Implied Force in American Presidential Foreign Policy - Essay Example

? 8 November Implied Force in American Presidential Foreign Policy History Throughout the history of the United s, certain latent tendencies have come to the fore as they pertain to the general direction of American foreign policy. One of the most discernible is surely the pronounced tendency of presidents to shape their policies with veiled threats about impending consequences of a military character if their terms are not met. Although Washington cautioned against “entangling alliances” in his farewell address, his successors have repeatedly deviated from that true course. Two such presidents were James Monroe and Theodore Roosevelt. Each sought to further aggrandize American security and control by venturing into previously uncharted territory through the assertion of presidential initiatives of a questionable nature. They were not the only presidents to do this. In later times, at least three Cold War era presidents also followed this course, including Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy. Nor did it end with the conclusion of the Cold War. Barack Obama himself has embraced this policy of implied force as a central theme of his policy. As will be seen, this overriding theme of implied force is the definitive common denominator of all presidential decision-making in foreign policy. Five sources were consulted in the preparation of this paper, and all proved invaluable in the development of one’s understanding of this topic. Harry Ammon provided a critical background for the analysis of James Monroe’s famous doctrine of 1823 as a major departure point for American external policies. Harlow Giles Unger took a somewhat dissenting view from the conventional view that the Europeans had a distinct advantage over the fledgling American republic, and notes that the Americans were stronger at that time than usually given credit for, a surprising position indeed! Former senator Cary Hart of Colorado has the unique insider’s perspective as a practicing politician in the halls of power for many years. Although a seasoned practitioner, Hart is no intellectual lightweight. He holds a doctorate and has lectured at Yale, Oxford and other hallowed institutions. Aida Donald offers keen insights into the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, and helps to elevate Roosevelt in historical stature. Louis Auchincloss, an authoritative Roosevelt biographer, establishes the basic thread of continuity between Monroe and Roosevelt, the two presidents emphasized here. James Monroe seemed marked out by destiny to be a diplomat. A protege of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, fellow Virginians and his immediate forerunners as presidents, Monroe apprenticed himself as a minister to foreign powers. What bothered him from an early date, however, was the complete lack of respect he encountered toward American diplomats and his beloved country. He felt that America should be taken more seriously as an emerging power in its own right, and he was determined to gain that respect. When he became president, Monroe continued to be influenced by Jefferson and Madison. Britain, Spain and Russia proved particularly worrisome to him. Jefferson had cautioned him against entanglements with European powers—echoing Washington—but Monroe had some ideas of his own about diplomacy. Apparently, as early as March 1822, Monroe was disturbed by European expansion into Latin America (Ammon 476-481). He was already toying with the notion of an “American system” by that date, so it was not surprising that he went before Congress in December 1823 with the address that would come to be known as the “Monroe Doctrine”, but only after 1850. This policy, now so familiar to posterity, was only part of Monroe’s unique position in American history. He may be credited with being America’s first “national security president” (Hart 114). He had already fortified America’s northern border with Canada and taken other measures deemed appropriate for security purposes, so it was but a small leap for him to expand his security consciousness to the lands to the south. The conventional approach to this policy suggests that Monroe ventured far out on a limb and took a great risk by framing it the way he did, again with the hint of implied force. Actually, the United States enjoyed certain advantages over potential adversaries even in those early days. Logistics and distance were two of these advantages. Despite the Europeans’ combined strength, they had not failed to learn from the American Revolution and Napoleon’s disastrous 1812 invasion of Russia that it was difficult to project power over vast distances. Indeed, no less a military authority than the Duke of Wellington had warned of the high cost of subduing America in a future hypothetical conflict. While the British reception of the new doctrine was generally favorable, the Austrians-- under the redoubtable Prince Metternich—and the Russians were severely critical of it (Unger 317-318). The Monroe Doctrine therefore was a calculated gamble, but it paid off, as no fleet or coalition of