The First Contra Groups in Nicaragua - Essay Example

Background of the Contra Movement The overthrow of Anastasio Somoza’s dictatorship in 1979 ended the dynasty’s 43-year rule. The Marxist Sandinista Junta of National Reconstruction or Sandinistas came to power and were opposed by armed groups who came to be known as contras. These groups had little in common by way of a unified ideology. They were mainly opposed to the Sandinistas’ nationalisation of their land, formation of large faming cooperatives, and the brutal treatment of those who dissent. They initially received financial and military support from Argentina and the United States. The CIA was responsible for U.S. operations involving the contras. Aid was later done covertly under the Reagan administration. Although many Nicaraguans also opposed the Sandinistas, few of them supported the contras because they focused on civilian targets and their brutality raised condemnation among the population and human rights groups (Horton 1998). The first contra groups such as the MILPAS were peasant militias formed by former Sandinista supporters. Formed in Honduras as the Fuerza Democratica Nicaraguense (FDN), it was headed by Enrique Bermudez, a former National Guard colonel and Jaime Irving Steidel, a Honduran-born field commander. Steidel was later replaced by Oscar Sobalvarro. In 1983, a political directorate was created under Adolfo Calero, a businessman and anti-Sandinista politician (Brown 2001). The creation of the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE) and the Sandino Revolutionary Front headed by Eden Pastora in 1982 in Costa Rica established a second front. The ARDE was composed mainly of Sandinista dissidents and those who overthrew Somoza. They were primarily opposed to the increasing Cuban influence in the Managuan government. Although Pastora clearly stated his ideological difference from the FDN, he nevertheless called his campaign as the “southern front” to emphasise a common campaign against the Sandinistas (Brown 2001). Amerindian tribes such as the Misurasata, Sumo and Rama created a third front in 1981 against what they considered the Sandinistas’ genocide campaign against them. These tribes had a number of grievances against the Sandinista regime including: exploitive natural resource policies which deprived ethnic groups access to their ancestral lands and their subsistence activities; arrest and execution of the majority of Misurasata leaders; the bombing and occupation of more than half of Miskto and Sumu villages; the forced conscription of young men into the army; the eviction and relocation of 100,000 Indian families from their ancestral lands; and economic measures taken against villages which were not sympathetic to the Sandinistas (Brown 2001). U.S. military & financial assistance U.S. involvement came under the pretext of combatting Soviet influence in Latin America. The United States held that Nicaragua served as a proxy for the Soviet Union in Latin America. American conservatives supported the Reagan adminstration in its activities against Soviet-supported governments in the region. It was the period of the Cold War and the United Stateds had been resisting the spreading of communist influence in Latin America for over two decades. Aside from the Soviets, Castro had been vocal and active in his intention of undermining U.S. influence in te region. Likewise, The United States has economic ineterests in the region which holds vast natural resources and are promising markets for American businesses. The United States could not afford to have its repuattion and prestige diminished or threatened by radical governments. The Central Inetlligence Agency (CIA) was primarily responsible for implementing the eagan administration’s policies in the region. It provided training, weapons and other supports to the contras. It also financed contra activities through a $ 19 million miltary aid package. Nicaragua filed a suit against the U.S. in 1984 in the International Court of Justice. The Court came out with a ‘guilty’ verdict in 1986, directing the U.S. to to cease providing training, financing and supports to the contras. The U.S. was also instructed to pay reparations to Nicaragua. However, the United States ignored the decision of the Court arguing that its jurisdiction and powers did not supersede the Constitution. The U.S. reaction was to further escalate its activities against Nicaragua. In 1982, the Boland Agreement which was passed by the U.S. Congress forbade all government agencies from taking action against the sandinistas. The Reagan adminstration thus began clandestine activities in providing support for the contras using third parties. This ended with the Iran-Contra Affair which was revealed in 1986. In 1988, President Reagan’s request for $36.25 million in aid for the contras was denied by the U.S. Congress. That same year, investigations by the Kerry committee revealed links between the contras and drug trafficking. The Reagan adminstration continued its involvement with the contras until the 1990s (Webb 1996). Evidence of U.S. Involvement Oliver North was an aide in the National Security Council during the Reagan administration, and was responsible for running the contra war and other covert operations. Through the Freedom of Information Act lawsuit filed in 1989, the National