Os Claim Against VC for Outstanding Freight - Coursework Example

?Admiralty Law Question O’s Claim Against VC for Outstanding Freight O’s claim against VC for the outstanding freight depends largely on two factors. First, it must be determined whether or not VC breached the contract for the delivery of crude oil from Piraeus, Greece to Southampton, UK. Secondly, it must be determined, if no breach of contract was found to have occurred, whether or not the contract was completed once the ship sailed from Piraeus. The underlying determining factors in both instances are seaworthiness on the part of the transporting vessel (Costa Lotta) and/or negligence on the part of Costa’s captain and crew. Generally seaworthiness refers to the state of the ship and places upon the ship owner a duty to provide a seaworthy vessel.1 Since O owns the Costa, it can be assumed that the ship itself is seaworthy in terms of structural soundness or “fit for purpose”2 otherwise the ship would not have chosen for the journey. The crew’s competence is relevant in determining the seaworthiness of the vessel. It was held in Wedderburn v Bell that whether a ship’s construction is sound or not is irrelevant if the ship’s crew is incompetent or lacks the skills necessary for navigating the ship for the duration of the chartered journey.3 In other words, the seaworthiness of a ship will also depend on the competence of the crew. It was held in Standard Oil v Clan Line that “a ship may be rendered unseaworthy by the inefficiency of the master who commands her.”4 Based on the facts of the case for discussion however, there is no evidence that the captain or his crew lacked the necessary skills to navigate the ship. There is also no evidence of negligence. The fact is, the Costa came across unusual weather and unanticipated delays which ultimately resulted in the loss of freight. By all accounts the master acted promptly and responsibly. The main question is therefore whether or not the contract for the delivery of the freight was completed once the ship sailed from Piraeus. The leading case on the issue is Bank of Boston Connecticut v European Grain & Shipping Ltd (The Dominique). In The Dominique the ship owner entered into a charterparty with the defendant in which payment for freight was due after the signing of the bills of lading. The bills of lading were signed and the ship was subsequently arrested and thus failed to complete the journey. It was held that the ship owner had a right to claim the freight once the bills of lading were signed. Thus the ship onwer’s right accrued prior to the ship’s arrest and the chaterparty’s termination. Therefore not only was the ship owner entitled to claim the freight, the chaterer was not entitled to offset damages arising out of the breach of a charterparty relative to the freight claim.5 The facts of The Dominique are entirely similar to the facts of the case for discussion. Payment for the freight was due once the ship sailed from Piraeus. Therefore O’s claim predates the perils at sea and the subsequent salvage operations. In this regard, O can successfully pursue a claim against VC for the outstanding freight. The action may be commenced by filing an action is rem. An action is rem is an action not against a ship, although it impacts the ship’s owner.6 The ship in question is the Jolly Roger owned by VC and purportedly arriving in the UK, which is the only asset that VC will have in the UK. The jurisdiction for filing an action in rem is facilitated by Section 20(2) of the Supreme Court Act 1981. In this regard, Section 20(2) of the 1981 Act provides that actions in rem may be pursued in any of the two following circumstances: (g) any claim for loss of or damage to goods carried in a ship; (h) any claim arising out of any agreement relating to the carriage of goods in a ship or to the use or hire of a ship.7 In addition, the jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court may be invoked relative to an action in rem when: (a) the claim arises in connection with a ship; and (b) The person who would be liable on the claim in an action in personam (the relevant person) was, when the cause of action arose, the owner or charterer of, or in possession or in control of, the ship.8 In this regard, an action in rem is permitted against a ship if the ship in question is owned by or charted by the relevant person (defendant) at the time the action is filed. Pursuant to Section 21 of the Supreme Court Act 1981, O must first establish the identity of the party who would necessarily have liability in personam relative to the claim. This does not mean however, that O will be required to establish the merits of a claim in personam. O will only be required to identify the relevant party to which a claim in personam would be applicable.9 As Force and Davies explain: The plaintiff is required to identify who the ‘normal’ human defendant would be, leaving aside any questions of in rem admiralty jurisdiction.10 Once O establishes the identity of the defendant against whom an action in personam may be lodged, O will then have to illustrate that there is an adequate connection between the “in personam defendant and the relevant ship” so as to “justify brining an action in rem.”11 It has already been established that an action in personam is properly claimed against VC as VC was liable for the completion of the contract once