Are Kurds a Threat to Turkish National Homogeneity - Essay Example

The Kurdish Question: Is it a threat to the ‘national homogeneity’ of the Turkish Republic? Introduction The Kurdish question remains at the centre of every unsettled conflict in Turkey. Strict policies implemented by the state in the past to threaten, limit, and prevent the emergence of an independent civil society have triggered various antagonistic movements. Attempts by the Kurds to attain official recognition of their ethnic identity, political representation, and freedom have persistently been tarnished by bloodshed and coercion. Without a doubt, the multifaceted and conflicting approaches to the Kurdish issue have hampered progress and slowed down the development of a reasonable solution.1 This essay tries to determine the reason Turkey’s leaders found it hard to accommodate the aspirations of many of the Kurdish population. This essay argues that the strong nationalist tendencies within Turkey are the primary reason for the failure to resolve the Kurdish issue. The analysis looks at the development in Turkish-Kurdish relations since the 1970s. Without successfully resolving the Kurdish issue Turkey will continuously fail in its attempt to become a full member of the European Union (EU). Turkey will be forced to change its oppressive ideological foundations, and may fail to realise its full economic capability. But specifically, the country will continue to be engaged in its undying commitment to secure the nation. The capacity of Turkey’s leaders to resolve the Kurdish conflict has been impeded by too much politicisation that viewed the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) as a persistent hazard to the country. The Kurdish conflict aggravates the progressing inflation in Turkey and is the primary root of human rights abuses, and the greatest threat to the Turkey-EU relationship. In spite of the forceful Turkish military attempt and several substantial achievements in dealing with the PKK rebellion, the struggle continues. Turkey’s Response to the Kurdish Question Turkey’s leaders realised that the European political system had been evolving. Thus, they understood the need to reform the country’s political structure to align it with the emerging European political system. In short, they know that the successful conclusion of the customs union relied on Turkey’s success in the arena of human rights, parliamentary democracy, and the Kurdish question.2 Thus, Turkey carried out definite reforms to abolish several anti-democratic policies, which had been established by the military regime. Furthermore, several reforms were instigated so as to advance the country’s human rights condition and to find a solution to the Kurdish issue. More essentially, Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel acknowledged the Kurdish issue and understood the necessity to strengthen constitutional and legislative changes.3 As a preliminary measure, legal constraints on Kurdish cultural practices were abolished and a prohibition on the use of the Kurdish language was removed; indeed, the Kurds, for the first time, were permitted to observe their national celebration publicly.4 Even though Turkey embarked on several reforms to put a stop to human rights abuses, and to acknowledge Kurdish aspirations, the EU and the member states were not pleased with the progress the country had achieved. The EU further intensified its disapproval of Turkey’s response to the Kurdish issue.5 However, Turkey expressed unwillingness to comply with EU’s demands primarily due to the growth of Islamist and nationalist sentiments in the country.6 Obviously, the EU has a weak influence on the response of Turkey’s leaders to the Kurdish issue. This was not merely due to the public’s perception of the issue, but also due to the manner in which the EU had addressed it. Above all, Turkey did not willingly accept the European Parliament’s (EP) aggressive response to the Kurdish question.7 In the majority of its decisions, the EP proposed cultural freedom for the Kurds as a solution to the problem, as well as Turkish officials’ acknowledgment of the political, social, and cultural rights of the Kurdish people. One more problem with the EP’s response to the issue was its language, which seemed to be quite condemning. While it strongly criticised the response of Turkey’s leaders to the Kurdish question, it did not express any intense condemnation of the PKK’s terrorist activities in its decisions.8 Even though the Commission and the member states adopted the critical attitude of EP towards Turkey with regard to the Kurdish question, they have a tendency to be more subtle in their condemnation and expressed some level of recognition of Turkish dilemmas as regards human rights and Kurdish independence. They emphasised the urgency to develop a political solution to the Kurdish issue, and the need for Turkey’s leaders to address the valid and lawful aspirations of the Kurds, based on their own cultural, social, and political identity.9 The member states expressed their opinion about the Kurdish question in the EU-Turkey Association Council assemblies and in the EU Council reports. These challenged Turkey’s