The Weaknesses of the Insurgency Strategy in Colombia - Coursework Example

Discuss the weaknesses of the insurgency strategy in Colombia December 7, Introduction Colombia has used a counter-insurgency strategy to deal with the problem of insurgency. In this strategy, the government is not only confronted with the FARC but also other insurgents working under the banner of different organizations. To control and eliminate these insurgent organizations, the central government has been using different counter insurgency strategies, and to some extent, these strategies have brought some positive results in the shape of reduced insurgent attacks and decreased drug trade as well. However, still some weaknesses in the counter-insurgency strategies exist which enable the insurgents to collect their support for fighting against the government. For example, the counter-insurgency has primarily relied on the use of military force for eliminating the problem of insurgency. At the same time, rising unemployment also fuels insurgency and drug trade as the unemployed are easy targets for such organizations. In order to reduce this trade, the United States has been regularly enhancing the military assistance for enabling the Colombian army to end the drug trade and all those drug dealers which are directly or indirectly involved in the drug trade (Busky 2002). In the following parts of this paper, first Colombia’s historical perspective has been given. In this perspective, fundamental information has been provided so as to better assess and evaluate the current type and level of insurgency inside the country and all those factors that directly or indirectly have severely affected all counter insurgency strategies which have been implemented by the law enforcement agencies till this point of time. After this part, insurgency background section has been included. This section highlights all those groups and proscribed outfits that are directly and indirectly responsible for insurgency by using drug trade, kidnappings and other illegal activities for funding the insurgency. Before the conclusion part, a comprehensive discussion section has been incorporated, highlighting and discussing all those weaknesses that clearly highlight the ineffectiveness of all counter insurgency strategies that have been carried out by the law enforcement agencies. Colombia: Historical Perspective Colombia has a long political history. On 20 July 1810, Republic of Colombia got independence from Spain; it is located in Northern South America region, and it is surrounded by the Caribbean Sean, the North Pacific Ocean, Panama, Ecuador and Venezuela (Central Intelligence Agency 2014). Before coming into this nation-state status, Colombia was a part of Gran Colombia structure in which the afore-mentioned countries were part and constituted the Gran Colombia. During the period of 1829 to 1830, the Gran Colombia status was revoked and all above nations got independence and became independent nations. Naturally, the country retains a substantial amount of natural resources including oil, gold, platinum, emeralds and coal; additionally, the country has been identified as the fourth largest country and most populous nation in South America (BBC News 2014). Moreover, in the year of 1948, Jorge Gaitan, who was a presidential candidate from the Colombian Liberal Party, was murdered in the capital city, Bogota; till the end of 1957, this era known as La Violencia, civil war took place between the members and supporters of liberals and conservatives; (Tucker 2013). In order to restore law and order situation in the country, both parties decides to end hostilities and came together and formed a new party known as National Front; this entire step brought much needed political reconciliation and stability to Bogota which was desperately needed by the country during that time (Tucker 2013). And later in the political history, the country started to experience the rise of crime, terror, drug trafficking, kidnappings and all sorts of social, political, economic crises that hallmarked the concept of state within state; and the country is in state of political instability till this point of time (Ratliff and Buscaglia 2001). Insurgent Organizations Colombia’ insurgency is mainly fuelled by the civil strife existing for the period of last five decades (BBC News 2013). Fundamentally, there are three insurgent and guerrilla organisations currently operating on the soil of Colombia: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia [FARC], National Liberation Army [ELN], United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia [AUC] and splinter criminal and drug gangs and bands working separately and some time fighting with other insurgent organizations and sometimes with the police and army of the Republic of Colombia. The FARC came into existence in 1964 and grew out of the Colombian Communist Party for imposing the Marxist agenda and installing the Marxist regime in the country; there are no confirmed and accurate number of members working in this outfit but some estimates indicate that the group has more than 8,000 active and loyal members and supporters (BBC News, 2013). The FARC imported its ideological underpinnings from the Cuban Revolution in 1960s (Tucker 2013). Initially, the group attempted to use different political and other means to achieve their political aims and objectives. However, when it failed to obtain its political and ideological objectives through political framework, the group resorted to violence and all types of illegal activities for generating money for obtaining their objectives. National Liberation Army was formed by the liberals and other associated guerrillas who refused to put down arms in 1958 when the democracy was restored in the country (Leonard 2006). In 1965, this insurgent group was founded in the backdrop of the Cuban Revolution in 1959 which