U.S. One China Policy - Essay Example

U.S. One China Policy The relationship between the United s, Taiwan, and the People’s Republic of China, while being a complex challenge diplomatically, is an important one. Beginning in 1972, the US has viewed the region through its One-China policy (Sutter 11). This policy, according to the United States State Department, that both the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan maintain the existence of only one China, in addition to, the people of Taiwan being part of China. In turn, the People’s Republic of China recognizes the right of the United States to continue with unofficial, cultural, and commercial contacts with Taiwanese authorities and people. While the One-China policy effectively recognizes that there is only one country of China in existence, only the United States acknowledges the governing of both territories by two legitimate and separate governments (Sutter 12). This paper will seek to explore the background of Taiwanese and PRC’s relations prior to the one-China policy and the evolution of the policy since the beginning of US-PRC relations. Before focusing on the one-China policy, it is important to discuss first the history of relations between Taiwan and the PRC. Prior to the 17th century, aborigines from Taiwan mainly inhabited the Island of Taiwan. However, with the successive waves of migration by the Han Chinese, the demographics of the island started to change. In 1662, Taiwan was brought under Ming loyalist Zheng Chenggong’s control, prior to incorporation in 1683 into part of the Qing Dynasty (Tunsjo 92). The Dutch also briefly colonized Taiwan between 1624 and 1662, while the Spanish ruled Northern Taiwan between 1626 and 1642. Between 1895 and 1945, Taiwan was under colonial rule from the Japanese with the French also briefly ruling Northern Taiwan between 1884 and 1885. Under the Qing Dynasty, Taiwan existed as a prefecture of the province of Fuji as part of the Chinese government from 1683 up to 1887. In 1887, Taiwan became a separate province of China. It remained a province of China until 1895 at which point the Treaty of Shimonoseki ceded authority over Taiwan to the Japanese (Tunsjo 92). After Japan had surrendered in Taipei in 1945, The Republic of China took over the role of governing polity in Taiwan under the KMT in a period that was characterized as a military occupation. However, the government of the Republic of China lost control in 1949 over the Chinese mainland after the Civil War on the mainland (Tunsjo 93). Since this was prior to the implementation of treaties made after the Second World War, the KMT withdrew to Taiwan that was still technically a territory of the Japanese. This exiled government under Chiang Kai-shek took over authority of Taiwan and avowed the Island was under martial law. After the renunciation of rights to Taiwanese territory through a peace treaty signed in San Francisco by the Japanese, Taiwan’s sovereignty was put under question. Neither the Treaty of San Francisco nor the Japanese-Chinese treaty dealt with the issue of Taiwan’s territorial sovereignty and its award to the KMT representing the Republic of China (Tunsjo 94). The governing body of the Republic of China is still the government in Taiwan with a transformation in the 90s towards democracy as the government lifted the martial law it had imposed in 1949. Since then, the political and legal status bequeathed on Taiwan has become an issue of contention and controversy with sentiments of Taiwan’s independence become more public and gaining some level of international support. At this point, it becomes important to discuss the role of the US in PRC-ROC relations, especially given that Taiwan is the second highest buyer of American made products after Canada. With the tensions between the PRC and the ROC, the United States has had to come up with a policy that allows it to continue relations with both territories. The one-China policy in the United State’s case was initially drafted in 1972 through the Shanghai Communique (Tkacik 73). In this communique, the US sought to acknowledge that people living in Taiwan and Mainland China maintain the existence of only one Chinese republic with Taiwan being part of one China. In addition, the communique insists that the US has no challenge to put up over this position. Since then, the United States has been careful not to offer any explicit statements with regards to the independence of Taiwan. Rather than state their position on Taiwan’s claim to independence, the United States has continually stated their understanding of the People’s Republic of China claim to Taiwanese territory as the PRC’s own (Tkacik 73). It has also been claimed that the major reason that the United States agreed to the one-China policy was meant to enable the US conduct relations in the Chinese region, rather than as a way to appease the People’s Republic of China. Once President Carter had overseen, in 1979, a break off in relations with the Republic of China, ostensibly in order to improve associations with the People’s Republic of China, the US Congress passed the Taiwanese Relations Act (Hodge 