US COIN Campaigns in Philippines and Vietnam - Research Paper Example

?Outline Introduction The introduction section will entail a brief discussion of the selected area for this research study. This includes comparing and contrasting two counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns covered in H100 (the Vietnam War and the Philippines Insurrection). This section will also attempt to introduce various COIN strategies in the context of H100. Furthermore, this section of the research study will precisely depict the primary objectives of the paper. Backgrounds of US COIN Campaigns in Philippines and Vietnam This section will focus on assessing the backgrounds of the two COIN campaigns covered in H100 (the Vietnam War and the Philippines Insurrection). This section will also entail the figures related with personnel and property losses incurred during the two COIN campaigns from a comparative view. Comparing and Contrasting the Root Causes of Success in Philippines COIN campaign and Failure in Vietnam This section will represent the circumstantial factors when the US Army was engaged in the two COIN campaigns from a comparative point of view. This section will also ascertain three major causes of success in US COIN campaign in Philippines and failure in Vietnam. Conclusion The conclusion section of the research study will present a review of the findings obtained from the discussion. This section will also highlight the relevant factors that could be identified from the research study. Furthermore, this section will emphasize the success of COIN. Compare and Contrast Two Counterinsurgency Campaigns Covered in H100 (the Vietnam War and the Philippine Insurrection) and Analyze the Root Causes of Success or Failure in Each Conflict. Your Analysis Will Identify Three Critical Factors That Led to Success or Fail. Abstract This paper intends to compare and contrast the Counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns covered in H100 (referring to the Vietnam War and the Philippines Insurrection) by the United States Army. This paper will further conduct a thorough examination of both campaigns and will strive to determine the root causes or motivating factors lying under both the COIN campaigns in Vietnam and the Philippines. Furthermore, this paper will identify the critical factors associated with the consequences of these COIN campaigns conducted by the US Army. Finally, this paper will strive to highlight the lessons that US learnt from its past COIN campaigns in the form of two consecutive successes; one achieved in Iraq and the other in Afghanistan. Introduction Counterinsurgencies (COIN) are described as a common war tactic. Foe groups engaged in wars often use this particular tactic to identify and overcome insurgencies prior to their occurrence. The authoritative governmental military groups since time immemorial have organized COIN campaigns. However, its rudimental intention remains the same. COIN campaigns were majorly covered in H100 when the US Army used many tactics and strategies in Vietnam and the Philippines. Governmental forces took a considerable amount of time to frame winning strategies in the COIN campaigns in both cases. The focus on these COIN campaigns was to make devastating offensive operations to defeat the insurgency disclosed, develop cultural understandings with the foes and to apply competent intelligence in mitigating chances for future insurgency attacks. Nonetheless, the results obtained in both the COIN campaigns proved drastically different. Even though the COIN campaign against Filipino insurgencies was a success, the US Army failed to defeat Vietnamese insurgencies in H100 (Gentile, 2009). Certainly, there are certain aspects essential for framing COIN strategies and thus ensuring their overall success. For instance, a COIN strategy must include an in-depth understanding of the motives and the objectives of insurgencies along with cultural and religious aspects of both insurgents and local populace in a differentiated manner. It is vital that the COIN strategy complies with the legal aspects of performing a counterinsurgency. Correspondingly, governmental policies to combat insurgencies with effective COIN campaigns also play an essential role (Corum, 2007). Perhaps, differences in the implications of these factors resulted in the success of one COIN campaign and the failure of the other covered in H100. The following discussion will therefore aim at identifying the root causes behind the success of the US COIN campaign against Philippines and failure of the other campaign against Vietnam from a comparative point of view. At least, three success and three failure factors will be identified in the comparative analysis concentrating on the COIN campaigns covered in H100. Backgrounds of US COIN Campaigns in Philippines and Vietnam The welfare intentions of all the engaged foes were apparently versed in the milieu of H100. The war involving McKinley administered US Army began during the first months of 1899 and was ignited by the political conflicts between Spain and the US in a bid to colonize Philippines. Philippines were declared a