Case Note Nicklinson Versus Ministry of Justice - Report Example

Case on R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice UKSC 38 Case R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice UKSC 38 Introduction R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice (2014) UKSC 38 case stands among the major constitutional significant as well as interesting judgements made by the United Kingdom (UK) Supreme Court (Muller, 2014). The case possesses great significance for moral ethics, as well as social importance considering that changes to the law recommendation, may change to allow assisted suicide. Tony Nicklinson filed the case after getting paralysed from a catastrophic cancer. However, his physical condition dictates that he may only seek assistance to end his life. Section 2 of the Coroners and justice Act 2009, an amendment to Suicide Act of 1961, stood as a major hindrance for his proposed assistance as it prohibits individuals from assisting others in committing suicide. Mr Nicklinson filed the case on a background that sought declarations as to whether it will be lawful to seek assistance from a medical profession to help end his life (Eliot, 2014). Consequently, he sought a declaration of the court on the compatibility of the law preventing suicide assistance as outlined in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The article provides respect for life for private with restriction of privacy arising from national security issues, protecting freedoms and rights of the society as well as health protection (Ziegler, 2009, pg. 98). Though he lost the case at the high court, an appeal filed with the tribunal of appeal subsequently failed to give the declarations by a majority of seven to two. Mr Nicklinson died earlier before the supreme court ruling as a result of pneumonia arising after he declined to eat. The Facts Regarding the Case The Defendant: Mr Nicklinson suffered catastrophic cancer that destroyed his physical condition indicating his inability to commit suicide without assistance; he however dies before the determination of final judgement as a result of pneumonia sustained after failing to eat The Constitution: the constitution lacks provision of assisted suicide although it recognises the right to personal life of an individual and autonomy Suicide is legal under the UK law but assisting suicide nit provided The Decision and Ratio A panel of seven judges decided on the case five of them refusing to grant consideration of Nicklinson’s request The decision shows contradiction between the U.S law on rights of private individual The decision also presents differences between two government arms: the legislature and judiciary. Constitution Question Raised The essential query the court faced relates to the compatibility of the UK law on article 8. In other words, the case sought declaration as to whether assisting in suicide amounts to a criminal offence. It stands for individuals intending to end their lives but fail due to physical or other challenges. Considering the right to private life outlined by the constitution, preventing a person like Nicklinson from legally obtaining suicide assistance serves as an incursion to the right to respect individual’s private life ( Davidson, 2014). However, a counter argument on the aspect of legalizing assisted suicide serves a risk of allowing criminalization and therefore, the decline serves in the best interest of protecting the sick, old, as well as the vulnerable within the society that may be forced to avail themselves to assisted suicide. The question of criminalization presents proportionality as to whether criminalization of assisted suicide serves as a proportionate measure as to whether those risks of the vulnerable groups within the society will be protected (Muller, 2014). However, the initial determination failed to take effect, confronting the question will arise in considering a fundamental question that outlines the power of the legislature as well as the judiciary in the UK. The parliament may enact section 2 of the constitution under Suicide Act of 1961 repealed in 2009, through re-enacting the relevant provision, by parliament adopting the required provision there arises a question as to why the Supreme Court made determination of the case (Lexis, 2014). Dissentients two members there stand compatibility between the current laws with article 8. Furthermore, they argued on the court’s appropriateness to issue incompatibility declaration forming a basis of Section 4 of the Human Rights Act. Deference and Appreciation Margins in the case Considering the difference between the doctrine of margin of appreciation raised by the Strasbourg, as well as internal doctrine of deference, it proves essential in dealing with the two doctrines. In R (S) Secretary of State for Justice [2012] EWHC 1810 (Admin), there seems an equation of the two doctrines. Sales J suggested that domestic legislative, as well as administrative action failure within the margin of appreciation in the UK, requires being lawful under the Human Rights Act (Muller, 2014). The conclusion arrived was through considering that the human rights act renders unlawful that breach the convention rights of contained in the agreement. The concept of appreciation margin governs the convention rights as it appeared in the application of ECtHR’s case. In the case, margin of appreciation implied by ECtHR concluded that convention rights violation by the state were unavailable. The necessary point is that the applicants conventional rights failed to extend to a right requiring the state to stop from acting in a particular manner. Therefore, it remains difficult to separate the margin of appreciation of the content of rights. Dislocating the margin of appreciation and the basis that form it found in transnational-institutional legislation, renders Sales J analysis defective. It is clear that domestic legislative falling outside the margin proves critical rendering it unlawful in the UK. The case is thus open to a local court as supported by Supreme Court decision regarding Nicklinson’s case. The nine judge’s bench concluded that obtaining national law apparently fell under the UK’s appreciation margin because suicide assistance falls at the margin and therefore discrediting Sales J analysis of transplanting the margin of appreciation into a domestic judgment context. Since the local laws fall under the margin of appreciation, indicating that the determining question of declaration of incompatibility is issuable under the HRA (Tench, 2014). On such analysis, there stands a clear indication that the Supreme Court had the powers to consider compatibility question guided by the fact