Concorde Air France Flight 4590 Crash - Case Study Example

Concorde Air France Flight 4590 crash (2000) Accidents normally take place involving engineering practices gone wrong.The Concorde Air Crash is an example of an engineering disaster due to simple mistakes made by the engineers. This is because of the failure to tighten a loose strip that had disturbed the crew in previous occasions. As a result, the strip deflated the Concorde Flight’s tyres on the runway, causing the accident. This is an engineering fault since it involved negligence and communication barrier with the manufacturers, a situation that was easy to rectify. The relevance of this disaster to the engineering practice is that it has contributed to new laws and practices. It has also led to the establishment of policies that govern the operations airports, engineers and airlines. Table of Contents Introduction……………………………………………………………………………….4 How it is an Engineering Disaster…………………………………………………………4 Aspects that make it an Engineering Fault………………………………………………....5 Relevance of the Disaster in Engineering Practice…………………………………….…..6 Causes of the Accident………………………………………………………………….…7 Recommendations and Precautions……………………………………………………...…8 Emergence of New Laws and Practices………………………………………………….…9 Overall Impact on Engineering Practice……………………………………………………9 How the Disaster changed the Engineering Practice………………………………………10 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………....11 References………………………………………………………………………………….13 Introduction The crash involved an Air France Flight 4590, which was destined for New York from Paris’ Charles de Gaulle Airport. This accident took place in 2000 after the flight crashed into a hotel in Paris Airport due to a burst of its tyres. It is apparent that the Concorde had hit a thin metal piece while on the runway, causing one of the tyres to rupture. As a result, parts of the burst tyre collided with the Concord’s wing at high velocity, leading to a powerful shock signal within the wing’s gas tank that deflated it. The crash is an engineering disaster because it involved the analysis of the connection between the gas tank, velocity and the cause of the tyres to burst. It is assumed that the take-off speed that the plane had initiated could not enable it to make an emergency landing since the tyres were already deflated and the gas tank was leaking. How it is an Engineering Disaster The crash is an engineering disaster because the cause might have also been due to an inadequacy in the design, shortcomings in the safety analysis or an error in the wheel maintenance and poor tyre performance (Byers, 2003). Planes have safety control mechanisms and humans, especially engineers contribute to a higher percentage of the accidents. For instance, since the accident occurred at high stress during the take-off session, it might be explained that there was a traffic error. This is because the air traffic control failed to notice the strips on the runway to divert the take-off to another safe mode operation. Although it may be attributed to engineering errors that made the earlier plane to leave strips on the runway, the crash might have been avoided. According to Byers (2003), the accident did not occur from the other causes such as bad weather conditions or acts of terrorism. This implies that the other plane had maintenance faults that contributed to the falling of strips off its engine. The other aspect that makes this crash an engineering disaster is that the traffic control department did not prepare the runway for the impending flight. As a result, the poor cabin maintenance affected the Flight 4590, which had accelerated the velocity ready for a takeoff. The concept of preparing the runway to allow safe landing and takeoff should be rectified by the airport engineers who need to inspect the road before allowing other flights to use it. Aspects that make it an Engineering Fault The aspect of the disaster that makes it a result of poor engineering choice or practice is that the aircraft had an extra load that was beyond the required weight. This happened because the engineers ignored the effect on takeoff performance caused by the extra weight. Considering this, upon reaching the takeoff speed, the tyre struck on a wear strip on the runway. It emerges that the same wear strip had been replaced at Israel during the normal checks (McEvily, 2013). Similarly, additional maintenance work had been undertaken in Texas, but it appears the strip was not installed according to the guidelines stipulated by the manufacturer. The other aspect of the disaster that makes it a result of poor engineering choice or practice is that the engineers had not speculated engine failures during takeoff or landing (McEvily, 2013). This implies that there existed no plan for the simultaneous failure of two engines since they thought it was an unlikely event to happen. The engineering procedures failed to plan for such eventualities that could lead to the wear and tear of strips along the runway. The only viable rectification could be to consult the manufacturers for the way forward before proceeding with the repairs, which failed to correct the error (McEvily, 2013). A single strip had undergone repairs at two different airports without any improvements and this was a dangerous engineering practice. Engineers need to take precautions whenever a faulty spare part does not respond to the mechanical actions. In this regard, the disaster was a result of a poor choice or practice since the engineers failed to change the wear strip according to the manufacturer’s instructions. Relevance of the Disaster in Engineering Practice This disaster is relevant to the study and practice of engineering in that it highlights on negligence and failure to follow manufacturer’s manuals. For instance, the fault experienced by the Continental Airlines DC-10 contributed to this Concord Flight disaster. This is because it had experienced the same breakdown previously, but the engineers working on the engine ignored the error. As a result, they tried to fix it in order to keep the flight departure time and avoid