The UK Aviation Law - Case Study Example

UK Aviation Law Jack’s Liabilities under the ANO and the ROTAR A reading of the problem at hand would instantly show that Jack committed his first violation of the Rules of the Air Regulations (ROTAR hereafter) when he failed to check the weather conditions of the areas covered by his flight path en route to his destination. Under Section 16(1) of the said regulations, Jack is obliged to check before he begins his flight to “examine the reports and forecasts of the weather conditions on the proposed flight path, in order to determine whether Instrument Meteorological Conditions prevail, or are likely to prevail, during any part of the flight.” The same pre-flight requirement is echoed by the Air Navigation Act 2005 (ANO) in s 52 § (a) thereof. In addition, ANO requires that the commander of the aircraft do the following before take-off: that equipment required under the rules to be carried by the aircraft are fit for use or that the flight is in accordance with the permission given by the authorities; that the aircraft is fit for the flight; that the load being carried is in accordance with the aircraft specs and is so distributed within the aircraft that it won’t hamper the flight’s safety; that it carries sufficient fuel, coolant and oil for the duration of the flight with sufficient margins for emergencies; that sufficient ballast is carried; any scheduled pre-flight maintenance check had been complied with (§ (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (h)). Jack had not performed any of these pre-flight activities except look at the instrumentation cursorily. Similarly, under s 98 on small aircrafts, the Air Navigation Act 2005 specifically mandated any person in-charge of a small aircraft not to fly it unless he has performed certain acts that will ensure the safety of such flight. These particular regulations apply to aircrafts weighing more than 7 kg without fuel. The CESSNA 172 , of the CESSNA family of planes, is a 3-passenger capacity small plane and is classified as a non-EASA small aeroplane, with a single piston engine A/C (Non-EU Aircraft p 25). It has a weight of 743 kg when empty and 1,111kg as its maximum take-off load (MTOL) (CESSNA 172 Specs) making it fall within the ambit of s 98 of ANO which prohibits among others, flying the aircraft without ensuring that the flight can be made safely which should include checking fuel sufficiency, prior permission of the air traffic controller for Class A, C, D, or E airspace before flying the aircraft over their airspace. In the case at hand, Jack flew the CESSNA 172 over Luton and eventually in Leeds airport, its destination, without prior communication and approval of their ATCs before the flight initiation. The same section also prohibits the flight of the aircraft over 400 feet unless being made over controlled airspace. Jack flew most of the time above 400 feet as he proceeded to Leeds flying in zero visibility conditions and without sight of the ground. Before that however, Jack violated the prohibition of dropping of articles to the ground from aboard an aircraft while in flight when he likewise failed to take note the maximum load of the CESNA 172 which is 400.5 kg (881 lbs). Obviously, the total sum of the weight of the crew and passengers and the luggage was more than the allowable maximum load because the aircraft had trouble lifting off before some of the articles were dropped by Mary at the behest of Jack (ANO s 98, § (1)(2)). The dropping of articles from the CESSNA 172 by Mary upon orders of Jack is treated in detail in s 66 of ANO. In this section, the dropping of some of the articles from Mary’s luggage over UK turned out to be a prohibited act as they are considered acts that would endanger the population, unless under the circumstances, the act could be considered a jettisoning of the aircraft’s load under an emergency case, one of the exceptions to the case. This act was precede however by Jack’s failure to take note of the allowable maximum load by a small aeroplane like the CESSNA 172. As to Jack’s Private Pilot Licence (PPL hereafter) to fly aeroplanes, there are certain limitations to this kind of license. For Jack to fly out of sight of the surface and navigate the plane on an Instrument Flying Rules (IFR hereafter), as he did when there was zero visibility en route to the Leeds airport, his license should have included an instrument rating or instrument meteorological rating. This is true when he was flying beyond controlled airspace when the flight visibility is less than 3 km or he was out of sight of the surface (ANO Sched 8, s2(c)(i)(iii) or flew in Class A, B or C airspace which require compliance with IFR rules (s f). An instrument rating (aeroplane) “entitles the holder of the licence to act as a pilot in command or co-pilot of an aeroplane flying in controlled airspace in circumstances which require compliance with the Instrument Fight Rules” (ANO Part B, Rating and Qualifications, § 2). However, Jack’s instrument rating had already expired, a fact which the operator Bob failed to note. Under § (g) of the same provision, Jack was also disqualified to command an aeroplane with passengers on it considering that he did not, during his last three flights within the preceding 90 days, fly the same type as CESSNA 172 carrying out, at least, three landings and three take-offs. As the problem stated, he falsified the entries of his last three flights in his Pilot Log Book, another blatant violation of the regulations. In addition, the Instrument Flying Rules of ROTAR s 6 prohibits flying at a distance of less than 1000 feet above sea level. Jack after violating the ANO and the ROTAR by flying using the IFR beyond controlled airspace without a corresponding valid instrument rating for several minutes in zero visibility conditions suddenly executed a dangerous descent down to 400 feet under the same zero visibility condition which resulted the plane almost hitting an electricity pylon and forcing him to make a dangerous maneuver which clipped the starboard wing of the aircraft. As to Jack’s flying at a very low altitude after Lutton, the ROTAR 2007 Section 3, § 5 sets out the low-flying prohibitions, some of which are: an aircraft should not be flown at too low an altitude for the purpose of an eventual emergency landing that it will jeopardise the safety of persons and structures below it; an aircraft cannot be flown 500 ft or less to the ground, persons, or structures, except upon a written permission by the CAA, and; an aircraft cannot fly below 1000 feet above a congested area except a prior written permission by the CAA. Anent Jack’s flying over the Lutton aerodrome, the ROTAR mandates the maintenance of a continuous watch over the appropriate radio frequency used in the aerodrome. The VFR rules for flying above controlled airspace is set forth in S 5 of the ROTAR, which states, among others, the visibility and flight level requirements of aircrafts. If an aircraft flies above flight level 100 then it should fly free of cloud and a visibility at a minimum of 8 km and if below flight level 100 then to remain free of cloud and a visibility of at least 5 km. Possible CAA Actions Jack’s actions while in control of the CESSNA 172 can be characterised as negligence, because of his reckless disregard for safety rules which he as a pilot ought to know and follow. Specifically, ANO sections 73 and 74 proscribe such acts: s 73, “A person shall not recklessly or negligently act in a manner likely to endanger an aircraft, or any person therein” and s 74 “A person shall not recklessly or negligently cause or permit an aircraft to endanger any person or property.” Failing to check on the maximum load allowable by the CESSNA 172, forcing him to unload some of the articles aboard while on flight, as well as failing to check on the sufficiency of the fuel content of the aircraft resulting in the aircraft’s failure while on flight did not endanger only his life or that of his passengers but also that of the people and structures who may have been hit by the jettisoning or in the event of an airplane crash. These and other failures that Jack committed constituted negligence and the ANO provided for penalties for such negligence like, among others, the revocation and suspension of licence in accordance with s 92 of the said law. On the other hand, s 148 thereof provides for penalties that may be imposed not only against Jack but also against Bob, the operator, in the event that his negligence can be proved, in allowing Jack to command the plane unless “he proves that the contravention occurred without his consent or connivance and that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the contravention.” If Jack is found guilty of any of the offences, under s 148 § 4, 5, which includes failure to weigh aircraft and keep weigh schedule, flight in unfit condition, requirements for loading aircraft, operational restrictions on aircrafts, and aerodrome operating minima, under summary conviction he could be adjudged a fine. If on the other hand, he is found guilty under § 6, which includes endangering persons lives or properties, use of fuel unfit for aviation, as well as use of falsified records, he could be sentenced to a 2-year prison term and worse, if found guilty under §7, which is endangering safety of aircraft, Jack could be imprisoned to a maximum term of 5 years. The AAIB Approach The Air Accidents Aviation Branch (AAIB) is a government agency