Bioterrorism: Safety Concerns and Security Policy - Essay Example

There is evidently much gap between the talk and walk. a) Dual-Use Research: Bio-safety concerns have considerably impacted research funding, peer-review, publication, technology transfer, employment and teaching, and international travel, and legislation, limiting legitimate use of bio-research for peaceful civilian use (McLeish & Nightingale, 2007). b) Public Opinion: Public opposition to research in bioterrorism stems from a fear of its widespread misuse [safety] with large scale catastrophe to human kind and environment [ethics].

Public opposition can cause halt to construction of new labs, and limit the range and scale of research efforts (Baram, 2008). c) Informational Security: There is a thin line of divide between academic freedom and scientific inquiry versus security threat through leaked information falling into wrong hands. The control of information juxtaposed with advance of knowledge is a dilemma for policy makers (Simoncelli & Stanley, 2005). d) Bio-safety Guidelines and Capacity Building: Serious concerns have been expressed in adequacy of guidelines and procedures to maintain safety standards in bio-defense laboratories (United States General Accounting Office, 2003).

Building capacities is further hampered by recruitment of ill-prepared workforce with regards to bio-safety standards. This position paper focuses on the dual-use of bio-defense research, and its impact on bio-safety. The author is of the view that dual-use research should embrace positive connotations as postulated by Alic et. al. (1992). Herein, the reuse of civilian technologies should be dovetailed to benefit defense applications. It mandates a mature and uniform international security policy with regard to information sharing, and technology transfer; such that, legitimate scientific bioresearch would not get misappropriated to produce weapons of mass destruction.

A range of policy measures has since been initiated to counter misuse of life sciences (Lentzos, 2008). The dual-use research when applied to life sciences extends to threats posed by biological weapons. Dual use must address the diffusion of social beneficial technologies to non-state actors, and terrorists, who do not come under the ambit of security policies. The moot question is: can biosafety and secrecy co-exist (Kahn, 2004) It is more a question of responsible citizenship, than censorship.

The author believes that curtailed research, and restricted academic pursuits, can adversely affect excellence and societal growth in the long run. The author's position therefore, is to encourage openness in fundamental research, while at the same time, foster a sense of responsible citizenship. The challenge of preventing misuse of dual-use research falls into two broad categories: (a) Control of information with potential applications to biological weapons: American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) surveyed a sample of AAAS members in the life sciences to assess their awareness of and attitudes toward such "dual-use" research-studies undertaken for beneficial purposes that could also have harmful applications such as bioterrorism (AAAS report, 2009).

Survey results indicate that some respondents have been overly concerned about dual-use issues; they have