The Rules of Statutory Interpretation - Report Example

Sta y Interpretation Module Module Number Academic Year Seminar Essay Question: With reference to the rules of sta y interpretation and the doctrine of binding precedent, to what extent do UK judges trespass on the proper function of Government and the Legislature when exercising their legal decision-making functions? Student’s number Statutory interpretation The process by which courts construe complex and ambiguous laws to create meaning and improve their enforcement is called statutory interpretation. There are a number of occasions where courts call for statutory laws to be repealed, whereas in other cases they give it the best meaning possible in respect of the intention of legislature. Owing to the existence of scant cases where courts have petitioned parliament to repeal laws, it is arguable that parliament has been passing laws with either minimal drafting errors or courts are increasingly usurping the law-making roles of parliament. Through the common law rules of interpreting statutes such as mischief rule, golden rule and purposive approach, courts are seeking to seal the gaps that parliament may leave in laws. The application of these rules alongside the doctrine of legal precedent has provided sufficient grounds for courts to trespass on the proper function of government and the legislature, but which courts have been unwilling to seize in a direct way. Golden Rule The golden rule of interpreting law allows courts of law to examine the ordinary meaning of statutes, but then circumvent absurdity where the ordinary interpretation would create such an outcome. Court’s deviation from the ordinary meaning of parliamentary Acts or administrative policy documents may make parliament and the executive subject to court orders, some of which have the potential to alter the ordinary operations of the two arms of government. Court orders barring pieces of legislation, where in the opinion of the court there is some inconsistency in the drafting of the statutory bodies in respect of fundamental rules or other basic bodies of law, courts may sometimes exercise powers which are otherwise not clearly within their jurisdiction1. Regardless, the golden rule requires courts to give the executive and parliament the opportunity to use the authority afforded to them by the constitution and statutory laws to write clear laws and policies at first instance. Failure in this solemn duty would leave courts with no option but to intervene only where the other two arms of government have failed to pass closely-knit laws. The doctrine was affirmed in The River Wear Commissioners v Anderson [1877] L.R. 2 App Cas 743, where it was held that courts have a duty to consider the statutory law in question in its entirety and interpret in based on the plain reading of the laws2. The court observed that where the plain reading generates an inconsistency or an illogicality or inconvenience so material as to influence the judges to believe that meaning is different from the original intention of the drafters, courts have a duty to modify the interpretation to reflect their most possible intention. This ruling is sufficiently clear that the golden rule does not intend to interfere in the business of parliament or the executive, but the failure of the latter two organizations is what calls for it to correct the mistakes. In light of this complimentary role, it can be argued that courts do not trespass on other jurisdictions without a valid cause. In another case of R v Allen [1872] LR 1 CCR 367, the court would have recommended a parliamentary appeal of s57 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 seeking to outlaw second marriages following its poor drafting as to exclude anybody from culpability, but chose to seal the loophole using the golden rule. In in his defence, Allen argued that the customary law barred a second marriage where an individual was in a legal marriage, so his bigamy acts were ‘legal’ because they were not within the law. The court then had to apply the golden rule in interpreting the word ‘marry’ to mean taking part in a wedding ceremony in order to circumvent an absurdity which could have resulted in the discharge of an otherwise culpable individual on the ground of the technicality. In that scenario, waiting for parliament to pass an amendment to the law as part of observing the principle of separation of powers would not have been reasonable in attempting to resolve the issue at hand. In Re v Sigsworth [1935] 1 Ch 98 a son who was entitled to his late mother’s estate following her death as required by the statutory laws of intestacy where there is no will, was denied those rights by virtue of the golden rule. If the court allowed him to acquire title to the property, parliament’s ordinary good will intention to ensure that property of the deceased should be inherited by the surviving dependants would have violated. The court believed it was duty-bound to ‘trespass’ legislative authority and on the basis of public policy, to deter the murderer gaining from the impacts of his crime3. In Adler v George [1964] 2 QB 7, however, the accused was charged with obstructing soldiers contrary to the Official Secrets Act 1920. The court ruled that the accused had committed the crime by walking ‘near’ a proscribed place. The ruling arguably brought the court on collision path with parliament, which may have intended to outlaw civilian movements ‘inside’ of the restricted area only. As such, if the court invoked the plain interpretation of the law, the conduct the accused would have earned him freedom he was spotted ‘outside’ of the outlawed area and he may not have caused sufficient distractions as envisaged by parliament. In light of this, the court may have trespassed on the role of parliament on this interpretation. Mischief Rule The mischief rule refers to finding out the mistake which parliament wanted to correct and interpreting the law in a way that corrects it. The Rule arguably compliments the role of parliament more than it trespasses. This is because the court would be under the obligation to ‘trespass’ parliamentary role only where it is satisfied that the mischief which an Act of parliament or Administrative polity was meant to fix is still alive either in its original state or a new form. The Rule is arguably the most ancient principles of interpreting the law as set in Heydon’s Case (1584). In this case, the court set out certain tests to guide subsequent processes of legal interpretation as follows: the court should; a) consider the nature of the previous laws before the Act was enacted; b) identify the mistakes in the previous laws; c) determine how the legislature intended to strengthen the legal regime by enacting the Act in question, and; d); consider the outcome of the findings in the ruling. Generally speaking, the rule is arguably meant to assess the legal weaknesses before a statute came into effect and