Government Intelligence Agencies - Literature review Example

Interagency agencies I. Introduction The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack has brought the issue of the United s interagency intelligence performance to a higher level of prominence among scholars and policymakers. Previous history tells us that after the National Security Act of 1947, the literature on the American interagency process focused on the creation of the National Security Council – its functions and operations. The following decades, particularly in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, it was dominated by criticisms on policy setbacks as well as challenges to the national security systems. Finally, during the 1980s, there was an emphasis on intelligence issues including the threat of terrorism in the discourse. The so-called 9/11 attacks intensified the discussion on these concerns, producing a large body of literature that explores US homeland security threats. This development highlighted in the literature high-level turnover, overlapping responsibilities among intelligence agencies as well as bureaucratic rivalries The interagency cooperation and the failings of interagency coordination in the intelligence community have been perennially cited as one of the major flaws in interagency intelligence performance. There is a vast number of literature that explore and attempt to demonstrate the reasons behind this particular dilemma and recommending solutions at the same time for strengthening interagency performance. A number of recent discussions in regard to the problem of intelligence community are focused on the role of technology in the intelligence gathering and sharing processes. This is the reason why this particular topic needs to be studied again because human resource seems to be sidelined in the ongoing debate. II. Literature Review Presently, there is an excessive dependence on high-tech intelligence in the United States military establishment, including a tight integration between the technical intelligence and conventional military intelligence and that it could be problematic as demonstrated by the fighting in Iraq. (Posner, p. 70) There are several studies that show why human resource is significant in interagency cooperation in the intelligence community – a role that is even more significant than technological advances and budget resources. The technological intelligence reliance and its consequences is what Johnson, Ledlow and Cwiek have been pointing at in their discussion on information processing, as they that it does not work in a vacuum. Here, it was argued it is still people who perceive and evaluate information and that it is influenced by their judgments, including judgments on how others interpret and respond to these same messages. (p. 318) A series of interviews conducted by Riley et al., emphasized how traditional intelligence is very tactical and analytical – tips and liaison with connections or locations of subjects and the assessment of information, assembling of piece from various sources to produce an understanding of patterns or anomalies. (p. 38) This resource has a wealth of first-hand insights from the interviewed rank and file operatives in regard to intelligence work. The study, however, is specific to this aspect and, therefore, is not helpful in regard to a discussion of interagency cooperation. Theoharis and Immerman (2006) illustrated the importance of human resource in the intelligence field by extensively presenting evidences in history referencing the experiences of Britain, Russia and France. In their book, The Central Intelligence Agency, it was argued intelligence agencies must rely on human intelligence because this resource is the only ones that acquire experience and skills necessary to succeed in intelligence operations. (p. 111) Furthermore, it was established in the study intelligence professionals are required in order to build cooperation and ties. This work has the necessary data to establish why manpower plays a significant role in a spy network and hence, useful only to the extent of supporting an argument in human versus technology debate. The work did not explore much about interagency cooperation or how the human-factor figures in such circumstance. At present the US intelligence community is consisted of sixteen separate government agencies, including intelligence agencies, military intelligence, civilian intelligence and analysis offices under federal executive departments. The sheer number of these agencies leads to power struggle, rivalry, overlapping responsibilities, and so forth. A compounding problem of a very serious nature, wrote Boin and Stern (2005), is the unwillingness of organizations to cooperate with each other even in the wake of a disaster or an attack: “It would be naïve to think that under crisis conditions all pre-existing bureaucratic tensions make way for a mechanistic, rationalistic mode of centralized and tightly coordinated policymaking and implementation. On the contrary, interagency tensions often intensify.” (p. 58) This the reason why many studies on interagency collaboration point to leadership as a key element in bringing disparate units together. Johnson, Ledlow and Cwiek argued that it is imperative that leader among these agencies develop a sense of shared values and trust as they work together for essential common goals. (p. 321) According to Johnson, Ledlow and Cwiek, interagency communication is a prerequisite to the coordination activity in preparation for and in response to terrorism and that n order to reduce the potential for terrorism and to mitigate its effects, agencies must communicate effectively and responsively: “Above all, they should be committed to working together as an integrated and unified team, to prepare for terrorism and restore normality following an act of terrorism.” (p. 