Examining Sartori on Political Stability - Essay Example

Examining Sartori on Political Stability EXAMINING SARTORI ON POLITICAL STABILITY Giovanni Sartori, along with his contemporary Gabriel Almond, offered critical insight into how political stability should be approached. Gabriel Almond focused his discourse on societal relations and their anthropological aspects. He argued that the extent to which political cultures, in this case the set of ideologies, meanings, attitudes, and values that form the grounding of a political system, are fragmented is a fundamental determinant of the level of political instability (Almond, 1956: p399). Sartori, on the other hand, identified the distinction between political systems that are unstable and those that are stable, disputing that the political system’s polarization and segmentation is dependent on how many relevant parties take part in political battles (Sartori, 1990: p331). The purpose of the current essay is to discuss the cases of the 3rd and 4th French Republics, the Weimar Republic, and post-war Italy in order to determine the validity of Sartori’s polarized pluralism theory. The essay will argue that, although Sartori’s theory is useful in explaining government instability, other factors should be taken into account to explain the political instability experienced in the three case-countries. Sartori tried to classify the 3rd and 4th French Republics, the Weimar Republic, and post-war Italy under the theory of polarized pluralist party systems, which tends to show the most instability because the party systems are dominated by strongly polarized ideologies. He posited that where there were five parties relevant to the political system with extensive ideological differences between the parties, the possibility of any consensus is ruled out because party politics become broadly fragmented (Sartori & Mair, 2009: p51). Moreover, at least three of the political spectrum poles have occupants, in which the far right and the far left are identified as working towards the undermining of the system’s legitimacy, i.e. as anti-system parties. If there is presence of bipolar opposition and the center of the political spectrum is occupied, centripetal competition is discouraged, which leads to enhanced party-politics polarization and widening of the ideological distances between parties occupying the two poles. In addition, if the centre of the political spectrum is permanently occupied, irresponsible oppositions tend to arise, where the parties that occupy both poles seek to conduct outbidding politics by making powerful promises and appeals they have no intention of fulfilling (Sartori & Mair, 2009: p52). In turn, this will lead to the political system becoming more unstable. Under the 4th and 5th Republic, France would seem to adhere well to Sartori’s polarized pluralism theory. The presence of many parties considered anti-system, such as the Communists, the Monarchists, and the Gaullists that took approximately half of the vote, worsened the polarization in the 4th and 5th Republic (Campus et al, 2011: p78). As a result, parties at the center were forced into forming fragile coalitions and alliances, ostensibly to prevent losing any further votes to the parties occupying the poles of the political system. In addition, centrifugal drives tended to dominate the political system, which, in turn, made it even more difficult to maintain the already fragile centrist alliances and coalitions. This resulted in multiple cleavages in political ideology that was further translated into an additional number of political parties. These political parties existed for the sole purpose of negotiating benefits for the population segment that they represented, which meant that they rarely diverged from their ideological objectives (Campus et al, 2011: 79). Therefore, these parties ended up causing political instability by immobilizing the parliament. However, there are several inherent deficiencies in Sartori’s theory of polarized pluralism when it comes to the Weimar Republic in Germany. While it is true that the Weimar Republic did undergo high levels of fragmentation, the polarized pluralism model cannot account fully for why this happened. In the Weimar Republic, political debate and discourse was characterized by irresponsible politics, in which the different political parties tended to prioritize their policies and interests first, instead of attempting to reach a negotiated consensus that was acceptable to majority of political parties (Picot, 2014: p144). The Republic also witnessed enhanced centrifugal drives in the political system, which lasted up to the elections of 1928. The trend, however, was reversed following these elections in 1928, specifically as the electorate decided to make a shift towards backing the centrist parties. While the two poles at the extremes of the political system spectrum continued to pose anti-system opposition, there were clear signs that centripetal movements and drives would dominate in the end. This raises questions as to whether the collapse faced by the Weimar Republic was as a result of the polarization and fragmentation due to social cleavages. Other forces, such as the economic crisis between 1929 and 1931 could also have been responsible for raising the electorate’s distrust and tensions (Picot, 2014: p145). The situation in post-war Italy would also seem to bring out some of the inconsistencies possessed by Sartori’s polarized pluralism model. Sartori perceived post-war Italy as the best example of his model in contemporary times, which seemed to be supported