Cuban Missile Crisis and the International System - Essay Example

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 2007 INTRODUCTION Cold War – this pair of words was perhaps one of the most often used political terms in the last fifty years. Today this phrase is widely accepted in historical writings referring to the period between 1947-1948 and 1989-1990. Usually scholars associate it with nuclear confrontation between the Soviets and the United States, and the arms race that put the whole world on the brink of a devastating military clash1. The Cold War was characterized by mutual mistrust and misunderstanding when the United States accused the USSR of attempts to swell the Communist doctrine throughout the world while the Soviets, in its turn, charged the United States with imperialist ways. The nature of the Cold War, its causes and outcomes are not yet clear: any scholar who explores the theme will inevitably face a series of controversial issues, such as inevitability of the Cold War, the role of personalities in escalation of the tension, the factors, economic, political or ideological that played the key role in the War, etc. The ideological aspect of the communist – capitalist confrontation was apparently the core thread of the Cold War. The wider notion of this conflict posits “… as a distinctive period into the ideological struggle, originated in 1917-18, between the Wilsonian Impulse and Lenins urge for peoples democracy as the basis for securing peace”2. Being the first impulse for emergence of the bipolar world, the ideological antagonism played the key role in changing threat perceptions and shifts of balance throughout confrontation. The Cuban Missile Crisis represented an important milestone in this confrontation: it was probably the first time in modern history that the two world leading superpowers realized their high vulnerability and mutual dependence. This realization eventually resulted in the political thaw which proved the lesson had received 100 percent consideration from all parties involved. MAIN BODY There was a great disparity between the Soviets and the United States in 1945. The war was made far away from the American territory, in the other hemisphere, and did not damage the US economic system. On the contrary, the US was the main supplier of anti-German coalition during the whole war and due to this its economic position significantly improved. And finally the US had a nuclear weapons as well as the vivid evidence of its terrifying potency. American aircraft-carriers and long-range attack bombers allowed delivering the A-bomb to virtually any part of the world while the US territory was impossible to reach from the other hemisphere3. US dominance over the Soviets became threatening to the USSR. Apparently, the war worn Soviets had two choices: either to accept global American dominance or oppose it with all resources available. Stalin chose the second variant and hurled all effort into creation of nuclear weapons. In 1949 the Soviets created their own bomb and the largest arms race began. The USSR made frenzied efforts to catch up with the four-year backlog and grade up to the US in quantity of nuclear warheads. The United States in its turn did not want to loose dominance in this field and intensively built up and improved its nuclear armory. Nuclear weapons became the key issue of international policy4. The 1950’s were characterized by technological competition between the two countries. In 1952 the United States successfully tested the first H-bomb that was much better weapon than A-bomb5. The Soviets did their best to catch up with their transoceanic competitor but despite this the initial handicap of approximately four years remained. In 1953 the United States began Korean War and American relations with the USSR became tenser. Major events that largely determined the future of nuclear arms race occurred during the 1960’s. The new Cuban administration led by Fidel Castro became a major international concern of the Kennedy administration since January 19616. The Bay of Pigs events when the US Central Intelligence Agency staged an invasion of the island catalyzed the political developments in the region reasonably convincing Castro that the powerful neighbor would attempt the staged invasion in real life. The only way to prevent it was to find an equally powerful ally which Castro did by declaring Cuba a socialist republic. This smart move immediately paid off when the Soviets extremely interested in increasing their presence in the Western Hemisphere offered huge military upgrade to the Cuban militaries7. Evidently, the preceding confrontation between the Soviets and the US did not allow the latter to put up with the presence of a socialist bastion near its borders. Consequently, the US government took serious efforts to undermine and eventually overthrow Castro administration. Thus, in February 1962 the country initiated a harsh economic embargo against the island and a covert military operation known as Operation Mongoose8. However, neither effort led to any considerable success for the US: the only outcome was improved understanding that only heavy serious measures are required to make the US forget about the invasion. Despite the apparent superiority of the US in nuclear weapons and submarines, Nikita Khrushchev who occupied Kremlin after Stalin’s death, decided to take advantage of the opportunity to locate Soviet missiles in close proximity to the major American cities, and thus fully compensate the American nuclear superiority9. In September the Soviets delivered several SS-4 missiles to the island and started building several launching sites. The planned arsenal included forty launching machines which constituted an impressive 70 percent share of the total Soviet first strike capacity. The activities could not remain unnoticed and very soon hundreds of reports reached Florida and other coastal areas of the US10. However, these reports were largely neglected on the official level until in the middle of October an American U-2 discovered 24 surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers construction sites in Western Cuba11. On the 16th of October 1962, McGeorge Bundy, the National Security Adviser, informed the American President, John F. Kennedy, about the availability of photo evidences confirming the ongoing construction of launchers for Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles. The President reacted by called a meeting of a group of advisers – the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm). In the first ExComm meeting on 16 October, they decided to use all available means to remove the Soviet missiles from the island. The ensuing debates within the ExComm