The Shia Revival by Vali Nas - Book Report/Review Example

Review of Vali Nasr’s "The Shia Revival" Vali Nasr, who is a at the American Naval Postgraduate School, published a book under the "The Shia Revival," in which he analyzes one of the significant phenomena in Islamic history; namely, the Sunn-Shaia split. The dominant theme in Nasr’s book is that this historical conflict between the two Islamic sects "will shape the future." The author makes an insightful link between Islamic history and the contemporary status of Muslims, focusing on the recent impacts of the Operation Iraqi Freedom, which has paved the way for a "new" Middle East. According to Nasr, Islam, like most other world religions, is comprised of more than one religious sect. Disregarding other small fractions of Islamic groups, Islam is primarily divided into two main sects, who are the Sunni and the Shaia. The root of this distinction among those two Islamic sects dates back to the early years of Islam, particularly after the death of Prophet Mohamed. Moslems at that time differed about the man who should be the successor of the prophet. Early Moslems were divided, as one group believed that succession should be inside the Prophets family, seeing Ali, the prophets cousin to be the one who should succeed the prophet. The other group believed that the Prophet did not leave any instructions about succession, and so, this should be left to the discretion of the Umma. However, it should not be understood that the only difference among the Shaia and Sunni Moslems has to do with politics. Rather, there are other significant religious differences that are as important as the political differences. Nasr, in his book, declares that some recent works of orientalists have, in fact, tried to reduce the distinction between Sunnism and Shiism to a sheer political one. Although this view is to a certain extent true, such perspective leaves aside the more important religious and theological considerations involved. Thus, Nasr argues that Sunnism and Shiism should not be looked upon as completely different and opposite Islamic sects, nor as different due to political reasons only, but as two interpretations of the Islamic theology and teachings. Regarding the theological differences between Sunnism and Shiism, they have basic differences in their beliefs, appearances and rituals. They even differ in the basic requirement of Islam, which is the word of witness. The Shaia adds a sentence to the word of witness: "Ali is the Walli of Allah" to refer to the sanctity of Ali for the Shia sect of Islam. Historically, the name "Shaia" means "party of Ali", because the Shaia maintains that Ali Ben Abu Taleb was the rightful heir to the office of the caliph and not Abu Bakr. On the death of Uthman, the third Caliph, Ali was chosen as the fourth caliph. In his book, Nasr states that the Shaia as a major sect in Islam with its religious rituals and beliefs appeared basically after the assassination of Ali in 661 CE and accelerated on the martyrdom of Husayn son of Ali, by the army of Yazid, son of Muawiyya, in Kerbala in 680 CE. This event is marked to this day by the Shaia as a struggle against oppression. (Moiz M Anjarwalla). However, this political tension between Shia and Sunni Moslems is not the only difference between the two sects; rather, there are other religious and theological differences between them, reflecting different interpretations of the teachings of Islam. Although Shaia Muslims hold the same fundamental beliefs of other Muslims, they differ from them in some principle beliefs. For instance, they believe in an imamate, which is the distinctive institution of Shaia Islam. The principal of the imamate was developed in the tenth century, while other beliefs developed still later ("Shia Islam, Shiite Muslims and Twelver Muslims"). The imamate, for Shaia Moslems, began with Ali, who is also accepted by Sunni Muslims as the fourth of the "rightly guided caliphs" to succeed the Prophet. Yet, the Shaia consider Ali the First Imam, and his descendants, beginning with his sons Hasan and Husain, continue the line of the Imams until the twelfth (Moiz M Anjarwalla). Thus, Shaia Moslems has special views about the concept of Imamate. An Imam usually remains in the role of a political outsider, although he always retained spiritual and religious authority. So, the Shaia believes in a separation between temporal and spiritual authority which is unlike the Sunni. As a result, Shaia Islam is a voice of opposition and "an advocate for the underclasses and downtrodden" ("Shia Islam, Shiite Muslims and Twelver Muslims"). One of the specialties of Shaia Islam is that it has developed its own sub-sects, including Twelver, or "Ithna-Ashari", "Shiism", the "Ismailis", the "Zaidis" and the "Fatimids." As for their religious guidance, Shiites generally follow the Jafri School of legal thought, in contrast to Sunni Muslims, who follow the Hanifa, Shafi, Hanibal and Malik schools of legal thought. "One of the practical differences this