39). This Act sought to maintain US relations with Taiwan, although it did not recognize the sovereignty of the China Republic. Moving forward, President Carter’s successor President Reagan in 1982 sought the adoption of the Six Assurances, of which the fifth stated that there would be no acknowledgement of the People’s Republic of China’s sovereignty over the Republic of China. However, the policy of the United States towards the issue has remained somewhat ambiguous. The United States’ position, however, attempted to clarify their position on the one-China policy in 2007 through a report titled Taiwan/China: Evolution of the one-China Policy by Congress (Hodge 39). The aforementioned report contends that the United States appreciates that the one-China policy is a position taken by both the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China (Hodge 40). Secondly, the United States does not explicitly state that Taiwan has sovereign status in any of their official communiques in 1982, 1979, or 1972. Thirdly, United States policy does not recognize the People’s Republic of China’s sovereignty over the Republic of China, while US policy also does not recognize the sovereignty of Taiwan. Finally, United States’ policy considers the status of the Republic of China as undetermined and unsettled (Hodge 40). In a 2013 report by the Research Service of Congress, these stated positions have not changed. United States Presidents since the thawing of relations between the People’s Republic of China have articulated publicly and secretly the one-China policy in their communications with the People’s Republic of China (Hodge 42). Congress oversight committees have watched for shifts and agreements with regards to the United States’ stance towards the People’s Republic of China and the one-China policy, especially with regards to dialogue, sales of arms, and Taiwan’s sovereignty. While declining to recognize the sovereignty status of Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China’s claim over Taiwanese territory, the United States has continued to leave the question of Taiwan’s sovereignty to be resolved by the PRC and the ROC peacefully without any unilateral changes and with the assent from the Republic of China in Taiwan (Hodge 43). Therefore, it seems that United States’ policy on the PRC-ROC question is focused of its resolution, rather than its outcome. It is also important to note that the one-China policy has existed in the absence of any defense treaty or diplomatic relations with the Republic of China. The aforementioned Taiwan Relations Act passed by US Congress in 1979 has played the main role in normalizing relations between the two territories, while forming a critical part of the one-China policy (Chow 32). The Taiwanese Relations Act stipulates that the United States expects the future of the Republic of China will be resolved through bi-lateral and peaceful means. The one-China policy, as defined by the Taiwan Relations Act, considers that any determination of the Republic of China’s future through military solutions is of grave concern to US interests and threatens the Western Pacific’s security and peace. In addition, the one-China policy as directed by the Taiwan Relations Act considers that the US should only sell arms of a defensive nature to the Republic of China (Chow 32). Finally, the Taiwan Relations Act also seeks to maintain the United State’s capacity to act in case the People’s Republic of China resorts to coercion or force in resolving the PRC-ROC issue, which could threaten economic, social, and security systems of the Republic of China. An analysis of the Taiwan Relations Act shows that its main role, in the absence of any definitive legislation to back up the one-China policy, was to provide Congress and the US with a legislated role in assisting the Republic of China in terms of security necessary to enhance their ability to sufficiently defend their territory from mainland China. However, even with the Taiwan Relations Act, United States’ policymakers continue to face various issues that remain unresolved in their observance of the one-China policy (Yang 55). In addition, the strategic and political context of the one-China policy has seen dramatic changes since it was agreed upon ion the 70s. In spite of this ambiguity, however, it is noteworthy that the United States has not carried out any comprehensive review of the one-China policy since 1994 (Yang 55). This can be explained by the fact that the United States is alive to the growing power of China in the region. It is important to see this in the context of the changing military balance in the Western Pacific, as well as the challenges to stability in the strait between Taiwan and mainland China due to military build up by the People’s Republic of China. In addition, coercion by the People’s Republic of China and resistance from the Republic of China to perceived moves from the PRC for dejure independence and increased military spending (Hodge 46). However, these tensions have seen a recent decline with the Republic of China’s President Ma Ying-jeou resuming dialogue after more than a decade. With