leaders to resolve the Kurdish conflict through political mechanisms, with absolute recognition of human rights, the legitimacy of a democratic order, and in absolute compliance with Turkey’s obligations as a constituent of the Council of Europe.10 In EU-Turkey Association Council assemblies in 1997, for instance, the Presidency declaration for the EU stressed that: The EU is aware of the extent of the problem Turkey is facing in the south-east, but the fight against terrorism must be conducted with due respect for human rights and the rule of law, and calls for a political solution. Turkey should have no doubt that the Union upholds the territorial integrity of Turkey and all countries in the region, and condemns terrorism.11 The Commission adopted the same stance, which can be evident in several of its statements; all emphasising that Turkey must create a diplomatic and political solution to the issue. A potential solution may involve greater respect for Kurdish cultural identity and the ways of practicing this identity so long as it does not support terrorist or separatist objectives.12 The EP expressed a more serious position; it postponed the Joint Parliamentary Committee convention in 1994 and proclaimed that a nonviolent political solution to the Kurdish issue and improvement in the adherence to human rights were a definite requirement of the new legitimate agreement between Turkey and the EU.13 The European Council expressed the same opinion. Furthermore, representing the EU Presidency, Klaus Kinkel, the Foreign Minister of Germany, declared that “If Turkey wants to have a customs union it must not turn a cold shoulder to everything Europe stands for”.14 Hence, during the customs union planning at the 1994 Turkey-EU Association Council convention, the EU Ministers informed Murat Karayalcin, Turkey’s representative, that they were troubled about Turkish officials’ handling of the Kurds and the continuous perpetration of human rights violations and ordered Turkey to show progress in these issues prior to the conclusion of the customs union.15 It seems that Turkish officials’ response to the Kurdish issue was contrary to that of a growing agreement over the treatment of minorities in the European Union.16 Due to the intense disapproval of the EU, alongside PKK’s heightened terrorist operations, Turkey expressed severe unwillingness to give in to EU’s involvement in the issue. The verdict of the Turkish Court to suspend the Kurdish Democracy Party (DEP) and the prosecutions of the DEP agents were a major sign that the EU was exerting a weak influence on the policy decisions of Turkey in this regard.17 According to Arikan (2006), disbanding of the DEP and the prosecution of its representatives took place during Turkey’s lobbying for the customs union.18 Nevertheless, the unwavering attempt of Turkey to accomplish the customs union made EU’s involvement a serious challenge for Turkey. The EU heightened its efforts to emphasise the Kurdish question as a prerequisite for setting up a customs union with Turkey.19 Jacques Delors, the Commission’s President, denounced the judgment of the Turkish Court: “this kind of behaviour could not be considered appropriate within the context of Turkey’s integration with Europe”.20 He further adds: “the customs union agreement should not be signed with Turkey without guarantees that Turkey would respect human rights and find a political solution to the Kurdish problem”.21 Turkish-Kurdish Relations since the 1970s The traditional response of Turkish officials to the Kurdish problem has traditionally been through military arbitration. Unfortunately, this approach only led to severe violations of human rights, bloodshed, and an enduring strife between the PKK and the government. Since the 1970s, the social and political approaches of Turkey’s officials towards Kurdish aspirations have been characterised by marginalisation, prejudice, and denunciation.22 The Kurdish population, being the biggest minority group in Turkey, have posed what is believed as the biggest risk to the formation of national homogeneity in Turkey. Successive responses and solutions of Turkish officials, even though in conflict with international law, have hence denounced the existence of the Kurdish population as an independent ethnic group within the diverse population of Turkey, and efforts towards a legitimate rule of assimilation and ‘Turkification’ has led to a drawn out armed conflict.23 Strategies implemented since the founding of the Turkish Republic, which are inspired by the Kemalist doctrine— rules that identify the fundamental features of the modern Turkish Republic—in their efforts to create a national Turkish culture and identity, were evidently unsuccessful in mitigating the Kurdish issue.24 Demands to recognise the human rights of the Kurdish population and, particularly, their political and cultural interests, have been ignored and efforts to linguistically, culturally, and ethnically consolidate all groups in Turkey have persisted whilst disregard for the fundamental human rights of the Kurdish population has worsened the issue.25 Recently, the response of Turkish officials to existing and persistent violations of human