US colony in exchange for a mere US$20 million after Washington and Madrid gave their consent to the Treaty of Paris. Consequently, Filipinos broke into hostilities in protest against the colonization (Putnam, 2013). However, certain clues were found to suggest that an insurgency was being planned against the US army, in need to be defeated at the earliest. These war tactics taken against the Philippines illustrate one of the best examples of US army’s practicing of Napoleonic warfare (Linn & Weigley, 2002). On the other hand, the US Army was confused, dismayed and discouraged in the Vietnam War. Critics have argued concentrating on the premise of US Army COIN campaigns against Vietnam was a “conventionally-minded attrition strategy” (Rovner, 2012). The Vietnam insurgency was identified after Philippines defeat in the mid-1960s. However, the US Army failed to execute the COIN campaign with equal proficiency as it had done when combating the Filipino insurgency. Alas, the COIN campaign in Vietnam failed (Rovner, 2012). The COIN campaign in Vietnam had greater casualties reported in comparison with the US COIN campaign against Philippines irrespective of its failure. Estimations reveal that nearly 1.5 million army personnel were killed in the Vietnam War alone. In addition, over 2,000 military people were missing and 305,000 were badly wounded during the Vietnam War. The cost associated with the COIN campaign in Philippines was not massive in contrast to the Vietnam War (Stiteler, 2008; King, 2008). However, the US Army’s COIN campaign against Filipino insurgency during H100 was also held accountable for the loss of millions of dollars and casualties of more than 4,000 military personnel apart from children, women and the elderly locales in the Filipino colonized areas when assessed separately. Notably, the differing ideologies between the economic and political motivations of the two groups were the prime cause behind the COIN campaigns in the both wars. However, published reports depicted that in the US, people opposed both wars owing to their devastating effects and intended to maintain peace (Stiteler, 2008; King, 2008). Comparing and Contrasting the Root Causes of Success in Philippines COIN Campaign and Failure in Vietnam Peterson (2009) assessed the warfares of US Army in executing the COIN campaigns in Philippines in comparison with the tactics used in Vietnam War and inferred that even though the US Army had been successful in implementing COIN related lessons from the emerging British war model, it had failed to apply the same and succeed in Vietnamese war. Apparently, one success factor of the US Army to drive positive consequences of the COIN campaign in Philippines was its efficiency in planning. As Linn & Weigley (2002) propagates, US Army was able to defeat the Filipino insurgencies during the early 1900s because they had efficiently concentrated on their motifs and applied Napoleonic battle strategies. Flaws in doing the same are further held as a major reason for the failure of COIN campaigns in the US-Vietnam war in the mid 1960s. The motifs of both the parties in the US-Philippines war were apparent. The McKinley and Major General Elwell S. Otis led US Army aimed to obtain authority on the newly gained Philippines colony from the Treaty of Paris. On the other hand, Emilio Aguinaldo’s Filipino army aimed at obtaining liberalization from the colonization. Apparently, the size of both the adversaries had a considerable difference, which may be regarded as another cause of success in COIN campaigns covered during US-Philippines war. However, analysts like Linn & Weigley (2002), Gentile (2009) and Putnam (2013) argue that these tactics proved to be beneficial for the US COIN campaign to defeat the Filipinos. Aguinaldo’s Filipino army was surrounded by the US COIN forces thwarting any chances for the enemy’s escape or retreat from the war field as part of the Napoleonic war strategy. Hence, the US Army was able to destroy the complete insurgency force that Aguinaldo had formed (Linn & Weigle, 2002). On the contrary, the US war tactics against Vietnam have been under considerable criticism owing to the slavishness of the guerrilla units. The US force was led by General William Westmoreland in the US-Vietnam war. Critics have often argued that the shortsightedness of Westmoreland and his inability to make objective re-assessment led to the failure of US COIN campaign in Vietnam. In Rovner (2012: pp. 223) the critic says, “He was either a victim of ‘‘organizational hubris or slavishness to the Concept (or both),’’ and as a result he was never able to make an objective reassessment in time to adjust his strategy”. With faults persisting in the rudimental war strategies, the US Army failed in executing its COIN campaign successfully in Vietnam (Rovner, 2012). Additionally, critics also hold Westmoreland’s operational approach led by firepower intensively as a major reason for the massive casualties witnessed in the US-Vietnam war in comparison with the US Filipino COIN campaign (Rovner, 2012). Therefore, leadership slipups are also among major reasons for the success of US-Philippines