Security Archive was able to obtain North’s handwritten notebooks and declassified memos sent to him which contained information on contra ties with drug trafficking. North’s August 9, 1985 entry gave a summary of his meeting with Robert Owen who was his liaison with the contras. The entry discussed a plane which was being used by Mario Calero, the Frente Democratico Nacional (FDN) head Adolfo Calero’s brother, in transporting supplies to the contras in Honduras from New Orleans. “Honduran DC-6 which is being used for runs out of New Orleans is probably being used for drug runs into U.S. (National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 2). Lorraine Adams of the Washington Post reported on October 22, 1994 that there are no evidence to support North’s later assertion that he reported this possible connection between the contras and drug trafficking with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Another entry by North dated July 12, 1985 records his conversation with retired Air Force general Richard Secord wherein the latter told him the contras’ plan to purchase arms from a Honduran warehouse with money raised by the Reagan administration in Saudi Arabia. Secord told North that $ 14 million came from money raised through drug trafficking. Another memo from Owen dated April 1, 1985 to North gave a description of contra operations in the southern front wherein Adolfo Calero picked a new Southern Front commander, a former captain to Eden Pastora, who was paid to defect to the FDN. The new Southern Front officials included “people who are questionable because of past indiscretions”, among them Jose Robelo who was possibly involved in drug trafficking and Sebastian Gonzalez who is “now involved in drug running out of Panama (National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 2).” Owen’s communication to North on February 10, 1986 discussed a plane which was being used to transport “humanitarian aid” to contras, and which was formerly used to run drugs. The plane was owned by Vortex, a Miami-based company operated by Michael Palmer, one of the largest marijuana traffickers in the United States. For his services in transporting supplies to contras, Palmer received over $ 300,000 from the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Aid Office (NHAO) which was being overseen by Oliver North and CIA operative Alan Fiers. Contracts from the State Department document the details of Palmer’s operations on behalf of the NHAO (National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 2). The Senate Subcommittee on Narcotics, Terrorism and International Operations led by Senator John Kerry began investigations on the decade-old links between contras and drug running. Among the allegations investigated by the committee was an effort to funnel drug money from a counternarcotics operation into the contra war. Two DEA agents gave their testimony on July 28, 1988 about a sting peraton undertaken against the Medellin Cartel. They also testified that Oliver North tried to obtain $ 1.5 million in Cartel bribe money for the purpose of giving it to the contras. The DEA did not agree with the idea (National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 2). The New York Times reported on June 1986, about the collaboration between Panamanian president Manuel Noriega and Colombian drug syndicates. The report stated that the Panamanian leader “is extensively involved in illicit money laundering and drug activities.” The reports also mentioned that a White House official commented that “the most significant drug running in Panama was being directed by General Noriega.” Noriega was an important CIA asset and he sought the Reagan administration’s help in cleaning up his reputation. In his August 23, 1986 e-mail message to national security advisor John Poindexter, North stated that “over the years Manuel Noriega in Panama and I have developed a fairly good relationship.” He continues to discuss Noriega’s proposal of assisting in sabotaging the Sandinistas in exchange for payment of $ 1 million sourced from funds raised from the sale of armaments to Iran. Poindexter gave North his authorisation to negotiate with Noriega. Poindexter also wrote, “I have nothing against him other than his illegal activities (National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 2).” The following day, North met with CIA official Duane Clarridge about Noriega’s proposal and both agreed to meet the Panamanian strongman in Europe or Israel. During the 1992 trial of Claire George, a former CIA official, Alan Fiers recounted North’s involvement with the Noriega proposal, discussed during a meeting of the Reagan adminstration’s Restricted Interagency Group: “[North] made a very strong suggestion that… there needed to be a resistance presence in the western part of Nicaragua, where the resistance did not operate. And he said, I can arrange to have General Noriega execute some insurgent -- some operations there -- sabotage operations in that area. It will cost us about $1 million. Do we want to do it? And there was significant silence at the table. And then I recall I said, No. We dont want to do that.” (National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 2). On September 20, North e-mailed Poindexter that the Panamanian leader wants to meet him in London and that Elliot