Difficulty of Predicting Terror Attacks in the United States - Essay Example

? Difficulty of Predicting Terror Attacks in the United s Today, terrorists are more organized, possess massive resources, and have better coordination compared to the past. Over the years, terrorists have mastered tactics of altering their identity, camouflaging their operations, and behaviour, and can now blend into any background. As a result, it has increasingly become difficult to prevent and deter terror activities, leave alone predicting them. Terrorists have mastered ways of concealing their fundamentalist roots, which eventually translates to the difficulty in predicting terror attacks. The paper explores the reasons that make the prediction of terror attacks in the United States a difficult affair. Difficulty of Predicting Terror Attacks in the United States Introduction Modern times have witnessed a transformation of terror groups into barbaric and more determined groups. The present terrorism model differs from the previous models as it is characterized by loosely articulated political objectives, indiscriminate attacks, and efforts to attain maximum psychological and social disruption. The differentiations between the present and past models have left serious gaps in preventing and disrupting terror attacks. This has come in the backdrop of a growing Islamic resentment of the United States, which has become entrenched within the world. The significance of understanding terrorism in the United States was heightened in the wake of 9/11 attacks. America’s sense of immunity to large-scale terrorist attacks within its own borders suffered a massive blow with 9/11 attacks. The attacks were a traumatic awakening to America. The success of the 9/11 attacks was grounded in three prominent capabilities that terror organizations such as Al-Qaeda still retain. These include the capability to exploit vulnerabilities of the enemy, effective employment of deception, and the application of suicide attacks to enhance success (Bullock, Haddow & Coppola, 2012). Despite the focus, little is known about general patterns of terror attacks within the U.S. Terrorists have honed their capability to gather intelligence, employ technology, and identify security gaps. As a result, predicting terrorist activities has become a tall order. Making assessments on future likelihood or consequences of terror attack is in essence an elusive undertaking (Pillar, 2011). This is mainly compounded by the fact that there are limited statistical data detailing terrorist attacks from which to parameterize terrorism risk. Besides, relevant variables influencing terror undertakings such as target type, weapon type, and target (geographical) location are hard to pin point. Terrorist threat is perpetually changing in ways that make it dangerous and difficult to counter. While most terrorist activities were traditionally confined in conflict- prone areas, especially in the last decade, terrorist activities have attained a global dimension. The main focus of terror attacks centre on inflicting massive civilian casualties and causing lasting economic damage. This propels the urgency in attaining capability to predict and pre-empt such attacks (Forest, 2007). The impact of terrorist attacks in the society has been so severe to the extent of becoming imperative to predict and disrupt the attacks. Most of the successful terrorist attacks exhibit common features such as meticulous long-term planning, cautious target selection, access to destruction means, and effective support in terms of logistics. The overriding question in those circles is not if but when. Irrespective of the mode and scale of attack, few Americans doubt that time is quickly running out. Nevertheless, this view tends to be contestable and may even be exaggerated. It is difficult or even impossible to predict terrorist intentions. Indexing of potential terrorist attacks is based on criteria such as motivation of terrorists, presence of terror groups, efficacy of the groups in undertaking terror acts, the scale and frequency of previous attacks, and the number of attacks thwarted by a country. Hence, the U.S.-led military action in Iraq and Afghanistan aggravated anti-U.S sentiment increasing predisposition to terror attacks (Forest, 2007). However, the war on terrorism has started to bear fruits as it has decentralized terrorist’s organization structure; this reduces vulnerability to terror attacks. Why it is Difficult to Predict Terror Attacks in the United States The difficulty in predicting terror attacks in the United States owes to the precedence that terrorist organizations are known to evolve and adapt as security and counterterrorism efforts are executed. One of the uncertainties enveloping prediction of terror attacks in the U.S. stems from the fact that terrorist attacks largely occurred outside the United States. Therefore, the evolvement into becoming a common threat in the United States heralded fresh problems (Forest, 2007). In short, there is no golden rule that outlines that terrorists will continue to choose certain targets or commission attacks in a related way as they have done in the past. For instance, prior to 9/11 attacks, a large number of intelligence and law enforcement authorities did not imagine terrorists could use an aeroplane as a flying bomb or missile. Within the national security circles, there is a persistent belief that the United States of America faces an imminent attack from extremists. Terrorist organizations have conventionally used guns and explosives in conducting terror attacks due to their accessibility and easy application. However, in recent years, terrorists have started to show interests in acquiring the capability to deploy weapons of mass destruction. Terrorist attacks in the world have become more organized, widespread, frequent, and deadly. These developments have made the task of predicting and disrupting terror attacks even harder (Pillar, 2011). Although it is complex to forecast the possibility of deployment of weapons of mass destruction, analysts contend that the shift in acquisition of such agents is motivated by the desire to inflict mass casualties. The grim