Federal Emergency Management - Case Study Example

Charleston Firefighter Fatality Investigation Report On Monday 18th June 2007 at 7 pm, the Sofa Super Store in Charleston South Carolina bust in flames. 9 brave firefighters entered the warehouse to save lives and a collapsing roof ensured that they never came out. They had given over 100 years of service to the city’s fire department. According to the National Fire Protection Association, it was the worst death toll of firefighters since the September 11 terrorist attacks and the deadliest in South Carolina since 1979 when eleven died at the Lancaster County Jail. The 272 page Charleston Firefighter Fatality Investigation Report gave an exhaustive report on future management of such incidences based on the lessons learned in the Charleston incident. It is considered a must have in every fire department and a must read for all fire chiefs so as to help prevent future firefighter fatalities. The Charleston tragedy was both predictable and preventable but due to a sequence of ill-preparedness and ill-advised strategic ideas lives were lost. One of the most important lessons in preparedness that is outlined in the report and forms the focus of this study is training of firefighting officers at all levels and rank. They should be trained in incident management systems, how to assess the risks involved, formulate and implement strategies and tactics and in the effective use and care of life-saving equipment. The report found that in addition to the risks posed by the building itself such as highly combustible materials in a large area next to a smoking zone and with no warning signs, the large area covered by the loading dock area, no fire walls or sprinklers, among other shortcomings relating to the training of the officers at the Charleston Fire Department also contributed to the unfortunate events of that evening. The officers at the Charleston Fire Department were poorly trained in incident management systems. The firefighting protocol is that the highest ranking officer that arrives at the scene first assumes position as Incident Commander and initiates operations. The identity of the commander can change during the operation but there can only be one at a time. The Fire Chief and the Assistant Fire Chief did not formally assume command or establish a fixed command post immediately they arrived. They proceeded to join the other firemen already on the scene without an incident management system that would have provided command, control and coordination of the emergency. Since there was no one that was officially in command, there were two teams that were not to be working in tandem at different areas of the warehouse. At one point, orders were being issued by the Fire Chief, the Assistant Chief and the Battalion Chief through a single radio channel. This clear lack of a chain of command and overload of the radio channel made it impossible for critical information to be relayed such as the mayday calls from the firefighters. Another area of training that goes hand in hand with incident management and that the officers showed inadequacy or naivety in is in risk assessment and management. The officers did not carry out a proper risk assessment and provide a proper management program. Had the officers carried out a proper risk analysis, they might have discovered the many risks the building and its contents posed to lives in case of a fire. The furniture were made of highly combustible material, the building was not constructed and maintained according to local and state codes since it had no fire walls or sprinklers installed, the fire in the loading dock area covered a large area and there were voids that had not been indicated on a sketch obtained on a reconnaissance visit a year before. A good risk management plan should weigh what is being salvaged and the lives to be rescued against the chances of their successful accomplishment and the lives on line that are to take on the operation. It should also allow for the fact that in such a volatile environment, the risk levels can change suddenly and dramatically and thus strategy would need to be adjusted in an instant. Another critical piece of training that seemed to be lacking in the Charleston Fire Department officers, was their ability to manage resources, both equipment and human resources. In terms of equipment, the department had a thermal imaging camera but failed to use it to recognize that the fire had spread to the void spaces and thus dangerous to continue attacking it with the hoses they had. The camera might also have helped the trapped firefighters to escape. They also overwhelmed the single radio channel that they had hence critical information could not be relayed such as the mayday calls made by the deceased firefighters. The human resource was mismanaged in terms of poor deployment of the necessary skill to the required areas. When the ladder team was needed to provide vertical ventilation, they could not be found as they had also joined the teams on the hose lines. Due to these serious deficiencies in training on incidence, risk and resource management, the Charleston Fire Department could not formulate and implement an effective offensive strategy. Had they carried out a proper incident management and initiated an incident action plan they would have realized from the National Fire Academy formula that the amount of water supplied by the two 1-1/2 inch hose lines in addition to the single 2-1/2 inch hose line would not be sufficient to quell the fire that covered the large space in the loading dock area. Tactics that were needed to implement the offensive strategy successfully such as vertical and horizontal ventilation were not implemented to support the offensive attack on the void areas. According to the British Fire Rescue Manual, the Assistant Chief and the Fire Chief should assume 2 command posts. While the Fire Chief as the Incident Commander runs the operation from a strategic level, the Assistant Chief should run the tactics. The Charleston Fire Department Assistant Chief left his post to go and help in the rescue operation of another individual on the other side at a crucial time. He thus could not inform the fire chief when the situation in the west end had changed and the risks involved became too high. At this stage, they needed to change strategy to a defensive one. On Monday 18th June 2007, 9 lives were lost as a result of inadequate incident management. This may have been due to poor training or that the Charleston Fire Department officers ignored protocol completely. To avoid a recurrence of such an accident or reduce the risks involved in such dangerous situations, it is recommended that all Fire Departments including the Charleston Fire Department retrain and reeducate their officers to the required modern standards of incident management and strategy implementation. References Federal Emergency Management Agency United States Fire Administration (1996). RISK AGEMENT PRACTICES IN THE FIRE SERVICE. Fire Service Operations. (2008). Incident Command, 3rd Edition. London: TSO. Read More