The Composition of the European Union and Its Function on the States - Essay Example

?The European Union: s under a Judicial System Introduction The European Union is an organization made to settle disputes between and among countries of Europe and is known to be a binding organization making a unified European nation through agreements, treaties, policies and laws drafted and agreed among member states. Moreover, it is an economic and political union of 27 European countries (Oxford Dictionary of English, 2008) and it operates though a fusion of “supranational” independent institutions and intergovernmental decisions negotiated among its members (Anneli, 2005, p.205). There are essential institutions that this organization comprises; these are the European Commission, the European Central Bank, the European council, the council of European Union, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice of the European Union. In this paper, we will be emphasizing on the Court of Justice of the European Union as an institution built up by the organization to settle the predicaments, anomalies and ambiguities in its polices and statutes regarding its rule of law. Also, the power of the judiciary branch and its role in the union will be tackled heavily, we will be looking into its structure and what can it do in the political sphere especially in policy making process. Thus, Article 267 of the consolidated version of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU) will be stress also, stating its jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of laws and treaties of the organization as well as the validity of the acts done by the member states and of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union. Furthermore, the composition of the European Union and its function on the states regarding its laws and its effect to their political and judicial structure will be highlighted. To what extend has the EU become a federal state? The European Union has a very important role in the political system of its member states. As mentioned above, it is comprised of several commissions, council and other political agencies which supervise the actions of the organization as well as its member countries. When the states agreed to put up the Union, they already bind themselves under the law to govern their actions between each other. Also, the existence of Union’s parliament, European council and European commission strengthen the power of the organization in governance, having a strong power to preside over the actions of its members. Thus, we can compare these proceedings of the EU into a federal form of government making the EU’s decision as the primary ruler, ensuring the validity of the action’s done by the member countries and the supervising them whether they conform to the laws set by the organization (Moe, 1990). We can assume the complete power of the Union over its member countries due to the fact that it can impose penalties and punishment to the member whose performance is against the law implemented by the organization. Article 258 of the TFEU states that “the Commission may initiate infringement proceedings (enforcement actions) against a Member State for non-compliance with EC law; rounds of negotiation with the government then ensue; if these fail, the Commission may refer the matter to the Court for decision.” Unlike other organizations like the Association of the South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) who cannot impose punishments to its member countries, the EU is a very powerful organization that it can actually control the countries that are associated to such making a more united country like a federal state. Does the Treaty of Lisbon form a constitution for the state? The treaty of Lisbon is an international agreement, signed by the EU member states, amends the two treaties (TEC and TEU) which comprise the constitutional basis of the European Union. The treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) was renamed to treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU) which is comprised of laws, rules and regulation governing its member countries. It also drafts the functions of the established commission and their power in the organization as well as their rule in governance. The entry of force of the Lisbon Treaty, on December 1, 2009, has made important changes to the EU constitutional architecture. The new Treaty further strengthens the supranational features of the system: qualified majority voting and co-decision are now the presumptively “normal” procedures for legislating, and the Parliament’s powers have increased in other ways. Furthermore, the Lisbon Treaty gave legal effect to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The agreement is a written compilation of Fundamental rights against which the EU's legal acts can be judged. It consolidates many rights which were previously recognized by the European Court of Justice and derived from the constitutional traditions common to the member states. The European Court of Justice has long recognized fundamental rights and has, on occasion, invalidated EU legislation based on its failure to adhere to those fundamental rights. The Charter of Fundamental Rights was drawn up in 2000. Although originally not legally binding the Charter was frequently cited by the EU's courts as encapsulating rights which the courts had long recognized as the fundamental principles of EU law. This step caters a clearer law to almost all European states especially those with unwritten constitution. Moreover, it standardized the laws in Europe giving lawyers and judges a relief in interpreting the law because of the treaty of Lisbon. Strengths and Weaknesses of Article 267 of the TFEU Article 267 of the TFEU states the power and function of the Court of