the ship sailed from Piraeus. The fact that the ship encountered unexpected or especially bad weather and subsequently lost most of its cargo is of no consequence to VC’s claim relative to breach of contract or unseaworthiness relative to the master’s alleged competence. The Jolly Roger is owned by VC and thus a connection between the in personam defendant and the ship to be arrested is made. In this regard, O can successfully claim the remainder of the freight from VC and may also invoke the jurisdiction of the Admiralty court for the purpose of pursuing an action in rem under Section 21 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. Question 2: Salvor’s Claim for A Rescue Award The salvage operation was conducted by a salvage company’s ship, the Thunderbird its master and crews. The salvage claim may be lodged by the owners of the Thunderbird, the crew of the Thunderbird and any person who helped in the salvage operations or who permitted the use of their equipment or other property in aiding the salvage operations.12 Claims for salvage now fall under the jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court.13 Thus the salvors identified above may bring a claim in the UK under the Supreme Court Act 1981 against the Costa14 if the Rhine Convention does not apply.15 The Rhine Convention applies to protecting the Rhine and all waters connected to it from pollution.16 The Rhine Convention does not appear to apply in this case. The salvage agreement between the owners of the Thunderbird and the master of the Costa was a Lloyd’s Open Form (LOF) with the SCOPIC provisions. Essentially this means that the slavors are entitled to bring the action under Arbitration in London and to apply English laws relative to an award for compensation in the salvage operations. Although the Lloyd’s Open Form is prefaced by “no cure no pay”, compensation may be made in cases involving oil spillage.17 Thus the salvors are entitled to bring a claim for compensation for their salvage efforts in England. The Salvage Convention 1989 was introduced into English law by virtue of the Merchant (Salvage and Pollution) Act 199418 and is thus relevant to this discussion. Article 21(3) of the Salvage Convention 1989 states that: The salved vessel and other property shall not, without the consent of the salvor, be removed from the port or place at which they first arrive after the completion of the salvage operations until satisfactory has been put up for the salvor’s claim against the relevant vessel or property.19 It would therefore appear that the salvors have an automatic lien against the Costa by virtue of their salvage operations. Moreover, it has been held that by virtue of the salvor’s services, a lien is automatically applied relative to the slaved property.20 In addition, the salvor has a statutory lien over the slaved ship as well as any sister ship.21 When the salvor occupies the salved property, the salvor is also entitled to execute a possessory lien with respect to the salvage compensation.22 In general, the interest salved is responsible for paying salvage proportionate with the value of the salvage in relation to the value of the whole salved property.23 Although the salvage services were conducted pursuant to the LOF contract, the salvors are nonetheless entitled to conduct salvage operations if “a salvor has conferred a benefit on any maritime property in danger”.24 Salvage operations may be conducted for the purpose of avoiding losses or damages relative to the ship or its cargo and therefore ultimately for the owner of the salvaged property’s benefit. Salvage operations may also be conducted for the purpose of minimizing or removing environmental damages and therefore to the benefit of the ship owner who would ultimately confront liability for damages. Or salvage operations may be conducted for both reasons.25 Based on the facts of the case for discussion, the salvage operations were conducted for both purposes as the damages to the environment were minimized and O was as a result able to minimize the extent to which it would be liable for environmental damages. Pursuant to Articles 13 and 14 of the Salvage Convention 1989 the salvors are entitled to two specific awards. Pursuant to Article 13 of the Salvage Convention 1989 the salvors are entitled to a reward for conducting the salvage operation when it accords a benefit relative to the property salved.26 By virtue of Article 14, the salvors are entitled to a reward in circumstances where the salvage operations relative to a ship which itself or via its cargo presented a risk of harm to the environment and has not received an award equal to the special compensatory scheme provided for under Article 14.27 The salvors have obviously not yet received a compensatory award as they are currently putting pressure on O to pay them for their efforts. The right for special compensation pursuant to Article 14 was replaced by the implementation of the SCOPIC (Special Compensation P and I Clause) Clause under the LOF 2000. Thus pursuant to the SCOPIC Clause the salvors are entitled to an award calculated by reference to an agreed rate, actual expenditures conducted for the salvage operations as well as a bonus.28 The salvors may not claim Article 13 and 14 remuneration unless the special compensation provided under Article 14 is less than compensation under Article 13 of the Salvage Convention 