delays, not knowing that the loose wear strips could cause damage. The disaster exposes engineers’ negligence because they did not install the strip in accordance with the procedures laid down by the manufacturers (Byers, 2003). It would be appropriate to refer to the manufacturer’s procedures or change the flight for a thorough mechanical check up. After the second attempt at Texas, the engineers ought to have changed the entire engine for a proper maintenance procedure without speeding up the completion and partial installations. The disaster is also relevant to the study and practice of engineering because it encourages the existence of a plan that could solve the breakdown of two engines on the airstrip. The engineers had assumed that such scenarios were unlikely to happen and they did not have a plan to correct the collapse of two engines on the runway. This emphasizes on proper maintenance by the engineers before allowing an airplane to takeoff. It emerged that the engineers forgot to replace a “spacer”, which is a section of the landing gear. The spacer helps in keeping the wheels in the right alignment. This is because of the sideways slants that forced the pilot to leave the ground very fast in order to avoid knocking other planes that were near the runway. The overload of the plane is not a certified thing and it was wrong to load the extra weight beyond the required limit. Causes of the Accident The causes of the accident can be attributed to a number of factors such as negligence, overload of the plane, the absence of a plan to handle the breakdown of two engines and the puncture caused by the fallen strip (Duffey & Saull, 2003). The main cause of this crash was the fallen strip that punctured the tyre, making the plane to lose balance. It is apparent that the engineers agreed to this cause because it was the only thing that could make the plane not to takeoff as expected. The other cause was negligence in which the crew overloaded the plane despite knowing the recommended capacity that it should carry. As a result, the plane could not balance properly after the tyres were deflated on the runway. Negligence also caused the disaster because the engineers who were working on the Continental DC-10 did not rectify the mistake of the falling strip. This was dangerous considering that the fault was recurring at every airstrip (Duffey & Saull, 2003). The failure to install the strip for a permanent solution made the engine of the Concorde Flight to break down. Engineers have always overlooked the need to have a plan that would help in servicing two engines whenever a crash occurred. If the plan existed, then the problem could have been resolved at the correct time to avoid falling off the strip on the airstrip. The absence of such scenarios made the engineers not to come up with workable plans that could address eventualities (Duffey & Saull, 2003). As a result, the aspect of simultaneous failure of multiple engines was perceived to be unlikely to occur. However, the above causes were due to human error and some were mistakes that happened at the last minute of the takeoff time. This implies that crashes should not happen due to the above causes because the authorities and the engineers already have adopted measures of averting the damages. The fault of the crash is the responsibility of the experts who worked on the Continental DC-10, the airport authorities who allowed its release and the crew who participated in overloading Concorde Flight (Duffey & Saull, 2003). Recommendations and Precautions In order to avoid the recurrence of such a disaster in the airline industry, recommendations and precautions were done to protect the interest of the passengers, the crew and other persons. The first recommendation was the revocation of the certificate of airworthiness for Concord flight. This was meant to ensure that the company had submitted sufficient measures to certify that they had adopted safety policies regarding the risks associated with the tyre destruction (Cramoisi, 2011). The other precaution was to ensure that the company installed flexible linings in the six gas tanks to easy maintenance services. It was vital to modify the light manual procedures in order to reduce power delivery to the brake ventilators during dangerous phases of the journey. Similarly, it was recommended that a review of the MMEL (master Minimum equipment list) to guarantee that mechanical operational restrictions cannot be useful for the tyre-under pressure-recognition system (Cramoisi, 2011). It was also crucial to establish a plan that could help whenever two engines broke down at the same time on the runway. However, there were needs to adjust the shape of the water deflector and the elimination of the holding cable. The French Airport officials also received recommendations that in-service analysis reports must be brought to their attention before releasing any flight. This implies that the engineers must follow the manufacturer’s manual in case they fail to install the parts as recommended. The implementation of all the recommendations and precautions were to take place immediately after the investigations were over. This was to ensure that all the French airlines were observing the above recommendations in order to improve their safety measures and engineers manuals (Cramoisi, 2011). Emergence of New Laws and Practices After the investigations of the Concord crash, a number of new laws and practices were implemented. For instance, the new law required that the runway should not have debris since this could affect the landing or takeoff of a flight. This law recommended that the staff were responsible for cleaning the runway after and before the landing of any flight on their runway. Significantly, the suggested recommendations were applicable to all players within the French Airline industry. This comprised new laws pertaining to maintenance and rapid implementation of various programs for the avoidance of debris on airports. Another new practice introduced involved the installation of safety surveillance programs that show the foreign objects that might affect the