Study of American Politics - Essay Example

Study of American Politics Q Congress is made up of parties, which are teams of individuals aiming to take controlof government and its governing apparatus during elections. The winning party in Congress carries out the formulation of government policies after ascending power. Congress acts as it does because various members are motivated by personal desire regarding power, prestige, and income that are benefits of holding office (Downs 28). Because Congress cannot enjoy these privileges without winning elections, the major objective of all parties within Congress is geared towards claiming victory in an election by maximizing votes. This means that policies pursued in Congress are only a means towards maximizing American votes. This hypothesis regarding maximization of votes among the American public explains Congress’ democratic political actions, while also distinguishing between irrational and rational behaviour in politics (Downs 30). Uncertainty within the political landscape enhances the development of party ideologies within Congress, particularly as tool to achieve victory and office. This ideology is the image created by parties in Congress to define what a good society is and what should be done to achieve such a society. Ideology is critical in gaining support from social groups and, because uncertainty ensures that no one ideology in Congress is superior to the other, parties will tend to align their ideology with a competing ideology that proves superior (Downs 113). Respective parties in Congress ensure that there is a relationship between their ideology and their actions, which means that their actions cannot go against the precedent set by their party ideologies. Therefore, these parties are forced to adhere to their ideologies and policies when in Congress due to the dynamics of competition between parties and the values respective voters imbue on their parties. Ideological stability in Congress has institutional roots that do not allow any major changes to fit the dynamics of change, especially since they are meant to attract a vast amount of groups who would vote against the party if they changed. Therefore, because winning elections is the main objective of parties in congress, any conflicts arising between this objective and maintaining ideology that causes discontinuity and costs votes usually ends with parties choosing to do whatever it takes to win elections (Downs 113). However, even with this competition between parties to win elections, ideologies that guide their actions in Congress tend towards a centre, although they do not become identical so as not to lose crucial voting blocks. Finally, parties in Congress have a wider policy spread and, thus, less integration of these policies. This results in overlapping of party policies towards the centre, meaning that the parties will resemble each other. Therefore, Congress fosters ambiguity in their policies in order to offer voters a rational choice. Q #2 The principal-agent theory refers to occurrence of a problem in which one entity or individual, referred to as the agent, has the ability to make decisions, which could impact on other entities or individuals, referred to as the principal (Macdonald 526). This exists because, at times, the gent has motivation to act in their own interest, rather than the interests of the principal. This relationship is especially useful as an analytical instrument in politics. Agents can differ with principals in three major ways. Agents could possess preferences that differ from those of the agent, for example, a willingness to work, while the incentives of the agent may also differ from those of the principal. The latter difference implies that the stakes or rewards that the agent wants may be different from those of the principal. Finally, agents may also possess information that the principal does not possess and vice versa. In case these divergences occur, problems related to strategy, coordination, incentives, and monitoring may occur. With regards to bureaucracy in American politics, bureaucratic agencies may formulate policies that are deviant from those presented in their original mandate (Macdonald 527). This deviation can be taken as an example of the principal-agent problem, in which the bureaucracy is the agent and Congress is the principal. Congress seeks to control this deviation through oversight and Congressional acts. This regulation can be in the form of congressional oversight and statutory control. In the latter, Congress seeks to limit this drift by the bureaucracy by exerting influence on the bureaucratic agency prior to its occurrence (Macdonald 530). This can be done through specification of the fiscal, time, structure, and agenda constraints, which limits bureaucratic discretion. Congressional oversight, on its part, involves the monitoring of bureaucratic actions, especially in checking the progress of policy implementation. Congressional has the sufficient monopoly of control that enables it to settle disputes in an orderly manner with organizations and agencies, including bureaucracies (Downs 22). Those in control of Congress normally possess the last word on issues by enforcing decisions on the bureaucracy. Congress acts according to its stated goals in ideology and rationally ordered structures, attempting to mobilize resources in order to attain its objectives. However, bureaucracies will usually resist this treatment as means due to their differing incentives, preferences, and