that the domestic laws were within the margin of appreciation. Contrasting Views of the Judges The aspect under consideration here relates to deference. It sounds understandable that through focusing on the margin of appreciation and the domestic law requirements failed to prevent the Supreme Court from dealing with the issue (Charles, 2014). It seems logical to mention that the court failed to exhaust its constitution legitimacy regarding proportionality of outright deterrence on assisted suicide as the court highlighted. The Supreme Court justices first had to make a decision as t o whether the court was constitutionally appropriate in determining the case (Tench, 2014. Consequently, it fell upon the judges’ credential to consider the parliament’s credentials in relation to the primary choice made by parliament in the main legislation noting that parliament is a democratic legislature. The judicial branch was inappropriate in disturbing the view that the house arrived. The two dissenting justices, through their rejection of the argument, presented clear case. For example, Lord Kerr stood with the view that although a judicial system possesses a role of scrutiny of legislative justification, it varies in intensity (Elliot, 2014). Therefore, the judgement had little room for deference in the same manner conceived traditionally. Professor Trevor Allan argued that determining proportionality requires the court to focus on the right of qualities available as opposed to investing deference factors. Therefore, the two justices ruling stands compatible basing on the fact that deference scepticism remained a guiding factor. Focusing on the judgement from the five justices fails in identifying a precise way of creating or allowing the court to rule in relation to a statutory provision amount to an infringement of the convention in areas beyond the tribunal’s jurisdiction. The five justices based their judgement on violation of the rights of others within Mr Nicklinson’s case. Nicklinson’s case, therefore, offers the scale and nature under which disagreements arise in the UK courts regarding when the courts need to defer to legislation (Charles, 2014). Consequently, Nicklinson’s situation provides a focus on relief. As thereof the judges noted that a declaration of incompatibility requires issuing in matters such as relief will prove appropriate if parliament fails to change the law. The aspect of relief counterbalances the interventionist approach to remedial reference. It appears a major incursion to the autonomy value of an individual to prevent a person like Mr Nicklinson from obtaining suicide assistance lawfully. Respecting rights of a private life of a person seems infringed since his requirement to suicide assistance poses no threat to the society as a whole or stands in the way for national security. Autonomy relates to the right as well as the capability to choose, and the choice of independence is only limited where there stands diminished autonomy (Hoffman, 2011, pg. 316). Suicide remains a choice under the constitution of the UK. Therefore, there seems a need to consider individual’s choices regarding suicide assistance especially where the person remains physically challenged. Allowing Mr Nicklinson right to suicide assistance hardly relates to the reason the five judges gave that it would lead to the criminalization of suicide request sounds irrational. Where a person’s rights fail to infringe those of others, there stands a need to grant an individual the rights. Conclusion In conclusion, Nicklinson’s case presents a significant division within the Supreme Court that relate to judicial review regarding cases that possess sensitive ethical or moral considerations. Consequently, the disagreements and the divisions in judgement present deeper conflicts between the legislature and judiciary roles. There seems a significant argument on the matter to in determining how the two branches of government need to relate. The HRA consequently brings the disagreements a height further to some extent (Wagner, 2014). The parliament assigns the judiciary and the courts for that matter a constitutional role aimed at balancing of relevant interests. The case, therefore, presents a canvas under which the disagreements occur. The case thus proves essential to serve as a reference point regarding the enduring debate attributed to the division of constitutional powers that fall between the political organs and the judiciary. The case consequently serves as a significant turning point and development of the UK law. References Davidson, M, 2014, June 27. Case Digest: R (on the application of Nicklinson and another) v Ministry of Justice; R (on the application of AM) (AP) v The Director of Public Prosecutions [2014] UKSC 38. Retrieved November 30, 2014, from http://blog.justcite.com/digest-r-on-the-application-of-nicklinson-and-ano-v-ministry-of-justice-r-on-the-application-of-am-ap-v-the-director-of-public-prosecutions-2014-uksc-38 Elliot, M, 2014, June 25. UK Supreme Court Blog EDITORS: Dan Tench, Laura Coogan, Cathryn Hopkins, Sophie Lalor-Harbord, Luke Pardey & Ryan Dolby-Stevens (Olswang) Hugh Tomlinson QC, Matthew Ryder QC, Anthony Fairclough, Eloise Le Santo, Victoria Durham & Aimee Denholm (Matrix). Retrieved November 30, 2014, from http://ukscblog.com/case-comment-r-nicklinson-r-v-dpp-2014-uksc-38/ Hoffman, D, 2011. The impact of the UK Human Rights Act on private law. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Kappen, T, 2011. The persistent power of human rights: From commitment to compliance. Lexis, N, 2014, June 25. LexisWeb. Retrieved November 30, 2014, from http://lexisweb.co.uk/cases/2014/june/r-on-the-application-of-nicklinson-and-another-v-ministry-of-justice-r-on-the-application-of-am-v-di Muller, M, 2014, June 25. R (on the application of Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2014] UKSC 38. Retrieved November 30, 2014. Tench, D, 2014, June 26. UK Supreme Court Blog EDITORS: Dan Tench, Laura Coogan, Cathryn Hopkins, Sophie Lalor-Harbord, Luke Pardey & Ryan Dolby-Stevens (Olswang) Hugh Tomlinson QC, Matthew Ryder QC, Anthony Fairclough, Eloise Le Santo, Victoria Durham & Aimee Denholm (Matrix). Retrieved November 30, 2014, from http://ukscblog.com/case-comment-r-nicklinson-r-v-dpp-2014-uksc-38/ Wagner, A, 2014, June 27. UK Human Rights Blog. Retrieved November 30, 2014, from http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/tag/right-to-die/ Ziegler, K, 2009. Human rights and private law: Privacy as autonomy. Oxford: Hart Pub. Charles, K, 2014, June 25. United Kingdom Supreme Court. Retrieved November 30, 2014, from http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2014/38.html Read More