Clausewitz Theories of Warfare in the Modern Warfare - Literature review Example

Real-world strategic decision validating applicability of Clausewitz theories of warfare in the Modern Warfare Thesis: Clausewitztheories of warfare were not only applicable during the previous wars, but are still applicable in the modern day military strategy. Introduction The thesis above serves to indicate that the traditional theories of warfare, such as the Moral Theory of War and the Theory of Combat that were developed by Carl Clausewitz were not only useful for the traditional warfare, but also in the modern warfare where the technology and military tactics have advanced greatly. According to the Theory of Why War by Albert Einstein, “You cannot simultaneously prevent and prepare for war” (Lindell, 2009). This theory by Albert Einstein serves to validate and reinforce the theory of Moral Theory of War by Carl Clausewitz, which offers that the moral factor in war serves for both victory and defeat, such that when victory does not seem to be forthcoming, then, the military can take up defeat bravely (Peter et al., 1986). This is because, Albert Einstein contends that the military can either prepare for war or prevent war, but cannot simultaneously achieve both, to mean that in war, preparing for both victory and defeat is inevitable. Therefore, the theories of warfare as developed by Carl Clausewitz are still applicable in modern warfare, owing to the fact that the modern military must inevitably prepare for both victory and defeat, but cannot simply prepare for one and neglect the other. The moral factor in war represents the fundamental basis of inner strength that enables soldiers to target victory, while also enabling the military to respond with a daring action even when it is eminent that victory in that war cannot be achieved (Gat, 1993). The Theory of Combat, as developed by Carl Clausewitz, is yet another theory that is still applicable in the modern warfare, which offers that the most important thing in warfare is that the opponent shall be defeated in combat (Peter et al., 1986). This theory underlines the relevance of physical combat/conventional war as the major factor in the military warfare, as opposed to the application of the unconventional war that allows for surrender, unnoticed and intelligent operations or taking defeat without raising any objections (Fitzsimmons, 2013). Clausewitz’s Theory of Combat is validated by the E-M theory of aerial combat developed by Col. John Boyd, which offers that physical combat through airstrike is a popular and fundamental basis of achieving military victory during a war (Coram, 2002). Thus, the E-M theory of aerial combat seeks to reinforce the provisions of the Clausewitz’s Theory of Combat, that despite the fact that other unconventional war strategies are essential for delivering victory during a war, nothing can overcome the relevance of physical combat. The Theory of Combat provides that military warfare must entail physical combat preparations as the fundamental basis of winning the war, where by the better weaponry; superior training and sufficient material resources offer the best basis of victory in military warfare (Gat, 1993). Nevertheless, the Theory of Combat requires that the troops shall remain covered for as long as possible unless they are the ones attacking, and even then, they must be covered against surprise attacks (Peter et al., 1986). The essence of this provision of the Theory of Combat is to ensure that the troops remain alive during the warfare for as long as possible, since defeat in a military war can be overturned, but only when the troops are still alive (Gat, 1993). In this respect, the physical aspect of the war remains the most dominant strategy that must be highly upheld, while treating the intelligence and the other unconventional war aspects as a supplementary element of actual battle front combat (Fitzsimmons, 2013). The two supplementary theories, namely the Theory of Why War by Albert Einstein and the E-M Theory of Aerial Combat developed by Col. John Boyd, serves to reinforce the fact that the traditional warfare theories that were developed by Carl Clausewitz are still applicable in the modern day warfare. These two theories validate the Clausewitz traditional theories by upholding that the moral factor and the physical combat are two most essential strategies that the military should adapt when preparing for war (Lindell, 2009). Therefore, irrespective of whether it is in the traditional or the modern warfare, covering the troops and ensuring that they remain alive for as long as possible during the war is essential for the achievement of victory in war (Sawyer, 1993). Additionally, the moral force, which comprises of the prudent spending of resources by the government to support the military as well as fostering value and behavioral support of the military by the populace, will still remain essential factors determining war victory even in the 21st century. Real-world Vietnam War strategic decision and how it further validates the above thesis The Vietnam War was a strategic decision that was taken by the USA to enter into war with North Vietnam and its communist allies in support of South Vietnam in 1955 (Peterson, 2006). This war serves as the longest war ever fought by the USA, since