In-Vitro Fertilization as a Technology - Essay Example

It may be contended that in relation to IVF and the wider concept of designer babies, much of English law is unwarranted and unnecessary. In particular, this contention is based on the belief that there is no need for the law to intervene in a well-established 'Doctor - parents-to-be' relationship to prevent the latter benefiting from the use of whatever methods of assisted conception are possible to enable them to have children. Moreover, this is well-illustrated by the plight of parents seeking to use such methods so as to give birth to a child that will help save the life of an existing, ill sibling.' July 25, 1978 marks an important turning point in the field of medical science and ushers in new hope for scores of married couples and would-be parents having difficulties conceiving. On that day, Louise Joy Brown, the world's first successful "test-tube" baby was born to British parents in Great Britain. It was considered an astounding feat for medicine, but it also led to sober reflection on the possible implications and abuse of the new technology. In vitro fertilization is a technique wherein the egg cells are fertilized by sperm outside the mother' womb. The zygote (or the fertilized egg) is then transferred back to the uterus, and the woman is guided through what is hoped to be a nomal pregnancy resulting in successful childbirth. Indeed, the question of in-vitro fertilization has given rise to a wide range of ethical and legal issues and has generated much controversy and in some cases, much objections from certain conservative sectors. It has been compared to Aldous Huxley's A Brave New World. (Imber, 1987, p. 228). In 2001, a French woman pretended to be the wife of her brother in order to undergo artificial insemination of his sperm with her egg. It drew outrage from some religious groups, believing the act to be an act of incest. Some raised concerns on the psychological well-being of the child, and the potential problems the truth of his/her birth might cause him/her. There are others, however, who believe that it is solely the prerogative of the parents. The fact remains that since the embryo is, for a certain period of time, located outside a woman's body, it can be manipulated in an unprecedented number of ways. (Mulkay, 1994, p. 611). Because of these ethical issues, it has become imperative to create a legal framework that will provide the "operational guidelines", so to speak, for both patients and medical practitioners who wish to undertake in-vitro fertilization. Medical practice and law, after all, are governed to a huge extent by moral and ethical law. (Mason & McCall Smith, 2005) In July 1982, the Government formed the Warnock Committee whose mandate was as follows: To consider recent and potential developments in medicine and science related to human fertilization and embryology; to consider what policies and safeguards should be applied, including consideration of the social, ethical and legal implications of these developments; and to make recommendations.1 Two years after it was set up, or in July of 1984, the Warnock Committee released its report and the recommendations made therein found their way to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 1990 (HFEA 1990). Said Montgomery (1991, p. 524): The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 1990 represents a milestone in biomedical regulation. Not only does it finally bring to fruition the long running government discussions about the proper limits of reproductive science, it also provides the first attempt in English Law to provide a comprehensive framework for making medical science democratically accountable. Its interest therefore arises both from the solutions it adopts for particular issues and from the model of regulation on which it builds. If the licensing authority which lies at the heart of its provisions proves successful, it is likely to be replicated in the oversight of many controversial areas of medical progress. Viewed in equal parts with fear and hope (Bloomfield & Vurduvakis, 1995, p. 533) One of the recommendations was to create a regulatory body to act as overseer and monitor developments in the field of genetics and embryology to make sure that these developments do not overstep ethical bounds. Such recommendation came into fruition with the creation of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, which has the power to grant or revoke licenses for procedures involving the creation of an embryo ex vivo or the use of gametes. Three types of licenses may be granted, and these are: Activities in the course of providing treatment services, The storage of gametes and embryos Activities for research purposes. Children as property: legal and ethical implications A major concern created by this technological development is that children could be perceived as property owned by parents, who can "tweak" them at will. The relatively new development of "designer babies" places a unique strain on the principle of children as not being the property of their parents. The case of Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority (1986)2 is a landmark case in that it set a precedent on child autonomy in health care. It established the capacity approach" whereby "A child who, in the opinion of a qualified medical practitioner, is deemed to have the appropriate maturity and understanding of the risks involved is recognised in law as being able to give consent." However, until the child reaches the right age to give consent, the parent shall be allowed to make the decision for him. (Davies, 1988, 144). Whereas we would be quick to object if a parent sets his daughter for an involuntary appointment with a plastic surgeon, we are a bit lost when the alterations are made while the child is not yet born. It's a difficult dilemma because it forces us to specify the point when a child already enjoys his rights as an individual person. Coming from a time when abortion of the fetus is generally legalized, then we could not help but say that the object that is being exposed to genetic engineering at that point does not as yet enjoy the rights of children. The genes being altered may be seen as the property of the parents. Generally speaking then, genetic alteration for the purpose of conceiving "designer babies" does not directly violate the principle that a child is not the property of his parent Although it does not directly violate that principle, however, there is a tendency that it risks encouraging the re-emergence of the notion of children being perceived as the property of their parents. The use of genetic alteration to create designer babies who are "healthy, disease-free, bright, attractive and alert," strengthens the notion that children can be bought, or to be more precise, better children can be bought at a better price. This emerging connection between monetary capacity and the ability to get a better child thins the line which place children as distinct and different from one's property. In the same way that designer clothes, cars and houses are employed as status symbols, designer babies could become objectified into the next status symbol for the affluent. It sounds like a far-fetched notion, but this fear is not completely baseless. The notion of children being the property of their parents provides grounds for parents who prostitute their children, compel them into forced labor, or deprive them of quality basic education. It is a notion that