An Assessment of the United Kingdoms National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies - Case Study Example

A Critical Assessment of United Kingdom’s National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies Introduction The National Register defines a public emergency as a situation or occurrence which may cause severe damages to the welfare of human beings in a location in the UK. Severe damages include human sickness, injury, death, homelessness, and property destruction, interruption on supply of food, money or water, disruption of health services, communication and transport systems. This poster aims at critically evaluating United Kingdom’s National Risk Register which provides an evaluation of the probability and likely effects of an assortment of various risks which may affect UK’s nationals as outlined in the policy for national security. The evaluation will be carried out through the analysis of types of risk that are assessed in the register as well as the way of quantifying or qualifying the risks. The evaluation will also look at the main results that are highlighted in the National Register and the variations that are likely to be experienced in practice as a way of responding to the assessment of risks. In addition, this report intends to spot the main issues that are present in the United Kingdom’s publication. Risks assessed There are a number of risks that are assessed in the National Register and are categorised under two main groups namely; high priority risks and recently assessed risks. The assessment takes into account both their possibility and impact on the country and the citizens as well. The high priority risks include human disease, coastal flooding, disastrous terrorist attacks, and volcanic eruptions in other countries. Pandemic influenza is the most prioritised type of human disease in the United Kingdom and is considered the most noteworthy public emergency risk. The harshness of the situation that is planned for in the National Register does not complement the severity of H1N1 influenza’s outbreak that took place in 2009. The H1N1 is not suggestive of pandemic influenzas that may take place in the future. For instance, the 1918-19, 1957-58 along with 1968-69 influenzas had different degrees of severity. In the National Register’s assessment of risk, its plan is based on an imaginary severity of pandemic influenzas. It is made for a high level of severity from any likely influenza outbreaks in the United Kingdom in the future. Making such a plan is advisable since the UK government will be in a position to handle any degree of influenza’s severity. In case the plan is made to cater for only severity that matches the kind of influenzas that have been experienced in the past, the government may not be able to manage pandemics whose effects are very extensive. Normally, endemic influenzas are very fatal and require a fast remedy and thus, it is good for the government to always have plans in place for dealing with such scenarios. On the contrary, government plans for dealing with civil emergencies should mostly be based on past experiences. Therefore, the National Register’s plan should be based on the severity of the 20th century influenzas and the 2009’s H1N1. The making of a plan that does not take into account past influenzas is impractical. Giving precedence to coastal flooding is based on the risk of an occurrence that matches the 1953 coastal flooding. The flooding was the very last event on which the UK government declared an official national emergency. It was as a result of an amalgamation of high oceanic tides and a huge sea surge from strong wind’s force. In November 2007, a similar event of a less severe storm surge took place but its level of damage was less compared to the 1953’s tragedy. The National Register acknowledges that, United Kingdom is less susceptible to coastal flooding as a result of improved flood defences. Despite such acknowledgement, a greater emphasis is laid on coastal flooding as compared to on storm surge, which is inappropriate. The plan should mainly focus on the possibility and impact of a storm surge in the country and put in place measures for controlling and managing such a scenario. However, it should not ignore the possibility of coastal flooding because if it happened in 1953, there are chances of a repeat of the same or more severe event. Even though terrorist activities causing colossal damage are not likely, the 9/11 terrorist attack in the United States has proved to United Kingdom that, such activities cannot be ignored. The possibility of terrorists getting effective huge-impact biological agents or an operational nuclear device continues to be low though not insignificant and the effects are potentially severe. Accordingly, the UK government’s counter-terrorism policy is giving priority to efforts for preventing terrorists from accessing the know-how and materials needed for delivering this type of attacks, as well as to get ready for the outcome in case they succeed. Though it is a good thing for the UK government to have plans for preventing possible terrorist attacks, the matter does not deserve such precedence. This is because; UK has no first-hand experience on the impact of terrorist attacks similar to the 9/11 attack. Thus, it is a bit difficult to plan for such attacks. Moreover, the individuals carrying out attacks of massive destruction at the present are very knowledgeable and experienced about the use of dangerous bombs. It is thus almost impossible for UK government to prevent their access to know-how and materials for carrying out such attacks because they are capable of making their own weapons. Volcanic eruptions in other countries like the 2010 eruption in Iceland signalled the kind of consequences that UK and its nationals can experience from such events. After consulting meteorological and geological experts regarding the likely risks on UK from eruptions taking place in Iceland or in other countries, two main risks were identified. The first risk relates to an ash-producing eruption, while the second risk is from an effusive-mode eruption which may have extensive effects on agriculture, health and transport like the 1783-84 eruption in Iceland. The inclusion of this type of risk in the NRR is significant in protecting UK citizens from the effects of natural hazards like volcanic eruption. However, developing a plan