Maksim Litvinov and Soviet Foreign Policy during the 1930s - Essay Example

MAKSIM LITVINOV AND SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE 1930S BACKGROUND Maksim Maximovich Litvinov is the considered to be one of the best known Soviet diplomats during the regime of Joseph Stalin. He was remembered for brokering and initiating mutual efforts between the Soviet Union and prevailing Western powers against fascist Germany (Dunn, 1988). Litvinov was born Meyer Wallach on 17 July, 1876 to Jewish parents based in Bialystok. In 1898, he left his native Bialystok for Ukraine to become an active member of the Russian Social Democratic Labor party. During this period, he energetically recruited new members and followers in the general location of Kiev. When the party separated into two factions, he joined the Bolsheviks faction and formed a strong bond with several party members; one of these was Joseph Stalin (Roberts, 1953). Subsequently, Litvinov spent the next fifteen years journeyed west Europe on varying tasks to instill and strengthen the Bolshevik ideology. He adopted many guises and aliases to help him steer clear of the police. Among his errands were smuggling guns to aid revolutionaries in Russia. He was arrested in Paris in 1907 after a bank heist masterminded by Stalin. Though many of his attempts to help the cause were unsuccessful, hid unwavering and constant labors made him a hero in the eyes of his comrades (Roberts, 1953). After the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution concluded, Litvinov campaigned the cause in Britain but was expulsed because of the British discontent over the treatment of compatriot Bruce Lockhart in Moscow. In addition, he was also evicted from Britain because of his pacifist beliefs. After returning to Moscow, he was given the position of Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. He handled many significant and high-profile assignments for his government, notably bringing the Soviet-Estonian clashes to a standstill and initiating talks with the President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson (Roberts, 1953). Four years after his assignation, he was promoted to deputy commissar of foreign affairs in 1921, under the eye of Georgi ChicherinLitvinov's relationship with Chicherin were turbulent, as they both held opposing views on policies, as well as having contrasting and strong personalities. In spite of this, Litvinov's career as a diplomat flourished under Chicherin, whom he served for almost a decade. In 1928, he initiated proposals focusing on total disarmament, instead of following standard formulas or ratios favored by the USSR. He later became the commissar when his superior, Chicherin, was forced to retire due to ill health (Roberts, 1953). CAREER HIGHLIGHTS AND ACHIEVEMENTS In many standards and principles, Litvinov deserved his place in Soviet history because of the degree of successes he garnered in the name of his country which also played and have a huge impact on other nations. When Hitler ascended to power through the powerhouse generated by his Nazi Party, Litvinov immediately recognized the significance of this event (Dunn, 1988). In 1933, he spoke of a need to change the direction of Soviet foreign policy to counteract the influence of Nazi Germany under Hitler. He managed these changes through the establishment of diplomatic contact with the United States and other Western powers. He was also instrumental in the institutionalization of the League of Nations, the predecessor of the United Nations. His conviction in resisting and containing fascism was well-known. In addition, his name was etched in the global spheres when he became the proponent of collective security (Dunn, 1988). TRADE AGREEMENTS FOR SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND GOVERNMENT RECOGNITION When Stalin came into power, he restructured USSR's policies towards foreign trade in order to abolish and curtail free and private trade practices. In anticipation of the irregular and what he deemed disruptive market forces that come with foreign trade, Stalin placed all activity and policies on foreign trade under state control. In addition, Stalin created monopolies on particular goods, with importation chiefly restricted only to crucial factory machinery and equipment. Stalin intended to support fast industrialization and modernization by hugely increasing importation of goods (Drummond, 1972). By the early 1931, the USSR became the largest consumer of goods, particularly factory equipment/apparatus from the United States and Great Britain. To gain funds for disbursements, Stalin commanded the unloading of its raw materials and produce on the world market that had just recently suffered a great depression. In retaliation, the United States accused the USSR of flooding the market with cheap goods in the hope of undermining the practice of capitalism. In similar fashion, France imposed sanctions while Britain totally ended any trade relations (via its Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement of 1921) with the USSR (Drummond, 1972). During this period, Litvinov was insistent in pursuing two main goals, that is to reestablish trading and