1989. In assessing compensation under Article 13 the arbitrator or arbitration panel will take account of the value of the ship and any other property salved; the degree of skill and the efforts asserted by the salvors in either prevention or minimizing environmental damages; the extent to which the salvors succeeded; the extent of the danger posed; the salvors’ skills and efforts in the salvage operations; the potential liability and risks the salvors or their equipment were exposed to; the time that it took the salvors to render their services; the extent to which a ship or equipment were available for the salvage; the value and the efficiency of the equipment used by the salvors.29 Article 14(3) of the Salvage Convention 1989 permits an award commensurate with the salvor’s expenses.30 This would include actual but reasonable out-of-pocket payments made by the slavors during the salvage operations and a reasonable sum for expenses incurred indirectly taking account of the cost incurred for the provision of timely services, having equipment and a ship available and the expenses incurred for the upkeep of the equipment.31 Based on the foregoing it would appear that the salvors will likely obtain greater compensation for their salvage operations under Article 13 of the Salvage Convention 1989 since they seem to fit under each of the factors taken into account. The salvors minimized the risk of harm to the environment. They were also entirely skilled and the Thunderbird’s master purportedly had significant oil-pollution control skills. It is also reported that Captain Hook and his crew were entirely helpful. However, this would not minimize the extent to which the salvors were successful in the clean-up efforts as Captain Hook and his crew are attached to the ship causing the risk of harm to the environment. Pursuant to automatic common law and statutory (Supreme Court Act 1981) liens conferred on the salvors, it would appear that they are entitled to place a lien on the Costa. Thus the action is in reality an action in rem and should be brought accordingly rather than an action in personam.32 It would also appear that despite the automatic lien, O has sold the ship to Bruno, well aware of the fact that the salvors are pressing for remuneration in respect of the salvage operations. The ship therefore passes to Bruno with the lien attached to it. In the event O fails to provide compensation, Bruno will be able to recover damages for any losses incurred since O was aware of the defect in title as a result of the lien attached to the vessel. In the meantime, O may claim compensatory damages by virtue of issuing third party notice to VC.33 Question 3: The Role of the LOF in International Salvage. The LOF plays an important role in international salvage operations for a number of reasons. The most significant reason is the fact that salvors do not typically rely solely on salvage operations as a means of income. Therefore in the absence of a contract with a specific means of providing for compensation or an award is offered to salvors there would be no real assurance that compensation would be adequate and thus salvors would be entirely difficult to obtain on short notice in emergency situations.34 Moreover, the exceptions to the no cure, no pay proviso of the LOF contracts indicate that there are concerns that awards may not be adequate.35 Exceptions to this proviso are therefore calculated to ensure that salvors are available on short notice particularly in cases of extreme emergency. Arbitration has also posed some difficulties for salvors as perceptions are that arbitration could be delayed and awards may also be delayed. LOF 90 was implemented for the express purpose of moving the salvor’s claim for an award along more efficiently with the expectation that the salvor would receive prompt payment for services rendered.36 Ultimately, when an award is only guaranteed where results are demonstrated, salvors would be less likely to take the risk of engaging in salvage operations. The reality is, a salvage operation typically involves the use of expensive equipment that requires maintenance. Moreover, the cost of fuel and labour are also involved and other out-of-pocket expenses. Face with a no cure, no pay culture, salvors would likely abandon a salvage operation once it becomes clear to them that salvage operations will not cure the problem caused by the incident. Meanwhile damages will continue or worsen. Thus as Paulsen noted: A salvor taking an open form contract in today’s liability environment takes an undefined risk—salvors rarely can afford.37 LOF’s role in international salvage operations recognizes the flaws implicit in the no cure no pay ideology and changed it to create a contractual framework in which salvors will be more amenable to engaging in salvage operations. In this regard LOF 1980 makes provision for a “safety net for salvors”.38 In this regard, LOF 1980 was introduced in response to an immediate need for a response to the grounding of the VLCC Amaco Cadiz in 1978 along the Atlantic coast of France. This case drew attention to the urgent need for quick, decisive and efficient salvage aid in circumstances where marine and coastal areas are threatened with environmental and pollution damages. Huybrechts, van Hoodydonk and Dieryck explain: LOF 1980 provided a “safety net” which guaranteed a salvor his expenses plus