revolved around the immediate response to the Soviets and the necessity of military preparations12. Finally, on the 20th of October President Kennedy after five days of intensive debates made a decision to impose a naval blockade of the island in order to prevent the further delivery of missiles and other military equipment. Simultaneously, the Soviets were requested to withdraw the missiles already delivered to Cuba13. Evidently, such modest reaction to the direct threat could have only one reasonable explanation: the risk of a nuclear escalation was very high and Kennedy preferred to avoid further escalation. On October 22, President announced his decision to the world simultaneously warning the Soviets that the United States would regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the western hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the US, requiring a full retaliatory response against the Soviet Union14. However, the fact that Kennedy did not agreed to launch an air strike or a full-scale invasion to forcedly remove the Cuban threat proved that such scenario was the least preferred option for Kennedy. A series of political moves and mutual compromises that followed once again confirmed the both sides perfectly realized the potential danger of the situation. Yet, one of the primary questions to be asked in this regard was did the Soviets understand the consequences of their missiles being located in Cuba? The Cuban Missile Crisis was not the first serious confrontation between the powers: the late 1950s – early 1960s witnessed several clashes. Thus, the Berlin crisis of 1961 – 1962 became the first test of strength between Kennedy and Khrushchev, and greatly increased the tension in Europe. Therefore, it would be imprudent to believe that the Soviets did not understand what kind of response their Cuban adventure could draw. Nowadays, it commonly agreed among the Western historians that Khrushchev had three major reasons for his decision. Firstly, after a failed attempt by Cuban exiles supported by US intelligence to invade Cuba in the Bay of Pigs in April 1961, both the Cuban leader Fidel Castro and Nikita Khrushchev felt the need to preserve the Cuban revolution and deter a possible US invasion. Secondly, from the Soviet point of view the stationing of the missiles in Cuba was a means of closing the “missile gap” with the United States and, in one move, redressing the highly unfavorable strategic balance. Thirdly, Khrushchev perceived it as a favorable opportunity to expose the United States to a direct threat comparable to that faced by the Soviet Union, owing to the deployment of US nuclear weapons on its periphery15. For a long time Khrushchev’s official explanation for the missile deployment – the fear of an American invasion – has been considered by Western analysts and politicians as a post hoc justification for the outcome of the crisis16. The fact that after a preliminary conflict settlement had been almost reached on the 25-25th of October, Khrushchev suddenly changed his initial positions insisting that that the US remove its Jupiter missiles from Turkey in return for the removal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba17. The requirement demonstrated that the threat of American invasion on the island was at least as important pretext as the strategic balance of power in the world. As a result, on the 27th of October the sides almost lost control over the crisis. In the morning, American intelligence reported that a Soviet tanker was challenging the blockade, and that the Soviet diplomats in New York and Washington were destroying all their sensitive documents in anticipation of a war18. Moreover, an American U-2 air-craft entered Soviet airspace as a result of a navigational error, and around noon another U-2 reconnaissance plane was shot down over Cuba by the Soviet air defense without authorization from the Kremlin. The strategic nuclear force of the United States was poised for action, and for the first time in history it was put on DefCon2 (Defense Condition 2)19. At the same time, the reports appeared that several Soviet missile sites on Cuba were already operational. Negotiations at the United Nations in New York were adjourned, while the ExComm was still considering possible reactions to Khrushchev’s latest message. At the same time the Soviet Chairman gathered the Presidium and Secretariat members and stayed there all day and night discussing what to do in case the US strikes first20. Yet once again the sharp understanding of the huge danger made the leaders intensively seek for an acceptable solution at any price. On his part, Kennedy sent to Khrushchev his proposal calling for the complete removal of the offensive weapons from Cuba under UN supervision, in exchange for a US guarantee of non-invasion in Cuba. In addition, the President was ready to send his brother, Attorney-General Robert F. Kennedy, to see the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Anatoliy Dobrynin, with a private message for Chairman Khrushchev announcing that the missiles in Turkey would be removed once the crisis was resolved. However, if the Soviets made public any reference to this guarantee, the proposal would become invalid. Refusal of Khrushchev to accept this offer would lead to a military attack on Cuba21. Khrushchev immediately accepted Kennedy’s terms of a unilateral withdrawal of “all Soviet offensive arms” from Cuba. In his answer to President Kennedy the Soviet Chairman did not mention the missiles in Turkey again. This end to the crisis was publicly announced on the radio, and the Soviet military began to dismantle the missile sites and prepare them for shipping back to the Soviet Union. During that last and decisive phase of the crisis the exchange between the two superpower leaders was conducted exclusively through direct messages between Moscow and Washington. These private exchanges were crucial in leading to the peaceful solution of the crisis22. In the short term the consequences of the Cuban Missile Crisis remained practically unnoticed and only the global political transformations that followed the conflict revealed its major importance and most important consequences. Perhaps the most essential outcome of the clash was the realization that it was not acceptable for any country to risk the third world war. The lesson was learned: the governments of both states would never again allow similar situations in their relationships. And what was specifically important, it was not until the Cuban Crisis that the political relations between the US and Soviets reached the new level of cooperation. Several treaties signed during that period significantly improved international climate. In 1963 the Limited