inspired many students and warring factions fighting in Colombia; however, initially, this group primarily focused on the insurgent activities and attacks but revamped its strategy in the decade of 1970s when the group started the political manifestation through gaining support from the peasants and urban poor people (Martin 2011). Within this context, some reports indicated that the National Liberation Army received state sponsorship from the regime of Cuba for carrying out insurgent attacks inside the state of Colombia (Sloan and Anderson 2009). Strengths and weaknesses in counter insurgency strategies Strengths: US Active Involvement The United States’ financial and military assistance has largely enabled Bogota to effectively deal with the insurgency in the country. And the level of cooperation can be gauged by the fact that the United States substantially supports Bogota’s socio-economic, trade, investment, security, and peace and stability in the country. For example, for this purpose, both countries have entered into agreement, known as multi-year Country Assistance Agreement in 2009, in the first year, the country received $ 212 million for improving the socio-economic conditions besides providing humanitarian assistance to the affected areas (US Embassy n.d.). At the same time, the US has entered a free trade agreement with Colombia and that have been effective since May 2012; additionally, around 250 US businesses have directly invested and conducted business in Colombia under the foreign direct investment framework (State.gov 2013). Furthermore, it has been reported that more than 60 per cent cocaine entering into the United States is directly provided and sent by the FARC (Adel 2014). Under this situation, the United States has no other option but to support all those military and non-military operations taking place inside Colombia against the FARC as the group is directly posing threat to the US youth through supplying cocaine to the United States. However, the collective combative operations against the FARC have provided a rationale to sell in the local community by highlighting the negative dimension through which the United States is using its influence and power to the internal economic and security affairs of the country. And it is this factor that receives recognition from the discontented community mostly living in the rural areas. Effective military operations This is another important strength in which highly effective military operations against insurgents have been carried out. For example, in the [Plan Patriota], the Colombian military carried out successful operations in which effective tactics were used for killing or capturing the high-value targets. For example, first intelligence was gathered before carrying out the military operation; consequently, this tactical level strategy particularly in the Southern and eastern Colombia has killed the central leadership of the FARC (Martin, 2012). Weaknesses: Counter insurgency strategy Rural Control Numerous reports highlight that many rural areas are directly controlled by the FARC and other insurgents and this situation has also increased to the urban areas as well. For example, in Medellin, which is Colombia’s second city, sizable areas are not controlled by government but local gangs along with the support of insurgents (Winn 2006). Additionally, the issue of government writ has further worsened recently as it has been mentioned that rural Colombia is in a state of quagmire in which it faces hostilities between insurgents, government forces and paramilitaries (Howard and Corum 2007). Based on this information, it can be deduced that the insurgency strategies have further solidified the existence and courage of the insurgent groups which prove that the insurgency strategy has become counter-productive till this point of time. and this is also understandable by the fact that the absence of government writ even in the rural areas has further decreased as well, reflecting that the military capacities of the insurgent groups have not been substantially decreased as depicted by some conflicting reports instead their counter-productivity has further fuelled the fire of insurgency strength which has entered into the urban areas where largely the government control is observed and exercised as well. Unaddressed Ideological basis Also, this leftist group has been historically opposing the US policies and its influence on the central government working of Colombia. The group has ideological underpinnings from the Marxist and Soviet Union which had strongly opposed the US and its allies in the complex events that took place particularly after the end of the Second World War. During that time, the Soviet Union was spreading its wings throughout the world by fighting against the US and its interests in all strategic and major regions including in Latin America. However, after the end of the Cold War, the strength of Marxist forces decreased and they were forced fight independently so as to provide financial support for securing weapons and ammunitions for continue resisting against the US influence in the region and in the country. This legacy has been continued till this point of time. Instead of attempting to break the ideological base of Marxist manifesto, the central governments have not particularly emphasized on those factors that directly affect the ideological thinking of the local masses. In this regard, it is important to mention that the FARC’s ideology appeals more as it speaks for under-privileged class mostly living in the rural part of the country. More specifically, the Marxist philosophy has used the vacuum created by the central governments as they were simply unable to eliminate the positive effects of the Marxist on the people living in the rural parts of the country. Economic weaknesses The FARC mostly controls the rural areas where unemployment, social