possibly a 15% increment on them in cases involving the salvage of a laden tanker (anywhere in the world) if the award of salvage was either inadequate or non-existent. This development could only take place if the safety net payments were guaranteed and this was done by the P and I clubs.39 Thus the main purpose of the LOF is to ensure that salvors had an incentive to become involved in salvage operations, particularly those urgent situations threatening significant harm to the marine environment. This specific role of the LOF in international salvage operations if further exemplified by the Salvage Convention 1989 which purportedly was introduced to expound upon the safety net provided under the LOF 1980. LOF 1980 in the context of the safety net provision was only applicable in circumstances relative to laden tankers. The newly introduced remedy would permit special compensation in all cases and all vessels irrespective of whether or not the LOF applied or not.40 The Salvage Convention went farther to define environmental damages as follows: Damage to the environment means substantial physical damage to human health or the marine life or resources in coastal or inland waters or areas adjacent thereto, caused by pollution, contamination, fire, explosion or similar major incidents.41 It therefore follows that LOF 1980 was important for initially drawing attention to the significance of salvor’s contributions to minimizing or preventing environmental damages. The Salvage Convention 1989 widens the scope and range of awards by establishing a specific criterion for establishing an award system. Moreover, the 1989 Convention provides that should a vessel become derelict, awards would still be payable if the salvors were able to demonstrably minimize environmental harm. The salvor would obtain 30% of his expenses and in certain circumstances the salvor could claim all of his/her expenses.42 SCOPIC is calculated to be implemented under the LOF contract as a means of replacing Article 14.43 References to the special skills and the efforts of the salvors as a means of compensation or for obtaining an award can have two conflicting outcomes. First there is always the chance that highly skilled individuals in terms of environmental clean-up operations may be encouraged to participate in salvage operations. Secondly, there is always the chance that individuals who can actually provide the necessary manpower, but have no specific skills or expertise may not be encouraged to become involved in salvage operations. This cannot be the intent of LOF and the expanded version of salvage undertakings as articulated in the Salvage Convention 1989. Nevertheless, it is an area that could be narrowed done to simply keep the focus on the extent to which damages are minimized and salvors assert efforts, maintain equipment and make themselves and their equipment available. Realistically, an individual salvage company or an individual may have sophisticated equipment, know how to use it, but may have no special expertise in clean-up operations, but may be able to conduct an effective and efficient salvage operation. It can also be argued however, that an expert in environmental clean-up and prevention of environmental damages may lack the necessary equipment, but can provide valuable assistance in a salvage operation. Thus including expertise as a criterion for special compensation may be entirely justified and necessary in certain emergency situations. On the facts of the case for discussion, the salvage company appears to have all the necessary ingredients for special compensation under LOF’s SCOPIC clause. The salvage company consisted of an oil pollution clean-up expert, equipment, a ship and a capable crew. Together the crew and the Thunderbird’s master with the assistance of the salvaged ship’s crew and master were able to minimize the damages to the environment and more especially were able to stop the oil spillage altogether. The facts of the case do not reveal whether or not the salvage company were motivated by the LOF contract or not. However, it can be assumed that since they willingly signed the contract, it is unlikely that the salvage crew would have made themselves available had they not had a contract to ensure compensation or at the release out-of-pocket expenses. Thus the LOF contract plays a significant role in ensuring the salvage crews are not only available but are committed to reducing or eliminating the damages that flow from environmental risk posed by ships in distress often carrying potentially harmful cargo. LOF is arguably a “standard form of salvage contract” used worldwide and thus provides a universal incentive for salvors to ensure that the equipment and resources available in situations calling for immediate action to minimize or prevent damages to the marine environment. 