The Pacific War - between Japan and the United States - Essay Example

The Pacific War - between Japan and the United States The Pacific War—fought between the Allies (mostly the United States) and Imperial Japan—had huge significance. Not only was it far different in intensity and scope than America’s involvement in the Western front in Europe, but it reshaped East Asia for decades to come. The brutality of Japanese colonialism in Asia is a legacy that the Japanese continue to live with and continues to effect their foreign policy and ability to trade, but more significantly for the purposes of this paper, it was the unconditional surrender of Japan that cleared the way for profound American influence in Asia. America’s influence in the post-war period in Asia was often very direct, with American leaders dictating what the Japanese government should do, for example; it is now more subtle and seen in the legacy of capitalism, democracy, and spectacular economic growth. The Pacific War is really the story of how the United States destroyed fascist Japan and then built it up again to be a hugely prosperous and peaceful power. This essay will examine these issues and consider the various opinions of the Pacific War and the defeat of Imperial Japan. It is one of the most vital historical events of the 20th century and does not get enough attention. The war between Japan and the United States began with the air attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 and ended with dropping of two atomic bombs on Japan in August 1945. Millions died, many more suffered horribly. But what was the real significance of this conflict, and what did it come to mean in the decades to follow? There are many answers to these questions, some of which have political motivations. But the best place to begin to examine these questions is at one of the key moments in World War II: the Casablanca conference in 1943 where Roosevelt decided the Allies would only accept an unconditional surrender from the Axis powers. Nothing else would suffice. Germany, Japan, and Italy would not be able to “sue for terms,” instead, terms would be imposed upon them. Although this was controversial at the time and the idea had its critics, it turned out to be an extremely wise move. The governments and ideologies that ruled both Japan and Germany were so poisonous that nothing they represented should be allowed to live on in the post-war period. This idea probably saved lives in Asia too. If Japan had been allowed to keep its colonial possessions in a peace deal, millions more Asians would probably have died due to Japanese brutality and being treated like virtual slaves. It was a harsh idea to support, but it was best on utilitarian thinking and it underwrote American attitudes towards Japan from 1943-45, in particular the blockade that strangled the Japanese economy and the planned invasion that fortunately never happened. It also directly led to the dropping of the atomic bombs and the dawn of the atomic age. If Roosevelt had not supported the idea of unconditional surrender, it would have been very unlikely that the Americans would have found so brutal a battle on Okinawai or continued to press the Japanese so hard. Faced with the atomic bombs the Japanese government would probably have sued for terms and given up some colonial possessions in return for peace. Even at the end they thought they could buy off the Americans in this way. But the Americans had their eye on a larger picture: the stability and prosperity of East Asia in the post-war period. They absolutely refused to allow any vestige of the militaristic Japanese regime remain behind after the conclusion of the war. That is why they fought to the bitter end. In his eloquent defence of the American actions to end the Pacific War, Richard B. Frank, a military historian and author of Downfall: The End of Imperial Japan, attacks the orthodoxy that the atomic bombs were immoral or unnecessary to secure Japan’s capitulation. While Frank admits that some of the incendiary bombing campaigns carried out against Japanese cities in the final year of the war may not have been especially effective, he nevertheless mounts a powerful defence of the utilitarian value of the American blockade and bombardment: it saved more lives than it cost. It also had the added bonus of securing Japan’s unconditional surrender—what would turn out to be the bedrock of the post-war economic Japanese miracle. As Frank writes, Viewed in this light, massive urban bombing complemented the aim of unconditional surrender. It was not just a handful of men in rogue governments who flaunted vile ideologies; whole populations imbibed these beliefs and acted as willing acolytes. Unconditional surrender and vast physical destruction would sear the price of aggression into the mind of the German and Japanese peoples. No soil would be left from which myths might later sprout that Germany and Japan had not really been defeated. These policies would assure there would be no third world war . . .1 Frank provides plenty of evidence that the Japanese government had no intention of surrendering in the summer of 1945. Indeed some members of the cabinet fantasized about the country “folding in on itself, like a beautiful chrysanthemum.” There was a very high degree of delusion in the government which made Japan especially dangerous in this time. Even after the atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki and the Soviet Union declared war (and it was common knowledge in Japan that any Soviet occupation would be much more brutal than an American one) the government of Japan did not intend to surrender unconditionally. Even the Potsdam Declaration in July 1945 had not focused minds in Japan. If the requirements of Casablanca had faded with time, the Allies, meeting in the ruins of defeated Germany, reiterated their demands regarding Japanese surrender. If Japan did not surrender unconditionally, Truman, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek said, it would face “prompt and utter destruction.” The war finally ended when a broadcast of Emperor Hirohito was played on Japanese radio stations. In this capitulatory statement the most memorable line remains, “However, it is