Test Ban Treaty was agreed by a total of 116 countries, including those, which had sufficient potential to develop their own nuclear weapons – Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Africa. It prohibited nuclear tests in the atmosphere, space and under the water. Despite the success was not full – two major nuclear states, France and the Peoples Republic of China, withheld their signatures – the treaty nonetheless marked the first limitation of arms expansion since the beginning of the Cold War23. The treaty also decreased the threat of nuclear contamination of the planet. The Soviets was the first country that launched a space satellite in 195724. Both sides immediately recognized literally infinite military possibilities of space satellites. However, the cost of shifting arms race to space was too high so that neither the United States nor Soviets could afford it. This fact became perhaps the major reason for signing a treaty prohibiting space dislocation of any massive weapon in 1967. And finally in 1968 the famous Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed and ratified by the United States, USSR, and Great Britain. 133 non-nuclear-weapon states also joined the treaty intended to prevent further spread of nuclear weapons as well as secure all guarantees that the peaceful nuclear programs of non-nuclear-weapon states will not be used for massive weapons production25. The period known “era of détente” began in the 1970’s with signature of several bilateral and multilateral agreements. Those treaties did not mean finish of arms race; nonetheless they blocked developments of several most dangerous and expensive military nuclear research, and normalized international situation after Berlin and Cuban crises. Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I, Interim Agreement was signed in 1972. It was a bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviets of five-year duration that froze the quantity of strategic ballistic missiles at mark of 1972 and banned construction of new silos. The agreement covered both offensive arms and defensive systems. The part of SALT – I treaty concerning nuclear submarines have not been changed since the time of its signature in 1972. The limits were 62 submarines for the USSR and 44 for the United States26. Fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 symbolized the beginning of global stabilization and further disarmament of states. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between the US and USSR signed in 1991 and ratified by both states decreased a ceiling of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to 1600 and established a limit of 6,000 “accountable” warheads for each country. START also significantly cut long-range nuclear weapons27. And finally, the collapse of the USSR in 1991 drew a line under the Cold War and constant threat of nuclear war. Constant buildup of the US and Soviet arsenals gave place to their gradual reduction. But at the same time the world faced a new problem rooted in grave change of international relations. CONCLUSION Almost two decades have passed since the end of the Cold War, but up to date historians rethink and reconsider some events of that era. The Cuban Missile Crisis which proved to be arguably the most dangerous moment during the whole the Cold War. The two superpowers were face to face in a dispute over nuclear weapons. Any mistake or inadequate reaction of either Kennedy or Khrushchev would likely lead to the devastating Third World War. The US naval blockade of Cuba was followed by a series of political and military moves and reactions that sometimes slipped out of control of the opponents involved. Although the common point of view among Western historians is the Soviets and namely Nikita Khrushchev panicked and stepped back, the conflict outcomes should not be viewed from the standard win-loose stance. Both sides managed to recognize the danger of hard line policy that resulted in reciprocal concessions: the USSR withdrew its missiles from Cuba while Kennedy agreed to raise the blockade of the island and guarantee non-interference in its domestic affairs. Therefore, the most important outcome of the crisis was grave change in the relationship between the Soviets and the US which eventually resulted in improved international situation. WORKS CITED Chang, L. and P. Kornbluh (eds), The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader, New Press, New York, 1992. Deighton A, The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War, Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK, 1990 Department of State, Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I. Retrieved May 29, 2007 from http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/salt1.html Department of State, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Retrieved May 29, 2007 from http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/starthtm/start.html Fischer, T. “The ICRC and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis”, International Review of the Red Cross, June 2001, Vol.83, No.842, 287-309. Frankel, M., High Noon in the Cold War; Ballantine Books, 2004. Franklin, J., Cuba and the United States: A Chronological History [excepts]. Retrieved May 30, 2007 from http://andromeda.rutgers.edu/~hbf/missile.htm Glynn, P. Closing Pandoras Box: Arms Races, Arms Control, and the History of the Cold War, New York: Basic Books, 1992. Goldman, J. and G. Stein, The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 18-29, 1962 [Electronic version]. Retrieved May 31, 2007 from http://www.hpol.org/jfk/cuban/ Kennedy, R. F., Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis, W.W. Norton, New York, 1969. May, E. R. and Ph. D. Zelikow (Eds), The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), London, 1997. McGeorge, B., Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years, Random House, New York, 1988. Nash, Ph., The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957-1963, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, N.C., 1997. Proclamation 3447 - Embargo on All Trade with Cuba, February 3rd, 1962. Woolley, J. and G. Peters, The American Presidency Project [online]. Santa Barbara, CA: University of California (hosted), Gerhard Peters (database). Retrieved May 30, 2007 from http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58824 Peace and Security Through Disarmament, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Department for Disarmament Affairs official web site, retrieved May 28, 2007, from http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/ Wenger, A., Living with Peril: Eisenhower, Kennedy and Nuclear Weapons, Rowman & Littelfields Publishers, New York, 1997. Read More