the ascension of President Obama to the US presidency, one can see a recent convergence of rhetoric with regards to the one-China policy among the US, the People’s Republic of China, and the Republic of China about peaceful development in the region (Hodge 47). However, even with President Obama’s diplomatic efforts and rhetoric, disagreements still persist with regards to arms sales by the US to the Republic of China. Even as the United States under the one-China policy has been opposed to any unilateral changes from either the People’s Republic of China or from the Republic of China with regards to the status quo, what these discussions indicate is that the real status quo is still in question. It has been suggested that, rather than the presence of a status quo as maintained by the one-China policy, the situation between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of china has seen significant shifts (Wang 77). As discussed, the military balance between the two territories has shifted dramatically in favor of mainland China. In addition, the extensive engagements and rapid rapprochement between the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China since 2008 have led to significant changes in the situation that was prevalent when the one-China policy was first agreed on (Wang 77). Since the United States has had no comprehensive reviews of its one-China policy since the mid-90s, it might be time for the US to review its policy or strategy in order to sustain its economic and security interests with both the PRC and ROC. In 2009, during a hearing over the confirmation of Hillary Clinton as the Secretary of State, she was questioned by the Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate about the administration’s view of holding another review of the Taiwan Relations Act (Costa & Silva 45). She declined to answer this question, which shows that the status quo is still in effect, but in an ambiguous manner. However, the Commander of the Pacific Command in Honolulu, Admiral Robert Willard, in 2010 began a review of approaches towards the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China through strategic focus groups. These efforts, while narrower than Act reviews by congress, still indicate the United States’ intention to redefine the one-China policy and make it less ambiguous. However, it is still important to note that the Republic of china does not claim sole legal government status of China, despite these changes to the initial status quo, as espoused in the one-China policy. Instead, they claim legitimacy as a government over Taiwan and islands in close proximity (Costa & Silva 49). In addition, they insist that they draw their legitimacy from election by the people of the Republic of china. What could be seen as the biggest threat to the survival of the one-China policy is the Republic of china’s insistence that, within the broad cultural and historic Chinese entity, the People’s Republic of china and the Republic of china can now be taken as two separate jurisdictions governed by different entities. In addition, they also insist that each territory is qualified to be recognized internationally and seek membership of international organizations (Costa & Silva 450 From this research, it is clear that the current ambiguous nature of the one-China policy will ensure that the Taiwanese sovereignty issue will continue to play a critical role in relations between the People’s Republic of china and the United States. However, adherence to the basic texts that have helped to contextualize the one-China policy; the three joint communiques of 1972, 1979, and 1982, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the Six Assurances offered by President Reagan to the Republic of china will make the one-China policy less contradictory, less confusing, and less ambiguous. However, what one can conclude from this research on the current status of the one-China policy is that reviews to the policy will not affect the status of Taiwan. This status change, as shown explicitly in the research, is only reliant on the PRC and the ROC. Works Cited Chow, Peter C. Y. The "one China" Dilemma, New York, NY [u.a.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. Internet resource Costa, Meredith. A. & Silva, Jeremy. P. China, Taiwan and the Evolution of "one China" Policy, New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2011. Print. Hodge, Carl. C. U.S. Presidents and Foreign Policy: From 1789 to the Present. Santa Barbara, Calif [u.a.: ABC-CLIO, 2012. Print. Sutter, Robert. G. Us Policy toward China: An Introduction to the Role of Interest Groups. Lanham [u.a.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013. Print. Tkacik, John. J. Rethinking "one China". Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2009. Print. Tunsjo, Oystein. Us Taiwan Policy: Constructing the Triangle. London: Routledge, 2011. Print. Wang, Gabe. T. China and the Taiwan Issue: Impending War at Taiwan Strait. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2012. Print. Yang, Jian. Congress and Us China Policy: 1989-1999. Huntington, NY: Nova Science Publ, 2010. Print. Read More