Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century - Case Study Example

Counterterrorism: Problems and Suggestions The International Cooperation for the Suppression of Terrorism (ICST) is a movement conceptualized by theSecurity Council in hopes of suppressing and fighting terrorism. One of the problems related to fighting terrorism is the lack of available legal remedies. After the Munich Olympics Massacre in 1972, the United Nations took notice of the growing problem of terrorism. As a result, antiterrorist measures were slowly formulated by the UN, but these measures unfortunately faced a deadlock when the Ad Hoc Committee failed to come up with an agreement on how to deal with the terrorist issue. The committee found it difficult to define terrorism since it was entangled in the political ideals of oppressed masses. It was only about a decade ago when the General Assembly formally condemned terrorism through a series of resolutions. However these resolutions did not have legal weight because no methods and measures of enforcement were laid out (Combs, 2003, p. 200). Realizing this deficiency, the Security Council passed a series of resolutions emphasizing the vital role of the UN in the suppression of terrorism and the importance of bilateral and multilateral agreements in suppressing terrorism. In this instance, it may be said that the International Cooperation for the Suppression of Terrorism (ICST) came into being. The ICST is an amalgam of continued efforts taken by the UN against terrorism. Resolutions 1373 passed by the Security Council called on states to control the financial assets flowing towards terrorist activities and to implement all relevant UN protocols and conventions on terrorism. These conventions now make up the bulk of actions which are considered under the International Cooperation for the Suppression of Terrorism. “To date 12 major conventions and protocols designed to combat terrorism have been adopted by the UN General Assembly and have been ratified by a sufficient number of states to become international law” (Combs, 2003, p. 201). These conventions and treaties relate to the use of nuclear weapons, freezing of terrorist assets, and sanctions for related terrorist activities. There are various types of ICST. These are: bilateral, regional, and global. Bilateral ICST involves only two countries in its cooperation efforts. This is usually the preferred form of cooperation because it involves fewer complications and fewer concessions for either country to make. Regional ICST is more elaborate and involves more countries. Therefore, there are more changes, adjustments, and terms to settle before this form of cooperation can be set into place. Global ICST is more or less the same with regional ICST, only that it involves more countries. This form of cooperation is less effective than the first two methods because it is liable to encounter different barriers and hindrances in international cooperation. ICST has a good potential of curtailing terrorism. More particularly, “bilateral terrorism could succeed if a chain of such agreements eventually encompassed many states” (Dragon Courseware, n.d). Nations who have similar ideologies and regimes usually find it easy to adapt and expand bilateral agreements. However, this form of cooperation can also produce disastrous results. In the case of Abu Daoud, who was responsible for the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre, bilateral agreements did not effectively work for countries involved. Intelligence efforts by Israel and Germany established that Daoud was responsible for the Munich Massacre, and he was later arrested in France for such criminal activities. Israel and Germany both applied for the extradition of Daoud, both of them thinking that their extradition treaties with France would make possible the transfer of Daoud for litigation. However, France had to protect its own political and economic interests in the Arab world. And these interests prevented it from extraditing Daoud to either Israel or Germany. Daoud was later released. France later made a flimsy excuse for refusing extradition by pointing out apparent irregularities in the German and Israeli requests for extradition (Dragon Courseware, n.d). This incident illustrates how international cooperation can sometimes be fickle and consequently be ineffective. The Daoud incident can easily happen again. Many states have their individual interests to protect; and extradition treaties can be set aside for various legal technicalities if nations value their personal interests more than they value their international ‘word of honor’. This incident can easily happen again because many terrorist acts are often labeled as political crimes, making their perpetrators political offenders. “Those believed guilty of political offenses are eligible for the granting of political asylum by friendly states” (Combs, 2003, p. 199). In order to evade the legal ramifications of their actions, terrorists can simply take refuge in a nation sympathetic to their cause. International laws have come up with actions to declare terrorist acts as criminal, however implementing parties find it difficult to address the practical and political problems related to international terrorism. And terrorists are still free to commit violent and criminal acts in the name of their political ideals. International cooperation is easier said than done. There are various difficulties in maintaining international cooperation. Gal-or identifies some of these obstacles as: global ideological pluralism, variance of regimes in the international system, and political and economic interdependence. The ideological pluralism that exists today impedes international cooperation to suppress terrorism. The West views terrorism as a “crime that breaks every state’s moral-legal code” (Dragon Courseware, n.d). Therefore, they deem that terrorism must be contained and suppressed. On the other hand, underdogs view terrorism as a way for them to fight back. They view it as “a weapon of the weak or a last resort for the globally deprived and exploited” (Dragon Courseware, n.d). And for them, terrorism must not be contained. With this in mind, the attentat clause is not a very favorable mandate for underdogs. The