according to the dictates of time and fate that We have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is unsufferable."2 This is a very important statement. It leads us into the post-war period and what Hirohito foresaw to be a “grand peace of all the generations to come . . .” It is also here important to note that Hirohito’s decision to end the war was not the act of a helpless figurehead as he is sometimes portrayed. In the fascinating and nuanced portrait written in Herbert Bix’s book Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, we see an individual who in many ways was at the centre of war planning; no one could end the war but Hirohito, the embodiment of authority. In this surrender statement we see how he had turned his attention to the future, to peace and reconstruction. As shrewd as he was in war, Hirohito would be shrewd in peace—preserving his own position and working willingly with the Americans who would soon administer his country. In his book Embracing Defeat, John Dower argues that the Japanese were so exhausted by the war, that when they Americans took over they effectively turned over the keys to the ranch to them and allowed them to do whatever they wanted. There certainly seems to be some truth to this. Because of how destructive the war was, the Japanese had nothing to lose anymore. Their factories and infrastructure had been destroyed, their farms didn’t work, millions were dead, their cities were ruined. They were in a position where they basically had to do what the Americans wanted them to do, otherwise they would not survive. This is how Dower describes the scene when the Americans finally arrived in Tokyo: In this all-consuming milieu, the immediate meaning of “liberation” for most Japanese was no political but psychological. Surrender—and, by association, the Allied victory, the American army of occupation itself—liberated them from death. Month after month they had prepared for the worst; then, abruptly, the tension was broken. In an almost literal sense, they were given back their lives.3 What Roosevelt had desired had come to pass. A defeated Japan could be built up as a peaceful, capitalist democracy, capable of doing much good in the world. The previous militaristic regime had been discredited—the physical destruction of Japan chalked up on their side of the ledger. So what happened next to make this defeat so significant? It was the way the Americans rebuilt Japan. One of the first things done was to strip away all colonial possessions.4 This allowed these former subjects to become self-determining. In some countries this worked better than others, but it brought to many Asians a great deal of freedom. Had the Americans not pressed for an unconditional surrender much of Asia would have continued to have been in chains following the end of the war and the world would look very differently. Next, what was left of the Japanese war machine was destroyed and many officers were put on trial and executed. This purged Japan of much of its militaristic spirit. With the promulgation of a new constitution in 1947 by General MacArthur, Japan was banned from having an army and the emperor was stripped of most of his powers—these were plain products of the unconditional surrender. The Americans were committed to making sure that Japan, which had wrought so much death and destruction on Asia, would be forced to concentrate on economic matters rather than military ones—and hopefully in the process help to bring the rest of Asia out of poverty. This was in a way the penance the Americans imagined Japan paying. Universal suffrage was introduced and human rights were to be protected. It was important to ensure that Japan was democratic and that there were equal opportunities available in an open marketplace. In terms of land reforms, concentration was reduced; in terms of business, monopolies were broken up; church and state were separated; the education system was decentralized.5 These are the kind of reforms that America continues to promote in Asia—and now does so with Japan firmly at its side. These sorts of reforms contributed hugely to the success of Japan in the post war period and indeed to the continuing economic and political development of other countries such as Korea and China, both of which have in part emulated the Japanese model and greatly benefited from trade with Japan. Japan’s influence is now not military but economic, and is largely based on good intentions and openness to its neighbours. As Asia continues to grow, Japan will continue to be a vital moderating influence that shows profound leadership. It is truly remarkable that 60+ years after the United States blockaded, fire-bombed and dropped atomic weapons on Japan, the two countries are now extremely close allies, who are carefully managing the prosperity and economic development of Asia together. This state of affairs can be traced to the way the Pacific War was managed by the American government. By seeking an unconditional surrender on the part of the brutal militaristic Japanese regime, the Americans ensured that this way of thinking would be destroyed and that Japan would be open to a new way of doing things. The post-war economic miracle seen in Japan (and later copied in part by Korea and China) stems directly from American attitudes to Japan and reforms implemented by American administrators in the early years following the Second World War. The Pacific War between the U.S. and Japan was truly brutal, but its careful prosecution and conclusion by the Americans has made Asia—and the world—a better place. Works consulted Bix, Herbert. Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan. New York: Perennial, 2001. Dower, John. Embracing Defeat. New York: W.W. Norton, 2000. Ferguson, Niall. The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West. New York: The Penguin Press, 2006. Spector, Ronald H. Eagle Against The Sun: The American War With Japan. New York: Vintage Books, 1985. Schaller, Michael. The American Occupation of Japan: the Origins of the Cold War in Asia. New York, Oxford University Press, 1985. Valley, David. Gaijin Shogun. (New York: Sektor, 2000). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_post-war_economic_miracle Read More