Coin campaign and the failure of the COIN campaigns in Vietnam. Nonetheless, weaknesses and strengths of the foes are also scrutinized as a major success driver in both the wars. Where on one hand, the Aguinaldo’s led Filipino army was weaker with no international sovereign body to support its liberation objectives, the Vietnamese forces were supported by the military powers like Russia and China. Thus, weak tactics to combat a strong enemy led to the failure of COIN in US-Vietnam war; while, the scenario was reverse in the milieu of US-Philippines war where US army applied stronger tactics against a weak army force (Linn & Weigle, 2002). The tabular description based on the comparative analysis of the US COIN strategies in Philippines and Vietnam shall assist in obtaining a more comprehensive understanding of the factors responsible for the success of the US in Philippines COIN campaign and its failure in Vietnamese COIN campaign. Factors Responsible For the COIN Campaign Consequences Philippines (Success) Vietnam (Failure) Causing Factor 1: Effective COIN strategies The US army focused on proper planning on the basis of the identified lacunas possessed by the opponent army in the US COIN campaign against Philippines. Consequently, the US army was able to make proper use of the opposition’s weaknesses in confirming its success. The US army was much concerned to depict the superiority of armed forces utilizing firearms at almost every instance in the US COIN campaign against Vietnam. The US army not only disregarded the potentials of the foe but also lacked in making any structured and well-sketched planning to attack the enemy resulting in its failure. Causing Factor 2: Leadership tactics McKinley and Major General Elwell S. Otis led the US COIN campaign against Philippines. These leaders were quite experienced and also possessed learning outcomes from the Napoleonic battle strategies used in British war model. They used a similar war tactic when facing Philippines’ small army and were able to destroy the insurgency army entirely. General William Westmoreland led the US army in the COIN campaign against Vietnam. The general certainly lacked in making an accurate measurement of the opponent army competitiveness. This further hampered the effectiveness of COIN strategies taken against the insurgency army of Vietnam. The leader also refused to inculcate Napoleonic battle strategies and gain a control on all the possibilities of the enemy escaping the attack. Thus, the US army failed to obstruct the Vietnamese insurgency plan. Causing Factor 3: Enemy’s strengths and weaknesses The US army was able to assess the weaknesses of the opponent army in the US-Philippines COIN campaign. Philippines’ liberalization army was smaller and weaker in comparison with the huge US army and was also lacking in terms of aids from the ten uprising global military powers. The Filipino army failed to stand long against a superiorly managed US army without support. The Vietnamese insurgency army received supports from Russia and China unlike the Filipino army. These nations were then the uprising global military powers in conflict with the US. Thus, with the aid of these two military powers, the Vietnamese insurgency army became more powerful in comparison with the poorly led US army. Apparently, this led to the failure of the US COIN army. Conclusion To be inferred, the failure of the COIN campaigns executed by the US to achieve its long-term military success in Vietnam and its success drivers in Philippines helped the US to shape the battlefield in Afghanistan and Iraq in the modern era. However, the consequences of COIN have never been in favor of humankind. It has always resulted in loss of millions of lives and property damages. There are many mistakes made by the US in the Vietnam War and many lessons learnt from its success in the Philippines War, while executing the COIN campaigns, which ultimately helped the US to frame successful and comprehensive counterinsurgency strategies based on their previous experiences. It is thus argued that many strategies, which are practiced during COIN campaigns, are unethical and immoral but are effective enough to reach success in the battlefield. References Corum, J. S. (2007). Fighting the war on terror: A counterinsurgency strategy. United States of America: Zenith Imprint. Gentile, G. P. (2009). A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army (pp. 1-17). Parameters. King, D. (2008). Comparison of Iraq and Vietnam (pp. 1–12). United States Army Sergeants Major Academy. Linn, B. M. & Weigley, R. F. (2002). "The American Way of War" Revisited 16.2: (pp. 501-533). The Journal of Military History. Peterson, J. E. (2009). The Experience of British Counter-Insurgency Campaigns and Implications for Iraq (pp. 1-23). Arabian Peninsula Background Note. Putnam, B. (2013). COIN Lessons Ignored: The Philippines Campaign (1899-1902). Small Wars Journal. Rovner, J. (2012). The Heroes of COIN (pp. 215-232). Foreign Policy Research Institute by Elsevier Ltd. Stiteler, G. R. (2008). Counterinsurgency (pp. 1–10). United States Army Sergeants Major Academy. Read More