trading recognition that was waylaid by Stalin's centralized control in order to enforce economic growth, security and renewal. In November 7, 1933, Litvinov arrived in Washington to spearhead talks with Franklin D. Roosevelt to lift US restrictions on its trade with USSR. Concurrently, Litvinov was also pushing for the formal recognition of Russia, thereby legitimizing the country in world politics. After a series of correspondences and meetings, the Roosevelt administration officially acknowledged the USSR as a legitimate government, ending a long-time rift between the two countries. Included in the exchange of notes between Litvinov and Roosevelt are Soviet pledges no to impede on affairs relating to US domestic policies, which included propaganda, diplomatic relations between the two countries, the extension of religious freedom to US citizens residing in the Soviet Union, the promise of fair judiciary assistance to Americans accused of offenses in Russia and finally, an arrangement to settle debts and claims (Drummond, 1972). For its part, the Soviet government resolved issues pertaining to nationalization policies between 1918 to 1919 and releasing assets held in relation to these said policies back to the United States. These later became known as the Litvinov Assignments. The gentleman's agreement between Roosevelt and Litvinov included the resolution of debts amounting to $600 million, to which the Soviet union will only pay between $75 to $150 million. On July 13, 1935, the first U.S.-USSR Trade Agreement was instituted through U.S. Ambassador to Russia William Bullitt and Litvinov. The trade volume outcome was not to the expectations of both countries but the talks between Litvinov and Roosevelt reinstated trade relations and officially recognized the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a government entity (Drummond, 1972). Similarly, France also began to extend its diplomatic relations to Russia in an effort to mitigate the growing influence of Germany. It reinstated a trade pact on January 11, 1934. At the same time, French foreign minister, Louis Barthou attempted to broker a mutual agreement between East Central European nations, Germany and the USSR in the hope of maintaining peaceful relations. In response, Germany rejected the proposal. When the USSR joined the League of Nations, France and Czechoslovakia ratified mutual assistance treaties on May 2, 1935 and May 16, 1935 (Drummond, 1972). COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS Recognizing Germany as an emerging threat, the Soviet Union implemented unexpected changes in its foreign policy. In an unprecedented move, Stalin reversed his opposition to collective security in December 1933, which was supported by Litvinov since 1930. Maksim Litvinov was considered a primary proponent and the architect of policies concerning collective security. Under Litvinov, the policy of collective security reached its peak when he successfully brokered and concluded mutual defense accords with France and Czechoslovakia in 1935 (Dullin, 2001). With the softening of Stalin's stance against collective security, Litvinov campaigned to have Russia a member of the League of Nations, ratifying mutual treatises with pacifist nations. He believed that the membership with the League of Nations will put to rest any animosity with the West and thus increase foreign trade and revitalize the economy. On these two points, Litvinov proved he was right, for it eased relations with France, Eastern European countries and eventually began the talks with Britain (Carley, 1994). His efforts was dampened, however by Stalin's purging of his deemed enemies, resulting from his extreme distrust and paranoia. The visibility of the purges affected and frustrated Litvinov, who expressed his abhorrence to the public bloodbath that greatly put into jeopardy Russia's standing in the international community, especially in drafting foreign policies with other states. Stalin's public displays were frowned upon by the West and at that time, Hitler's fascism and plans for conquest was hidden from the diplomatic front. It was especially awkward for Litvinov's position. At the time he was struggling to spread the policy of collective security with the West, Stalin was purging Russia of what he deemed as "enemies of the state", killing Litvinov's top men in the diplomatic corps (Van Ree, 2005). It was not surprising that because of Stalin's purging, democracies in Europe, many of which are still undecided whether to resist Germany or support fascist ideals have responded halfheartedly to Litvinov's campaigns to control Nazi Germany and collective security. The failure of collective security and the League of Nations were evident during the Manchurian crisis, when Japan invaded Chinese Manchuria. There was no collective resolution to apprehend or condemn the action until two years later. Soviet diplomats avoided to be involved itself, giving rights to doubts of Russia's capability to rally other countries in a collective security plan against Germany (Stromberg, 1995). The annexation of Austria in 1938 added to the widening gap between the Soviet Union, France and Great Britain and the eventual