that was created for the purpose of investigating civil aviation accidents within the United Kingdom and special cases, even beyond the country’s borders where its interests are at stake. Part of, but operating autonomously from the Department of Transportation, and independent from the Civil Aviation Authority the AAIB reports directly to the Secretary of State and derived its statutory power fron the Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents and Incidents) Regulation 1996. The AAIB role is to investigate and make recommendations thereafter. The investigation process involves the examination of the circumstances as well as the causes of the accident. The recommendations of AAIB however do not have compulsory effects but are merely advisory. In the case at bar, AAIB will most likely proceed upon notification of the incident involving Jack and the CESNA 172 firstly, by coordinating with the police, the Air Traffic Control and the Aircraft Operator for evidentiary purposes. It will thereafter send two kinds of inspector to conduct the investigation: an Operations Inspector (OI) and an Engineering Inspector (EI). The OI, who is usually an experienced professional pilot will zero in on the human factor involved: the navigational and flying procedures and techniques used by Jack; the witnesses’ accounts, if any, and; other peripheral elements like the air traffic control, airfield, and weather. On the other hand, the EI will mostly focus on the CESNA 172 itself and its airworthiness including all pertinent documentation. Although the AAIB recommendations do not have compulsory effects, its inspectors however have all the accompanying powers relevant to their investigation: to compel witnesses to give signed statements; to enter premises and areas relevant to their investigation, and; retain or remove relevant papers or documents. Thus, the investigation of the case at bar will involve two stages: the field investigation phase and the report. The OI will take the statements of Jack and Mary, as well as Bob, the Luton Air Traffic controller, the farmer on whose farm jack made an emergency landing, the petrol station owner where Jack purchased the petrol after the crash landing, the Leeds traffic air controller, the Leeds authorities and all other witnesses of the incident. The EI, on the other hand, will closely examine the CESNA 172 physically and take note of its condition relevant to its airworthiness, take pictures of it and examine its log books and maintenance records and may request that the plane be temporarily impounded to the AAIB headquarters for this purpose. The two will then present their initial findings to the Chief Inspector of Air Accidents, who will then determine the course that any further investigation will take. The report, which can take months to materialize, will initially be released as a draft form to Jack and to Bob and other persons who may affected by it. This is to give them 28 days to file or submit their answers or comments to it. At the expiration of the prescriptive period, a final copy of the report will be released to the public and to all persons involved. The AAIB website will also make available such copy of the report. Under the Memorandum of Understanding between the Crown Prosecution Service and Air Accident Aviation Branch, the Marine Accident Investigation Branch, and Rail Accident Aviation Branch, there will be a sharing of factual information and evidence between these branches where applicable. So in the case of the investigation of the incident involving Jack and the CESSNA 172, the AAIB is liable to share its findings, but not its opinions, with the Crown Prosecution Service. Jack’s Other Liabilities Jack could likewise be liable under laws beyond Aviation Laws, like Tort and other civil actions that operator Bob could bring against him for destroying his aircraft and jeopardizing it through negligence as well as the misrepresentations he made with the falsified documents he presented to him. References: 2009, Non-EU Aircraft, European Aviation Safety Agency Air Navigation Order 2005 CESSNA Specs. Global Oneness. http://www.experiencefestival.com/a/Cessna_172_-_Specifications_172R/id/4909149 Memorandum of Understanding between the Crown Prosecution Service and the AAIB, Marine Accident Investigation Branch, and Rail Accident Investigation Branch Rules of the Air Navigation 2007 The Air Navigation (General) Regulations 2006 The Civil Aviation Authority Regulations 1991 The Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents and Incidents) Regulation 1996 AAIB. The Investigation of Accidents to General Aviation Aircrafts. http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources/Gen%20Aviation%20Leaflet.pdf Read More