44 As observed on the facts of the case for discussion, the LOF and its SCOPIC clause were instrumental in establishing the right to compensation on the part of salvors who committed cash and human capital to a salvage operation with considerable success. Question 4: The Modern Propensity to use Criminal Law in the Regulation of Ship-source Pollution Traditionally, international criminal law deals with environmental damages as non-criminal matters. The difficulty with criminalizing environmental damages cases has always been related to the fact that it is difficult to establish mens rea. However, international environmental regulations and conventions have not been successful in preventing a significant degree of serious environmental damages. For instance, the Chernobyl disaster demonstrates the high degree of harm and the large risk of transnational environmental harm than can occur from a single environmental disaster. Moreover, Mergret observes: There is certainly evidence of environmental catastrophes evincing such neglect of human life and property to make them compatible with some form of subjective mens rea.45 Concerns about the kinds of environmental damages that can come from ships influenced the implementation of EU Directive 2005/35. Following some serious incidence of marine damages and devastating oil spills like the Erika in 1999 and the Prestige in 2002, the EU determined that it was time to take decisive action to counter the environmental risks posed by oil spillages at sea.46 The Directive established a legal regime applicable to Member States and requiring that they implement measures for imposing penalties including criminal sanctions in cases of oil spillages and other harmful material from ships that are from out of the Community’s waters, internal waters, Member States’ territorial waters, straits navigated internationally that Member States have jurisdiction over, the exclusive economic zone or any zone of equivalence under the auspices of a Member State and the High Seas.47 Paragraph 8 of EU Directive 2005/35 provides that: Ship-source discharges of polluting substances should be regarded as infringements if committed with intent, recklessly or by serious negligence. These infringements are regarded as criminal offences by, and in the circumstances provided for in Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA Supplementing this Directive.48 In this regard, the Framework Decision 2005/667/JHA provides that Member States are required to take measures creating and enforcing criminal offences for infringements articulated in Articles 4 and 5 of the of EU Directive 2005/35.49 Moreover, Article 2 instructs member states to create offences out of aiding and abetting crimes described in EU Directive 2005/35.50 Article 4 of the Framework Decision goes on to prescribe the penalties for crimes committed pursuant to EU Directive 2005/35 and the penalties include terms of imprisonment.51 Article 1 of EU Directive 2005/35 states that its purpose is to implement “international standards for ship-source pollution into Community law” and to: Ensure that persons responsible for discharges are subject to adequate penalties as referred to in Article 8, in order to improve maritime safety and to enhance protection of the marine environment from pollution by ships.52 According to Article 4 of EU Directive 2005/35 Member States have a duty to take steps calculated to criminalize spillages from ships into the areas identified by Article 3(1) (cited above) in circumstances where such spillage occurs as a result of recklessness or with intent or “by serious negligence”.53 Article 5 of EU Directive 2005/35 provides for exceptions which are annexed to the Directive. The Exceptions to Article 4 crimes are essentially where the ship is out of the restricted areas designated in Article 3(1), the spillage does not exceed a specific amount and the ship has a satisfactory monitoring programme installed and efforts were made to minimize or prevent harm.54 Essentially, where the damages are no minimal or where there is no harm to EU waters, negligence, intent and recklessness are negated. These exceptions however are self-explanatory as they are already implicit in Articles 3 and 4 and thus Article 5 is essentially unnecessary. Article 6 of EU Directive 2005/35 provides for Member States to inspect a ship in circumstances where it is suspected that the ship is in a port or Member State port ‘has engaged or is engaging in a discharge of polluting substances into any areas referred to in Article 3(1)”.55 Moreover, where: There is clear, objective evidence that a ship navigating in the areas referred to in Article 3(1)(b) or (d) has, in the area referred to in Article 3(1)(d), committed an infringement resulting in a discharge causing major damage or a threat of major damage to the coastline or related interests of the Member State concerned, or to any resources of the areas referred to in Article 3(1)(b) or (d), that State shall…provided that the evidence so warrants, submit the matter to its competent authorities with a view to instituting proceedings, including detention of the ship, in accordance with its national law.56 Although Article 7 does not specifically call for or permit detaining the master of such a ship, Article 7 does state that the detention is merely one option in terms of the instituting of proceedings. Moreover, Article 1(2) provides that the Directive “does not prevent Member States” taking “more stringent measures against ship-source pollution” provided such measures are consistent with international law.57 The French authorities were therefore at liberty to detain the master of the Costa Lotta since they were permitted to take action or implement measures that are stricter than the provisions contained in EU Directive 2005/35. Article 8 does not however, mandatorily provide for criminal sanctions although Article 4 specifically requires that ship-source