rights, hostility, and discrimination, has been emulated in other countries inhabited by the Kurds, such as Iraq, Iran, and Syria.26 Wholesale denunciation of the Kurdish issue in Turkey has been attributed to the following: the repression of rebellions, the forcible detention of Kurds, the prohibition of cultural and linguistic expressions, and violent displacement. The response of succeeding Turkish governments to the Kurdish question has led to the further marginalisation and discrimination of the Kurdish population in Turkey.27 Prolonged conflict and escalating hostility in Kurdish provinces revealed a hidden rift in Turkish society. However, in spite of the persistent hostility in Turkey, reports of improvements and of progress towards democratic expansion and peacemaking have been made public by the existing ruling party since 2002.28 The Justice and Development Party—also known as AK Party—has in numerous ways been more dedicated than any former administration, not least by recognising that there are problems to be resolved.29 Nevertheless, the unrelenting tendency of the conflict and the toughening public opinion attest to the unsuccessful policy reforms and emphasises an urgent need for more proactive responses and a revitalisation of the pledge given in 2005 to effectively respond to Kurdish demands through democratic means.30 In spite of what may be regarded as a change of response or reform in strategy, with several definite improvements being promoted by the state, mass arrests of civil society leaders, members of the press, scholars, and politicians as a component of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) and related undertakings 31, prove that a number of major challenges to the advancement of any attempt towards reform still linger in Turkey, and demonstrate the incongruity in the commitment of Turkish officials to Kurdish aspirations. The absence of a national consensus and an effective conflict resolution mechanism has been the major hindrances to resolving the Kurdish issue. Lately, it has been reported that Turkish officials have repeatedly talked with PKK delegates arbitrated by Norway.32 Unfortunately, these meetings have not led to an encouraging finale. The negotiations even disintegrated after the 2011 general election. The frequent meetings that the head of PKK-- Abdullah Ocalan-- has been having with his family members and attorneys were prohibited by the government in 2011. In support of the government’s traditional security ideology, the AKP administration has embarked on a more practical and more wide-ranging strategy to eradicate the presence of PKK in the area, which resulted in a heightened conflict.33 The decision of the government to conform to the well-established security framework rather than try to explore potential political and civil solutions is possibly a reaction to the existing political situation in Turkey being vastly polarised.34 In spite of the substantial decline in PKK’s violent activities in the area in recent times, the Turkish nationalist perspective on the Kurdish issue has sustained its considerable influence among the general Turkish public and recognition of pro-independence political parties within Turkey has been strong and widespread.35 These circumstances also shed light on the sluggish progress of Turkey in its efforts to accommodate the Kurds’ political aspirations. Today, the pace of progress is still largely motivated by Turkey’s aims to become an official member of the EU.36 The continuing hindrances and absence of consensus has been the major barriers to successful conflict resolution and political compromise. Meanwhile, it is also essential to explain the prospects that the mitigation of violence generated. At first, the mitigation of violence pushed the Kurdish issue out of the public policy domain. This has been understood wrongly by the general Turkish public as the cessation of conflict. In 2007, with the restoration of the pro-Kurdish presence in the parliament, the Kurdish issue and the absence of an effective conflict resolution strategy began to dominate the public discourse, yet again.37 The consequent public discourse have exposed vast polarisation in the country. It also revealed the prevalent disagreement among the powerful political entities regarding the attributes of the conflict and how to respond to it. The continuing debate has revealed the inflexibility or firmness of the nationalist attitude of Turkish officials and their reluctance to accommodate Kurdish aspirations.38 As argued by Balci (2008), the accommodation of Kurdish demands and the acknowledgment of Kurdish rights and identity call for large-scale and profound changes in the status of Turkey as a nation-state, and these can merely be achieved if there is compromise and eagerness to reform the prevailing perception of universal rights and citizenship.39 Prohibiting PKK’s leader from meeting with his legal representatives and the persistence of repressive activities against Kurdish political advocates has resulted in a similarly aggressive reaction from the PKK. This has been evident in the escalation of the violent activities of PKK in 2012.40 Furthermore, in September 2012, a mass hunger