The Collective Ministerial Responsibility and the Values of Transparency - Essay Example

?Project 506946 Topic: The question is asking about the workability of a coalition government - Suggesting that party politicsplay a big role, especially in a election year. Also asks you to consider Dicey's quote is analyze if it is a workable solution. Through the years, United Kingdom’s (UK) governance evolved from a system that is ruled by dominant- party into ‘coalition governance.’ This is best exhibited by the agreements of Labour and the Liberal Democrats in Scotland and of the four parties in Northern Ireland though “power sharing arrangement” as well as in Welsh Assembly. ? Sociologists believe that this political phenomenon in most states in Britain could also happen in Westminster as officials have introduced “a semi-proportional electoral system which, it argued, would entail frequent, if not permanent, coalition” although electoral reform seems near to nil. 2 Anent to this phenomena is the recent move of the British parliament to publish a Cabinet Manual that will contain a collection of statutes, court judgments and treaties which they considered as “first ever written legal convention and precedent on how UK is run”—an attempt toward codification. These developments in the political arena must be scrutinized by electorates to be abreast with government official’s plans. It is also in this context that we will explore issues relating to workability of coalition of government viz-a-viz its ministerial duties as well as the proposed codification of conventions, which is largely perceived as unnecessary. 1. Coalition Government: Workable? That question has been raised by a British columnist at the height of electoral controversies in 2010. It seems that the question remained unsettled since hodge-podge of discourse revived the theme as election nears again. But what is a coalition government? Why does it attempt to question the competence and capacity of the single party’s governance especially in matters that relate to fairness and representation? 3 Coalition government is a composition of several political parties cooperating to “govern a country or a region.” 4 It removes an elite unitary system of political decision-makings and allowed democratization of political discourse by tolerating convergence and intra-party agreements. It is often a structural consequence whenever there are economic problems, unpeace, and political events such as merging of political parties during election. Practically, coalition government permeates sharing of executive powers and therefore changes the paradigms; broadens political party behaviors; widen operational methods in governance including internal rules of political engagements within the administration. 5 But these changes are neither worrisome nor irrelevant because all countries worldwide evolved from monarchical or unitary toward two or multi-party coalitions to democratize governance. 6 Nousiainen and Blondel (1993) have once asserted that “coalitions can be more or less extreme, more or less ideologically diverse, and composed of partners who are more or less equal.” The system espoused collective cabinet responsibility and legislated policies are credited to the government. 7 Policies will therefore be attributed to the government collectively and they expect stringent legislative discipline, unless they’d agree to exercise freely their respective votes during decision-making. Last year, UK officials formed a coalition government after serious discussions between the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats. 8 Observers however thought that this coalition politics have “focused so much on selection instead of accountability” perceiving that its political survival is considerably dependent from electoral process. 9 Political critics argued that government coalition, for it to be workable, should be built on trust. Some political shenanigans however bared experiences of alleged serial infidelity of Liberal Democrats, hence it is likely that government will be riddled with mutual suspicion.10 Ben Syed, 11 a researcher who made a comparative study about coalition government in major countries worldwide, inferred that coalition management can only be truly achieved if, besides formal agreements, there will be sustained “coordination, negotiation and compromise between the partners.” This is because, for him, coalition needs formal structures and informal devices which largely depend on political culture and structure of the country. 12 It also require “trust and a consensual approach to negotiations, in coalition government, is essential.” In UK, the coalition government appeared to be practiced differently because while parties coalesce, blend policies and made workplan as partners, they however maintained their independent party identity and separately campaign during electoral period. 13 Now that election is fast approaching, it is very likely that issues on political coalitions will be revived or be used as a political electoral strategy to gain political seats and power. From these developments, varied speculations sprouted in many discourses that either opposition Conservative Party will win; that Conservative will return a parliament of minorities because of smaller parties supports and Labour’s prejudice to electoral process. 14 Others thought that a hung parliament is foreseeable as an electoral end game scenario. Observers however thought that coalition government might be difficult at this stage because “inconclusive election” may end uncertain due to negative public confidence and partly due to government ineffectiveness in delivering services. 