Alaska Law: Voluntariness of Confession - Essay Example

Alaska Law-Voluntariness of Confession v. Ridgely, 732 P.2d 550 (Alaska 1987) Thesis ment The decision by the trial court to convict Ridgely must be remanded and a new trial ordered as the state had not met its burden of proving that the confession which formed the basis of the evidence was voluntary (West Publishing Company 514) and that the accused had effectively waived his rights under the Miranda rule. Rule When a court is charged with an issue that is coming up for appeal meant to review the determination of voluntariness as decided by a trial judge, its standard of review must reflect the legal nature and the mixed factual nature of the voluntariness inquiry. This is as held in the case of Giacomazzi v. State, 633 P.2d 218, 222 n. 4 (Alaska 1981) where the state has the burden of proving the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver (Goldstein and Naomi 38). In addition, a confession through a preponderance of the evidence and the burden is usually heavy in matters involving juveniles as held in S.B. v. State, 614 P.2d 786, 789 n. 5 (Alaska 1980). Rule Explanation In finding out the voluntariness of a confession, the court must follow three steps in order to reach the right conclusion and determination. The trial judge must be able to find the external phenomenological facts that surround the confession before inferring whether there exists an internal psychological fact that in this case denotes the mental state of the accused person (Thomas 96). The judge then assesses the legal importance of the inferred mental state as was enumerated in Troyer v. State, 614 P.2d 313, 318 (Alaska 1980) while quoting the U.S Supreme Court decision of  United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 547-8 (6th Cir.1977). This means that the court must satisfy itself of the credibility of the witnesses and this call for the appellate court to defer to the trial judge findings of the historical fact and only overturn them if they are not factual or have errors. The appellate court must in such an instance perform its duty of examining the entire record and making its own determinations as to the mental state of the accused person and how it is legally significant to the case beforehand. Application Here, the court should reverse the decision of the trial judge that was related to the confession by Ridgely as it had not met the burden of proof that the confession was made voluntarily and that the accused had waived his rights under the Miranda rights. His conviction should therefore be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial to determine whether the evidence obtained through the confession used in the first court was admissible in the first place. Background factors such as age, intelligence and drug usage did not cast doubt on the voluntariness of Ridgely’s waiver and confession and the fact that there is no record regarding his lack of sleep, which the state was required to rebut. Ridgely was also able to voluntarily and intelligently know when waiving his Miranda rights and making a voluntary confession (Levesque 228). Ridgely could also waive his Miranda rights without the help or guidance of someone despite being a juvenile as allowed in the case of Quick v. State, 599 P.2d 712, 719 (Alaska 1979). However, the court should not apply the suppression of statements held in Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985) as he had not recorded it as a ground at the trial court which makes it unavailable to him in line with the decision in  Farleigh v. Anchorage, 728 P.2d 637(Alaska 1986). Conclusion This court should reverse and remand for further proceedings by concluding that the confession by Ridgely was voluntary, as he his state of mind has clearly shown from inferences from the record. Carney v. State, 249 P3d 308 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011) Thesis Statement The decision of the superior court should be reaffirmed as the confession was not obtained through inducement by promises of immunity or leniency and therefore it should hold (West Publishing Company 178). Rule The test for determining whether the statement is voluntary is a three-part inquiry whereby the trial judge must find the external, phenomenological facts that surround the confession after which the court infers the internal psychological facts from these external factors. After all these have been done, the judge is bound to assess the legal significance of the inferred state of mind that has been made by the court as held in State v. Ridgely, 732 P.2d 550 (Alaska 1987). Rule Explanation In the application of the first test, the appellate court will only be allowed to overturn the determination by the trial court only if they were clearly with errors while in the second test, the court will exercise its independent judgment. Having a determination of the mental state of the accused and its legal significance will mean that the entire record is examined and a conclusion made based on the totality of the circumstances when the confession was made (West Publishing Company 550). This calls for the determination of the age mentality and prior criminal experience of the accused person, the length and intensity of the interrogation and whether the accused person was mistreated, threatened or induced in any way in order to obtain a confession as enshrined in Sprague v. State, 590 P.2d 410, 414 (Alaska 1979) while quoting Brown v. United States, 356 F.2d 230, 232 (10th Cir.1966). Application The application of the three test rule here focused more on the second and the third rules as they reveal the circumstances of the interview. It is important to note that the interview was cordial in nature and Carney attended it voluntarily and the accused person was also assured of the confidentiality of the statements. The test whether a statement is voluntary relies majorly on subjective effect of the conduct of the police and the willingness of the suspect to make a confession as shown in Edwards v. State 842 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Alaska App.1992) (Inbau 432). Inferring from the above, the fact that Carney believed that he would be prosecuted for murder if he confessed showed that his revelation was not convinced by the promises by the police officers. Conclusion This court should affirm the superior court’s judgment and that the confession by Carney was not convinced by assurances of humanity or immunity as a confession an only be involuntary it is induced by assurances indicating immunity from trial as held previously in Smith v. State, 787 P.2d 1038, 1039 (Alaska App.1990). Therefore, if Carney had believed that the police officers and face prosecution would not arrest him, then the promises would have rendered his confession involuntary and therefore inadmissible. State v. Waterman, 196 P.3d 1115 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008) Thesis Statement The statements made by an accused person following a threat do not rebut the presumption of involuntariness and only the statements made voluntarily in a confession are admissible in a court of law (Pizzi 34). Rule