results in is that Shaia recognize the practice of temporary marriages, something more common before Islam but which the Sunni forbid" ("Muharram - A Martyrs Story Retold"). As observed by Nasr, the Twelve-Imam or “Twelvers” refers to the group of Shias who believe in twelve Imams. They constitute the majority of current Shias. They are also konwn as Jafaris, Imamis, Rafidis, and by other names. But in general, when talking about Shia, it is usually in reference to the Twelvers since they are the "orthodox" variant of Shiism. Politically speaking, the Umayyads and the following Islamic rulers, for the Shaia Moslems, were corrupt and had fallen away from the path set by the prophet Mohamed (PBUH). They believed that justice and good government would only replace tyranny and corruption when the rightful heirs of Mohamed took control. For them, this heir would be the "Mahdi", a leader guided pesonally and directly by god. The Mahdi is believed by Shaia to appear for people again to guide them to the right path. (Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Al Kashifu). The Shaia came to rule once again during the time of the Abbasids. The only successful revolt against the Umayyads which the Shiites managed to organize was led by Muhammads uncle, Abbas, who founded the Abbasid caliphate. He and his successors, however, ended up "repudiating the fundamental Shiite ideals and asserted themselves as the new establishment. With this, the Shia remained a sect within the larger Muslim world, distinct from Muslim orthodoxy and mainstream culture. Therefore, Nasr argues that the political ideology is not the only difference between the Shaii and Sunni Moslems. There are a set of religious rituals and practices that differentiate every sect from the other. However, this does not mean that both sects are completely different or opposite from each other. Rather, they share most of the basic rules of Islam, including the basic concept of tawhid, the five pillars of Islam, and many other rulings. This led many historians, such as Nasr to believe that similarity between Sunnism and Shiism in daily practice is far greater than a comparison of theological texts might show. In that sense, the difference between the Shaia and the Sunni Muslims should not be looked upon as any other differences between the various sects of world religions. For example, the differences between Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant Christians are much deeper than the differences between the Shaia and Sunni Moslems. This concept is made clear by Nassr, when he claims that Sunnism and Shiism are two orthodox dimensions of Islam providentially placed in this tradition to enable collectivities of different psychological and spiritual temperament to become integrated within the Islamic community. Accordingly, it can be said that the Sunni-Shaia distinction is just a differentiation between two interpretations of the religious and political teachings of Islam. Historically, the Sunni-Shia split in Islam dates back to the early Islamic era just after the death of Prophet Mohamed. This split started as an ideological difference over who should succeed the prophet. While the supporters of Ali, the Prophets cousin, believed that he should be the legal successor of the Prophet, the great majority believed that the Prophet did not assign any one to follow him, and so this issue of succession should be left to the will of the people. As such, the supporters of Ali came to be referred to as "Shia," while the rest of Muslims are referred to as "Sunnis." However, this split between the Shia and Sunnis did not end at the issue of succession and ruling; rather, there are various other religious differences in rituals, teachings, and habits. Since their early split till the present day, Sunnis and Shias are known to be the two major sects of Islam, who comprise the great majority of all Muslims in the world. Geographically, Shias are concentrated in Persia with some Shia scattered in other countries, while Sunnis are dominant in all Arab countries, except Iraq where the majority are Shia. The reason behind the dominance of Shia in Iraq is the wide immigration of Persian Shia clerics to southern Iraq during the eighteenth century "under the protection of the Iranian government in an area of Iraq where Ottoman control was weak" ("Shia-Sunni Relations"). Since then, the conflict between Sunnis and Shia in Iraq grows with the increasing power of the Shia community, who took the mission of protecting the Shia shrine cities in Iraq. Therefore, the importance of Iraq for both Sunnis and Shias has caused some clashes between both sectors, highlighting the religious and ideological differences between them. In his book, Nasr points out that although the religious difference between Sunnis and Shias in Iraq is the root of the split between both sects, the conflict between them has always been triggered by political ideologies. The wide immigration of Persian Shia to Iraq and their growing influence infuriated Ottoman