pollution be criminalized. According to Article 8: Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that infringements within the meaning of Article 4 are subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties which may include criminal or administrative penalties.58 The use of the word “may” indicates that Member States have an option to forego the imposition of criminal penalties and may wish to impose other penalties. However, if Article 4 requires that Member States criminalize ship-source pollution in circumstances where there is negligence, recklessness or intent, it is difficult to conceive of non-criminal penalties in cases were conduct constitutes a crime. Regardless, the European Court of Justice found that the Framework Decision was entirely void and contrary to Article 82 of the EU Treaty. Specifically the European Court of Justice ruled that the Commission was not competent to “determine the type and level of criminal penalties” applicable to ship-source pollution.59 The court ruled that in general criminal law and criminal penalties are not within the jurisdiction of the Community. However, where environmental protection is concerned, the Community may call upon Memver States to implement measures for ensuring the Community’s framework in terms of environmental protection is effective. However, prescribing the type of criminal sanctions to impose did not come under the Community’s jurisdiction.60 Be that as it may, EU Directive 2005/35 does not distinguish between functional and accidental ship-source pollution in terms of imposing criminal penlaties. Criminal liability is attached when there are infringements that occur with intent, recklessness, or serious negligence. As Han and Shan explain the criminal offences will apply to the ship owner, the master, the crew, the salvor, the charterers and the “classification society.”61 The reason for the implementation of criminal sanctions against those responsible for ship-source pollution is essentially the same as the implementation of criminal penalties for ensuring the protection of the environment generally. It is generally believed that in order to prevent or at the very least minimize the extent to which ship-source pollution and pollution generally harms the universe, it is important to implement criminal sanctions as a deterrence against reckless or negligent behaviour that generally results in environmental damages. For the most part dealing with environmental damages as non-criminal incidents has not prevented pollution and more especially ship-source pollution. 62 Whether or not criminalizing conduct associated with ship-source pollution will lead to a reduction or elimination of ship-source pollution remains to be seen. Obviously the EU’s intends to criminalize deliberate discharge of toxins and/or oil at sea. However, Article 4 of EU Directive 2005/35 specifically speaks to recklessness and serious negligence. Recklessness and negligence will generally be torts for which the ship owner or controller would be liable in damages for these torts. It is difficult to reconcile recklessness and serious negligence with intent as the latter implies conscious and deliberate spillage at sea, while the former two (serious negligence and recklessness) aspects of environmental damages at sea are merely accidental or a result of operational error. Even so, there is no evidence that the Costa’s ship-source pollution was deliberate, negligent or reckless. On the facts of the case, the ship encountered unusual weather at sea and this weather caused the resulting spillage. Not only was it clearly an accidental spillage, the French have taken it upon themselves to treat it as a crime pursuant to Article 4 of EU Directive 2005/35. Although criminal penalties are necessary in specific cases, this is clearly not one of those cases and France’s conduct speaks to the continuous concern for the environment and a need to take more decisive and strict approaches to the protection of the environment. Whether or not criminalizing ship-source pollution will serve as a deterrent is questionable, since a trial on the issues will most likely exonerate a defendant who came across unusual weather and was not negligent or reckless and certainly lacked the necessary intent. 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Merchant (Salvage and Pollution) Act 1994. Mergret, F. (2011). “The Problem of an International Criminal Law of the Environment.” Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, Vol. 36(2): 195-257. Omida, M. (2004). Europe and the Environment. Europa Law Publishing. Paulsen, G. W. (1994). A Reassessment of the Marine Salvage Posture of the United States. Washington, D.C. Re Aro Co. Ltd [1980] 2 WLR 453. Republic of India and Others v India Steamship Company Limited [1997-1998] House of Lords. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199798/ldjudgmt/jd971016/india01.htm (Retrieved 12 May, 2012). Rhine Convention 1999. Salvage Convention 1989. Standard Oil v Clan Line [1924] AC 100. Steel v State Line [1877] 3 AC 72. Supreme Court Act 1981. The Longford [1881] 6 PD 60. The Nagasaki Spirit [1997] A.C. 455. The Nordglimt [1988] QB 183. The Yuta Bondarovskaya [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 357. Wedderburn v Bell [1807] 1 Camp. 1. White, M. W. D. (2000). Australian Maritime Law. 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