The Collapse of Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel - Case Study Example

Author’s name Instructors’ name Course Date Abstract The following paper intends to discuss the collapse of Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel, which occurred in July 1981. Hundreds of people had gathered in this particular day for the ‘tea dance’ –which was a traditional event. On this night of the accident, the Hyatt Regency Hotel, at its atrium lobby, was hosting a tea-dance party. The number of people who were attending the party was estimated to be more than 300. This paper will start with the introduction that provides an overview of the collapse. The chronology of events that led to the collapse of the hotel has been provided before the causes of the same. This is followed by the miscommunication and missed opportunities as well as the lessons learned and the impacts of this collapse. A final paragraph has been provided to wind up and offer some recommendations as well. Learning from Disasters: The Collapse of Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel Introduction It was in the middle of the night of 17 July 1981, when hundreds of people had gathered in the Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel for the yearly traditional ‘tea dances’. Many people had gathered in on the dance floor as well as at the three different walkways that were suspended on the floors. At around 7pm, the walkway of the fourth floor collapsed, which brought down the walkway of the second floor (Texas A & M University 2009). The collapse of the walkways to the floor caused more than 100 people being killed, as well as leaving more than 200 injured (Marshall 1982). Investigations indicated that a flaw at the walkways’ connection as well as the support rods was the causative agent of this collapse. It should be noted that the engineers who had signed off on the structure’s design, had as well lost their licenses. After a while the hotel was restored, and is now operating under the normal conditions. Chronology of Events Leading Up to the Collapse The construction of Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City began in January 1978. The objective of the design was to link the bedrooms on the hotel’s one side, to the conference rooms through the use various levels in order to ensure that the interior space was enhanced (Marshall 1982). One year later, during the time construction phase, the design of the connections of the hanger rod was changed from a one-rod system to a two-rod one. Further, the fabricator-Havens Steel Company had received the drawings which were stamped at the back with the G.C.E.’s review seal and on which the walkways were constructed. Later on, in the same year, around 2700 square feet roof, collapsed. This took place when one of connections of the roof at the north side of this building failed. According to the G.C.E, on-site representation was requested on several occasions. However, these requests were never answered because of additional costs as far as on-site inspection was concerned. Further, on the night of the accident, the Hyatt Regency Hotel was in its atrium lobby was hosting a tea-dance party. The number of people who were attending the party was estimated to be more than 300. Most of these people were standing as well as dancing on the walkways, which were suspending in the atrium (Texas A & M University 2009). This was just before the collapse, to the atrium floor, of both the second and fourth floor walkways. Investigations revealed that around forty people were situated on the second walkway. At around seven, in the evening, as if the final restraining nut was ripping through the box, beam popping could be heard about 30 meters away. The Causes of the Hyatt Regency Hotel walkway collapse It is prudent to note that the collapse of the Hyatt Regency Hotel walkway did not happen because of construction, innovative design or material use (Bandhauer & Veber 2009). However, it was because of numerous errors in management. It was due to these critical errors of management that led to the flaws in the construction details e especially on the support system of the Hotel Atrium’s walkways One year later, during the construction phase, many controversial events and communications between Havens Steel Company and G.C.E. engineers were responsible for the change of the connections of the hanger rod from a one-rod system to a two-rod one(Texas A & M University 2009). It was impractical as far as contractor was concerned; it appeared, for the original design detail of continuous threading of the nut through two storeys of this building. Thus, the contractor was forced to change the drawings of the design, therefore replacing connections of the hanger rod from a one-rod system to a two-rod one. In this system of two rods, one of the rods is directed from the lower bridge to the upper one. The next rod goes to the roof truss from the upper bridge. It is therefore true that the change in these hanger rods helped to at least double the load that was to be transferred up to the fourth floor box beam-hanger rod connection (Marshall 1982). Further, the fourth floor walkway’s design load was about 20.3 kips (90 KN). However, if it was under the system’s new design, this connection needed to have had a design load of 40.7 kips (181 KN), which was double the original weight. In addition, the