alienation and resentment against the central government have been strongly felt by all people. In this regard, it is important to mention that insurgency strategy can be only dealt through military power by killing or capturing the insurgents instead it has political, social and economic perspectives as well. By killing the hard core of insurgency, only one part of insurgency will not be eliminated but other parts will remain the same as they will require different supporting strategy to exterminate the effects of insurgency. And, these perspectives are highly essential as they have direct link with the hard core aspect of insurgency. Till this point of time, unemployment is not decreasing particularly in the rural areas of Colombia. According to 2013 estimates, the current estimated unemployment between the 15 to 24 year age group is 21.9 per cent in Colombia and around 25 per cent of the total population lives in the rural areas of the country (Central Intelligence Agency 2014). And, this rising unemployment has not been properly addressed by the central government. When the basic economic needs are not fulfilled and the youth find no employment opportunities from a legal and appropriate means, they become easy prey for the insurgent groups as they hire them with for their insurgent objectives and use them against their own country. Despite receiving enormous amount of aid and different trade agreements with the United States and other regional countries, the central Colombian governments have been miserably failed to tackle the unemployment problem which has increased the mark of 20 per cent, reflecting that the aid and other economic measures are generating enough employment opportunities for sufficiently meeting with the current number of unemployed people in the country. Only reliance on military solution Furthermore, till this point of time, numerous plans and strategies have been envisioned and implemented for terminating the menace of insurgency. However, all these programmes have primarily and mainly focused on the military dimension of insurgency in which combat operations have been only used as a way to deal with the problem. Now, only relying on the military solution has not ended the problem of insurgency rather it has prolonged and deepened the divide in the country. For instance, during the period of Pastrana and Uribe regimes and in the subsequent years, the United States provided financial and military assistance for eliminating narcotics and enhance the government capability to increase its presence and writ in the insurgent controlled areas besides protecting the infrastructure and kidnappings as well; from 2002 to 2005, 91 per cent reduction was recorded in the attacks; and till the end of 2008, decrease of 44 per cent homicides, 88 per cent kidnappings, 60 per cent infrastructure and 79 per cent terror attacks took place, highlighting the substantial decline on the major issues of the country (US Embassy n.d.). On the face of it, above statistics are sound and may convince many to say that both countries have successfully got rid of the security issues in the country. However, the ground reality is different from it. Still almost all insurgent groups exist though their military might has been curtailed largely. In other words, the problem is not resolved but has been controlled largely and it would be more accurate to say that that a part of the whole problem has been managed by the central Colombian government but the other dimensions of the insurgency, such as political, economic and social, have not been addressed. Consequently, these are areas which encourage the FARC and other insurgents groups to utilize the weaknesses of the counter insurgency strategy of the central governments. Moreover, it is important to mention that the use of military and force only provides an environment in which other socio-economic factors are encouraged to play their role. More clearly, the Colombian military and the police are only capable to handle the security and law and order issue, which itself is not a cause but rather an effect of socio-economic problems that have compounded over the years particularly since the start of insurgency. In other words, the use of military force is only to facilitate the socio-economic factors to perform their role and enable those soft elements that want to become a responsible and peaceful member of the society. Unfortunately, the Colombia’s counter-insurgency strategy has completely overlooked these dimensions and that adds fuel to the fire of insurgency and law and order situation. Growing drug trade Colombia is the world’s top producer and distributor of cocaine (Rabasa and Chalk 2001). And, the insurgent groups use illegal drug trade for fuelling insurgency. Some estimates highlight that the FARC earns around $600 million annually from the sale of illegal drugs (United Nation’s Regional Information Centre for Western Europe 2014). This one of the major weaknesses of the counter insurgency strategy as the Colombian governments has miserably failed to rein in the financial supply line of the FARC. Such insurgents groups do not rely on other sources but use only those which provide them the highest and fastest money for funding and supporting the insurgency. Had any part of counter insurgency strategy been precisely attempted to at least decrease the financial supply line to the FARC and other insurgent groups, the situation would have been much different and the government would have been in a better position while negotiating peace deals with these groups. As a result, the FARC has used that money against the governments, making them unable to effectively control and run the government affairs. And this failure has manifold ramifications for the government. First, the FARC and other insurgent groups are able to attract, recruit, train and equip personnel for carrying out the