by the fact that Italy had forty eight governments in the period spanning between the end of WWII and 1988 (Curini, 2012: p466). This comes to an average of a new administration after every eleven months. In this case, there were several anti-system parties with relative strength and support from the electorate, including the MSI-DN and the CPI. The system’s perpetuation rested on the DC party occupying the centrist position in the political spectrum, which worked to prevent the emergence of an alternative government in Italy. The DC party, which received only up to 35% of all cast votes, had to craft alliances and coalitions with other minor parties, most of which preferred to keep the identities they had assumed during the elections with little incentives to adopt more moderate policies (Curini, 2012: p467). As a result, the post-war Italian political system was dominated by minor parties and their extreme manifestos that grew more extreme with time, leading to centrifugal drives in the system (Mancini, 2013: p339). At the same time, the parties occupying the extreme positions at the poles began to gain votes as the centrist CD party lost votes. Internal disputes also dominated coalitions that formed the government; especially over the role, religion should play in government, how resources should be distributed, and the new role of the Catholic Church in post-war Italy. During the 70s, nevertheless, the acuity of ideological polarization in post-war Italy became less salient, particularly as the PCI party became less of an anti-system party (Mancini, 2013: p339). Therefore, although Italy did seem to adhere to the tenets of the polarized pluralist model between the end of WWII and 1961, it took on a more centripetal tendency after 1965. The polarized pluralism model does not possess sufficient flexibility to factor in changes in the Italian political system in the post-war period. Although Sartori did offer compelling evidence and cases to explain political stability, they did over-emphasize the system of political parties, which makes the polarized pluralism model unresponsive to additional factors that may play vital roles in the instability of government. To begin with, various classical political scientists, for example Duvenger and Hermens, identified proportional representation as liable for blame due to the absence of ideological moderation (Nwokora & Pelizzo, 2014: p832). This eventually caused the breakdown and dissolution of democratic principles in the Weimar Republic. Anti-system parties were not hindered by proportional representation from addressing the concerns of electoral segments, which at times was done through extremist ideologies. In addition, this also meant that coalition making and increased differentiation occurred, of which the coalitions became increasingly unstable. Sartori’s theory of polarized pluralism also fails to account for role played by constitutions in the three countries. The Constitution in the 3rd and 4th Republics of France gave a fragmented parliament more power than the government, which caused the government to become increasingly unstable (Nwokora & Pelizzo, 2014: p832). General de Gaulle in the 4th Republic, in addition, found that the political system was faulty, leading to the Republic’s termination. The Weimar Republic’s Constitution, in similar vein, granted emergency powers to the president, which was, in effect, utilized in ending the Weimar Republic (Mair & Biezen, 2014:p51). The Constitution of post-war Italy, on the other hand, established a system of regional devolution and strengthened social and political cleavages, but did not cause the regime to fall. These socio-political cleavages, in turn, led to the regime becoming increasingly unstable. Finally, Sartori’s theory of polarized pluralism did not consider that a government’s stability could be threatened by external societal sources, for example external shocks that shape the behavior of party systems. For the Weimar Republic, the economic crisis in 1929 led to a reemergence of old socio-political systems that undermined the Republic’s political stability (Mair & Biezen, 2014:p53). On the other hand, the role-played by the Vatican and the US protected Italy’s status quo after WWII, while centrifugal tendencies were accelerated by the Algerian Crisis in France’s 4th Republic. In conclusion, while Sartori’s theory of polarized pluralism is compelling, it fails to sufficiently explain the political instability that characterized the 3rd and 4th French Republics, the Weimar Republic, and post-war Italy. Moreover, while Sartori’s model does identify specific instability factors correctly, it does not factor in aspects like external disturbances, electoral systems, and constitutional arrangements, failing to sufficiently and fully explain political instability. Finally, the model also overemphasizes the role that polarized pluralism plays at the expense of other factors that are just as important. References Almond, G. A. (1956). Comparative Political Systems. The Journal of Politics , 18 (3), 391-409. Curini, L. Missing Links in Party-System Polarization: How Institutions and Voters Matter. (January 01, 2012). The Journal of Politics, 74, 2, 460-473. Campus, D., Pasquino, G., & Bull, M. J. (2011). Maestri of political science. Colchester, UK: ECPR Press. Mair, P., & Biezen, I. (2014). On parties, party systems and democracy: Selected writings of Peter Mair. Colchester, U.K: ECPR Press. Mancini, P. (June 01, 2013). The Italian public sphere: a case of dramatized polarization. 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