strike was initiated by a number of imprisoned PKK representatives. Their major demands were to give back Ocalan’s right to meet with his legal representatives and the right to publicly use Kurdish language.41 In November 2012, Ocalan persuaded the PKK members to end the hunger strikes. This move considerably eased the escalating conflict in Turkey. Afterwards, in January 2013, a statement was made that pro-Kurdish MPs have talked with Ocalan and that efforts to discuss possible solutions to the conflict have been renewed.42 The PKK’s endorsement of the democratic rhetoric was viewed as a tactical reorientation. Its major goal is to promote a democratic approach to the Kurdish issue.43 Recently, the PKK also expressed other aspirations like environmental conservation and gender equality. Moreover, the Union of the Communities of Kurdistan (KCK) was officially instituted in 2005, formed as another institutional structure to minister Kurdish political representation and give them the opportunity to mobilise as a nation within the current state restrictions.44 ‘Democratic Autonomy’ has been adopted since August 2010 to define particular recommendations for the solution of the Kurdish problem that the PKK aspires to create.45 As regards the identification of the Kurdish issue and measures required to solve it, the pro-Kurdish democratic body has the same beliefs as those of the PKK. Nevertheless, as it developed at an entirely different setting in Turkey, there are major distinctions as well. One of the main demands presented by pro-Kurdish groups has been the issue of political compromise. The pro-Kurdish democratic campaign, since its emergence in 1990, has been represented by several political parties.46 Because of the attributes of the political aspirations they have been presenting, like the official recognition of the Kurdish identity, they have been regarded as political nonconformists. Thus, they have experienced suppression because they demand Kurdish independence.47 The pro-Kurdish movement has been expressing national aspirations and Kurdish identity within the framework of human rights and democracy. They have been constantly highlighting the urgency of creating a plural and participatory democratic order that values cultural and human rights, and the recognition of Kurdish aspirations and rights.48 At first, the pro-Kurdish movement fought more particularly for political compromise and conflict resolution. Emphasising the anti-democratic, homogenising, repressive, and self-centred nature of the Turkish Republic, the pro-Kurdish democratic movement puts forward nonviolent political reform and aspires to undermine the hostilities produced by this strife.49 In spite of the suppression and discrimination it has endured, the pro-Kurdish democratic movement has sustained strong unity, stability, and an objective attitude towards articulation of specific Kurdish aspirations with more general democratic aspirations. The key aspiration of the pro-Kurdish movement has been the acknowledgment of Kurdish linguistic and cultural rights, which in the agenda of the existing pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) is articulated along these lines: The right of every citizen, within the unity of the country, to express themselves freely, to develop their culture, to speak and develop their mother tongue, to be educated in it and use it in visual, auditory and written forms of media, are fundamental human rights and consequently they will be protected under the constitution.50 Besides the legal recognition of the language rights of the Kurdish population, the BDP has been appealing for Kurdish autonomy. Regional independence is viewed as a policy and an agenda that can successfully resolve the Kurdish issue and the BDP has supported the proclamation of the ‘democratic autonomy’ plans by the Democratic Society Congress (DTK) in July 2011.51 The ideological reconstruction of PKK has prompted a vigorous debate on how to approach the Kurdish issue and the potential measures that can be implemented to fulfil Kurdish aspirations. The suggestions presented by the Kurdish national movement were not able to gain support in Turkey. Moreover, the absence of solid measures to resolve the Kurdish issue has led to the continuation of hostilities.52 The present administration has adopted a strategy of military intervention. Current Turkish officials attempt to militarily eradicate the PKK and a component of its comprehensive ‘anti-terror’ strategy includes repressing and destroying the pro-Kurdish democratic movement.53 Thousands of pro-Kurdish campaigners have been imprisoned. This has led to a situation in which the already suppressed and barred political arena that the members of the pro-Kurdish democratic movement have been occupying is further limited. As long as nationalists in the rightist and centre-right parties and Kemalist extremists in judiciary, executive, legislative, and military leadership control Turkey’s approach towards Kurdish demands, the formation of a political compromise will be weighed down. This has been confirmed in different instances when Turkish officials attempted to formulate a more accommodating approach to the Kurdish