15 It was however presupposed that this multi-faceted precept on coalition can be more workable if its conventions are codified as laws of the land. 2. Codification of Conventions: A solution? But is Dicey’s ideation on codifying laws, adopted by the parliament, be the solution relating to the workability of coalition government? People wondered on its imperativeness since some officials proposed codification of these conventions and pushed for the publication of these unwritten conventions to make them as laws. It must be reckoned that UK’s governance has been administered with unwritten constitution for many decades. All of the acts of the state are historically and culturally derived from these constitutional conventions. 16 Conventions are informal17 laws that define how the state be administered and regulated by officials. But like legislated laws, conventions have binding and legal effect which enforce constitutional behavior among those who “operate the constitution although these are not enforceable by courts.” 18  These set of obligations were customarily adopted by people and has been regularly practiced, thus considered ‘golden rules of obligations.’ Marshall said that conventions are rules of constitutional behavior with legal effect. 19 Dicey on the other hand argued that those conventions are practices delivered as habits and have assisted in the regulation of conduct among members of “sovereign power”. 20 Since these conventions are unwritten, it is perceived non-legal and unenforceable by court of laws and yet binding among state actors-- the Crown, Parliament, the executive and the judiciary. It however bears force and effect similar to that of laws. This affirms political theorists’ ideation of convention as “political maxims, universally acknowledged in theory and universally carried out in practice” 21 and thought that it is differentiated from law because it’s more of a “positive political morality” framed to implement the “will of the electorates.” Clearly, convention is different from law (that are acts of the parliament) and that of case-laws (as judicial decision), because conventions are like golden rules which have transform overtime into an obligatory rule. 22 Laws are certain but conventions aren’t at all uncertain because there is clarity of Royal Assent under the Convention of Ministerial Responsibility. At some point, breaking rules could mean legal sanction while violating conventions can be reinterpreted with flexibility depending on situations though such may entail political risks23 in the process. To cite an example, the collective ministerial responsibility (CMR) has a standing policy that mandates how they should behave in accordance to an edict that upheld moral standards expected of public officials, such as practicing the values of transparency and honesty while dispensing public functions. 24 Anyone who has violated public trust is expected to resign from office as part of the individual duty of a minister. As an individual, the convention guide ministers to responsibly perform their duties in their respective departments. 25 They will engage themselves to discourses with stakeholders to defend government policy; propose legislation based on assessed needs that requires enabling policies; and perform ministerial appearances before DSCs. 26 Ministerial collective responsibility comes in only after collective cabinet decisions are made, deliberations were exhausted in confidentially, and the ministers defend publicly the decisions. 27 These processes are customary set of values that are considered in deciding matters of national significance, like issues affecting foreign policy, finance, economic, legislations (that may polarize the parliament), breach of confidentiality and security matters in relations to UK’s geopolitical relations. 28 Conventions on the other hand, permeates transparency of discussion especially on issues that are directly affecting the people or the interest of the state. With allows stakeholders participation in decision-making. Is codifying these conventions make coalition governments workable? The conventions are innately helpful and its codification apparently is insignificant since it is already customarily practiced as a political culture. But as to its imperativeness to make coalition governments workable, this question cannot be answered with reasonable certainty because actors within coalition government are already inherently bearing problems about their intents; on sustaining coordination29, in maintaining coherence in their political relations; or to be consistent with their values as supposed political allies to put an end to perceived political instability. In many instances, coalition governments failed to maintain unified positions on issues of national interests such as issues relating to forestry, stopping of tuition fees hike, and even on issues relating to geopolitical security. In retrospect, there were those who have already expressed frustrations because of officials’ inability or inconsistency in realizing political agenda, quite contrary to what is demanded from the code of ministerial responsibility. On one hand, while codifying conventions makes it written, certain, legal and with strength of a statutory provision, hence, officials violating thereof be civilly and criminally liable to the state, but still there is so much to consider in UK’s political landscape that necessitate to be seriously thought about. It was also argued that codifying the conventions nonetheless, will not guarantee that officials will not bend to the expediency of the situation nor absolve anyone who grossly violates rules based on circumstantial contexts. This is because reality is not a fix automaton. Governance often bends to differing and changing situations and contexts. 30 It may sound plausible, but codifying the convention will have its own ramification to society’s adaptability to changing circumstances and to political demands. Even legislated policies sometimes need to be amended or ratified to suit to political expediency. 