321) This study was reinforced by several case studies particularly in regard to interagency cooperation as well as scenarios requiring interagency response and solutions. What their work has accomplished is to illustrate that the number of intelligence agencies do not necessarily mean conflicts and rivalries in responsibilities but that their roles complement each other. For instance, they stated: A wide range of agencies and organizations are affected by and concerned about terrorism… These agencies are well served to develop, revisit, and refine terrorism preparedness and response programs that facilitate communication and action. (p. 321) Johnson, Ledlow and Cwiek’s work was supported by Richard Posner who, in his book Uncertain Shield (2006), discussed not only the weakness of the technological intelligence, but the specifics of the leadership variable in the intelligence cooperation among various governmental agencies – information that the former study was not able to address. Analyzing several documents as well as statutes, Posner was able to identify roles for the leaders of various agencies such as the CIA and the Department of Defense including the people and departments that may be crucial to the enhancement of interagency intelligence cooperation and coordination. For example, he was able to identify that the Intelligence Reform Act authorizes at least 500-strong staff for the Director of National Intelligence that would be tasked to engage in coordinating with different agencies. (p. 71) Unfortunately, while Posner demonstrated several opportunities for engagement and cooperation with specific details on departments and personnel that could facilitate interagency cooperation, there were no concrete roles for individual players besides the leaders of intelligence agencies or the collective role played by specific departments. Human resource is also a centerpiece in the need for the reorientation of a large and centrally managed federal security apparatus into more flexible adaptable systems. According to Cushman, emphasis is needed on new personnel rules, new organizational models as well as fundamental change in attitudes. (p. 163) Recommendations to improve human resource to address issues of interagency coordination have been the subject of numerous literature. For example, Carafano and Weitz reiterated a recurring suggestion to better educate civil servants on interagency processes and allow for routine short-term rotations of service among US government agencies. (p. 243) In Interagency Operations: Coordination through Education (2000), Robert Smith encouraged the establishment of an interagency professional education system and introducing interagency curriculum at the National Defense University. Johnson, Ledlow and Cwiek also proposed the concept of interagency training as a partial solution to the inadequacy in the capability of the intelligence community in regard to its emergency response policies and capabilities. (p. 24) III. Conclusion The available literature on human resource in the intelligence community could play a role in interagency cooperation and coordination has been sufficiently referenced particularly in recent studies. Enough references were made in regard to the advantages of operatives against technology or how politics hinder cooperation with the sheer number of intelligence agencies in the US government. However, the gap in the literature calls for a discussion on individual roles in interagency cooperation. In addition, there is a lack of reference on the factors such as organizational behavior, organizational culture – how to change these - so as individuals within an agency and the intelligence community as a whole - acquire a mindset or attitudes that allow for openness to a culture of engagement, cooperation and collaboration. Of course, there were discussions about training and education but there is a lack in initiative when it comes to structural change that aims to achieve this goal. For example, the proposed education in the National Defense University or the personnel training suggested by analysts – these are piecemeal and acknowledged as partial solutions to the interoperability problems of intelligence agencies. There is a difference between a “proactive personnel in the intelligence community” and a “proactive personnel in an intelligence community that encourages cooperation in all levels.” This paper will establish that the human variable must be the anchor of reform in the policies and priorities of the intelligence community. People are critical in establishing cooperation because they have the capacity of judgment; they have the skill to use technology; and the capability and experience to establish relationships. A change in this dimension, hence, is necessary in order for the intelligence community to achieve its objectives and mandate. IV. References Boin, Arjen and Stern, Eric. 2005. The politics of crisis management: public leadership under pressure. Cambridge University Press. Carafano, James and Weitz, Richard. 2008. Mismanaging Mayhem: How Washington Responds to Crisis. Greenwood Publishing Group. Cushman, Charles. 2006. An Introduction to the US Congress. M.E. Sharpe. Johnson, James, Ledlow, Gerald and Cwiek, Mark. 2005.Community Preparedness and Response to Terrorism: Communication and the media. Greenwood Publishing Group. Posner, Richard. 2006. Uncertain shield: the U.S. intelligence system in the throes of reform. Rowman & Littlefield. Riley, Kevin, Treverrton, Gregory, Wilson, Jeremy and Davis, Lois. 2005. State and local intelligence in the war on terrorism. Rand Corporation. Smith, Robert. 2000. Interagency Operations: Coordination Through Education. Defense Technical Information Center. Theoharis, Athan and Immerman, Richard. 2006. The Central Intelligence Agency: security under scrutiny. Greenwood Publishing Group. Read More