information from Congress (Downs 30). However, Congress attempts to solve this problem by investigating bureaucracies to identify any deviation in policy implementation through questioning of officials and reading agency reports. In addition, they also use information from interest groups and voters to detect bureaucratic drift. Q #3 The study of the presidency has changed significantly in the last fifty years, especially with the increased focus on the unilateral power powers possessed by the president and what he does with these powers. In the last fifty years, scholars and academics studying the American presidency have turned to concentrating on the wide array of unilateral powers possessed by the presidency, as well as the implications of actions taken along these unilateral powers. The initial paradigm used in studying these unilateral presidential powers was the bargaining model. According to this paradigm, the powers of the president are relevant during attempts to persuade, while the results are inconclusive in his attempts to command (Waterman 478). Therefore, the presidency was studied via their attempts to persuade Congress, the overseas community, and the American citizenry. However, this paradigm has changed due to the increasing polarization of the American Congress and an increasingly cleaved government, and the finite nature of political resources for persuasive means. This has rendered presidential ability to persuade less of a factor in assessing and studying the presidency. This has led to a new paradigm, the theory of unilateral action, in studying the presidency, which focuses on the capacity of the presidency to use political resources in a unilateral manner without depending too much on bargaining (Waterman 477). One advantage of this new paradigm of unilateral action is that by focusing on the capacity of the presidency to move first and the ability to act solely; it is possible to distinguish the president’s actions from other influence tools. This was not possible with the bargaining model that combined the bargaining tools together (Waterman 478). In addition, this new paradigm is also able to connect presidential unilateral action and their negotiations, particularly because unilateral action and the bargaining model are antithetical. Also, it takes into account the president’s first mover advantage, as well as the president’s anticipation of Congressional and Judicial reaction to their actions. Moreover, this paradigm takes into consideration the presidents who wish to utilize their political acumen increasingly and influence in decision making, while it also accounts for presidents who are willing to relinquish the veto role to Congress and move first. Finally, this paradigm also enhances the assessment of presidents who use their authority in the manipulation of policy agenda through executive orders to forestall legislative action. However, this paradigm also has several weaknesses, including its promotion of a model of presidential leadership that is ideologically driven, as well as raising pertinent questions about the true scope of presidential powers (Waterman 491). Q #4 There are several mechanisms used by the government that lead to changes in income inequality. One of them is explicit redistribution, which takes money from some citizens as taxes and redistributes them in form of benefits to others. The United States has various redistributive mechanisms like social security and welfare programs, in which the government explicitly redistributes income toward the bottom from the top (Kelly 24). Some of the programs under this mechanism include Medicare, social security, and food stamps. The former two are significantly redistributive because they target the elderly, who earns the least among the entire American population. Thus, in this mechanism, programs that have the most impact are not dedicated towards the poor but, rather, are provisions for social insurance. Another mechanism used by the government is market conditioning, in which economic outcomes are partially the result of government action, as well as market forces. Without the intervention of government, economic activity would differ in outcome, such as the economic inequality observed before government taxation and income transfer, which is an example of market inequality that is government conditioned (Kelly 41). Aspects under market conditioning that have direct and indirect effects on future income distribution include education and workforce development policy, regulatory policy that advantages some individuals and industries, and social policy. With regards to public opinion about inequality, there exists considerable sympathy among Americans for poor and working class citizens in America, as well as significant concern about the levels of inequality, especially among ordinary Americans (Bartels 4). However, there also exists increasing polarization about how to tackle this inequality in American society, especially as evidenced by misconnection between policy preferences and values and beliefs for those who are not attentive to public affairs and politics. This is in direct contrast to another section of society that has misperceptions that are politically motivated concerning inequality in America. For this group, inequalities are necessary for America’s prosperity (Bartels 14). This latter group believes that income distribution should be left to market forces, compared to the former that believes in government intervention to tackle income inequality. This increase