rod design’s original hanger could be in a position to ensure that the load was held during the time of this collapse (Moncarz 2000). Within a period of one year, there were some deformations of the box beam. This made it difficult for washers, as well as those box beams, which were resting on the supporting rod nuts being unable hold up the load. As a result, the box beams were detached from the second and fourth floor walkways, as well as from the ceiling rods of this Hotel (Texas A & M University 2009). This means that if the change in the design of the hanger rod not were executed, the maximum capacity of the connection’s design would have been far short of the building code requirements of the Kansas City that stipulates a minimum figure of 33.9 kip (151 KN). It can be estimated that the original connection’s value would have been about 20.5 kips (91 KN). This means that the capacity of the original connection would have been about 60% of what was initially being expected by these building codes. In addition, besides changes in the design, poor decisions and management as far as the construction firm as well as engineering firm was concerned, including the connection’s failure in meeting building codes, some other reasons led the collapse of this hotel (Unhelkar et al 2010). These included the quality of workmanship, as improper connections and welding processes (Texas A & M University 2009). Further, there were inadequate materials for building, as well as management’s failure of hiring building inspectors. On the same, note the building inspectors went ahead to allow occupancy of the building even after knowing how hazardous it was, which highly contributed to this collapse. Miscommunication and Missed Opportunities After a period one year of into the construction of skywalks of the Hyatt Hotel, G.C.E. Engineers came up with several series of drawings indicating the points of connections that were suspending the walkways to the fabricator-Havens Steel Company. G.C.E. , which was initially proposing that a single hanger rod was to support this walkways, later approved the suggestion of the fabricator of redesigning the connection though the use of two smaller rods(Nylson 2006). There was a miscommunication, however, that came between two groups where neither the fabricator nor the G.C.E. made calculations on the beam’s strength. Each group claimed that there was no responsibility and accountability among stakeholders (Texas A & M University 2009). There was a second opportunity of testing these connection points. This came up after the atrium ceiling collapsed in the construction phase. It was after this incident that some calculations were made at these critical points; however, this was not done on the skywalk connections. The G.C.E. would later be held accountable for allowing this design to go through inspection yet it was far below the building codes of Kansas City (Nylson 2006). It means that if these points were tested, then G.C.E. would have noted the crucial points of connections at the box beams that only supported one third of the required load capacity. Lessons Learned and impacts on the construction industry Based on the fatal miscommunication that was witnessed during this incident, the American Society of Civil Engineers finally rested responsibility on the engineers, especially due to their sealing of approval of the structure (Bandhauer & Veber 2009). This meant that any engineer who places the approval seal upon a series of construction plans would be responsible for the said building as well as any outcome of the same. Since then, it was agreed load bearing calculations was required to undergo inspection by an engineer who is appointed by a city appointed. These checks were also to be formal rather than being “spot checks” (Darling 2011). As far as the industry is concerned, it was critical for all responsible stakeholders such as architects, fabricators, engineers, among others to understand the challenges learned due to this fatal incident. Design provides a challenge to expect any failed details to the industry as well as correcting the same in the design process (Texas A & M University 2009). It was after the failed Hyatt Regency’s skywalk collapse that the industry was forced to develop a new objective of design. It was felt that suspended skywalks could no longer be used as an option especially after more than 100 people were killed. Therefore, this would no longer be a suitable design solution for engineers. Previously, The Hyatt Regency Hotel was one of the sources of attractions in this area (Band 2012). However, it was forced to pay more $140 million to the affected individuals and their families in legal liabilities because of this collapse. Instead, the construction engineering industry was needed to make these walkways appear as solid as they would now be, structurally. As a result, Hyatt hotel has now a walkway of a single span, which is supported using pillars (Wang 2008). These pillars are then supported deep into the rock below this hotel. Further, it is now less common, also, for fabricators to be having professional engineers on staff. This explains why there is a reduction of fabricators that are providing professional services. Conclusion Routinely, engineers are expected to be responsible in recommending solutions for engineering issues, which are related to process reengineering, product