Justice of the European Union in its jurisdictions in giving primary rulings. It has the power of to interpret treaties as well as to verify the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union if it complies with the laws legislated and implemented by the organization. One strength of the mentioned article is it gives the European Union’s Court of Justice the power to preside judicial matters on preliminary rulings. Also, it fills the deficiencies of the individual member country’s judiciary laws. It explicitly mentioned in the article that “where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a member state against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under the national law, which court tribunal shall bring the matter before the court.” This is actually a big help to the judicial system of the member countries wherein the organization stand-in for the betterment of their justice system. Though, the organization is capable to interfere in the judicial matters of the individual countries, this does not mean that it already remove the independence of national courts because as a matter of fact, it just interrupt when national courts cannot handle cases within their jurisdiction. The whole object of the reference procedure is to retain the independence of the national courts, while at the same time preventing ‘a body of national case law not in accord with the rules of Community law from coming into existence in any Member State’ (Case 107/76, Hoffman La Roche v. Centrafarm). When a national court requests the ECJ to give a preliminary ruling on a matter of Community law, as it may do under Art.267 TFEU, only the point of EC law is referred to the ECJ which, in turn, rules on the point and remits the issue to the national court, from where the reference was made, for a final decision. Ultimately, the national court may find that it can dispose of the case without having to refer to the point of Community law. If it finds that it is necessary to refer to it, however, it is bound by the ECJ’s decision (Case C-206/01, Arsenal FC v Reed). The primary role of the ECJ is to clarify matters regarding judicial questions and to solve predicaments on the rule of law. As also stated in the article, that “where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal member state, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the court to give ruling thereon.” On the other side, weakness that can be considered in this article would be the impediments on slower judicial decisions. As of 1993, the ECJ has more than 200 requests on preliminary proceedings (Tovey, 2010, p. 2). This actually can create slower release of judgments creating pending unsolved cases to be piled up for several years. Moreover, the ambiguity on the separation of the European Court of Justice and the Municipal Courts is raised. Because of the fact that the national court could actually refer its cases to the ECJ, then this makes a picture that the ECJ is positioned to the top of hierarchy of the judiciary system, making municipal courts under it. Question now would be the autonomy of the municipal court in the interpretation of law – does it still have sovereignty on interpreting its laws within its jurisdiction? In the case of Foglia vs Novello, the ECJ states that “The duty of the Court of Justice under Article [234] of the EC (now the 267 TFEU) Treaty is to supply all courts in the Community with the information on the interpretation of Community law which is necessary to enable them to settle genuine disputes which are brought before them. A situation in which the court was obliged by the expedient of arrangements like those described above to give rulings would jeopardise the whole system of legal remedies available to private individuals to enable them to protect themselves. . .” This would imply that the aim of the ECJ would be for supplementary purpose only whilst it is often viewed in the other way around. Hence the purpose of article 267 in this sense what they want to establish is a cooperation between the judiciary branch to have a more effective and accurate interpretations of the laws created and not to rule over municipal courts. Applied judiciously - one is tempted to say loyally - the provisions of Article [234](now 267 TFEU) must lead to a real and fruitful collaboration between the municipal courts and the Court of Justice of the Communities with mutual regard for their respective jurisdictions. (Case 13/61, Bosch v. de Geus). Samson vs. Prison Board (imaginary case) Under the article 267 of the TFEU on preliminary rulings, the Prison board can only refer the dispute to the ECJ only when the national court will refer the matter to it and only when there is no judicial remedy under the national law. That, as a general rule, it is for the national court to decide whether a reference should be made to the ECJ, demonstrated that the ECJ’s jurisdiction depends ‘solely on the existence of a request from the national court’ (Case 338/85, Pardini’s case). Thus in this sense, an Samson cannot simply direct the disputes regarding the Directive 112/93 if he alone wants to, but instead it would be first the national court’s power to decide on that particular matter. Though the prison board is a newly set-up board which implies the chance of a more ambivalent rules and accurate interpretation of its laws and policies, still it must cannot be put instantly to the ECJ. Thus, the issue cannot be bought directly to the ECJ without prior notification of the national court as what Samson would want to. ‘It is for the national court to decide at what stage of the procedure it is necessary for it to refer a question to the court of justice for a preliminary ruling’ (Case 338/85, Pardini). Court of Justice: role within the EU institutions and the power of the judges in