In such a matter, the rule is that the state in this case Alaska cannot introduce a defendant’s self-incriminating statement unless it has shown a preponderance of the evidence that the evidence presented was obtained through a voluntary confession as explained in Stobaugh v. State, 614 P.2d 767, 771 (Alaska 1980) and the burden is higher when the accused is a Beavers v. State, 998 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Alaska 2000). Rule Explanation In the determination of whether a statement was made voluntarily, the court should focus on the law enforcement officers and their conduct whether they overbear the willingness of the accused person or the suspect to give a confession that is not freely self-determined as shown in United States v. Ferrara, 377 F.2d 16, 17 (2d Cir.1967). The trial court must therefore engage in the three-part test of finding the external phenomenological facts that surround the confession and then the judge infers an internal psychological fact before assessing the legal significance of the inferred state inferred mental state of the accused person’s mind as shown in State v. Ridgely, 732 P.2d 550 (Alaska 1987). Application Now that the matter is at the appeal stage, it is important to review the findings of the trial judge and only reverse it if it was erroneous as to cause a miscarriage of justice in line with Beavers, 998 P.2d at 1044. In finding out the mental state of the mind of the accused person and whether it has any legal significance, there is need to conduct an independent audit of the records in their entirety and a conclusion based on the totality of the circumstances that surround the confession made by an alleged accused. In the statement by Waterman, it can be found that there was an element of threat prohibited by the Beaver case as it signified the officer’s disapproval of her cooperation. However, this did not change the fact that she made the statements voluntarily as in this case it still indicated that her will was not overcome by the threats. The statements made by the accused person after subsequent threats do not rebut the presumption of involuntariness in confessions and their admissibility. Therefore according to the decision in Beaver, when police officers use threats to induce a confession, the confession that is obtained should be regarded as involuntary unless the prosecution shows that the confession was voluntarily made (Hess and Christine 199). Therefore the statements made by an accused person after a threat by a person usually shows that they were involuntarily made and therefore in admissible in court as evidence. Conclusion The court in this instance should affirm the decision of the superior court of charging Waterman with the offence of murder as the statements made before the break were voluntary, but the ones made after the threats were involuntary and should be suppressed. Beavers v. State, 998 P.2d 1040 (Alaska 2000) Thesis Statement A confession is presumptively involuntary when partially induced by threat of a harsher treatment and therefore inadmissible in a court of law. The effect of this is that any decision or indictment from an involuntary confession must be reversed and has no substance in law. Rule Similarly, in this case, the three-part rule of voluntary confessions must apply and include the fact that the judge must find the external, phenomenological facts that surround the confession and from these facts gather internal psychological information that gives the psychological condition of the alleged. After accomplishing all these, the judge must evaluate the authorized importance of the incidental mental condition of mind of the accused to evidence and their admissibility. Rule Explanation The three part steps require that the concerned judge to go into fact finding and weighing how credible the witnesses are and thereafter review the findings of the judge of the history of the case but done in a differential manner (West Publishing Company 283). The court will only overturn them if they are erroneous and in the determination of the mental state of the mind of an accused person and its legal significance. There is need to conduct an independent examination of the record in its entirety and base the conclusions on the totality of all the circumstances that were prevailing at the time of making the confession as held in State v. Ridgely, 732 P.2d 550, 554 (Alaska 1987). Application A confession will not be admissible unless it is made voluntarily and the court must look at the totality of the circumstances of the confession and whether it was made out of free will by the accused person as was previously held in Sovalik v. State, 612 P.2d 1003, 1006 (Alaska 1980) and Ladd v. State, 568 P.2d 960, 967 (Alaska 1977). Voluntariness will be determined in terms of the age of the accused, their mentality and whether they had been involved in prior criminal activities as well as the existence of threat or inducement. In the case beforehand, the threats by police officers are presumptively coercive and when used, the subsequent revelation should be reflected instinctive unless the prosecution can affirmatively demonstrate to the court that the confession was made in a voluntary manner. There is also the need to make a proper peculiarity between assurances of indulgence and coercions of harsher punishment when deciding whether a statement has been obtained through inducement or threats. Conclusion The court should conclude that the confessions made be considered presumptively instinctive vague proof that indicates that the will of the suspect was not overawed by the intimidations. The court should find in favor of Beaver as his confession was involuntary as it was induced by the threats by a police officer who threatened him of a harsher treatment if he did not confess to the murder robbery charge. Works Cited American Law Book Company. Corpus Juris Secundum: A Complete Restatement of the Entire American Law As Developed by All Reported Cases, Vol 23 . St. Paul, Minn: Thomson/West, 2006. Print. Goldstein, Alan M, and Naomi E. S. Goldstein. Evaluating Capacity to Waive Miranda Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Print. Hess, Kären M, and Christine M. H. Orthmann. Criminal Investigation. Clifton Park, NY: Delmar, Cengage Learning, 2010. Print. Inbau, Fred E. Criminal Interrogation and Confessions. Burlington, MA: Jones & Bartlett Learning, 2013. Print. Levesque, Roger J. R. The Psychology and Law of Criminal Justice Processes. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2006. Print. Pizzi, William T. Trials Without Truth: Why Our System of Criminal Trials Has Become an Expensive Failure and What We Need to Do to Rebuild It. New York: New York University Press, 1999. Print. Thomas, George, C. “A Philosophical Account of Coerced Self-Incrimination.” Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities. 5.1 (25 March, 2013). 79-112. West Publishing Company. Wests Pacific Digest, beginning 585 P.2d, Volume 15, Part 1. 2002. West Publishing Company. The Pacific Report. 1987. Print. West Publishing Company. United States Supreme Court Digest, Volume 6, Part 2. 2008. Print.     Read More