Abrams and Secretary of State George Schultz both supported the idea. Poindexter gave his authorisation two days later. North’s meeting with Noriega took place on September 22, and they discussed details such as creating a commando training program in Panama, harnessing Israeli support for the contras and also the Afghan rebels. They also discussed sabotage operations in Managua, focusing on economic targets such as the airport, oil refinery and electric and telephone systems. These plans were later abandoned when the Iran-Contra Scandal broke loose (National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 2). Jose Bueso Rosa was a Honduran general who was deeply involved in CIA operations involving the contras. He also became involved in a large shipment of drugs to the United states for which he faced trial. The drug shipment of $40 million worth of cocaine was intercepted by the FBI in Florida. The money raised from this drug haul would have been used to finance the assassination of Honduran President Roberto Suazo Cordoba, a plan hatched by Rosa and other conspirators. Evidence again showed that Oliver North led the campaign to seek leniency for Rosa. U.S. officials also urged that Rosa be either pardoned, deported, given clemency or be given a reduced sentence. Their intervention resulted in a shorter sentence for Rosa. The Kerry Committee’s investigation of the Bueso Rosa case revealed that Reagan administration officials were involved in what the Justice Department considered the “most significant case of narco-terrorism yet discovered.” (National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 2). The FBI and the DEA also documented U.S. involvement in the contra wars. Ainsworth, a contra sympathiser who had extensive contacts with the contra leadership revealed to the FBI in February 1987 that the FDN was involved in drug trafficking. Ainsworth said that he believed the contras used drug trafficking for personal gain rather than for the effort of bringing down the Sandinista regime. Fabio Ernesto Carrasco testified in 1984 and 1985 that he piloted planes carrying weapons for contras based in Costa Rica. As a pilot for Colombian drug trafficker George Morales, he said that after the arms cargo was offloaded, drugs in military bags were loaded onto the planes for transport to the United States. He also revealed that Morales provided millions of dollars to two rebel leaders working with Eden Pastora, the head of the contras’ Southern Front. One of these rebel leaders, Adolfo Chamorro, asked his CIA control officer to ask if it was alright to accept money from Morales who was indicted for drug smuggling at the time. The CIA operative said that it was alright, according to Chamorro (National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 2). The Iran-Contra Affair The Reagan Doctrine brought about the active assistance of the U.S. government in anti-communist resistance wherever it can be found. United States policy was principally implemented by the CIA. The Boland Amendment which prohibited government agencies from providing assistance to the contras made the implementation of the Reagan Doctrine a difficult if not impossible task. However, opportunity presented itself as Iran which was then at war with Iraq, made a secret request to purchase weapons from the United States despite the existing arms embargo against the country (Wolf, PBS Online). The administration thought that providing arms to Iran would improve relations between the two countries. Likewise, it might lead to better relations with Lebanon leading to the release of seven Americans being held hostage and translate to greater U.S. influence in the Middle East. Selling arms to Iran would violate the embargo while negotiating with terrorists would violate the President’s campaign promise. The deal proceeded with the President’s approval. The deal was seen by many as an “arms for hostage” arrangement between the U.S., Iran and Lebanon. In total, around 1,500 missiles had been shipped to Iran by the time the deal was discovered. Of the $30 million the Iranians paid for American weapons only $12 million reached the government. National Security aide Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North explained that he had been diverting funds from the Iran weapons deal to support contra activities against Nicaragua. North explained that he undertook these activities with the full knowledge and approval of National Security Adviser John Poindexter. He also assumed that the President also approved of these actions (Wolf, PBS Online). References: Brown, Timothy. (2001). The Real Contra War: Highlander Peasant Resistance in Nicaragua. University of Oklahoma Press. Webb, Gary. 1996. Dark Alliance, by Gary Webb, San Jose Mercury News, August 1996. Horton, Lynn. Peasants in Arms: War and Peace in the Mountains of Nicaragua, 1979-1994. (1998). Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies. The Contras, Cocaine, and Covert Operations. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 2. The National Security Archive, The Gelman Library, George Washington University, Washington, DC. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB2/nsaebb2.htm Wolf, Julie. The Iran-Contra Affair. PBS Online. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/reagan/peopleevents/pande08.html Read More