making laws The European Court of Justice has a huge role in the EU institutions, whereas it is the one in-charge in supervising their action whether it is in accordance with their law. “The Court is the authoritative interpreter of EU law, not the Member States. The Member States have established the Court not only to provide judicial supervision of the activities of other Agents, such as the Commission, but also to control their own activities under EU law. Thus, the Court of Justice has a heavy duty on safeguarding the legality of the actions committed by other institutions under the European Union. It has an important role in deterring anomalies and abuse done by these institutions avoiding disputes to come about. The ECJ is consisting of 27 judges coming from different countries of the member states and eight Advocated-Generals who were appointed by the member states. Looking at the number of judges that comprises the ECJ, it is of advantageous feature because the more of them, the more would be the chances of having an accurate interpretation of laws. Also, with the fact that these came from the different countries from the member states would mean that bias regarding one’s country would be avoided in case of disputes between the members. In regards to policy making process, the ECJ also, has also a role in the drafting of laws governing the organization through its views regarding the drafted policy whether or not it is conformity in the rule of law. Though there is the European Parliament, still there is a continuous exchange of information and consultation between and among the EU’s institution on policy making. Moreover, the Court has the capacity to enhance the credibility of treaty commitments, or to promote the efficiency of policy making, under competences term laid down by articles 258,259,263,267 TFEU. Put differently, it is more likely for the steady judicialization of policymaking to proceed under conditions of Trusteeship, other things equal, than other conditions of simple Agency. A Trustee court, by definition, possesses the capacity to expand or contract its own zone of discretion, through interpreting the law, and the scope of its own powers considering now the constitutionalization of the treaty system. The power of the judges actually in creating policies is that it ensures that they are in accordance to the objectives of the EU and if it conforms to the prior laws and that it would not violate the rights of its members. Furthermore, it secures the legality of the act drafted by the parliament and other commissions. Through this, we can see the power of the judges to not only to supervise but also control the enactment of policies proposed though reviewing its constitutionality and whether it adheres to the advocacies of the European Union. This is very important in the organization as well as to the member countries because the attainment of order and justice could be best achieved through the ECJ. Conclusion The European Union is a very helpful organization in the Western world. They (member countries) have created a powerful tool to unify them as well as to govern their actions. This actually creates an integrated state which helps them in many aspects like economy and most especially political aspects. Thus, this creates a more advantageous move for them especially in Judiciary aspects granting power of to the ECJ to settle disputes between member states and other problem related to law interpretations. Also, it ensures an orderly coexistence between and among states giving the initiative to punish the members not complying with their policies making sure of the safety of all the member states. The European Union is a very powerful organization that it could actually bind its member states together with an ease to control their actions unlike other organization like the Association of South East Asian Nation through their power to corporal punishments to maximize the possibility of acquiescence. In liberalist perspective, it just proves the effectiveness of such, wherein countries can think of ways and means to settle their predicaments in a more peaceful manner. Also, we could see the important role of the ECJ in maintaining peace and order in the organization by reviewing the laws drafted by the parliament and by fulfilling the deficiencies of its member states in judicial matters. Thus, showing its importance in the political arena of every member states. References Albi, Anneli 2005, ‘Implications of the European constitution’, EU enlagement and the constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press. Alter, Karen J., 2001, ‘Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: The Making of an International Rule of Law in Europe, Studies in European Law’, New York, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Brown, L.N and Kennedy, T. 2000, ‘The Court of Justice of the European Communities’, 5th edn., London, Sweet & Maxwell. Chalmers, D, et al 2006, ‘European Union Law Text and Materials’, Cambridge, CUP, Ch.7, pp291-302. Craig, P & De Burca, G. 2008, ‘EU Law: Text, Cases & Materials’, 4th edn., Oxford, OUP. Craig, P & De Burca, G (eds) 1999, ‘The Evolution of EU Law’, Oxford: OUP. Fairhurst, J.2009, ‘Law of the European Union’, 7th edn., Harlow, Pearson Longman. Kaczorowska, A. 2009, ‘European Union Law’, 1st edn., 2009. Abingdon, Routledge-Cavendish. Steiner, J, Woods, L, & Twigg-Flesner, C. 2006, ‘EU Law’, Oxford, OUP. Tran, Mark 2007, ‘How the German EU proposal differ from the constitution’, London, The Guardian. Others http://books.google.com/?id=GXDxmx_1RmcC&pg=PA204&dq=%22European+union%22+%22Sui+generis%22+%22supranational+organisation%22. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0047:0199:EN:PDF. http://www.rwi.uzh.ch/lehreforschung/alphabetisch/jaag/cont/EurInst-4.pdf. Read More