issue.54 Neither the reputable Suleyman Demirel nor Turgut Ozal has been successful in surmounting the deep-rooted suspicions and reluctance of Kemalist and nationalist leaders.55 The head of the Islamist Welfare Party, Necmettin Erbakan, also failed to create a political answer to the Kurdish question. For the Kemalists and nationalists accommodating Kurdish aspirations is an absolute threat to the existence of a united Turkish nation-state. They would argue that cultural rights would certainly result in insistent bids for political rights. This, in turn, would generate demands for the transformation of the Turkish Republic into a federation.56 Once underway, separation would become a huge possibility. The major reason for the failure to resolve the Kurdish issue is the widespread reluctance and disagreement among Turkish officials about what the components of a political solution must be. Suggestions range from social and economic steps to address economic stagnancy to policies of decentralization to somehow allow a form of Kurdish autonomy at the local arena. Other proposals would be to respect the cultural identity of the Kurdish population by allowing Kurdish media or even considering the opportunity to teach Kurdish in schools.57 No one wants to suggest a formal recognition of Kurdish minority status. Most of all is the general objective of sustaining the so-called national homogeneity of Turkey, which military leaders consider as their most commendable duty. Nevertheless, as long as the terrorist campaigns of PKK persist and as long as the reluctance and opposition of Turkish nationalists and traditional Kemalists against any policy reform towards the accommodation of Kurdish aspirations continues, any Turkish administration will be extremely cautious in endorsing impractical political solutions, especially so if it is a pathetic regime rooted in an insecure alliance.58 Turks may hence eventually come into a realisation that they are a culturally and ethnically diverse society, but they are still a long way from completely recognising that fact, or fully accepting the inevitable political outcomes from it. Conclusions Turkey has evolved greatly over the past decade, and Turkish officials have managed to initiate a number of proactive and concrete reforms for the Kurdish population. Nevertheless, the tremendous complexity and magnitude of the Kurdish question should be recognised and addressed in order to come up with long-term and diplomatic results. The government must be the primary catalyst of change within this setting, working with the Kurdish population. Development of a definite, structured approach towards a solution, and strengthening the political determination and drive will aid in attaining an inclusive and stable peace and an ultimate political answer to the Kurdish question. Turkey’s current responses and its potential future actions as regards the Kurdish issue have to be viewed within the context of regional progress. The dominant attitude in Turkey reinforces the state’s resolve not to give in to any Kurdish demands, believing that such demands are basically a threat to a unified Turkish nation-state. In contrast, the Kurdish population has tamed and softened their demands. The Kurds presently aim to achieve their rights and aspirations within a democratic Turkey. Unfortunately, it seems that the rigidly nationalist Turkish public and a politically influential Kemalist military remain strongly opposed to a devolved state. The recognition of Kurdish demands and the degree of public acceptance of Kurdish identity will be a central point of debate and will continuously exert considerable influence on Turkish-Kurdish relations until the foreseeable future. References Arat, Z. (2007) Human Rights in Turkey. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press. Arikan, H. (2006) Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for EU Membership? UK: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. Balci, F. (2008) Politicisation of Kurdish Question through Human Rights Discourse in Turkey. Ann Arbor, MI: ProQuest. Barkey, H. & Fuller, G. (1998) Turkey’s Kurdish Question. England: Rowman & Littlefield. Casier, M. & Jongerden, J. (2010) Nationalisms and Politics in Turkey: Political Islam, Kemalism, and the Kurdish Issue. New York: Taylor & Francis. Eccarius-Kelly, V. (2011) The Militant Kurds: A Dual Strategy for Freedom. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. Gocek, F. (2011) The Transformation of Turkey: Redefining State and Society from the Ottoman Empire to the Modern Era. London: I.B. Tauris. Gunes, C., 2013(a). Turkey’s Kurdish Question: Dilemmas of War and Peace, Kurdish Question in Turkey: New Perspectives in Violence, Representation and Reconciliation, [online] Available at: < https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=turkeys-kurdish-question---dilemmas-of-war-and-peace.pdf&site=12> [Accessed 22 March 2013] Gunes, C. (2013b) The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey: From Protest to Resistance. London: Routledge. Kramer, H. (2000) A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Massicard, E. & Watts, N. 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