to control the effects of volcanic eruption on agriculture and transport may be a very expensive undertaking due to the extensive nature of agriculture and transport networks in UK. The recently assessed risks include harsh space weather which covers a variety of diverse phenomena such as coronal mass emissions, solar flares and solar energy particles. These events are hard to control or handle their impacts mainly because; it is very hard to do an exact timing of their happening. Chapter three of the National Risk Register is more of a repetition of the second chapter. The only difference is that, the third chapter gives more details of the risks assessed. Thus, the inclusion of the second chapter is unnecessary since chapter three includes the details of chapter two. Quantification/qualification of risks The possible risks were identified by consulting professionals in government units and outside, who identified natural events, major accidents, and cruel attacks that are likely to occur and cause considerable disruption and harm in UK in the coming years. The identified risks are qualified by matching the nature with the definition given to civil emergency by the National Risk Register. Numeric modelling and historical analysis are used in assessing the likelihood of events especially for accidentally and naturally occurring hazards. Expert judgement is also combined with the analysis in the estimation process. Moreover, separate risk matrices are used to represent threats and hazards in showing the various approaches to assessing the probability of hazards or risks. The scales that are used in the two matrices are not comparable. This makes the use of matrices very complex and hard to understand. Additionally, the use of incomparable scales does not make sense since the elements being assessed are closely related and thus their assessment should be similar. In addition, the impact of the likely civil emergencies is assessed using a 0 to 5 rating scale. The rating takes into account factors such as total fatalities, sickness or injury, social disruption, economic harm and psychological impact resulting from an emergency. Every factor is rated out of 5 and the general impact which shows the comparative scale and level of every impact, is gotten by calculating the mean of the five scores. The calculation of the mean of the five factors gives a balanced assessment. However, rating of certain factors like social disruption and psychological harm is unrealistic because such variables cannot be quantified. Main results After assessing the possible civil emergencies that may affect the people of United Kingdom, various plans and preparations have been put in place, both at the local as well as at the national level, to help deal with such emergencies. The assessment gives first priority to pandemic influenza, coastal flooding, terrorist attacks and volcanic eruptions in other countries. Some of the prioritized risks such as coastal flooding, terrorist attacks and volcanic eruptions do not deserve such precedence because their frequency is very low. The National Risk Register has given little attention to hazards that occur almost on a daily basis in the lives of UK citizens and which cause damage to property, loss of lives and human injuries such as fires, road accidents and industrial strikes. A critical evaluation of the categorisation of the risks, questions the kind of criteria that is used in giving precedence to the risks. The National Risk Register lays more emphasis on occasional hazards as compared to regular hazards in the UK, which is not logical. A bigger percentage of emergencies are considered to be well handled by local responders to emergencies as well as local emergency planners. The Contingencies Act and NRA provide an outline for the responders and planners’ planning, assigning them the responsibility of identifying and assessing the risks that affect their areas of operation. As much as professionalism is required in dealing with emergencies, the local people must be involved in the process, a feature which is not highlighted in the National Register. This is because; they are the ones who are highly affected by such emergencies. Variation in practice Different measures, programmes and preparations have been put in place by the UK government to help in preventing and handling civil emergencies. Moreover, different government departments have been charged with devising plans for handling civil emergencies. However, what is documented in the National Risk Register may be very different from what is done in practice. This occurs mainly because; different parts of the United Kingdom are at risk of different hazards and thus planning for all the likely hazards is very challenging. For instance, coastal flooding has been only experienced in the east and thus the plans for mitigating the impacts of such an event are specific to the east. This does not mean that, other parts of UK cannot experience flooding. Therefore, if a hazard occurs in an area that its likelihood was not predicted before, people may not have knowledge of the already set plans and measures for dealing with such a hazard and thus end up using different methods to handle the event. In addition, UK is a big country and thus the available equipment for dealing with emergencies such as fire may not be adequate. Therefore, sometimes the local people are forced to deal with emergencies themselves due to unavailability of emergency responders and equipment in certain areas. Conclusion The National Risk Register gives first priority to risks that though their occurrence could have huge impacts on UK and its nationals, their occurrence is minimal. Plans for dealing with pandemic influenzas are based on imaginary levels of severity. Attempts to prevent terrorists from accessing nuclear weapons may be futile since nowadays they have know-how for making weapons. Chapter 2 in the National Register is insignificant; it is a repetition of chapter 3. Risks are quantified and qualified through historical analysis, numeric modelling, risk matrices and use of scale rating. Difference in practice may occur due to the occurrence of unexpected hazards in a given area as well as the unavailability of and inadequate equipment and responders for handling emergencies. Reference Cabinet Office 2012, National Risk Register for Civil Emergencies , United Kingdom, Cabinet Office. Read More