attentat clause does not qualify the assassination of heads of state as political crimes; instead these assassinations are now criminal acts, therefore, exempt from concessions granted political crimes. Various concerned parties take issue with this clause. They contend that it potentially interferes and suppresses citizens’ rights to seek asylum from other countries sympathetic to their legitimate political cause. The variance in the regimes of countries also interferes with international cooperation. The Liberal regimes respond through slow and diplomatic channels in order to resolve terrorist problems. This makes them weak and sometimes vulnerable to terrorism. The Authoritarian regimes act swiftly, surely and massively against terrorist activities and groups. This makes them stronger and less vulnerable to terrorist problems and activities (Dragon Courseware, n.d). The political and economic interdependence that now dominates the world also interferes with international cooperation. Many countries have become dependent on the West, and this dependence has bred dissatisfaction and unrest among the Third world developing countries. This unrest inevitably gives rise to terrorist activities among the masses. Periphery nations (those that provide raw materials and labor) compete with each other in order to provide raw materials to Western countries; this makes them weak and less united in power over the richer countries. As a result, these periphery nations are often considered underdogs against richer countries. International cooperation against terrorism appears weak in the face of modern methods of warfare. Terrorists have now resorted to the use of weapons of mass destruction to perpetuate their ends. Weapons of mass destruction like biological agents, chemical weapons, and nuclear weapons seem to be gaining popularity among terrorist groups. The present legal constraints on the use of these weapons are currently insufficient to ensure that these weapons will not be used. And the cold calculation and determination of terrorists to cause massive damage was seen in the September 11 attacks; and these attacks “have made the real possibility that such terrorists would willingly use chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons” (Combs, 2003, p. 272). In the face of such deadly threats to our lives, international cooperation is difficult to achieve when the antagonists are armed with weapons that they have no qualms about using, and the protagonists cannot retaliate in the same way because they are bound by the mandates of international law. There are various counterterrorism measures currently being practiced. This study shall discuss three of these strategies, namely: diplomacy, use of military forces, and interdiction of financial assets (Pillar, 2001, p. 73). Diplomacy is about “articulating policy to foreign interlocutors, persuading them and reaching understanding or agreements with them…” (Pillar, 2001, p. 73). This counterterrorist method helps to support the other counterterrorist methods. It also helps provide a formal structure in making demands and in retaliating against states that sponsor terrorism. Diplomacy helps set-up international standards against terrorism. And finally, it helps provide uniform standards in facilitating cooperation on international matters (Pillar, 2001, pp. 75-79). But, for all the benefits that diplomacy has and can potentially bring, it carries certain disadvantages. Diplomacy does not work on a large scale, or when several nations are involved. As a result, diplomatic transactions involving several nations can actually accomplish limited goals. And with fewer nations involved, the point of international cooperation against terrorism is lost. Diplomacy has had its share of successes and failures. In instances of its success, fewer countries were involved and negotiations were conducted under small multilateral gatherings. To illustrate, the G8 ministerial meeting on terrorism in 1996 was successfully able to come to a committed agreement regarding terrorism; and the G8 nations were able to collectively make recommendations like, “sharing of information, vigorous prosecution of terrorists, and the development of antiterrorist technology” (Pillar, 2001, p. 76). However, diplomacy failed when it involved large gatherings. This was seen in the 1970s when national liberation movements gained widespread sympathy and the United Nations General Assembly had a difficult time actually condemning terrorism. Consequently, the UN, as a whole, failed to gain much needed support against terrorism because most of its member nations were sympathetic to the cause of terrorist liberation movements. Military and strike forces are defense elements of terrorism which can help protect innocent civilians and infiltrate terrorist lairs to extract known terrorists. It helps to demonstrate the seriousness of the United States in fighting terrorism. It disrupts terrorist operations and the threat of military attack sometimes deters further terrorist attacks from being undertaken against the United States. Fear of being a target of retaliatory action by the United States also helps deter other nations from supporting terrorists’ cause. This last point was seen in the case of Libya, when European governments were fearful of unilateral actions from the United States. This fear prompted them to expel Libyan officials from their country and to cancel agreements made with Libya. A disadvantage of using military forces is the fact that it can have minimal effect on terrorist groups and on terrorist lairs. It can also lead to more terrorist attacks from threatened terrorist groups. There is also no firm evidence and intelligence proving that the use of this counterterrorist method has affected or foiled the plans of terrorist groups (Pillar, 2001, 104). Hence, this method may be just a fruitless exercise, potentially triggering the terrorists’ anger and stirring their passion for their cause even more. This method can also be potentially harmful to civilians and other innocent persons. The rule of proportionality, which refers to the “need for the loss of civilian life to be minimal compared to the military advantage gained” can sometimes be ignored when military forces are deployed (Combs, 2003, p. 