in inequality has also caused a significant shift in support for liberal policies and, therefore, the Democratic Party, which makes income redistribution a campaign issue (Bartels 29). However, there has also been a shift towards conservatism for white, affluent voters, who are against government intervention in income equalization. Q #5 An institution refers to a social order mechanism or structure that governs behaviour of specific individuals in a community. Identification of institutions is normally done using their social purpose that transcends intentions and individuals through mediation of rules governing their behaviour. In this case, the political institution should be understood in relation to the executive, legislative, and electoral functions of the government (Aldrich 5). Institutions are vital aspects of political science study, as well as a central concern for formal political decision-making mechanisms, as well as enforcement. On the other hand, institutionalization is referent to the process through which social roles and particular behavioral modes are embedded in a social system or an organization. In the political sense, the term institutionalization refers to the creation of particular bodies whose main role and responsibility is to implement or oversee policy. The process of institutionalization is enhanced when the roles and responsibilities of an organizational body, as well as its complexity, increase. The main basis for institutionalization is for political outcomes as actors choose from a set of institutional arrangements (Aldrich 6). For example with the increasing growth of national government and its consequent branches grew, there was increasing need for institutionalization. There are various concepts used to explain the process of institutionalization. The first is that institutionalization is universalistic, in which organizational bodies follow universal and impersonal decision criteria, as compared to more particularistic criteria (Foley & Owens 34). In this case, nepotism and favoritism is replaced by merit systems that follow rules, regulations, and precedents. For instance, in Congress, the appointment of chairs to various committees follows regulations and precedent rule on seniority. In addition, making of decisions in these political institutions is made on the merits of a specific case, rather than on the basis of partisanship. Another concept is internal complexity, especially since; the functions of political institutions have been specialized and regularized (Foley & Owens 34). This leads to increased autonomy of and specialization, as well as the acquisition of specialized agencies for leadership. Also, the institutions gain increased office space, more staff, and increased committee staff. The third concept is that institutionalization results in well-bounded organizational bodies, especially as leadership and membership become increasingly walled-off (Foley & Owens 35). Membership becomes less open, and incumbency becomes more prevalent, while leadership positions are increasingly based on experience and seniority. One central feature in the development of the congressional and presidential branches of government has involved the process of institutionalization. Both branches, in their process of institutionalization, have utilized immense resources for both functional and operational purposes. Theoretical expeditions also suggest that expenditures by Congress and the presidency have exhibited a long-term relationship of equilibrium that is consistent with Non-myopic equilibria (Foley & Owens 63). In addition, historical institutional evolution of both branches are representative of a situation of conflict, in which neither Congress nor the presidency show long-term rational behaviour and equal power, thus ensuring that none has any permanent advantage over the other. Finally, the two branches’ efforts in institutionalization have been responsive to one another regarding their activities, rather than only coming from the respective branches. However, there have also been differences in the two branches’ institutionalization. For example, while the presidency has grown increasingly non-partisan due to the limit on incumbency, lack of incumbency limits in Congress has resulted in increasingly partisan politics as ideologies become entrenched (Foley & Owens 65). Moreover, the presidency has increasingly tended towards unilateral action of the president, which is in contrast to Congress that has to solicit bi-partisan assent to act. Works Cited Aldrich, John H. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2007. Print. Bartels, Larry M. Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2008. Print. Downs, Anthony. An Economic Theory of Democracy. Boston: Addison Wesley, 2003. Print. Foley, Michael, and Owens, John. Congress and the Presidency: Institutional Politics in a Separated System. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012. Print. Kelly, Nathan J. The Politics of Income Inequality in the United States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Print. Macdonald, Jason A. "Congressional Power over Executive Branch Policy Making: Limitations on Bureaucratic Regulations, 1989-2009." Presidential Studies Quarterly. 43.3 (2013): 523-537. Print. Waterman, Richard. "Assessing the Unilateral Presidency." Howell, George C. Edwards and William G. The Oxford Handbook of the American Presidency. Oxford: Oxford Handbooks Online, 2009. 477-495. 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