Epoch of Richelieu - Monarchial Intrigues - Essay Example

?Ramakrishna Surampudi 25 May Monarchial Intrigues If the aim of history is to learn from the past, it seems there is more to unlearn than learn. The story of the consolidation of French monarchy, first by the efforts of Cardinal Richelieu and later by Louis XIV is indeed as interesting as the consolidation of the power of the Shogunate in Japan almost simultaneously. The normal share of human wickedness may be taken for granted, but its levels appear to have reached a frighteningly abnormal degree (surpassing even the wicked Pechorin created by Lermontov) when power hunger dominated all other instincts. Louis XIV, undoubtedly, made a great contribution in strengthening the central authority of French monarchy. However, it was made a cakewalk for him in the light of what his predecessors, especially Richelieu had already accomplished. Still, he deserves to be complimented for his ability in reading quickly the invisible price tag attached to those who could challenge the absolutism that he envisaged and also for the shrewd, though unethical, strategies that he invented to pacify the aristocracy and to eliminate the remnants of feudal power, if any. By the use of pensions and privileges as decoys, he created circumstances in which loyalty became an obligation. To weaken the members of the noble elite further, he addicted them to luxury and indulgence at the Palace of Versailles. That also drastically reduced the time they would spend in their own estates. It was ‘Sankin-kotai’ in disguise. It is just that the system of alternate attendance was formalized as ‘Sankin-kotai’ by the Tokugawa Shoguns whereby the feudal lords were required to spend at least half of their time in Edo, the capital of the Shogun empire (Beasly 272). Louis XIV is often praised in history for ‘recognizing talent’ because during his reign, several high positions were filled with commoners. Though their credentials do not have to be doubted, it needs to be observed that he had a distinct advantage in having them there: they were easy to get rid of. A clear parallel between him and the Shogunate becomes apparent here, if we recall how Ieyasu allowed outsiders to assume the position of vassals. Just as Louis XIV exercised control over the nobles by making them have to remain under his scrutiny, Ieyasu’s successors Hidetada and Iemitsu vigorously pursued the land reallocation strategy by which they could impose order on Japan’s feudal lords (Beasly 130). The system was justified on the basis that it would ensure ‘good governance’ while the actual rationale was exercise of control. There is, however, one major difference between what transpired in France and Japan during that time. In France, Richelieu went about ‘bringing back all the King’s subjects to their duty and to elevate His Majesty’s name to the point where it belongs’ (Richelieu 11). He did that indeed. In this process, all his wicked deeds notwithstanding, he always considered himself a servant of the King and never attempted to surpass the King’s authority. Incidents like the Day of Dupes bear testimony to the fact that he remained secondary to the King. In the Japanese history, what we see is the second tier becoming stronger than the first, since the Tokugawa Shoguns, who had total control over the country, were not the emperors of Japan (Beasly 132). They were given the charge of the country’s administration by the legitimate emperor, but for all practical purposes, until the Meiji Restoration, for about two-and-a-half centuries, they wielded absolute power (Beasly 203). Undisputedly, it is Richelieu to whom the lion’s share of the credit legitimately goes. As Bismark was to Germany and Metternich was to Austria, so was Richelieu to France, a one-man-army, so much so that during his nearly two-decade-tenure, the history of France was synonymous with his biography. He commissioned himself to put the nobles, the Huguenots and the Habsburgs in their place on the one hand and to establish the royal authoritarianism beyond challenge on the other. He was as averse to Protestants as the Shogunate was to Christians. Yet, he was more adept at political opportunism than the Shoguns were. We know from the pages of history that during the couple of decades after Ieyasu’s death, thousands of Christians were executed and persecuted (Beasly 149), the same Christians who were pampered when it served the selfish interests of the emperor or of the Japanese foreign trade. If that is to be found shocking, Richelieu’s diplomacy and ruthlessness are nearly nauseating whether in switching loyalties to retain power or in intimidating adversaries, as may be witnessed in his deliberation in the decisions to aid the Protestant princes of Germany, to change sides from Marie de Medici to Louis XIII, to expel Pope’s army from Valtelline in spite of his strong Catholic inclination, to spare Henri duc de Rohan from execution and to ensure the execution of Cinq Mars whom he had once patronized. Without that incredibly profound political wisdom, he could not have managed to remain the most powerful man in France for eighteen years, though Louis XIII personally had a strong dislike for him. It is debatable whether the successes of Richelieu or the Tokugawa Shoguns were enduring. Should silence be a sign of order, discipline and all being well, they were definitely successful. What matters is whether the silence was the result of persuasion or acquiescence. Evidently, Richelieu had a large number of dissenters and he himself was aware of all those ‘who believed his fall assured’ (Richelieu 268). Throughout his tenure, there was never a time without someone conspiring against him. It is hard to believe that the efforts to centralize power in France or Japan were met with enthusiasm and without resentment or resistance. If that were to be, the Meiji Restoration would not have become necessary, nor would the Bastille eventually fall. These incidents may have happened a century or more after the death of Richelieu or Ieyasu, but the roots of displeasure were spread over several generations. In the monarchial institutions, the wrath of the common man was underrated; every move and decision was motivated by the politics of power and the interest of the public was never at the center. Richelieu’s ‘gabelle’ (salt tax) and the ‘taille’ (land tax) or the greedy fief assessment system of the Shogunate speaks volumes about their lack of concern as much as contempt for general welfare. As a result, what temporarily appears to be a successful power consolidation exercise, paves way, in the long run, to violent revolutions. And it did. Works Cited Beasly, W G. The Japanese Experience: A Short History of Japan. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000. Richelieu, Armand Jean du Plessis. The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu: The Significant Chapters and Supporting Selections. Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1961. Read More