projections on terror attacks have failed to materialize in many instances. However, the threat of an attack from a terrorist network is real, but the biggest hurdle remains in predicting an attack. Terrorist networks are perpetually evolving and are continually presenting fresh challenges in counterterrorism efforts. The surge in homegrown extremism arising from radicalization of disenfranchised sections of society has certainly made the prediction of terror attacks complicated (Lia, 2005). Terrorist organizations powerfully advocate Jihad as an individual responsibility fused with collective revenge. The 9/11 terror attack demonstrated that authorities cannot solely rely on counterterrorism strategies such as border controls to keep terrorist at bay. Terror networks are adept at operating covertly, which complicates the tracking of their whereabouts and predicting their activities. As a result, there is no capacity to estimate the frequency or severity of terror attacks in the United States. Thus, analysts are just left with simulating worst case scenarios (Bullock, Haddow & Coppola, 2012). The complexity in predicting terror attacks and their frequency and scale stems from a wide range of weapons that may be employed and multiple potential targets. The biggest challenges in pre-empting terrorism lie in identifying the place, time, and mode of attack. For most intelligence communities, the difficulty in predicting and disrupting terror activities lies in separating “noise” in the collected data with real warning signs. In addition, intelligence gathering may be hampered by limitation in resources and time constrains (Pillar, 2011). Terrorism has evolved to become a global phenomenon as terrorist attacks pose a threat not only to the targeted society, but also to the rest of the world. Acts of terror are exceedingly difficult to predict or provide early warning since terrorists have continued to maintain technological expertise and linkages via Internet. Terrorists utilize IT to formulate plans, collect information, recruit new members, and raise finances, as well as spread propaganda. Globalization has led to an unprecedented movement of people, goods, and ideas. Whereas globalization has been critical to economic stability and advancement of U.S. interests, it poses new security challenges that are borderless and unconventional (Bullock, Haddow & Coppola, 2012). Today, criminal and terror organizations possess the capability to impact the world with far reaching effects inclusive of those that may be disruptive and destructive to people’s ways of life; this has largely become common because of globalization and technological advancement. Some of the enabling factors of transnational crime and global Jihad include access to sophisticated technology as well as unwillingness to abide by the set international law. The difficulty of predicting terror attacks in the United States arises from the fact that what is a threat today might be slightly different in the next 5-10 years. In most assessments, the future is always perceived to be dramatically worse compared to the present terrorist threat. The pessimism in the assessments stems from the rapidly proliferating technology as well as the rise of sub-national actors. Most of the predictions on the potential targets for terrorist attacks encompass targets such as the airline industry, sea port, public events, and urban mass transit systems. However, research shows that the highest percentage centres on different and unexpected targets. Terrorists will most likely exploit unknown or unexpected targets as they are “soft” and vulnerable. For instance, analysts project that terrorists will most likely launch devastating cyber attacks, affecting Internet dependent components in society such as businesses, utilities, banking, and communications (Forest, 2007). The New Age of Terrorism The prospect of utilization of weapons of mass destruction presents an acute security challenge, especially after 9/11 that exacerbated the likelihood of a large scale terrorist attack being carried out in U.S. The enhancement of technology and expertise within terror networks is making it difficult in predicting terror in America. The arena of counterterrorism is radically changing with each dawn; terrorists are adopting novel ways of carrying out their heinous acts. The growth of home-grown terror cells brings out this aspect clearly. Foreign terrorist organizations are slowly exiting from the mainframe of terrorism, delegating critical operatives to local based extremists (Pillar, 2011). The London and Madrid bombings paint this picture exceptionally well, whereby homegrown terrorists carried out most of operations such as the masterminds of 9/11 and the Hamburg cell. Foreign Terror Organizations such as Al-Qaeda are conscious of this, and contented to be facilitators of such acts of terror rather than being the main masterminds. The rise of homegrown extremism, owing to disenfranchisement of some sections of society, is increasingly complicating the chances of detecting or predicting terror attacks within the U.S. The rise in homegrown terrorists can be partly attributed to the easy access to extremist videos and materials online. In addition, extremists nowadays utilize the Internet as a recruitment tool; they have taken full advantage of the Internet (cyber Jihad). This reflects changing of tactics employed by terrorists, which eventually weigh down on terror prediction. In addition, terrorist organization such as Al-Qaeda spotlight Islamic groups that subscribe to concepts of victimization or bearing anti-West sentiment to set up a propaganda perpetuating centre (Lia, 2005). Mosques carrying out radicalization programmes are prominent contributors to homegrown extremism. The increase in the capacities of the terrorists shows a growing collective subculture and the emergence of a widespread cause, which rallies radicals into perpetrating attacks against the Homeland. Homegrown terror networks are much harder to track as the perpetrators of terror acts hold “clean” citizenships. A general assessment and audit of the war on terrorism indicates that significant developments have been achieved in