flights. These laws also affected the new market entrants that had to implement the recommendations to be fully airworthy to operate. Similarly, planes on the runway were to park at distances further from the runway and the maintenance exercises to take place in the presence of an experienced engineer. The new policies and practices focused on the safety precautions only and the maintenance of the flights. This implies that areas that was ignored by the engineers and crew essential for review. For instance, the engineers had the task of ensuring that the planes were in good condition, with the correct loading of cargoes and passengers. The aspect of overloading is always an offense, but negligence of the crew loaded the plane beyond capacity. Overall Impact on Engineering Practice The overall impact on engineering practice concerning this Concorde Air Flight disaster entailed the observation of manufacturers’ manuals. This implies that engineers should not assume the precautions and instructions posted by manufacturers during the installation of spares. As a result, the disaster also improved the maintenance services undertaken by engineers. This is because of the quality assurance policies that expect only experienced engineers to handle complex mechanical problems (Woods & Woods, 2008). The other overall impact on engineering practice is that the designs and production of modern flights had to follow the new guidelines that provide safety programs. For instance, the positioning of the gas tanks should not be near the tyres since this contributes to explosion during crashes. Engineering practice discourages negligence and this leads to the prosecution of the concerned individuals. This is because slight errors cause accidents that are detrimental to the lives of others who use the flights. Cases that involve airplane disasters are not common because the engineers who handle the planes must pass the quality assessment evaluation (Woods & Woods, 2008). This ensures that the qualified engineers are accredited to operate the planes since they are not prone to mechanical errors. Another overall impact on engineering is that it changed regulations on world bodies that govern the airlines and airports. How the Disaster changed the Engineering Practice It is prudent that the accident changed the engineering practice both in general and in specific fields. This is because the engineering body had to review its policies to ensure that the experts offer quality services. The penalties and actions against the underperforming engineers were enhanced in which laxity leading to damage or accidents amounted to dismissal. For example, the Concorde disaster also led to the amendments of the significant changes at NASA (Hardy, 2010). This implies that the policies guiding the engineering practice concerning the maintenance of machinery required only qualified personnel. The general changes that emerged because of this disaster entailed the company losing its license until it proved that it had rectified its safety policies. The management had to submit the new measures it adopted to prevent the recurrence of a similar error and accident in the future. The aftermath of the Concorde disaster also facilitated the reorganization of the company’s communication and ethic practices (Hardy, 2010). The engineers’ ethical code was to protect the occurrence of risks that could lead to catastrophic disasters by working towards rectifying all the errors. The failure to observe the engineering ethics led to the breakdown of the Continental DC-10 flight because of lack of communication with the manufacturers. Another aspect that changed the engineering practice after the disaster was the supervisory and communication channels by the superiors. It is established that all engineering procedures were to be examined by the chief engineers before allowing the commencement of fixing the problem (Hardy, 2010). The management had to receive the report of the breakdown to certify if the plane was fit for transport. Conclusion The Concorde Air Flight disaster that took place in the year 2000 occurred during the takeoff stage. This was because the plane struck a strip on the runway, puncturing the tyres that knocked the engine. The causes of the accident can be attributed to a number of factors such as negligence, overload of the plane, the absence of a plan to handle the breakdown of two engines and the puncture caused by the fallen strip. The disaster was an engineering mistake because they failed to install the correct strip that broke off the Continental Flight. The other aspect that makes this crash an engineering disaster is that the traffic control department did not prepare the runway for the impending flight. In order to avoid the recurrence of such a disaster in the airline industry, the first recommendation was the revocation of the certificate of airworthiness for Concorde flight. The aftermath of the Concorde disaster also facilitated the reorganization of the company’s communication and ethical practices. The overall impact on engineering practice concerning this Concorde Air Flight disaster entailed the observation of manufacturers’ manuals. As a result, engineers need to be cautious when attending to airplanes by avoiding overloading the flights, contacting manufacturers if the error is recurring and maintaining their ethical standards. References Byers, A. (2003). The crash of the Concorde. New York: Rosen Central. Press. Cramoisi, G. (2011). Air crash investigations: The end of the Concorde era: the crash of Air France Flight 4590. Manila, Philippines: Mabuhay Publishing. Duffey, R. B., & Saull, J. W. (2003). Know the risk: Learning from errors and accidents: safety and risk in Todays technology. Amsterdam: Butterworth-Heinemann. Hardy, T. L. (2010). The system safety skeptic: Lessons learned in safety management and Engineering. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse. McEvily, A. J. (2013). Metal failures: Mechanisms, analysis, prevention. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Woods, M., & Woods, M. B. (2008). Air disasters. Minneapolis: Lerner. Read More