rulers, who feared the political power of the Iraqi Shia. Consequently, "to counter this Shia influence, the Ottomans placed the Sunni Arabs in positions of government in Iraq, a practice that was continued by the British" ("Shia-Sunni Relations"). Since then, the Shia majority in Iraq have been ruled by the Sunni minority, who attempted to suppress and persecute them. During the rule of the Baathists, which continued for about half a century, Shias were repeatedly persecuted and displaced to the extent that they are refugees in their own country. As noted by Alex Berenson, from the New York Times Magazine, Saddam Hussein, who ruled Iraq for more than thirty years, "impoverished much of Shiite southern Iraq, and jailed or killed many Shiite leaders. Now the Shiites want power to match their numbers" (Berenson). During his rule, Saddam Hussein not only controled the Shias politically, but economically and socially as well in order to deepen the Shia-Sunni split, which will tighten his grip on the whole country. Most of the economic wealth of Iraq, including oil resources, were controlled and dominated by Sunnis, leaving the Shias to suffer major economic difficulties. As such, many Shias were forced to move and leave their homelands in search for better living, employment, and housing. Thus, many historians concluded that "throughout the twentieth Century, the Sunni elite dominated economic and political life in Iraq. Sunni Arabs are at a distinct advantage in all areas of secular life, be it civil, political, military, or economic” ("A History of the Shia — Sunni Divide"). Therefore, one can easily realize that the Iraqi Shia were actually refugees in their own lands, as they were not able to enjoy their economic resources, nor were they able to exercise any political power. Moreover, one of the significant issues raised in Nasr’s book is that the Shias refugee-like status in Iraq can be realized in their inability to practice any of their religious rituals freely during Saddam Husseins era. An Iraqi Shia could not practice his or her religious rituals in public during Husseins era, otherwise, this Shia person would be persecuted and perhaps killed. In addition, the Shia in Iraq were banned from issuing or publicizing any of their books or cultural works in an attempt to abolish the Shia culture in the country. Many historians note that the regime of Saddam Hussein banned "Shi’i literature, political speech, and religious exercises, and even executed senior Shi’i Arab clerics, notably members of the Sadr and the Hakim families, to make sure that a strong and unified Shi’i religious establishment capable of playing a role in national politics did not emerge” ("A History of the Shia — Sunni Divide"). What adds to the suffering of the Shia in Iraq was that they were subjected to systematic governmental persecution and violence. The climax of this persecution was in 1982, when Saddam Hussein ordered his military men to use chemical weapons against the whole village of Degeil, whose populations are mainly Shia. That was only because a Shia person of that village was accused of trying to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Accordingly, the Shias of Iraq suffered greatly during the regime of Saddam Hussein in the political, economic, and cultural arenas. However, this suffering is not attributed to the religious differences between the Shias and Sunnis. Rather, their suffering came as a result of the political aspirations of the Baathist Party and Saddam Hussein, who tried to persecute the Shias to the utmost in his attempt to have a strong grip over the politics of Iraq. Given the fact that the Shias are the majority and the Sunnis are just a minority, Saddam Hussein used the utmost violent approaches in order to suppress the Shia in order to not to give them the chance to overthrow his regime. Within his analysis of the current status of the Sunni-Shai conflict, Nasr observes that after the fall of Saddam Hussein and his regime in 2002 by the coalition forces, the split between the Shia and Sunni in Iraq did not come to an end. Unfortunately, the new political regime did not succeed in ending the clashes between the Shia and the Sunnis. After the fall of Saddam, Iraqs ruling government became a Shia majority, while the Sunnis lost power. So, the refugee-like status has moved from the Shias to the Sunnis, who now feel excluded from the political arena. Actually, this situation was predicted by various political analysts, who declared that any form of direct democracy in Iraq will inevitably lead to what is called "the tyranny of the majority" (Dorf). After being persecuted for decades, there is high probability that the Shias would misuse the power given to them when they rule Iraq, in retaliation for their suffering during Saddam Husseins regime. As noted by Jim Hoagland, a political writer in The Washington Post, the main reason for the Sunni-Shia split in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein is the fear of the Sunnis that "democratic