design, as well as selection of technology and more so in construction industry (Trey 2008). In some cases, engineers find themselves significant uncertainties surrounding core components of the decisions, which may have a huge effect on practices of engineers. According to the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), it is always a mandatory task for engineers to go through this analysis especially when carrying out the process of designing in engineering. Therefore, engineers should evaluate the solutions of engineering using three criteria, which include likelihood of occurrence, severity, as well as inability to regulate detection more so in times of disasters. After the tragedy of losing around 114 lives as well as the massive number of injuries, is the reality of how a single and critical error, due to miscommunication, can cause the loss of careers for many engineers (Luth 2000). This is what happened to the reputation of the head of G.C.E, Jack Gillum. As a result, many investigative bodies have been formed to deal with such cases (Jupp 2001). One of the weaknesses of such bodies is lack of qualified personnel who are able to assess the cause and therefore the solution of a tragedy. This has resulted into some questionable recommendations being outlined in reports of these bodies. In addition, some investigative bodies do not have enough facilities and technical ability to unearth some disasters (Bandhauer & Veber 2009). Assessing engineering disaster is a complex process and thus there is need for the team members to have necessary equipment and support from all sources. Further, the process of investigation is usually marred with interference form stake. This could be form individuals who are responsible and have considerable influence. It could be as well from political angle. All these interferences influence the outcome of an investigative work after a disaster has occurred. This leads to poor solution being outlined. It is important to note that engineering risks should highly recognize especially in relation to disasters (Male 2012). On the same note, there should be enough data that objectively define engineering risks, which need to be replicated when conducting an analysis. In the context of engineering, quantification of risk should always be a process of subjectivity, which merges information with available practical experience or data after an incident. This need to start right from when one is dealing with matters of project cost, performance and the expected functionality. Deigning should be of utmost importance to minimize engineering disasters. As a result, when one is working on a difficult engineering task, especially in the degree of the perceived risk of disasters, caution should be prioritized. Further, engineering is one of the few practices, which have direct impact on the lives of people (Rajan 2013). On this note, the services provided to the public need impartiality, fairness, equity, honesty, as well as dedication in the protection of the public health, welfare and safety (Daniell 2012). Engineers are thus required to perform under strict guidelines that describe the way they should conduct themselves in engineering profession. They should adhere to the principles set out under the code of conduct. If the above elements could be taken into consideration, then disasters such as the collapse of Hyatt Regency Hotel walkway could be reduced (Patil et al 2012). This means that injuries and deaths from related accidents will be minimized. References Bandhauer, A., & Veber, M. (2009). The Kansas City Hyatt Regency. Sydney: Sydney University Press. Band, H. (2012). Innovation in Engineering. London: Thomas Telford. Daniell, K. A. (2012). The collapse of Kansas City Hyatt Regency: Hershey, PA: Information Science Reference. Darling, P. (2011). The engineering handbook. Englewood, Colo.: Society for Mining, Metallurgy, and Exploration. Jupp, J. (2001). The Kansas’s Hyatt Regency Hotel Collapse. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. Luth, Gregory P., (2000). “Chronology and Context of the Hyatt Regency Collapse.” Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities. Moncarz, Piotr (2000). “Engineering Process Failure-Hyatt Walkway Collapse.” Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities. 46-50. Marshall, Richard D. (1982). “Investigation of the Kansas City Hyatt Regency walkways collapse.” U.S. Dept. of Commerce, National Bureau of Standards. Male, S. (2012). Hyatt Regency Hotel walkway collapse. London: Thomas Telford. Nylson, P. (2006). “Seconds from Disaster: Skywalk Collapse.” National Geographic Channel. Patil, A. S., Eijkman, H., & Bhattacharyya, E. (2012). Regency Hotel walkway. Hershey, PA: Information Science Reference. Rajan, K. (2013). Engineering: Hyatt Regency Hotel walkway. Elsevier Science & Technology. Texas A & M University. (2009). “Engineering Ethics: The Kansas City Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse.” Department of Philosophy and Department of Mechanical Engineering. Trey, G. (2008). Lessons learned from the collapse of Hyatt Regency Hotel walkway. London: Thomas Telford. Unhelkar, B., Ghanbary, A., & Younessi, H. (2010). Events in the Collapse of Hyatt Regency Hotel walkway. Hershey, PA: Business Science Reference. Wang, G. (2008). Exploring in decision making in engineering. London: Thomas Telford. Read More