interpret the law in a way that compliments the role of the legislature and the executive rather than trespassing on their legitimate functions. Conversely, the mischief rule has been attributed to the shifting of the mischief from the original scaffolds to new ones which are harder to detect and thus complicating the work of policy-making bodies and parliament4. In Smith v Hughes [1960] 1 WLR 830, a number of prostitutes were charged with the offense of enticing customers in public, which was in contravention of the Street Offences Act 1958. The defendants were found guilty of the offense under the mischief rule because they sat on outhouses or inside private building or from the windows in ways that attempted to draw the men and members of the general public in the adjacent streets. However, parliament’s intention may have been in the literal interpretation of the law which would therefore not have outlawed soliciting from private premises. As such, the court may have erred in its generalized finding that everybody knew that parliament’s aim was to clear the streets (including private windows and balconies) of the prostitution mischief. Purposive Approach The purposive approach to interpreting statutory law focuses on the functions which parliament intended a new legislation would serve. The Approach draws several similarities from the mischief rule, but extends the application of law to issues which are not specifically crimes. In Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Harts [1993] UKHL 3, the court ruled that in some cases where there are no clear mischiefs, searching for the mischief so as to determine appropriate remedy can be too complex to resolve. The court, therefore, admitted the purposive approach as a more favourable way of establishing parliament’s intention to pass the Act in question and giving it the best interpretation that survives that purpose5. In Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Harts, the dispute arose from the exact interpretation of s63 of the Finance Act 1976 and its application in a taxation issue involving some teachers. The teachers entered an agreement with their school-employer under which their children would receive the education for 20% of the fees levied on children whose parents were non-teachers. The agreement specified that the benefit was taxable on ‘cash equivalent.’ The term could be construed to mean the extra cost of implementing the concession or the average costs of enforcing the concession or the average expenses arising from providing service to the rest of the public. In applying the purposive approach to determine the issue, the House of Lords honoured the Hansard in its quotation of the submissions made by the Financial Secretary to the Treasury during the initial stages of passing the law, suggesting that the aim of Parliament would be to impose taxes on employees based on the extra cost incurred by the employer in lieu of the concession. The interpretation clearly captured parliament’s intention at the time of debating the bill6. Judicial precedents A judicial precedent is a decision by a court of law invoked as an authority to help in determining a comparable case in future. The doctrine allows for the admission of only the legal principles (ratio decidendi) embodied in the authority to be applied in a new verdict and leaves out persuasive words (obiter dicta). Whereas judicial precedents have provided a great sense of consistency in the application of legal principles created at the common law level, some authorities have arguably trespassed on the functions of other arms of government, especially lower structures of government which are bound by the precedents set by courts of higher jurisdictions7. Regardless, the flexibility of the common law particularly at the highest level of courts has led to several precedents being set aside, in what has served to improve separation of powers. Superior courts have worked to ensure executive and legislative operations are executed without a hitch, by imposing reasonable injunctions, especially on the former and overturning precedents which serve as hindrances to work. In ensuring that the three arms of the government work in a consistent and seamless manner, the House of Lords in Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] UKHL 2 set aside the precedent it had set in Anns v Merton London Borough Council, [1978] AC 728 (HL) which had imposed liability upon local public authorities for failing to regulate prospective property buyers. By overruling the precedent, the House of Lords recognized the important role of government and the difficulty it undergoes in an attempt to see to the clearly different and demanding public interests in property purchase. In the ruling, the court observed that imposing additional responsibilities for negligence upon the public authority bordered on trespassing on the government’s responsibilities8. By contrast, the Court of Appeal, Civil Division, appears to be more indifferent to claims of trespassing on the role of other arms of government by choosing to stick to its previous verdicts. In Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd [1944] KB 718 (CA), the Court identified three extraordinary scenarios where it would not be bound by its precedent: (a) where two of its past decisions contradict; b) where its precedent has been overruled by the House of Lords; and c) where a verdict was delivered on the basis of care (per incuriam), in which case the Court must consider the House of Lords direction on the issue. Generally, the legal culture and arrangements for handling precedent cases obligate the House of Lords to formulate adequate rules that would ensure adequate functioning of government rather than trespassing on their mandates9. Conclusion The rules for statutory interpretation have been relatively fair in ensuring the three arms of government operate seamlessly. The mischief rule, the golden rule and the purposive approach tend to observe the primacy of parliamentary Acts, but even where the intention of parliament is not clearly stated, courts have always interpreted the law based on the closest intention of the drafters. Binding precedents have also been set and reformed to allow easier operations of the government by honouring the principle of separation of powers. As such, the role of courts has generally been to make laws more enforceable, rather than returning dictating to the executive and parliament. Bibliography Gillespie, Alisdair, The English Legal System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 36- 59 Hart, Grace E., ‘Methodological Stare Decisis and Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation in the Choice-of-Law Context,’ [2015] 124 YLJ 1825 Kafaltiya A.B., Interpretation of Statutes (London: Universal Law Publishing, 2008), pp.9-31 Shobe, Jarrod, ‘Intertemporal statutory interpretation and the evolution of legislative drafting,’ [2014] 114 CLR 807 Read More