collapse of the League of Nations. Despite Litvinov's vocal views to check Germany's aggression, France and Great Britain were reluctant to commit in the name of collective security and in using sanctions or military action against any aggressive state. Prime Minister Chamberlain of Britain did not seriously view Hitler as a threat to his country and would rather implement policies that are conciliatory towards Germany in the hope that Hitler would be a collaborator in maintaining peace. In comparison, France has expressed doubt over Hitler's foreign policies but was reluctant to openly counter Germany without the help of Britain (Stromberg, 1995). With all efforts to attain collective security exhausted, Litvinov tried to get and secure a military coalition with Great Britain; its primary objective was reciprocal aid if the Nazis decided to attack either of the two countries. Despite the obvious threat of Germany, the British government under Chamberlain declined a military pact with USSR. This move by the British government proved to be a debacle as Hitler became more empowered in his goal of establishing German economic and military supremacy and the power to be a dominion over Europe (Stromberg, 1995). With Litvinov unable to secure a military coalition with the British, Stalin once more reversed its foreign policy and voiced his doubts over collective security. Stalin saw the British rebuff as Western passiveness and that the West was not equipped to counteract against Axis powers. Stalin then entered into concealed negotiations with the Nazis. Stalin kept Litvinov in the dark until 1939, when the Molotov-Ribbentrop or the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact was signed. Litvinov, a Jew was unacceptable to the Nazis as a Foreign Minister and after the pact was signed he was replaced by Vyacheslav Molotov (Raack, 1995). There are two schools of thought regarding collective security in the context of the Soviets. One surmised that the USSR's goal in entering a collective security agreement mirrors that of any government or state: mitigate conflict and warfare and thus improving its stature in the arena of world politics by pursuing peaceful process. There was no motive to double-play other nations and that diplomatic objectives are shared by both Soviet diplomats and the Kremlin. Litvinov's motives are said to belong to under this assumption, as he was well-known to follow pacifist sentiments even before the 1930s (Van Ree, 2002). On the other hand, the other school of thought proposed that Stalin's sudden interest in collective security was but a pretense to broaden communist ideals by fuelling conflict among the capitalist nations. From the onset of 1933, Stalin's real objective was to sign a pact with Hitler and have the other capitalist powers declared war on Germany while USSR remain neutral (Van Ree, 2002). SOVIET POLICIES AND ANGLO-FRANCO RELATIONS Even though he was hampered by anti-Communist sentiments in France and Britain, as well as a critical Russian press, Litvinov played a vital role in the renewal of Soviet associations with the French and the British. As early as 1929, the Soviet government have renewed diplomatic relations with Great Britain and in 1931, USSR have initiated trade talks with France. On the part of Great Britain, the resumption of diplomatic dealings with Kremlin was a result of enticing trade package being offered by Russia (Carley, 1994). Because of his open support for "collective security" against fascist Germany, Litvinov enjoyed respect in the diplomatic community. He also expressed that he is interested in a rapprochement with France. Auspiciously, France also shares the same sentiment and between the years 1932 to 1934, three French foreign ministers took action in Litvinov's campaign to impede the continuing influence of Hitler. In November of 1932, Litvinov accomplished a non- aggression pact between Russia and France and in the following year, the two countries both agreed to begin to send military attaches to discuss technicalities of mutual missions (Carley, 1994). To further strengthen the association between the two nations, an interim trade agreement was signed and a more extensive mutual aid pact was initiated. With his success in developing closer dealings with France, Litvinov's standing in Moscow was solidified Litvinov's open concern with the Nazi threat drove his policies, for he was certain that an inevitable war between European countries and Germany was in the horizon. He warned his French counterparts that there is a need to exhaust all efforts in mitigating war (Carley, 1994). In contrast to the French, the British government is wary of renewing relations with USSR, mainly because of the prevailing anti-communist sentiment in Britain, spearheaded by Canadian Prime Minister Bennet. The proponents of anti-Soviet sentiment continually played on the capture and trial of the officials of a British corporation operating in Russia. Eventually in 1934, British and Russian relations eased and improved because of a collective trepidation of Hitler's Nazi influence. British diplomatic officials, particularly Laurence Collier pushed for the rapprochement between the two