31 Conventions allow certain level of flexibility as these are grounded in moralist’s intentions and standards. It has also a characteristic of an overarching or encompassing authority that is too broad to be legislated. It also perceived that sanctioning the branches of state with codified conventions will violate the independence of the branches of the state. Conclusion Considering all these, it cannot be accurately ascertained that codifying conventions will make coalition governments workable, the latter being besieged with numerous inherent problems that comes with coalescing. Even the act of coalition is already taunted with suspect. Besides, time is always changing and so is the political landscape. 32 Like bamboos, we all need to be swayed too to be adaptable to circumstances. For all the best convention’s has done to this British government, it is suggested that its more relevant and wiser for them to better devote efforts to good governance and in processes that will free the state from corruption and uphold “equity, participation, pluralism, transparency, accountability and lawfulness, in a manner that is effective, efficient and enduring.” Governance is effectively felt if stakeholders will focused on resolving major issues, improving economic development, and improving services toward an improved political and public life instead of squabbling over who’d hold the reign of political control in decision-making bodies. --------------- Footnotes 1 Philip G. Roeder,Donald S. Rothchild (2005) Sustainable peace: power and democracy after civil wars, Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After Civil Wars. (Cornell University Press, 2005). Volume 15. New York. 2 Seyd, Ben. Coalition GOvernment in britain: Lessons from Overseas. Insitutte for Government. Prospect Magazine Think Tank of the Year. United Kingdom http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/content/69/minority-and-coalition-government Accessed March 5, 2011. 3 Robert Hazell and Akash Paun (eds.)with Mark Chalmers, Ben Yong and Catherine Haddon. makingminority government work: Hung parliaments and the challenges for Westminster and Whitehall. Institute for Government. The Constitution Unit.(London, 2009) . Accessed March 5, 2011. 4 James L. Sundquist. Needed: A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition Government in the United States. Political Science Quarterly Vol. 103, No. 4 (Winter, 1988-1989), pp. 613-635 5 Ibid. 6 Nousiainen, Jaakko and Jean Blondel (1993) “Conclusion,” in Jean Blondel andFerdinand Muller-Rommel (Eds.) Governing Together: The Extent and Limits ofJoint Decision-Making in Western European Cabinets, pp. 301-307 (New York,NY: St. Martin’s Press). 7 Ibid. 8 Maravall, Jose Maria. Accountability in Coalition Governments Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 13: 81-100 (Spain, June 2010) DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.071108.101919 9 Information Policy Team. Parliament and government. The National Archives. Richmond Surrey. http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/role/parliament-government/ Date of access: March 1, 2011 10 Sara B. Hobolt and and Jeffrey A. Karp. Voters and coalition governments. Electoral Studies Volume 29, Issue 3, September 2010, Pages 299-307 11 Seyd, Ben. Coalition GOvernment in britain: Lessons from Overseas. Insitutte for Government. Prospect Magazine Think Tank of the Year. United Kingdom http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/content/69/minority-and-coalition-government Accessed March 5, 2011. 12 Ibid... 13 R. Michael Alvarez, Frederick J. Boehmke, Jonathan Nagle. Strategic voting in British elections. Electoral Studies, Volume 25, Issue 1, March 2006, Pages 1-19 14 . Arnaud Dellis. Blame-game politics in a coalition government Original Research Article Journal of Public Economics, Volume 91, Issues 1-2, February 2007, Pages 77-96 15 S. Macdonald, G. Rabinowitz. Voting: Issue International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, (2004) Pages 16318-16321 16 Flinders, M. (2004), Distributed Public Governance in Britain. Public Administration, 82: 883–909. doi: 10.1111/j.0033-3298.2004.00423.x 17 Author Unknown. Devolved government in the UK. Directgov: Public services all in one place. (UK, 2009)http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Governmentcitizensandrights/UK government/Devolvedgovernment/DG_073306. Accessed March 2, 2011. 18 Minority and coalition government. Insitutte for Government. Prospect Magazine Think Tank of the Year. United Kingdom http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/content/69/minority-and-coalition-government 19 Information Policy Team. Parliament and government. The National Archives. Richmond Surrey. http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/role/parliament-government/ Date of access: March 1, 2011 20 Ibid 21 Marshall, Geoffrey. What are Constitutional Conventions?. Parliam Aff (Oxford Journal ,1985) Vol 38 Issue 1 pp 33-39 22 Information Policy Team. Parliament and government. The National Archives. Richmond Surrey. http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/role/parliament-government/ Date of access: March 1, 2011 23 de la Torre, Jose and Neckar, David H.. Forecasting political risks for international operations International Journal of Forecasting (Published by Elsevier Science B.V., 1988) Volume 4, Issue 2, Pages 221-241 doi:10.1016/0169-2070(88)90079-9 | 24 Information Policy Team. Parliament and government. The National Archives. Richmond Surrey. http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/role/parliament-government/ Date of access: March 1, 2011 25 Ibid... 26 Devolved government in the UK. Directgov: Public services all in one place. (UK, 2009)http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Governmentcitizensandrights/UK government/Devolvedgovernment/DG_073306. Accessed March 2, 2011. 