the Vietnam War extended for two full decades, spanning through to 1975, when a ceasefire was finally signed, creating the end of the war. Despite the fact that the Vietnam War serves as the longest war ever fought by the USA, it still remains the most unpopular war amongst the USA citizens, owing to the devastating military effect that the USA faced during the war. First, the war spent billions of dollars during the two decades, in order to keep the USA forces in Vietnam so they could help South Vietnam try to resist the invasion of the Northern Vietnam communist state (Peterson, 2006). Additionally, the USA forces suffered a great casualty that accounted for 60,000 lives of soldiers which were lost and many more injured, while more civilians in Vietnam were killed, numbering approximately 3 million casualties. The importance of the Vietnam War strategic decision in validating the thesis above, which offers that Clausewitz theories of warfare are still applicable in the modern-day warfare, derives from the role that mind war and physical combat played in this war. Thus, the analysis of the mind war and physical combat elements of the Vietnam War will validate the above thesis. The first Clausewitz theory of warfare that is still relevant through to the modern day is the Moral Theory of War. The first principle of the Moral Theory of War as developed by Clausewitz provides that the prudent spending of resources by the government, coupled with the cultivation of supportive behaviors and values amongst the populace, are fundamental towards motivating the military to gain victory in a war (Peter et al., 1986). Thus, according to Clausewitz’s Moral Theory of War, in order for the USA to win the Vietnam War, it is that required two major components must be present. First, the USA government needed to spend its resources prudently. Secondly, the USA government required to cultivate behavioral and value support of the military in Vietnam by the USA populace. Therefore, if the USA had managed to muster these two components, then, it would have been assured of victory in the Vietnam War (Hammond, 2001). However, the major factor that contributed to the failure of the USA in the Vietnam War was the increasingly growing opposition to the Vietnam War from the American home front (Peterson, 2006). In this respect, one of the basic tenets of the Clausewitz’s Moral Theory of War, which requires that the military be motivated by the behavioral and value support of the populace, was missing in the Vietnam War. The consequence of the lack of support from the home front is that the USA forces came out of the Vietnam War defeated, de-motivated and ashamed of the outcome of the war. Thus, the outcome of the Vietnam War is a sufficient basis to validate the thesis to the effect that the Clausewitz theories of warfare are still applicable in modern war. This is because; the defeat of the USA forces in the Vietnam War was contributed by the failure of the moral factor that is provided by the Clausewitz’s Moral Theory of War, as an essential component to motivate the military into victory (Sawyer, 1993). Therefore, it is due to the fact that the USA war strategy during the Vietnam War did not adhere to the provisions of this traditional theory; that its troops ended up defeated, while suffering a high rate of casualty for a superior side that was capable of winning the war (Peterson, 2006). The USA side was superior in terms of military training, weaponry and even material supplies during the war compared to the Northern Vietnamese and their Viet Cong allies, who were no better in weaponry, supplies and techniques, such that they highly avoided direct battle front combat with the USA troops. The Northern Vietnamese and their Viet Cong relied heavily on the unconventional war tactics such as the guerrilla warfare in order to attack the USA troops effectively, due to the fact that the USA was heavily armed, trained and well equipped (Peterson, 2006). Nevertheless, despite the failure of the USA troops in the Vietnam War, taking defeat bravely; another major principle of the Clausewitz theories of warfare presented under the Clausewitz’s Moral Theory of War, has been validated by the Vietnam War strategic decision. This is because, after the Vietnam War had spanned for two decades without any sign of the war coming to an end, yet the USA continued to suffer heavy casualties in the war, the then USA President, Nixon, signed a ceasefire in 1973, bringing the Vietnam War to an end (Peterson, 2006). The Moral Theory of War by Carl Clausewitz provides that the moral factor in war serves for both victory and defeat. Therefore the military should prepare both for victory and conceding to defeat, on the event that it is eminent that the victory in the war cannot be achieved. This principle was applied by President Nixon when he stood up for defeat and signed the ceasefire, after recognizing that the USA had lost much resources and numerous lives, while the public support for the war had waned completely (Peterson, 2006). This is the principle that the previous USA Presidents ought to have applied, since preparation for the Vietnam War started during the reign of President Truman, and then extended through the terms of Presidents Eisenhower, John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, only