hostile powers appeared on the horizon to test the young republic’s resolve at that time. Theodore Roosevelt presided over a very different America than had James Monroe. The country had been tempered by the Civil War and the taming of the West. As it entered the new century, America was gaining internal stature and international confidence. New technologies, including the telegraph, telephone and railroads had transformed the surface of the world, and the internal combustion engine and powered flight were looming in the near future. For the first time, phrases like “imperialism” and the ”world’s policeman” were applied to America. There were even allusions to an “American Empire” after the Spanish-American War and the acquisition of new holdings in the Caribbean and Pacific. When Theodore Roosevelt succeeded William McKinley on the latter’s abrupt assassination in 1901, he thus inherited a vigorous and expanding country and national spirit. Add to this Roosevelt’s own energy and drive, and it was natural that he would devote some attention to existing ways of thinking about foreign policy. His subsequent actions reflected the general optimism of his era. What came to be called the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine evolved out of a local crisis in Latin America involving a debt collection problem between Germany and Venezuela in 1902. Roosevelt made it quite clear to the Germans that no force on the part of the Europeans must be used to collect debts by Latin American debtor nations. He also implied that the United States had the obligation to ensure that small countries behaved responsibly in the conduct of their finances, and seemed to leave the door open to direct intervention in such cases. Indeed, he clearly stated that the United States could take over and regulate such countries if events warranted it (Auchincloss 71). It should be noted that although this rhetoric made Roosevelt seem imperialistic, he also brokered the treaty that ended the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, an effort that won him the Nobel Peace Prize. So it is again demonstrated that implied force was a lightning rod for American foreign policy in Roosevelt’s time as it had been for Monroe’s. Roosevelt lost no time in the extension of his policy of “showing the flag” by dispatching a large fleet of American warships on a global cruise, thus again illustrating the emerging role of America as a peacekeeper and as a deterrent to potential adversaries, especially Japan. The Roosevelt Corollary thus served as the logical latter day extension of the Monroe Doctrine and proved that America was indeed coming of age (Donald 159). The relevance of the implied force doctrine as the outgrowth of earlier policies found expression in the Cold War. First with President Truman on the southeastern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and later with the “Eisenhower Doctrine”, which dispatched troops to the Middle East, American presidents did not hesitate to expand the original Monroe Doctrine to distant parts of the planet if it was thought that American strategic assets were threatened by Communist expansion. Back in this hemisphere in October 1962, President Kennedy cited the Monroe Doctrine during the height of the Cuban missile crisis as justification for his decision to quarantine that island with a naval blockade, drawing an interesting parallel with Monroe’s concerns about hemispheric security in his day (Hart 114). The suggestion and implication is that Soviet missiles could be seen as enemy troops stationed on inter-American soil, thus violating the Monroe Doctrine’s prime directive against further European colonies in the Americas. Even with the end of the Cold War, American implied force will still have a major role to play in future conflicts. While the threat of nuclear war has clearly diminished, the American president must rise to meet exotic challenges overseas. For example, in 2013 it was learned that Syrian president Assad had used chemical weapons against his own people in the ongoing Syrian civil war. President Obama dispatched warships to the eastern Mediterranean to stand by for action if required. Fortunately, no action was required, but America stood ready to unleash actual force if certain conditions were not met. As with Syria, so it will be with the rest of the world with America’s ability to project its power to meet strategic objectives. As long as foreign provocateurs lurk in the world arena, or the American president decides on his own initiative to apply pressure, implied force will be the chief policy instrument to achieve these goals. Works Cited Ammon, Harry. James Monroe: the Quest for National Identity. Charlottesville: U. of Virginia P., 1990. Print. Auchincloss, Louis. Theodore Roosevelt. New York: Times Books, 2001. Print. Donald, Aida D. Lion in the White House: a Life of Theodore Roosevelt. New York: Basic Books, 2007. Print. Hart, Gary. James Monroe. New York: Times Books, 2005. Print. Unger, Harlow Giles. The Last Founding Father: James Monroe and a Nation’s Call to Greatness. Philadelphia: Da Capo Press, 2009. Print. Read More