27 Ibid.. 28 Ibid... 29 Braun, Dietmar. Lessons on the political coordination of knowledge and innovation policies. Science and Public Policy, Volume 35, Number 4, (Beech Tree Publishing, May 2008) , pp. 289-298(10) 30 Glendon A. Schubert, Jr. "The Public Interest" In Administrative Decision-Making: Theorem, Theosophy, or Theory? The American Political Science Review Vol. 51, No. 2 (American Political Science Association, Jun., 1957), pp. 346-368 31 Farina, Cynthia R., Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, Columbia Law Review Vol. 89, No. 3 (Columbia Law Review Association, Inc., Apr., 1989), pp. 452-528 32 James W. Prothroa1 and Charles M. Grigga1. Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement. The Journal of Politics (1960), 22: 276-294 (Southern Political Science Association 1960) DOI: 10.2307/2127359 Published online: 18 Dec 2009 REFERENCES Philip G. Roeder,Donald S. Rothchild. Sustainable peace: power and democracy after civil wars, Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy After Civil Wars. (Cornell University Press, 2005). Volume 15. New York. Seyd, Ben. Coalition GOvernment in britain: Lessons from Overseas. Insitutte for Government. Prospect Magazine Think Tank of the Year. United Kingdom http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/content/69/minority-and-coalition-government Accessed March 5, 2011. Robert Hazell and Akash Paun (eds.)with Mark Chalmers, Ben Yong and Catherine Haddon. Making minority government work: Hung parliaments and the challenges for Westminster and Whitehall. Institute for Government. The Constitution Unit.(London, 2009) . Accessed March 5, 2011. James L. Sundquist. Needed: A Political Theory for the New Era of Coalition Government in the United States. Political Science Quarterly Vol. 103, No. 4 (Winter, 1988-1989), pp. 613-635 Nousiainen, Jaakko and Jean Blondel (1993) “Conclusion,” in Jean Blondel andFerdinand Muller-Rommel (Eds.) Governing Together: The Extent and Limits ofJoint Decision-Making in Western European Cabinets, pp. 301-307 (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press). Maravall, Jose Maria. Accountability in Coalition Governments Annual Review of Political Science Vol. 13: 81-100 (Spain, June 2010) DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.071108.101919 Information Policy Team. Parliament and government. The National Archives. Richmond Surrey. http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/role/parliament-government/ Date of access: March 1, 2011 Sara B. Hobolt and and Jeffrey A. Karp. Voters and coalition governments. Electoral Studies Volume 29, Issue 3, September 2010, Pages 299-307 Seyd, Ben. Coalition Government in Britain: Lessons from Overseas. Institute for Government. Prospect Magazine Think Tank of the Year. United Kingdom http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/content/69/minority-and-coalition-government Accessed March 5, 2011. R. Michael Alvarez, Frederick J. Boehmke, Jonathan Nagle. Strategic voting in British elections. Electoral Studies, Volume 25, Issue 1, March 2006, Pages 1-19 Arnaud Dellis. Blame-game politics in a coalition government Original Research Article Journal of Public Economics, Volume 91, Issues 1-2, February 2007, Pages 77-96 S. Macdonald, G. Rabinowitz. Voting: Issue International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, (2004) Pages 16318-16321 Flinders, M. (2004), Distributed Public Governance in Britain. Public Administration, 82: 883–909. doi: 10.1111/j.0033-3298.2004.00423.x Author Unknown. Devolved government in the UK. Directgov: Public services all in one place. (UK, 2009)http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Governmentcitizensandrights/UK government/Devolvedgovernment/DG_073306. Accessed March 2, 2011. Minority and coalition government. Institute for Government. Prospect Magazine Think Tank of the Year. United Kingdom http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/content/69/minority-and-coalition-government Information Policy Team. Parliament and government. The National Archives. Richmond Surrey. http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/role/parliament-government/ Date of access: March 1, 2011 Marshall, Geoffrey. What are Constitutional Conventions?. Parliam Aff (Oxford Journal ,1985) Vol 38 Issue 1 pp 33-39 Information Policy Team. Parliament and government. The National Archives. Richmond Surrey. http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/role/parliament-government/ Date of access: March 1, 2011 de la Torre, Jose and Neckar, David H.. Forecasting political risks for international operations International Journal of Forecasting (Published by Elsevier Science B.V., 1988) Volume 4, Issue 2, Pages 221-241 doi:10.1016/0169-2070(88)90079-9 | Information Policy Team. Parliament and government. The National Archives. Richmond Surrey. http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/role/parliament-government/ Date of access: March 1, 2011 Devolved government in the UK. Directgov: Public services all in one place. (UK, 2009)http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Governmentcitizensandrights/UK government/Devolvedgovernment/DG_073306. Accessed March 2, 2011. Braun, Dietmar. Lessons on the political coordination of knowledge and innovation policies. Science and Public Policy, Volume 35, Number 4, (Beech Tree Publishing, May 2008) , pp. 289-298(10) Glendon A. Schubert, Jr. "The Public Interest" In Administrative Decision-Making: Theorem, Theosophy, or Theory? The American Political Science Review Vol. 51, No. 2 (American Political Science Association, Jun., 1957), pp. 346-368 Farina, Cynthia R., Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, Columbia Law Review Vol. 89, No. 3 (Columbia Law Review Association, Inc., Apr., 1989), pp. 452-528 James W. Prothroa1 and Charles M. Grigga1. Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement. The Journal of Politics (1960), 22: 276-294 (Southern Political Science Association 1960) DOI: 10.2307/2127359 Published online: 18 Dec 2009 Read More