insurgency against the state and state institutions as well. Second, such earning further solidifies the military power and military capabilities of the FARC insurgents and that will certainly give higher resistance to any military operation conducted by the Colombian army and other law enforcement agencies. Keeping this view in mind, it is important to highlight that in any counter insurgency strategy, different fronts are identified so that they can be easily targeted. Among other targets, the financial front is of strategic importance for effectively launching combative operations against insurgents. However, till this point of time, although numerous plans and strategies have been decided and implemented by the Colombian governments, yet no effective strategy specifically focusing on the financial resources of the insurgent groups has produced any concrete and tangible result highlighting a reduction of financial capability of the insurgent groups. Ineffective cooperation For efficiently fighting against insurgency, an effective coordination and cooperation between law enforcement agencies is of paramount importance and essential as well. The International Crisis Group (2007) points out that, in the affected areas, the law enforcement agencies do not cooperate with each other besides showing lack of commitment for professionally and effectively fighting against insurgency and insurgent groups as well. This proves a major inherent weakness in the counter-insurgency strategy. For countries like Colombia and law and order threats that if face, it is highly needed that the counter-insurgency strategy should have an effective coordination and cooperation between the intelligence agencies, the police and army as well. It is and it will be the outcome of such cooperation which will decrease the threat and might of insurgency that is being faced by the insurgency-affected countries, such as Colombia. Moreover, lack of resources also causes ineffective coordination between the agencies (The International Crisis Group 2007). In this regard, it is important to emphasize that resources are highly essential as they enable forces to carry out military operations against insurgents besides motivating them to remain highly committed for fulfilling such tasks. However, this has not been the case for the counter-insurgency strategy of Colombia in which the governments have failed to provide enough and adequate resources for effectively carrying out the combative operations against the insurgents. Corruption in government ranks Infiltration in government ranks has been identified as a significant shortcoming in the counter-insurgency strategy. In the local police and other civilian and non-civilian law enforcement agencies, officials providing key information to the insurgents, criminals and other banned outfits are commonly found as they provide crucial information to the gangsters and that helps them to escape any police raid or military operations. This has been validated by the many political and law enforcement agencies reports. For example, some reports highlight that more than 60 times, accurate and actionable information had been given to the official Colombian forces for capturing or killing the FARC and other insurgent operatives but they were unable either to capture or kill them (Priest 2013). This single piece of evidence clearly indicates that the country’s police and other law enforcement agencies have been infiltrated by the supporters of these outfits, making the entire counter insurgency strategy meaningless. Conclusion Colombia’s counter insurgency has numerous flaws. There are many rural areas which are being controlled by the insurgents and the governments have failed to regain the control. And, till this point of time, the counter-insurgency has failed to curtail the ideological basis which is being used by the insurgents for hiring individuals. Moreover, till this point of time, all successive governments have only focused on the military side of the insurgency and have only resorted to using force for wiping out the insurgents and their supporters. However, military solution is not the only viable way to end insurgency and insurgent groups operating in the country. Consequently, the lack of concentration to other dimensions, such as economic, political and social, has created vacuum which is being utilized by the insurgent groups. Furthermore, there are many areas which are being controlled by the different insurgent groups and where the writ of government is totally unfound, clearly proving the existence of state within state. And from the economic perspective, it has been noted that 21. 9 per cent unemployment highlights that the unemployed can easily be recruited by these groups and that looks very easy for them as they are financially sound and stable enough to recruit and train them against the state military. Most importantly, it has been highlighted that there exists a lack of effective coordination and cooperation between the government agencies and forces fighting against the insurgents. Also, the counter-strategy has failed to tackle the problem of corruption in government’s ranks which unofficially support or provide assistance to the insurgents. References Adel, Alaa. 2014. “Neck-and-neck presidential race in Colombia: Will FARC deal break the tie?” Al-Tahrir News Network. May 25, 2014. http://www.tnnegypt.com/neck-neck-presidential-race-colombia-will-farc-deal-break-tie/ BBC News. 2014. “Colombia Profile.” BBC News Latin America & Caribbean. May 21, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19390026 BBC News. 2013. “Profiles: Colombia’s armed groups.” BBC News Latin America & Caribbean. August 29, 2013. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-11400950 Busky, F. Donald. 2002. Communism in History and Theory: Asia, Africa, and the Americas. 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