elections would enable the Shiites to do unto them as they did unto the Shiites under their co-religionist, the dictator Saddam Hussein" (Hoagland). The Sunnis exclusion, similar to the status of the Shia under Husseins regime, is a result of politics and has nothing to do with the religious differences between both sects. This time, the Iraqi sect that suffers is the Sunnis, who become the victims of the political aspirations of the Shia and their dominance in the government. The current Sunni-Shia split in Iraq is also fueled by many Sunni terrorists, who attempted to cleverly use the fears and concerns of Sunnis against the Shia to trigger animosity and clashes between the two sects. Fundamentalist groups, such as that which is led by the late Abou Mosaab Al-Zarkawy, were fully realizing the current political tensions between the Sunnis and Shias, and so, their main aim is to inflame tension and persecution between the two religious sects in order to lengthen instability in Iraq. From time to time, terrorist leaders issued declarations that the Shia are betrayals because they supported the American invasion of Iraq. Consequently, those terrorists aim at keeping the tension between Sunnis and Shias alive for the political gains of fundamentalists. Thus, the Sunni-Shia split is again triggered by the political ideologies of terrorists and fundamentalists. This is expressed clearly by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi himself, in a letter that he wrote to Osama bin Laden, appealing for help in "setting off a civil war through a campaign of bombings against Shia institutions" (Bazzi). In this letter, Al-Zarqawi states it clear, when he says, "so the solution, and only God knows, is that we need to bring the Shia into the battle. It is the only way to prolong the duration of the fight between the infidels and us." So, even the political ideologies of Islamic militants played on the split between the Sunnis and Shias, increasing their suffering in their own country. This led Michael Jansen, a political analyst in Deccan Herald Journal, to argue that "relations between Iraqi Sunnis and Shias have gone from bad to worse since the Shia-dominated government took office" (Jansen). Therefore, it can be claimed that the current clashes between the Sunnis and Shias fulfill the goals of the fundamentalist groups in Iraq and worsen the status of both religious sects in their own country. In conclusion, the main argument raised in Nasr’s book is that the everlasting Sunni-Shia split in Iraq is triggered by the various political ideologies that dominated Iraq since the start of the twentieth century till the present day. Although Sunnis and Shias have many religious differences, yet, these differences are not the cause of the current violence between the two sects. Rather, the clashes and tension between the Sunnis and Shias in Iraq are motivated by the political ideologies of the leaders that are involved in the Iraqi affairs. This led many political analysts, such as Mohamad Bazzi, to conclude that "the Sunni-Shia struggle in Iraq is largely political" (Bazzi). This claim has been valid during the various political regimes that dominated Iraq since the start of the twentieth century. During the Ottoman rule and British invasion at the start of the twentieth century, Sunnis were supported against Shias to suppress any political aspirations those Shias may have. Also, during the regime of Saddam Hussein, the Shias were persecuted to the utmost to fulfill the political ideologies of the Baathist party. Even with the end of this despotic regime, the Sunnis were isolated and their interests were not taken into consideration in the new Shia-dominated government. Thus, the Sunni-Shia conflict in the present day is triggered by the political aspirations of the Shia and the aims of the fundamentalist groups. In conclusion, it can be claimed that throughout history, both Iraqi Sunnis and Shias have become refugees in their own country to fulfill the political ideologies of the Iraqi rulers. Works Cited Berenson, Alex. "Iraqs Shiites Insist on Democracy: Washington Cringes." New York Times. Nov. 30, 2003. 21 Jun., 2006. Bazzi, Mohamad. " A Violent Cycle in Iraq." New York News Day. May 23, 2005. 22 Jun. 2006. Dorf, Michael C. "Caucuses and Democracy in Iowa and Iraq: Should Direct Elections Be Held Instead?" FindLaws Legal Commentary. 19 Jan., 2004. 20 Jun., 2006 Hoagland, Jim. "The Dangers of Aiming Too High." Washington Post. Nov. 9, 2003. Page B07. 21 Jun., 2006. Jansen, Michael. "Sunni-Shia Relations Hit rock Bottom in Iraq." Deccan Herald. DH News Service Nicosia. Jul. 21, 2005. Jun. 22, 2006. "Shia-Sunni Relations." Global Security Magazine. 21 Jun. 2006. Moiz M Anjarwalla. "A brief history of the Shia Muslims." May 13th, 2003 Nasr, Vali. “The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future.” 2006. Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Al Kashifu. "The Origin Of Shiite Islam And Its Principles." Published by Ansariyan Publications. Read More