The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill - Essay Example

Systems to address construction project risk……………………………….5 a. Technology…………………………………………………………5 b. People………………………………………………………………6 c. Planning…………………………………………………………….6 IV. Catastrophic failure fault tree………………………………………………7 V. Discussion of fault tree……………………………………………………..7 a.

Reduce risks……………………………………………………….8 b. Mitigate risks………………………………………………………..8 c. Avoid risks………………………………………………………….9 VI. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………..9 VII. Appendix……………………………………………………………… …..10 VIII. References…………………………………………………………………..11 Introduction The Deepwater Horizon disaster was triggered by failure of the sea-bed oil gusher to control the flow of oil following the 20th April 2010 blowout of the oil drilling rig.

The incident, blamed on failure of the rig owner to rein in the warning signs and put in place adequate risk prevention and management programs, killed almost a dozen crew members and injured several others. The development then resulted in a massive leakage of oil into the sea, resulting in an unfathomable environmental disaster in the Gulf Sea. The catastrophic failure of the BP Oil drilling rig was generally the most dangerous ever in the history of offshore oil drilling projects. Sources of construction project risk a.

Timeline On January 30th 2010, the Deepwater Horizon transferred its equipment to about 45 miles off the Louisiana coast in order to begin oil drilling operations at the Macondo well (Owens, 2012). In early April, an assessment was carried out to ascertain rig’s condition after Transocean Ltd., the chief operator the facility saw it wise to do so. On April 15, a cement job expert at the well-site travelled abroad to attend a conference on rig management techniques (Balaguer, 2010). A Halliburton’s employee specialized in designing cement job for plugging the well against spills, advised BP that the site needed 21 stabilizers to position the drill pipe at the centre, but BP superiors overruled his decision and directed the work to continue with only six centralizers in place.

On April 18, Halliburton carried out a vital test on the cement that was set for use, but denied BP some of the results. Meanwhile the company advised BP that the well was at risk of leaks if the work proceeded with fewer than the earlier recommended 21 centralizers. On April 19, the drilling work was completed to the desirable depths. This paved way for installation of the casing and pumping of the cement to stabilize the rig. Whereas, the work was behind schedule by more than a month, finishing touches were done on 20th April.

However, the well immediately failed, and triggered a blowout (Owens, 2012). b. Costs Transocean through Triton Asset Leasing Company was managing the rig. However, BP entered into a contract to use the rig for three years off the Louisiana coast. The contract was valued at $544 million, for the equipment only, with employees, supporting gear and other vessels costing