countries, especially after France renewed relations with Russia and its eventual move to enlist as a member of the League of Nations (Carley, 1994). LITVINOV'S DOWNFALL In the period of 1933 and 1936, the Russian government headed by Stalin has aimed to established closer relations with the West by openly pursuing policies that support collective security. This was considered to be the heyday of Litvinov, who was admired in the diplomatic arena for his serious commitment to this cause. However, all changed from 1936 onwards, when Litvinov continually failed to secure overwhelming support for the policy by other League of Nation members and more importantly when he was unsuccessful in winning strong and undeniable military defense treaties with the two primary members of the League - Britain and France. This inability to secure military alliances incited Stalin to discard support for collective security and entering into a covenant with the Nazis. Throughout these changes and isolation and eventual fall from Stalin's sphere of influence, Litvinov's belief in the policy never wavered and abandoned (Resis, 2000). It was said that one of the reasons for Litvinov's eventual downfall was his ability to understand the policies that is behind Western powers. Having said so, this made him a target of fundamentalist Bolsheviks who often accuse him of being an exponent in appeasing policies with the West. Litvinov and his diplomatic corps are not to be blamed though, for their knowledge on Western ways are rooted from having lived in other countries before the Revolution took place. Litvinov, like his followers in the foreign corps was cosmopolitan, polylingual, and well read in the intricacies of foreign policy compared to Stalin and his clique who are often than not lack these qualities that are essential in handling assignments dealing with foreign affairs. In addition, this disparity was further reinforced by the Stalinists' loathing of anything capitalistic in nature and disdainful of any policy that involved Western thought or action. Stalin put a premium on loyalty towards his views rather than diplomatic competence that was implicitly appreciated by Litvinov (Resis, 2000). Litvinov was the proponent of the program in building political, trade and military alliances with France and Britain that has definite military requirements for all parties involved and also assured bordering states of the USSR of the same military obligation. Looking back to his previous programs, his proposed tripartite coalition was still consistent with Soviet policies despite what his detractors claimed. Stalin felt that Litvinov was yielding too much to France and the British concessions, especially when Litvinov compromised regarding the provision of protection for the Dutch, Belgian and the Swiss governments. Stalin considered that he required a stronger person that Litvinov to bargain and obtain treaties with the French and British governments. Eventually Stalin discarded the idea of coalescing with France and British and went on to get an alliance with Germany, which was miscalculation for two years after signing a pact with the Nazis, the Germans invaded Russia. Litvinov's legacy was his consistency in drafting and directing foreign policies in his three decades as a Soviet diplomat. He never totally opposed the West as other Bolsheviks and Stalinists did. In his estimation, the security of his country was best supplied by proper and truthful relations with the West (Resis, 2000). REFERENCES Carley, Michael J. (1994). Down a blind-alley: Anglo-Franco-Soviet relations, 1920-39. Canadian Journal of History, Volume 26, Issue 1, 147. Carswell, John. (1983). The Exile: A Life of Ivy Litvinov. London: Faber and Faber. Drummond, Ian M. (1972). Empire Trade and Russian Trade: Economic Diplomacy in the Nineteen-Thirties. Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 5, No. 1, 35-47 Dullin, Sabine. (2001). The Men of Influence : Stalin's Ambassadors in Europe 1930-1939. Paris: Payot Publishers. Dunn, David. (1988). Maksim Litvinov: Commissar of Contradiction. Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 23, No. 2, 221-243. Hintze, Otto. (1960) Germany and the World Powers. New York: Mitchell Kennerley. Jackson, Peter. (2000). France and the Nazi Menace: Intelligence and Policy Making, 1930-1933. New York: Oxford University Press. Mastny, Vojtech. (1976). The Cassandra of the Foreign Commisariat: Makaim Litvinov and the Cold War. Foreign Affairs , Volume 54, No. 2 . Raack, R. C. (1995). Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938-1945: The Origins of the Cold War. Stanford: Stanford University Press Resis, Albert. (2000) The Fall of Litvinov: Harbinger of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 52, No. 1, 33-56. Roberts, Henry L. (1953). Maksim Litvinov : The Diplomats: 1919-1939. New York: Princeton. Stromberg, Roland N. (1995). Uncertainties and Perplexities about the League of Nations. Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 33, No.1, 141. Van Ree, Eric. (2002). The Political Thought of Joseph Stalin. London: Routledge Curzon Van Ree, Eric. (2005). Stalin: A New History. 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