191). This makes this strategy risky and sometimes counterproductive. The use of military and strike forces have been successful in the Entebbe raids where the Israeli Defense Forces helped neutralize a terrorist situation at the Entebbe airport in Uganda. Some authors and analysts contend that since civilian lives were lost and Uganda’s sovereignty was violated, the raid was not successful. However, global opinion counts the operation a success, justifying entry into Uganda under humanitarian reasons (Combs, 2003, p. 212). Strike forces were also used by Germany through its GSG 9 (Grenzschutzgruppe 9). This strike force was particularly successful in the Mogadishu Raid of 1977 when it was able to rescue all hostages without any casualties; and was able to secure the terrorists and the plane without breaking any laws. They were also able to successfully pull off the rescue because of the cooperation of the Somalian government (Combs, 2003, pp. 214-215). The use of military and strike forces has been known to fail, and it has failed a number of times because of the “inherent difficulty of using force in a situation in which the terrorists have the advantage of being able and willing to use it immediately against the captives” (Pillar, 2001, p. 99). Failures are seen in operations where hostages and civilians are killed (e.g. 1985-hijacked plane in Egypt where 69 of the 96 passengers and crew were killed); and when it did not fully neutralize vital terrorist facilities (e.g. Afghanistan air raids—where simple housing, firing ranges, and assembly areas, not vital terrorist staging areas were destroyed). Failures of military and strike forces were also seen in the early days of the Delta Force – the U.S. counterterrorist strike team established in 1977. This force initially lacked sufficient training and experience, and only in recent years has it gained enough expertise as an effective counterterrorist strike force. The instances of failure in US counterterrorist operations were especially seen in the rescue attempt of American embassy hostages in Tehran, Iran. Combs (2003, p. 220) mentions that “there were too many chiefs and not enough cooperation between military units”. The rivalries that often exist between the US military strike forces make it difficult to coordinate effective counterterrorist efforts. The third strategy, interdiction of financial assets, helps limit the activities and capabilities of terrorists, and they can also become bargaining chips in easing future agreements between states (Pillar, 2001, pp. 93-94). Freezing of assets, no matter how small, can wreak havoc on terrorist operations. “The threat of interdiction may complicate a group’s financial operations, and the criminalization of support to terrorists may deter potential supporters of terrorists” (Pillar, 2001, p. 94). However, even if terrorist assets are frozen, terrorist operations still flourish because their operations usually do not rely on large-scale financing. It does not cost much money to blow something or someone up. So, even if assets are frozen, terrorist activities can still succeed. Another reason why freezing of assets is a very limited exercise is that terrorist accounts are difficult to track. Accounts can also be easily concealed through bank accounts under false names; through the use of intermediaries; and by comingling funds for legitimate and illegitimate purposes. Also, informal channels can still be used by terrorist groups in order to continue their operations. This counterterrorist method succeeded in instances when state assets needed to be frozen. State assets are easy to track. At present, the U.S. has successfully frozen the assets of Iraq and Libya. It has been less successful in freezing the assets of smaller groups like the Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other terrorist groups. The bank accounts of a variety of terrorist groups remain active. Because of this, some experts claim that this counterterrorist method is, at best, only a symbolic means of expressing how serious the United States is in its fight against terrorism. Combs (2003, pp. 207-221) makes special mention of the use of Special Forces as a counterterrorism strategy. She cites Israel’s Sarayet Mat’kal, Britain’s SAS, Germany’s GSG 9, the US’s Delta Force, as strike forces which have yielded both positive and negative results in the War against Terrorism. These forces have helped neutralize terrorist threats in different parts of the globe. She mentions that with determination, adequate funding, advanced training, proper coordination, strike forces can be very successful. However, limited commitment and inadequate training can lead to undesirable and tragic results. These forces can also cause unfortunate civilian deaths. She cites the actions of the Sarayet Mat’kal when they went after PLO terrorist Khalil al Wazit. The Sarayet blew up Khalil’s car, killing Khalil, his bodyguards and innocent bystanders. The killing of the bystanders was not deliberate, however, Israel’s attitude about the death of such civilians was callous and a blatant disregard of human life (Combs, 2003, p. 210). There are also various hindrances to counterterrorist actions that make it difficult to really win the war against terrorism. These hindrances are: the question of identification, misperception about terrorism, extradition, and blowback. Firstly, the question of identification comes about in identifying who is responsible for the terrorist attack. Firm evidence needs to be established in order to positively identify who is responsible for the attack. Secondly, misperceptions about terrorism also interfere with counterterrorism efforts. Many countries perceive terrorism differently. Some see it as beneficial to their cause; some do not wish to take sides for fear of being a terrorist target, and others prefer to remain neutral. Thirdly, even when terrorist targets are identified, it is still difficult to accomplish the process of extraditing terrorists. Not all countries have extradition treaties with other states. And terrorists can take advantage of this fact by seeking refuge in countries where they can hide under the protection of international laws. Lastly, blowback is a CIA term which refers to the consequences of secret military