to be ended by President Nixon (Peterson, 2006). Should the previous presidents have applied this principle of Clausewitz’s Moral Theory of War requiring taking defeat bravely earlier, they could have saved America the huge losses it suffered both in loss of lives of the troops as well as the wastage of billions of dollars that were irrecoverable. The major moral factor problem arose from the misjudgment of Gen. Westmoreland who was leading the USA troops in Vietnam, when he misjudged the tenacity and endurance of the Vietnamese people, by holding that the Vietnamese would give up on the war after lasting a little longer, since the Americans were better equipped and supplied than the Northern Vietnam forces and its Viet Cong ally (Peterson, 2006). However, this turned out to be a very costly misjudgment, since the Viet Cong and the Northern Vietnamese troops proved more resilient, and they kept getting better and better as time went by, such that towards the signing of the ceasefire, it was eminent that the USA would lose the war at all costs (Peterson, 2006). The Vietnamese may not have had the military might that would have matched that of the USA or the strong equipment and weaponry supply, but they banked on one major advantage; the support of the Vietnamese population (Peterson, 2006). In this respect, it can be seen clearly that the moral factor plays a very important role in delivering victory for the military. Therefore, the Vietnam War validates the Clausewitz’s Moral Theory of War, by showing that indeed the moral factor, which comes in the form of public support for the military, plays a major role in enhancing victory for the military. The second Clausewitz theory of warfare that is relevant in the modern day warfare is the Theory of Combat, which underlines the relevance of physical combat as an important strategy for military war. According to this theory, nothing can overcome the relevance of physical combat strategy in military warfare (Peter et al., 1986). Further, the theory offers that it is fundamental for the military strategy to ensure that the troops remains covered for as long as possible, unless when they are the ones attacking the opponent, and even then, they need to be covered against surprise fire (Gat, 1993). The Vietnam War remains the war where this strategy was tested to the limits for the USA troops, owing to the fact that the Vietnam War was characterized by physical combat throughout its history, and the American troops did not seem capable of giving one another the necessary cover against surprise attack. Thus, the Vietnam War was won by the Northern Vietnamese troops and their Vet Cong allies through the use of surprise attack tactics, which most often found the USA troops unprepared (Peterson, 2006). The morale of the USA troops in Vietnam was absolutely low. However, it is the inability to cover against the surprise attacks of the Vietnamese troops that eventually saw the USA troops incur more casualties, which in turn affected the support of the troops back home causing the American populace to start agitating for the withdrawal of the troops from the war. The Vietnamese forces applied the camouflage tactic, where they blended with the locals and made it difficult for the USA troops to identify them (Peterson, 2006). This would have required that the USA troops focus on covering their own men, as opposed to launching attacks that ended up killing millions of the Vietnamese civilians, while the targeted Vietnamese forces remained elusive. Therefore, the Vietnam War serves to validate the Clausewitz Theory of Combat, by presenting lack of enough cover for the USA troops as the major factor contributing to the USA defeat in the war. On the event that the USA troops were able to adhere to the provisions of the Theory of Combat that requires keeping the troops covered for the longest time possible, most of the USA troops could have survived and eventually overturned the victory of the Vietnamese (Peterson, 2006). This is because the support from the American populace would have remained high if the troops did not die in large numbers, thus the moral support for the USA troops in the war would have remained high too. Conclusion Clausewitz theories of warfare are still relevant in the modern day military strategy. The Clausewitz’s Moral Theory of War and the Theory of Combat remains applicable in modern warfare, since it is the failure of the USA troops to observe the provisions of these theories that resulted in the USA defeat in the Vietnam War. Clausewitz’s Moral Theory of War offers that moral support from the government and the populace is essential for the military to achieve victory. On the other hand, Clausewitz’s Theory of Combat provides that the focus of any military strategy should be to cover its troops for the longest time possible, both from physical combat fire and from surprise attacks. The USA military strategy was neither able to achieve the support of the populace nor able to offer effective cover for its troops against the Vietnamese opponents. Thus, the Vietnam War serves to validate the thesis that Clausewitz theories of warfare are still relevant in modern day warfare. Reference List Coram, Robert. 2002. Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War. 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