On the other hand, the remnants of the Panzers and Italian forces gave it what all they had. The result was the mother of all tussles at El Alamein. This was a war of steel, fought by men with nerves of steel. All through the day of November 2, tank fire from both sides went in frenzy, spewing sheer venom and vengeance with its shells. One of the most moving narrations of this last fight is thus described, "The desert, quivering in the heat haze, became a scene that defies sober description. It can be discerned only as a confused arena clouded by the bursts of high explosives, darkened by the smoke of scores of burning tanks and trucks, lit by the flashes of innumerable guns, shot through by red, green and white tracers, shaken by heavy bombing from the air and deafened by the artillery of both sides" ("The Second Battle of El Alamein"). These harsh desert war conditions are vividly narrated in the brilliantly researched book, Alamein - War Without Hate, by John Bierman and Colin Smith. Of particular relevance are the numerous first-hand accounts of the Alameein war veterans, of their heroic struggle to survive, to sustain and to win, in this remarkable book. "Their stories add a personal dimension to the history presented" (Guide Review - Alamein -- War Without Hate by John Bierman and Colin Smith). The victory of Allies was a foregone conclusion, and this date was characterised by the pulverising of the Panzers. In another two days, victory was conclusively and officially designated to the Allies. Rommel, on his part, retreated with his troops much against the wish and order of his Fuhrer. Conclusion Upon a careful study and analysis of a variety of sources and materials on the Second Battle of El Alamein, the following rationale can be developed for the theme of this paper: By virtue of El Alamein being a desert battle, the skies were wide open for both the sides to exploit in its war efforts. Unlike in jungle warfare or urban war, there was absolutely nothing to hinder a sustained air attack. Yet, air offensive was not given a more proactive and strategic role to play in this battle. Montgomery took only limited advantage of the vast, clear desert panorama to strike from the skies in 100% visibility conditions aided by good weather conditions. He called for air strikes only in a supportive, secondary capacity to ground offensive. As seen in this paper, in the course of a fierce and intense battle that lasted for over two months, air sorties were called by the Allies just a few times - That too, mainly to provide cover to ground forces rather than to strike at the enemy from the air. On the other hand, Rommel just did not call on the Luftwaffe. With due respect to his good memory and military prowess, he could not have simply forgotten to call for air strikes. In total absence of the Luftwaffe above the El Alamein skies, whatever contribution that the Allied air force made to the battle went virtually unchallenged. In the final analysis, the limited role awarded to the Allied air force in this battle seems an intriguing factor. Even the Desert Air Force, which as commandeered by the highly illustrious Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham and "which could give direct support to the Army just about anywhere and at anytime required" (Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham) seems to have been underutilised. What factors led to the underutilisation of air power in this battle The answer remains an enigma. Works cited "Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham ." 22 march 2007 . "Guide Review - Alamein -- War Without Hate by John Bierman and Colin Smith." www.about.com. 22 Mar 2007 . "Pendulum of War: Three Battles at El Alamein ." www.amazon.com. 22 Mar 2007 . "The Second Battle of El Alamein." Wikipedia. Wikimdia Foundation, Inc.. 22 Mar 2007 . Read More