operations against terrorism. To cite a scenario, the U.S. assistance and training of Afghan groups against the Soviet Union consequently led to the rise of Osama Bin Laden and the eventual attack of American civilians on September 11, 2001 (Dragon Courseware, n.d). This is an uncomfortable truth that many American political leaders still contemplate to this day – that their own actions led to rash and disastrous consequences. US policy in the Middle East also resulted to unintended consequences. Many analysts opine that the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia which killed a number of American service men is an ultimate result of anti-American sentiments in the Middle East. And these unfavorable sentiments against America in general caused the blowback against Americans, both civilian and military. There are possibly five strategies governments can consider in fighting terrorism. These strategies are: law enforcement, social and economic reforms, moral suasion, deterrence, media restraint. In order for these strategies to be successful in crippling terrorism, they need to be simultaneously implemented. Firstly, the law enforcement strategy calls for law enforcers to implement measures against terrorists. These measures should be impartial – setting punishments which are commensurate with crimes committed, while disregarding ideological sentiments. This strategy was carried out by the U.S. in the form of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 which effectively set measures to prevent terrorism and protect victims of terrorism. Secondly, social and economic reforms will help deter terrorist tendencies in citizens who suffer from poverty, inequalities and deprivation. The government must not focus on dealing with terrorist activities only; it must also try to assist those who may be led into a life of terrorism. Thirdly, moral suasion is an attempt to “address terrorism at the moral level by creating a global abhorrence for terrorist acts” (Dragon Courseware, n.d). Consequently, various international treaties condemn hostage-taking, skyjacking, suicide bombings, piracy as deplorable terrorist acts. The Tokyo Convention of 1963 laid out provisions regarding offences committed aboard aircrafts. This convention defined the parameters of the offense known as skyjacking and prescribed severe penalties for the act. The fourth strategy – deterrence – involves the policy of prevention; of making it clear that negotiation with terrorists is an absolute and has no possible room for concession or bargaining. “The grim conclusion of deterrence is that the short-term concern for the fate of hostages must yield to the long-term consequences of capitulating to terrorism, which only encourages more of the same” (Dragon Courseware, n.d). Finally, media restraint is about curtailing terrorism by not allowing the terrorists to put across their message to the rest of the world. The media can help implement this strategy by reducing the glorification of violence in their reports and avoiding the sensationalism of terrorist incidents. Media restraint is important in order to avoid the so-called Wag-the dog scenario, where the government’s actions are often viewed as attempts at diverting the attention of the world away from less political, yet more controversial government scenarios. President Clinton was at one point accused of waging a war against Iraq just to detract attention from the Lewinsky scandal. Whether or not Clinton was guilty of such maneuvering will forever remain an issue. The above strategies cannot be effective if implemented independent of each other. I would employ all of them because they are all important and effective strategies in order to counter terrorism. In order to assist these strategies, I would also freeze the assets of these terrorist groups in order to financially cripple them. The 15-point counterterrorist method proposed by Wardlaw (Whitaker, 2003, pp 274-276) addresses the causes of terrorism, as well as ways of physically and legally addressing the problem of terrorism. It makes mention of more specific and long-term solutions to terrorism, and those solutions go to the very core of social and economic issues that eventually cause discontent among the people. It also is more aggressive about strong legal remedies for terrorism, one of them being the implementation of capital punishment. The previous text does not go so far as to mention capital punishment, only the implementation of legal sanctions for terrorist acts. Wardlaw also considers the use of strike forces as an effective counterterrorist measure, whereas, the previous text does not consider the use of strike forces as an effective government strategy against terrorism. Wardlaw makes some concessions for terrorists as long as they comply with international laws and the different conventions that govern warfare. Wardlaw is also not above the use of preemptive methods to prevent terrorist activities. Wardlaw’s methods call for the government to make some major decisions about how to counter terrorists and their activities. These decisions will cause them to skate legal boundaries. In comparing these methods with previously discussed methods, Wardlaw’s methods require a serious commitment from government authorities. These methods would work well in theory, but would be very difficult to implement because of the complexities of politics, international relations, and the current laws in place in different countries. Reference Combs, C. (2003) Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century. Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. Course Reader: Political Science Y200B. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana Duplicating Services Dragon Courseware (n.d) Discussion. Retrieved 22 March 2009 from https://dragon.pop.indiana.edu/students/courses/viewCourse.php?registrationID=263757;node=unit[8]/discussion[1] Hudson, R. (2002) Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why: The 1999 Government report on Profiling Terrorists. Guilford, Connecticut: Lyons Press Pillar, P. (2001) Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy. Washington: Brookings Institution Press. Whitaker, D. (2003) The Terrorism Reader. 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