The number of people who were attending the party was estimated to be more than 300. Most of these people were standing as well as dancing on the walkways, which were suspending in the atrium (Texas A & M University 2009). This was just before the collapse, to the atrium floor, of both the second and fourth floor walkways. Investigations revealed that around forty people were situated on the second walkway. At around seven, in the evening, as if the final restraining nut was ripping through the box, beam popping could be heard about 30 meters away.

The Causes of the Hyatt Regency Hotel walkway collapse It is prudent to note that the collapse of the Hyatt Regency Hotel walkway did not happen because of construction, innovative design or material use (Bandhauer & Veber 2009). However, it was because of numerous errors in management. It was due to these critical errors of management that led to the flaws in the construction details e especially on the support system of the Hotel Atrium’s walkways One year later, during the construction phase, many controversial events and communications between Havens Steel Company and G.C.E.

engineers were responsible for the change of the connections of the hanger rod from a one-rod system to a two-rod one(Texas A & M University 2009). It was impractical as far as contractor was concerned; it appeared, for the original design detail of continuous threading of the nut through two storeys of this building. Thus, the contractor was forced to change the drawings of the design, therefore replacing connections of the hanger rod from a one-rod system to a two-rod one. In this system of two rods, one of the rods is directed from the lower bridge to the upper one.

The next rod goes to the roof truss from the upper bridge. It is therefore true that the change in these hanger rods helped to at least double the load that was to be transferred up to the fourth floor box beam-hanger rod connection (Marshall 1982). Further, the fourth floor walkway’s design load was about 20.3 kips (90 KN). However, if it was under the system’s new design, this connection needed to have had a design load of 40.7 kips (181 KN), which was double the original weight. In addition, the rod design’s original hanger could be in a position to ensure that the load was held during the time of this collapse (Moncarz 2000).

Within a period of one year, there were some deformations of the box beam. This made it difficult for washers, as well as those box beams, which were resting on the supporting rod nuts being unable hold up the load. As a result, the box beams were detached from the second and fourth floor walkways, as well as from the ceiling rods of this Hotel (Texas A & M University 2009). This means that if the change in the design of the hanger rod not were executed, the maximum capacity of the connection’s design would have been far short of the building code requirements of the Kansas City that stipulates a minimum figure of 33.

9 kip (151 KN). It can be estimated that the original connection’s value would have been about 20.5 kips (91 KN). This means that the capacity of the original connection would have been about 60% of what was initially being expected by these building codes. In addition, besides changes in the design, poor decisions and management as far as the construction firm as well as engineering firm was concerned, including the connection’s failure in meeting building codes, some other reasons led the collapse of this hotel (Unhelkar et al 2010).

These included the quality of workmanship, as improper connections and welding processes (Texas A & M University 2009). Further, there were inadequate materials for building, as well as management’s failure of hiring building inspectors. On the same, note the building inspectors went ahead to allow occupancy of the building even after knowing how hazardous it was, which highly contributed to this collapse. Miscommunication and Missed Opportunities After a period one year of into the construction of skywalks of the Hyatt Hotel, G.C.E.

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