cannot be supported by the society that we live in today, whose principles follow the idea of democracy, individualism, and free will. Can children be the property of their parents In a warped-up society that does not espouse respect for individual life and liberty, indeed, children could be relegated as mere property. The notion of children as property, however, cannot thrive in a democratic society such as ours. The relationship between parents and children are very different between the relationship between owner and property. Whereas the owner of a property generally has real right over it, in that he can do anything he wishes to do with it, the same cannot be said in regards to children. We cannot legally dispose of them or any part of their body, either by selling them for adoption or by forcing him to undergo unnecessary surgery. Even when the parent himself is at the brink of death, the child cannot be compelled to donate his organ so as to ensure the success of any organ transplant that would save his father or mother. The child cannot be used as a means to benefit his family, his parents, or even society in general, if the act required of the child will be to his disadvantage. Even when the act required is to the child's advantage, if it is not essential and basic to his survival as a person, he cannot be forced into it. You cannot force a child to take a nap if he does not want to. You can beg him, as is often the case, but this would still entail voluntary assent on his part. Certainly, parents cannot be condemned when they go through significant efforts to increase the chances of their child's success, the concept of designer babies has nothing to do with parental effort at all. It's a healthy child for a healthy fee, without having to make them eat vegetables. That's what differentiates genetic altering and being an eager parent. With genetic alteration, you don't need to be a good parent at all, you just need to have the money to get a trouble-free healthy baby. Unlike property, a child has a mind and a will of his own, and is awarded specific rights as children and as individuals. Children enjoy a dual role, that of being their parents' child and that of being a separate individual. It is the existence of this dual role that draws the line between what parents can and cannot do with their child. As your child, he can be scolded for not eating his green peas. As an individual, he cannot be forced to eat the green peas. All the rights of an individual are enjoyed by the child, and these are tempered only by your rights as a parent looking after the good of your ward. You are allowed certain privileges that are not enjoyed by people not his parents, but these privileges do not supersede the basic human rights that extend to all individuals. These "privileges", also, are awarded with the presumption that they will be used with the child's welfare in mind. If this presumption is violated, parental rights can be withdrawn by the state such as when children are withdrawn from the custody of their parents. With property, on the other hand, the owner can do whatever he wishes to do with his property for as long as his acts do not endanger the rights of other individuals. This basically means, that if you could place your house in such a location that setting fire to it would not involve the risk of harming other people and their property, then you are quite free to go ahead and burn your house. Parenthood: Of Intent and Consent The fast-paced developments in reproductive technologies have given rise to a whole gamut of issues and questions on parenthood. In simpler times, it used to be that the woman carrying the fetus in her womb is the also the woman from whom the egg required to produce that fetus came. In-vitro fertilization has changed all that. Says Douglas (1994, p. 636): Deciding who is to be recognized as the parent of a child is an important matter because it provides the starting point for determining who has the right to bring up that child and who will be liable for his or her support. The development of assisted reproductive techniques whereby the genetic, gestational and social aspects of motherhood can be separated has complicated this decision and has required new provisions to settle the ascription of parental status. Section 27 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act provides that the "woman who is carrying or has carried a child as a result of the placing in her of an embryo or of sperm and eggs, and no other woman, is to be treated as the mother of the child." This preference for the gestational over the genetic mother upgrades the common law assumption that proof of maternity could be supplied by the fact of giving birth to a rule of law. There are, however, other more complicated issues that can arise out of this technology, and one of these is the tricky question of consent. No case embodies the new puzzles more than that of Natallie Evans. By virtue of tumours in her ovaries, Evans could no longer conceive normally though she could still carry a pregnancy to term. What she and her partner did at the time was to have their egg and sperm conjoined and freezed as embryos for later use. Unfortunately, the relationship broke down and her partner, Mr. Johnston, wrote to the clinic and requested that the embryos be destroyed. The current Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act says that consent from both man and woman is vital at every stage of the process, and on that basis, the Courts denied her petition. In this regard, it is essential to ask the fundamental question: should the courts have intervened Should law operate to regulate even those intimate spaces of a person's life Should this be better left to the judgment of consenting adults, within their private spheres Conclusion In conclusion, it cannot be gainsaid that in-vitro fertilization is a technology that lends itself to much abuse if left unregulated. It is correct to have the proper mechanisms in place to make sure that childbirth is not left to the vagaries of commerce. However, there is also something to be said about the law overstepping its bounds and regulating behavior that should be left to the parties, or should be protected under the law protecting the doctor-client relationship. The best thing is to strike a balance between protecting the policy interests of the state and the right to privacy of the individual. Works Cited Bloomfield, B. P. & T. Vurdubakis. (1995). Disrupted Boundaries: New Reproductive Technologies and the Language of Anxiety and Expectation. Social Studies of Science, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Aug., 1995), pp. 533-551. Davies M. Textbook on Medical law (2nd edn). London: Blackstone Press Ltd, 1998: 144. Douglas, G. (1994) The Intention to Be a Parent and the Making of Mothers. The Modern Law Review, Vol. 57, No. 4 pp. 636-641. Imber, J. (1987) Ethical Elites: Artificial Reproduction in Great Britain. Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Mar., 1987), pp. 228-230. Mason, K and McCall Smith, A. Law and Medical Ethics. London: Butterworths. 2005. Montgomery, J. (1991) Rights, Restraints and Pragmatism: The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. The Modern Law Review, Vol. 54, No. 4, pp. 524-534 Mulkay, M. (1994). The Triumph of the Pre-Embryo: Interpretations of the Human Embryo in Parliamentary Debate over Embryo Research. Social Studies of Science, Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 611-639 . Read More