the war against terror; however, the prospect of terrorists fooling the counterterrorism strategies in place still looms. The employment of operatives who do not necessarily fit the Middle Eastern stereotype makes it difficult to identify them using the standard profile of a terrorist. “Lone wolf” operatives, who have no background in terrorism, have made the prediction of terror attack in United States even more complicated (Lia, 2005). The emergence of lone operatives has increased the infrastructure that can be utilized by terrorists in carrying out attacks within the U.S. (Forest, 2007). Terrorists have incorporated a new cadre into their ranks; this can be demonstrated by the attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Centre. The recruitment of better trained and educated persons, who were willing to sacrifice their lives, indicates a radical shift from traditional recruitment of desperate loners driven by the quest for violence. Despite the rapid technological advancement in virtually every facet of people’s lives, there is no system, model, method, or person capable of accurately and consistently predicting future events (Lia, 2005). Presently, authorities utilize defense and intelligence as the basic sources of data employed in detecting terrorist networks such as open source intelligence, terrorist websites, email and telephone signal information, and intelligence records. Other proactive steps include understanding the global system with shared responsibilities. The theme of intelligence failure has persisted through ever since the attack on Pearly Harbour. In the past, the U.S intelligence community has failed in some predictions. For instance, a noted CIA assessment of Iran during the fall of 1978 predicted absence of an Islamic revolution, a prediction that did not hold within five months. So evidently, there may be loose gaps and chances of terrorists slipping through the radar. One has to be conservative when it comes to predicting terror attacks within United States and other places in the world inclusive of Europe (Pillar, 2011). The platform for launch of terror attacks is increasingly being redefined every now and then. Whereas the intelligence community such as FBI and CIA and institutions such as Homeland Security have done a commendable job, the notion of loopholes in counterterrorism efforts persists. Nobody is overly confident of ruling out terror attacks in the United States, leave alone predicting the attacks. The difficulty in predicting terror attacks is also compounded by reality that most of the responses to acts of terror are mainly reactionary rather than proactive. Terrorists have adopted fresh modes such as using explosives made of plastic instead of metal. This makes detection systems such as metal detectors out of date. Whereas predicting locations of terrorist events can aid in assembling defensive efforts, it is difficult to place predictions on when and where terror attacks may occur, and one is only left to deal with probabilities of vent unfolding over months, years, or decades. Undoubtedly, terrorists are innovators crafting modes of operations now and then (Purpura, 2007). Most of the predicted attacks never see the light of day. The difference in what is predicted and transpired highlights the difficulty of analyzing and evaluating terrorism. This is because it is dynamic and may be impacted by unforeseen social, political, economic, and other anthropologically motivated factors. This is compounded by a skewed perception of terrorism risk as citizens view themselves as the next possible victims of terrorism. The exaggerated perception of individual risk makes prediction to terror attacks even harder (Bullock, Haddow & Coppola, 2012). The authorities should draw upon information centering on terrorists attacks, why they occur and where. Understanding of the facilitators of terror attacks aid in measuring the effectiveness of counterterrorism efforts in altering the potential for terror attacks. The crucial focus should be defeating the underlying conditions that facilitate acts of terror (Purpura, 2007). Conclusion Terrorism has presented the authorities with an expanded range of hazards, most of which are emerging. The increasing threat of terror attacks in the U.S. has availed opportunities for integrating groups responsible for mitigating, preparing, and responding to terror attacks. Intelligence failures are the reason why terrorist acts come into fruition. For instance, in 9/11, virtually every intelligence indicator should have led the FBI or the CIA to detect the hijackers and attain awareness of the plot. Nevertheless, much of the intelligence was ignored, discredited or left unreported. Disruption of terror attacks is mainly effective if carried out at the planning and preparation stages, especially when the weapon to be applied is yet to be assembled. Despite the inroads made in the fight against global terrorism, terrorist organizations are far from dead owing to their capability to mutate into fresh, more dangerous forms. Terrorists have incorporated fresh models of organization and are able to wage global campaigns. Terrorists are no longer monolithic or isolated as they are now able to innovate, disseminate vicious propaganda to justify their actions, exploit fresh technology, learn from the past and imitate successful tactics. The combination of the new trends has rendered predicting terror activities difficult. The new trends employed by terrorists do not give room for prediction or extrapolation. References Bullock, J., Haddow, G. & Coppola, D. (2012). Introduction to Homeland security: Principles of all-hazard risk management. Waltham, MA: Elsevier. Forest, J. (2007). Countering terrorism and insurgency in the 21st Century: Strategic and tactical considerations. Westport, CT: Greenwood. Lia, B. (2005). Globalisation and future of terrorism: Patterns and predictions. New York, NY: Routledge. Pillar, P. (2011). Intelligence and U.S. Foreign policy: Iraq, 9/11, and misguided reform. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Purpura, P. (2007). Terrorism and Homeland security: An introduction with applications. Oxford, UK: Butterworth. Read More